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1 The Objective of this Thesis 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the very real and practical difficulties faced by 
lawyers in applying the tort private international law (PIL) rules to the internet and to 
investigate which factors, technology-related or otherwise, either assist or hinder the 
application of the PIL rules to the internet. These practical difficulties arise from the 
fact that many of the basic provisions of PIL relate to physical world (or offline) 
elements such as domicile, nationality and place of damage or harmful event (locus 
delicti). Effective application of PIL rules is dependent on sovereign competence 
operating within clear jurisdictional borders. As a consequence, difficulties arise for 
conflicts lawyers as the internet often disregards borders. Ubiquitous torts, such as 
unauthorised peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing affecting copyright works and online 
defamation have become commonplace in the online world. 
  
While geolocation technology1 and state control of the internet2 have both helped ‘erect’ 
borders on the internet, and aided conflicts lawyers in the process, considerable 
difficulty still lies in pinpointing the place of the harmful event in an online context. 
The localisation of the locus delicti is of particular importance for the application of 
Article 5(3) of Brussels I.3 In both online copyright and online defamation cases, there 
is the obvious dichotomy between place of upload and place of download. Localisation 
1 See para 7.3.6. onwards.  
2 See para 2.11. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, known 
colloquially as Brussels I. The Brussels I Regulation has been revised by virtue of Regulation 
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
[2012] OJ L351/1. While it is already in force, it will only apply to proceedings within the EU 
from 10 January 2015. Consequently, both the European courts and academic commentators 
continue to refer to Brussels I and use the article numbering of Brussels I. For this reason, I 
intend using and referring to Brussels I and its provisions in this thesis. Interestingly, the revised 
Brussels I addresses a limited number of circumstances under which Member State courts can 
exercise jurisdiction even if the defendant is not domiciled within the EU. In this regard, see 
Article 17(2) (consumer contracts) and Article 20(2) (individual contracts of employment) of 
revised Brussels I.     
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is further exacerbated by the widespread availability of portable internet-enabled 
devices coupled with general mobility of citizens in the 21st century. 
 
In many respects, the challenge for conflicts lawyers is to apply rules and principles 
formulated for a material world to a non-material environment. This non-material 
environment does not comprise sovereign States or clear jurisdictional borders - the 
traditional ‘landscape’ where PIL issues are played out.4 
In analysing the interface between PIL (or conflict of laws) and the internet, I have 
chosen as my primary research component, online copyright infringement. This is for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is arguable that it is the branch of IP Law which is subject to the 
greatest number of online infringements and, therefore, has been particularly affected by 
the dawn of the internet.5 Secondly, by virtue of the Berne Convention6 and its 
widespread membership, copyright comes into being almost worldwide and is not 
subject to a registration requirement. The internet has become a veritable battleground 
for copyright protection with, for example, unauthorised peer-to-peer (‘P2P’) file-
sharing very much to the fore in the ‘battle’. According to IFPI, 26 per cent of internet 
users worldwide regularly access illegal websites and they estimate that that figure 
could rise as consumers migrate to smartphone and tablet-based mobile services.7 In 
4  Certain sovereign states comprise separate jurisdictions, such as the UK which comprises 
three separate jurisdictions, i.e. England & Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Other 
countries which are divided into numerous jurisdictions, each with its own distinct legal 
system, include the US, Canada, and Australia. 
5  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) 547 (referring generally to Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Putting Cars on the 
Information Superhighway: Authors, Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace’ (1995) 95 
Colum L Rev 1466), where they state: ‘Infringement over the internet is most likely to arise 
in cases of breach of copyright.’  
6  See para 5.3 generally.  
7    Adam Sherwin, ‘Music sales fail to go in One Direction as growth turns to 3.9% decrease’ 
(The Independent, 18 March 2014) <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/music/news/music-sales-fail-to-go-in-one-direction-as-growth-turns-to-39-
decrease-9200304.html> accessed 21 May 2014 It is also revealing to read the attitudes of 
Europeans when it comes to IP. For instance, 42% of Europeans consider it acceptable to 
download or access copyright-protected content illegally when it is for personal use. OHIM, 
‘European Citizens and Intellectual Property: Perception, Awareness and Behaviour’ 
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terms of the UK, the BPI’s ‘Digital Music Nation’ report (2013) states that around 4 
million people in the UK use both BitTorrent and P2P each month to obtain 
unauthorised copyright material.8 In the same report, there is reference to the 
monitoring service, MusicMetric’s first ‘Digital Music Index’ report which estimates 
that over 43 million downloads were made via BitTorrent alone in just the first six 
months of 2012. Of those, 78% were albums and 22% single tracks, equating to 345 
million tracks downloaded via BitTorrent,9 most of them in infringement of 
copyright/related rights. 
When it comes to the use of illegal content, the 2013 Kantar Media report (prepared for 
Ofcom) claims that 35% of individuals avail of P2P technology to access illegal 
content. This contrasts with only 6% of individuals using P2P to access content 
legally.10 However, the news is not all bad for copyright owners. Website blocking 
measures implemented by Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) have generally been 
effective.11 Between January 2012 and July 2013, BitTorrent use declined by 11% in 
European countries where blocking orders were put in place. The UK and Italy saw 
particularly positive results from web-blocking.12 Sweden too has been somewhat of a 
poster boy for the resurgence of a recorded music market. Between 2008 and 2013, the 
turnover of that country’s music market rose by around 27%, to Skr991million 
($155million). Spotify’s launch in 2008 and a new anti-piracy law in 2009 helped nudge 
(November 2013) 13 <https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/IPContributionStudy/25
-11-2013/european_public_opinion_study_web.pdf> accessed 21 May 2014.    
8  BPI, ‘Digital Music Nation 2013 – The UK’s digital music landscape’ (January 2013) 5 
<www.bpi.co.uk/assets/files/BPI_Digital_Music_Nation_2013.PDF> accessed 8 May 2014. 
9  Ibid 26. 
10  Danny Kay, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Tracker Wave 3 (Covering period Nov 12-Jan 
13) Overview and key findings’ (Kantar Media, 2013) 17 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/telecoms-research/online-
copyright/w3/annexw3.pdf> accessed 8 May 2014.  
11  See para 7.3.5. 
12  IFPI, ‘IFPI Digital Music Report 2014 – Lighting up New Markets’ (April 2014) 41  
<http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2014.pdf> accessed 8 May 2014. 
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many Swedes to switch from illegal downloading. Of the 3 million or so Swedes who 
have streaming accounts, two thirds of them are paying subscribers.13   
Lastly, here in the UK, the government announced recently, the possible establishment 
of a new copyright enforcement framework for late-2014. The mooted Voluntary 
Copyright Alert Programme,14 involving collaboration between ISPs and rightholders, 
seems to be a reaction to the very delayed implementation of the Digital Economy Act 
2010 (DEA).15 The proposed ‘educational letters’ under the VCAP sound suspiciously 
similar to the DEA’s copyright infringement reports which will not issue now until end-
2015, at the earliest. The programme cannot be finalised until approval from the 
Information Commissioner’s Office is forthcoming. 
It is important to point out at this Juncture that the scope of the copyright component of 
this thesis extends beyond illegal peer-to-peer activity. This fact is borne out by chapter 
3 which examines transnational IP infringement (principally, copyright infringement) in 
more detailed terms. Aspects of transnational copyright treated in chapter 3 include 
artistic works (Lucasfilm), satellite broadcasting of audiovisual content (Football 
Association Premier League v QC Leisure), physical and digital photos (Eva Maria 
Painer ruling) and, the related sui generis database right (Football Dataco v 
Sportradar).   
 Scope of this thesis 1.1
The primary jurisdictional scope of this thesis is the UK/EU. As PIL is one of the 
central themes in this thesis, the EU’s sophisticated and largely harmonised PIL 
framework features prominently in this work. In terms of the copyright component, it 
too has a strong EU centre of gravity. In chapter 6, on the defamation analogue, I focus 
13  ‘I have a stream – The land of Abba takes to streaming’ (The Economist, 22 March 2014) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/business/21599353-land-abba-takes-streaming-i-have-
stream> accessed 21 May 2014.  
14  Pinsent Mason LLP, ‘Voluntary Copyright Alert Programme could be operational before end 
of 2014, says UK government’ (Out-Law, 24 March 2014) <http://www.out-
law.com/en/articles/2014/march/voluntary-copyright-alert-programme-could-be-operational-
before-end-of-2014-says-uk-government/> accessed 21 May 2014.  
15 See para 7.3.3. 
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on the UK and EU copyright regimes and critically evaluate the localisation of some of 
the key restricted rights in an online context.  
Given the global and ubiquitous nature of the internet however, and the fact that online 
torts do not respect national borders, it is difficult to totally exclude developments (legal 
and otherwise) which occur outside the EU.  
The principal elements in this thesis which fall outside the primary jurisdictional scope 
of this work are as follows:   
• Geolocation technology and certain North American rulings which refer to the 
technology’s value or usefulness 
• State control and filtering of the internet (Where China and Saudi Arabia, 
respectively, are used as examples)   
• The landmark Australian High Court ruling in the field of online defamation – 
Dow Jones v Gutnick16  
I shall now justify their inclusion.  
Geolocation features in this thesis because of its ability to link IP addresses to physical 
locations. This translates into a facility for potentially pinpointing the locus of an online 
copyright infringement committed via an internet-enabled device. While the 
technology’s usefulness is not in doubt, its impact in Europe is still rather weak.17 This 
fact is highlighted by Svantesson when he criticises the CJEU’s failure to consider the 
use of geolocation technology in joined cases Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH 
& KG, and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller,18 which concerned website 
reservations.19 
16  Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
17  See for instance recent acquisition of an Israeli geolocation startup – Kitlocate – by the 
Russian internet giant Yandex. Inbal Orpaz, ‘Russian Internet giant Yandex acquiring Israeli 
geolocation startup Kitlocate’ (Haaretz, 18 March 2014) 
<http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.580480> accessed 21 May 2014. 
18  Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter; and Hotel Alpenhof 
v Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527. This case is dealt with at para 2.10..  
19  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 424. 
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To contrast judicial attitudes to the technology, I looked at the US rulings in National 
Federation of the Blind v Target Corp,20 and Hageseth v Superior Court of San Mateo 
County,21 where the technology’s value was recognised and encouraged. Nor is it just 
court rulings from outside the EU that are apposite. Legislators too are showing an 
awareness of the technology. The Australian Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (albeit 
through its explanatory memorandum) makes reference to the technology.  
In this thesis, I have cited the works of three academic commentators who have written 
about the interface between geolocation technology and the law. While they are all 
based outside Europe, their contribution to intellectual debate on geolocation and 
particularly its utility as an evidential tool in court proceedings, justifies treatment of 
their work. The authors in question are: Svantesson of Bond University, Australia, 
Trimble of William S Boyd Law School, Nevada, and Kevin F King, law clerk at the 
US Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit.  
King is important in that he has observed the increasing accuracy rates of the 
technology while Svantesson opines that the technology has achieved sufficient levels 
of accuracy to be used for legal purposes. While the technology’s ‘footprint’ may still 
primarily be outside the EU, its endorsement by the Bavarian court (and separately by 
expert evidence given by Professor Thomas Hoeren) in Bay VGH,22 means that its 
impact on courts in EU Member States is beginning to grow.  
China and Saudi Arabia are analysed, but in the specific context of proving how 
bordered the internet has become over the last decade.23 These ‘borders’ are often 
coterminous with either national or possibly regional borders and are often linked to 
either physical manipulation of internet architecture (e.g. China’s Great Firewall) or 
content filtering carried out within a certain national territory (e.g. Saudi Arabia’s 
pervasive filtering system which blocks requests for blacklisted sites).  
In terms of non-EU case law treated in this PhD, the High Court of Australia’s Dow 
Jones v Gutnick24 ruling is pre-eminent. Justification for its inclusion lies in the fact that 
20  National Federation of the Blind v Target Corp, 452 F Supp 2d 946 (ND Cal 2006). 
21  Hageseth v Superior Court of San Mateo County, 150 Cal App 4th 1399.  
22  VGH Bayern 20.11.2008, 10 CS 08.2399.  
23  At para 2.11. 
24  Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. This ruling is analysed from para 9.3 onwards.  
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it is a landmark ruling situated at the intersection between PIL and internet torts. 
Despite being a controversial ruling with potentially negative implications for both 
freedom of expression on the internet and online publication, it does establish an 
important rule for the localisation of online defamation, with implications therefore for 
both jurisdiction and choice of law. To this day, it remains the highest ruling anywhere 
in the world to consider the issue of jurisdiction for the purposes of publication of 
defamatory material on the internet. In addition, treatment of this ruling is a core 
element in my analysis of points of connection and points of disconnection between 
online copyright infringement and online defamation in chapter 6.   
The important Canadian ruling of BMG Canada Inc v John Doe,25 treated in chapter 8 is 
also compelling due to its careful analysis of dynamic allocation of IP addresses and its 
implications from an evidence viewpoint. The comprehensive reference in the ruling to 
the content of affidavits filed by the ISPs’ employees highlights very vividly the 
challenges involved in linking IP addresses to actual subscribers where IP addresses are 
dynamically allocated. The fact that the ruling concerned both file-sharing and privacy 
justifies its inclusion in this PhD. At Federal Court of Appeal level, a delicate balance 
had to be struck between privacy interests and the public interest. This has certain 
parallels with the High Court ruling in Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica26 
(analysed at para 7.3.2.) where Arnold J had to strike a balance between the protection 
of IPRs and the fundamental rights of individuals under the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
 Focus on Civil Jurisdiction 1.1.5
This thesis will only address civil aspects of the various fields of law covered by this 
work. There are two practical reasons for focusing on the civil aspects of copyright 
prosecution. Firstly, the material scope of the three principal EU PIL regulations, ie 
Brussels I, Rome I27 and Rome II28 covers ’civil and commercial matters’, not  
25  BMG Canada Inc v John Doe [2004] FC 488. 
26  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch). 
27   Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6. 
28  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40. 
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criminal matters. Secondly, criminal prosecution of copyright infringement is relatively 
rare29 and this fact holds for most countries. While copyright infringement is normally a 
civil action, meaning that the copyright owner is suing the alleged infringer, it can also 
be a criminal act, meaning that the State brings the alleged infringer to court. However, 
the failure of the proposed EU Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the 
enforcement of IPRs30 and the European Parliament’s rejection on 4 July 2012 of the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)31 suggest that civil rather than criminal 
enforcement is seen as preferable in the EU.  
 
The focus on civil jurisdiction becomes apparent in chapter 7 through treatment of 
Norwich Pharmacal relief and similar orders available under the Enforcement Directive 
(Directive 2004/48/EC). Detailed consideration is given to blocking injunctions 
29  Louis Harms, ‘The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights By Means of Criminal 
Sanctions: An Assessment’ (WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement, WIPO/ACE/4/3, 7 
September 2007) para 19, where it is stated that IPR enforcement, in principle, should be 
civil, and that that is the preferred method of protecting IPRs in developed countries; Lionel 
Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 1124, where the 
authors state that for the most part, there has been little demand for criminal sanctions to 
protect IPR. This, the authors suggest, is linked to right holders’ preference for the lower 
standard of proof associated with civil actions. Laura Gasaway, ‘Criminal copyright 
infringement’ (Copyright Corner, April 2004)  
<http://www.unc.edu/~unclng/copy-corner66.htm> accessed 16 August 2012; Lee A 
Hollaar, ‘Chapter 1: An Overview of Copyright’ (Digital Law Online, 2002) II.L.4. 
<http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise16.html> accessed 23 July 2010, where it is 
stated: ‘While copyright infringement is normally a civil action, meaning that the copyright 
owner is suing the alleged infringer, it can also be a criminal act, meaning that the United 
States Government brings the alleged infringer into court.’  
30  The proposed Directive was officially withdrawn by way of an Official Journal notice, see 
European Commission, ‘Withdrawal of Obsolete Commission Proposals’ [2010] OJ C252/9, 
where there is reference to the original document – European Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights’ COM (2005) 276 final. 
31  European Parliament Press Service, ‘European Parliament rejects ACTA’ (European 
Parliament News, 4 July 2012) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120703IPR48247/html/Europ
ean-Parliament-rejects-ACTA> accessed 16 August 2012. 
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available under national laws,32 especially after Article 8 and Recital (59) of Directive 
2001/29/EC (the InfoSoc Directive) have triggered litigation that renders the Digital 
Economy Act 2010 otiose. 
 
As regards data retention laws, my principal focus will be on the recent CJEU ruling in 
Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications33 where the Data Retention 
Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) was ruled invalid. Unsurprisingly, this judgment has 
created significant uncertainty and confusion among lawyers and academic 
commentators. As the UK secondary legislation transposing the Data Retention 
Directive is still in force, I have examined it but rather superficially, bearing in mind the 
recent ruling.    
 Feasibility Issues  1.2
To a certain extent, my analysis goes to the feasibility of applying the tort PIL rules to 
the internet. In the context of Brussels I, the issue of localising the harmful event is 
undoubtedly important. But this task is far from straightforward in an online 
environment and may have been significantly underestimated by drafters of EU 
conflicts legislation. 
At least one other commentator has perceived the feasibility problems in terms of 
conventional application of conflict of laws doctrines to the unique characteristics of 
cyberspace. That same writer contends that the non-geographic character of the internet 
makes it very difficult to apply current, territorially-based PIL rules to activities 
online.34   
32  At para 7.3.5. 
33  Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and Kärntner Landesregierung (CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) 8 April 2014).  
34  Elizabeth Longworth, ’The possibilities for a legal framework for cyberspace including a 
New Zealand perspective’ in Bruno De Padirac (ed), The International Dimensions of 
Cyberspace Law (Law of Cyberspace Series, vol 1) (Ashgate 2001) 35. This contention is 
bolstered by the views expressed in Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins 
and Morris: The Conflict of Laws, vol 1 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 10, where it is 
argued that:   
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 Has PIL’s Usefulness Been Diminished in the Digital Age?  1.3
While the central theme of this thesis relates to the feasibility of applying the tort PIL 
rules to the internet, an important sub-theme emerges during the research; has the value 
or utility of PIL in general been diminished by the emergence of a de-territorialised 
internet? Given the wholly natural and close relationship (some would say, mutual 
dependence) between PIL and a bordered world, there is a very real risk that this 
symbiotic relationship will be weakened by the rapid emergence and growing 
importance of a border-disregarding internet which has become the tapestry for both 
torts and contractual disputes. The situation is further complicated by the incidence of 
ubiquitous infringement, made possible by the pervasiveness of the internet.  
 The Internet and PIL - Natural Bedfellows?  1.4
While the application of the tort PIL rules to the internet is far from problem-free, even 
a cursory glance at the internet’s physical structure reinforces the perception that it 
generates tremendous scope for conflicts issues to arise. The transnational nature of the 
internet is demonstrated by the following: where there is no direct physical connection 
and peering agreement35 in place between two networks, internet traffic has to find 
another route. Messages use the internet protocols to route around gaps or blockages. So 
a user in London accessing a site down the road could find that the message is routed 
via the US.  
This could happen if the user’s internet access provider is, say, a US company with an 
international network but no peering arrangement with another English network. The 
user dials into an English node of the access provider’s network, but the network’s 
gateway to the rest of the internet is in the US. The message has to go from the user to 
the London node, cross the access provider’s network to the US, transfer to another 
internet-compliant US network, travel back across the Atlantic to another English 
It has not been easy for the conflict of laws to adapt itself to the changes in social and 
commercial life which the 20th century has witnessed. Many of its rules were laid down 
in the 19th century and seem better suited to 19th century conditions than to those of the 
20th century. By logical extension, PIL’s adaptation to a border disregarding internet 
would be fraught with even greater difficulties!   
35  A peering agreement is a contractual arrangement that governs the exchange of Internet 
traffic between two networks. 
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network and thence to the target English site. The route, however, is unpredictable. So, 
not only is the responsibility for ensuring safe delivery of a message diffused among 
various networks, but the identity of those networks cannot accurately be predicted in 
advance.36 
 My Research Questions  1.5
My research questions are five in number. They relate primarily to jurisdiction, but the 
fifth research question relates to the key choice of law rule in the field of IP Law - the 
lex loci protectionis.37     
 
1. What are the main practical difficulties that arise in terms of applying the EU 
tort PIL rules to the internet? 
2. What role does technology play in conflicts scenarios in the twenty-first 
century? And, on balance, who derives greater benefit from technology - the 
claimant (IP owner) or the defendant (IP infringer)? 
3. In terms of applying Articles 2 and 5(3), Brussels I, to an internet environment, 
which elements are either facilitative or non-facilitative when it comes to the 
effective application of those provisions?  
4. In terms of applying Article 5(3), Brussels I, to online IP infringements, how 
useful is the analogue of online defamation?   
5. How well established is the lex loci protectionis within Europe?   
It is important to note that this thesis is not attempting to answer the question: whether 
PIL can be applied to an online environment. It goes without saying that PIL will apply 
to online scenarios just as it applies to offline scenarios. Rather, this thesis focuses on 
the practical application of certain substantive tort PIL provisions to the internet, 
highlighting the difficulties that arise during their application.   
The interface between PIL and the internet is an obvious one, since the internet is, by its 
very nature and physical make-up, transnational.38 This transnational character virtually 
36  Graham JH Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) para 1-
010.  
37    See para 5.2.3. 
38  Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights – Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2003) 5, where the author states as 
follows:  
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guarantees that conflicts issues will arise since many of the legal disputes associated 
with the internet will involve elements from different countries.39 
The description of the interface as ‘complex’ is certainly justified. The interface is 
between a field of law designed primarily for the offline world and a medium that 
makes the online world possible. The confluence of these two very different rivers gives 
rise to choppy waters. For instance, the rules of PIL often refer to connecting factors or 
perhaps a certain place, e.g. the place where the harmful event occurs (or may occur),40 
in order to determine either jurisdiction or applicable law. While conflicts lawyers may 
find these connecting factors and acts of localisation relatively easy to apply in a 
material or physical world, their application to the non-material world may prove a lot 
more difficult. The aim of this doctoral thesis is to shed as much light as possible on the 
perilous confluence. Another strained interface is that between PIL and Intellectual 
Property (IP) Law. Perhaps this is a consequence of the fact that PIL, in the strict sense 
of that term, has been slow in developing in the field of IP. As a result, both conflicts 
lawyers and IP lawyers have looked upon the interface between their respective fields as 
a disputed and dangerous, legal borderland.41 Over the past decade, a number of books 
analysing this complex interface have been written by the likes of Fawcett & 
Torremans, Drexl & Kur (eds), and Basedow (ed).42  
The advent of the ‘Information Society’ has awoken a fresh interest in choice of law for 
copyright and related rights, due to the fact that the production and use of information and 
information technologies have become of primary economic significance and the fact that 
modern communication technology offers new possibilities for massive and instantaneous 
distribution of information across geographic boundaries. By common admission, the arrival 
of the networked environment lays bare the shortcomings of the traditional territorial 
approach to copyright and related rights.   
39  However, the author concedes that not all internet communications traverse sovereign 
borders. It is fair to say, though, that a significant proportion of all internet communications 
are transborder in character.  
40  Brussels I Regulation, Article 5(3).  
41  Stig Stromholm, ‘Preface’ in Jürgen Basedow et al (eds), Intellectual Property in the 
Conflict of Laws (Mohr Siebeck 2005) v.  
42  See Annex 1 of this thesis where I have included a literature review of the principal works 
consulted during the writing of this thesis.   
    
 
32
                                                                                                                                               
It has been argued that one of the reasons for the slow development of PIL in the field 
of IP is due to the fact that in most European countries, IP came into existence through 
successive developments of systems of individual ad hoc privileges strictly limited to 
the territory of the State granting them.43 These historical roots were carried over with 
unfortunate consequences into the modern era. The challenge of trying to solve conflicts 
problems led to a sui generis solution at the end of the nineteenth century in the guise of 
international conventions, which do not even lay down rules for the choice of the 
applicable law.  
 The Interface Between the internet and PIL – Gradually Gaining in 1.6
Prominence   
Over the last few years, the theme of the internet/PIL interface has gradually begun to 
feature as a distinct theme in the legal literature. While Svantesson’s Private 
International Law and the Internet, first published in 2007 (and now into its second 
edition, published 2012) is the most obvious example, it was not the pioneering 
monograph. That accolade belongs to the jointly edited work by Boele-Woelki and 
Kessedjian titled Internet: Which Court Decides? Which Law Applies?,44 which dates 
from August 1998. 
 
Two years prior to the appearance of Svantesson’s second edition, Wang published her 
work Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and 
China.45 This text has, as its core, electronic commerce transactions, not IP 
infringements. Online dispute resolution, B2B contracts and B2C contracts in the EU, 
US and China constitute the various elements of this work. 
 
Fawcett and Torremans’ Intellectual Property and Private International Law also 
explores the internet/PIL intersection but only within the context of the primary theme 
of the IP/PIL interface.  
43  Stig Stromholm, ‘Preface’ in Jürgen Basedow et al (eds), Intellectual Property in the 
Conflict of Laws (Mohr Siebeck 2005) v.  
44  Katharina Boele-Woelki and Catherine Kessedjian (eds), Internet: Which Court Decides?, 
Which Law Applies? Quel tribunal decide? Quel droit s’applique? (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International 1998) 23.  
45  Faye Fangfei Wang, Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US 
and China (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2010).  
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 Somewhat surprisingly, in contrast with the legal literature, PIL legislation adopted at 
EU level over the last thirteen years or so (i.e. Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II) only 
makes scant reference to the internet and then, only in an oblique way.46 It is regrettable 
that the internet did not loom large in the EU legislators’ collective consciousness when 
they were drafting the three regulations just mentioned.47  
Despite the fact that PIL has been intensively studied by continental jurists since the 
13th century and that the first rules of English conflict of laws can be traced back to the 
late 17th century,48 tensions arise when this field of law, dependent on sovereign borders 
for the efficacy of its application, confronts the amorphous ‘territory’ of the internet.  
46  The tangential reference to the internet is made in Recital (24) of Rome I when reference is 
made to a Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission on Article 15 of the Brussels 
I Regulation. Article 15 relates to Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts and the targeting by 
an undertaking of its commercial activities at a Member State of the consumer’s residence. 
In their joint declaration, the Council and Commission state that ‘the mere fact that an 
internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, although a factor 
will be that this internet site solicits the conclusion of distance contracts and that a contract 
has actually been concluded at a distance.’ Interestingly, the E-Commerce Directive 
(Directive 2000/31/EC) does make reference to private international law at Recital (23) and 
Article 1(4). Recital (23) confirms that the E-Commerce Directive does not aim to establish 
additional PIL rules or deal with the jurisdiction of the courts. Somewhat oddly, it goes on to 
provide that applicable law provisions must not restrict the freedom to provide information 
society services as established in the E-Commerce Directive. The Directive on Enforcement 
of IPRs (Directive 2004/48/EC) has a similar provision to the E-Commerce Directive. Its 
Recital (11) provides that the Directive ‘does not aim to establish harmonised rules for 
judicial co-operation, jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and 
commercial matters, or deal with applicable law.’ It acknowledges that there are Community 
instruments which govern such matters in general terms and are, in principle, equally 
applicable to intellectual property. The InfoSoc Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) contains 
no reference to PIL.   
47  Of course, the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive in 2000 shows that the legal aspects of 
Information Society services were already in the minds of EU legislators at the start of the 
new millennium.    
48  Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins and Morris: The Conflict of Laws, vol 
1 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 9 et seq. In fact, conflict of laws first came to 
prominence in English courts towards the end of the 18th century, mainly because of conflicts 
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This may be due to the relatively recent emergence of the internet as a common medium 
of communication and dissemination, or perhaps, the fact that PIL has undergone 
significant changes in the past decade. This is particularly evident at EU level where 
three major PIL regulations, relevant to this thesis, have been adopted since 2000.49 
Brussels I (jurisdiction) was adopted in 2001 while the two applicable law regulations; 
Rome I (contractual obligations) and Rome II (non-contractual obligations) were 
adopted in 2008 and 2007 respectively. At Hague Convention level too, the long-
awaited Convention on Choice of Court Agreements50 was only concluded in June 
2005. In essence, therefore, the world of conflicts law is still in a relative state of flux 
and quite possibly conflicts experts prefer to observe evolutions (legislative and 
jurisprudential) and wait for the legal landscape to take on a more definite shape before 
proffering opinions on how the adapted (or new) conflicts frameworks might be applied 
to the online world. Perhaps the recent interest in ‘national solutions’ such as the French 
HADOPI51 and the UK’s Digital Economy Act 2010,52 as well as contractual models 
such as the Graduated Response approach reflect the unsatisfactory nature of a rule-
based approach?   
This thesis deals with a novel subject matter, but, given the newness of the subject 
matter, the author readily acknowledges that more than one interpretation of the central 
issue of this thesis exists. As a type of corollary, conflicts experts will undoubtedly 
differ as to the ease or difficulty of applying PIL rules/provisions to the internet. The 
reality is that disagreements are inevitable. We are still at a very early stage in the 
between the laws of England and Scotland. In the 19th century, its development was 
enormously accelerated by the rapid increase in commercial and social intercourse between 
England and Continental Europe and with the British territories overseas.  
49  Prior to the adoption of the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome 1 Regulation, there existed 
two predecessor conventions: the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters and, the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations.    
50  This convention is what remains of previous plans of the Hague Conference to formulate a 
convention on jurisdiction and recognition/enforcement of foreign judgments. The plans 
were scaled back significantly in late 2003. The narrower scope of the new convention 
means that it will only apply to parties in a contractual situation and therefore will not cover 
instances of online tortious copyright infringement.     
51    See para 7.3.4.  
52  See para 7.3.3. 
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application of PIL rules/provisions to an online environment, and, in many ways, there 
are no definitive answers to the issues raised in this thesis. Part of my task is to pinpoint 
the actual tort PIL rules that prove challenging to apply in an online environment and to 
determine whether technology, legislation or judge-made relief (or a combination of all 
three) can be used to ameliorate the situation.  
 
 Originality of this Work 1.7
Chapter 6 accounts for a considerable proportion of the originality in this thesis. In that 
chapter, online copyright infringement and online defamation are critically evaluated to 
determine how compelling the analogue of online defamation is. Much of this 
evaluation is carried out in the context of localisation, and points of connection and 
disconnection are identified as between the two torts. The media used to commit the 
infringements are analysed from the viewpoint of ‘push’ or ‘pull’ technology.   
 
This thesis’ originality is also strongly linked to the confluence at which it is located. It 
is, in effect, located at the point where three distinct fields of law meet: PIL, IP Law and 
Information Technology Law. Considerable tensions exist between the field of PIL and 
IP. Similar (and more easily understandable) differences exist between territory and 
sovereign borders-oriented PIL and the de-territorialised internet. 
 
Much of the novelty of this thesis derives from the fact that it starts from the premise 
that the interface between PIL and the internet will not be an entirely smooth one. In 
this thesis, there is an implicit acknowledgement that the PIL rules/laws alone may not 
be enough. For a provision like Article 2, Brussels I, to work effectively, there may well 
have to be reliance on some or all of the following elements: geolocation technology, 
equitable relief (Norwich Pharmacal orders/blocking injunctions) and data retention 
legislation. In sum, this means that the black letter law alone may be inadequate (or, 
insufficient) and that its efficacy will possibly depend on a ‘coalition’ of technology, 
equitable relief and IT law.  
 
By analysing the PIL/IP intersection from a decidedly technological perspective, I do 
something that was not done by Fawcett and Torremans in their work Intellectual 
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Property and Private International Law.53 While Fawcett and Torremans’ work draws 
attention to the distinct set of PIL challenges that arise with online IP infringements, 
their work does not explore the practical issues of proof as does this thesis. Their book 
does not seek to explore how PIL conundra in an online scenario can be resolved by 
searching outside PIL itself. My thesis, in contrast, explores how geolocation 
technology is gradually re-establishing physical borders on the internet, thereby 
assisting judges and conflicts lawyers alike. 
 
By focusing on copyright, my thesis remains distinct from Svantesson’s Private 
International Law and the Internet which focuses on online contracts and online 
defamation. Svantesson’s work also covers trade marks, albeit rather superficially. 
While Svantesson treats geolocation technology in depth, he does not treat either 
equitable relief or data retention legislation, two elements which feature prominently in 
my PhD. 
   
By attempting to deal with practical problems in a practical way, my thesis is 
distinguished from the more theoretical work of Fawcett and Torremans. By focusing 
exclusively on online copyright infringements, my thesis is distinguished from 
Svantesson’s work which has a strong defamation/contracts focus and some non-core 
treatment of trade marks. 
 
In short, my thesis addresses a gap in the legal literature and proposes solutions in 
situations when classic PIL rules are less than effective due to the presence of an online 
component. 
 
 Methodology: A Library-Based Research Study  1.8
I chose a functionalist comparative methodology as my thesis has a strong 
interdisciplinary character. My thesis is situated within a larger framework of other 
disciplines, most evidently Information and Communications Technology (with special 
focus on the internet). My doctoral research covers a gamut of technological issues, 
some of which are intrinsic to my overall conclusions. These include: geolocation 
technology, digital rights management, the BitTorrent protocol, data packets traffic on 
53  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011).  
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the internet and copyright infringements perpetrated by satellite or cable. Technological 
processes such as upload and download feature conspicuously too in the context of 
localisation.    
 
While there is always a risk element in a comparative lawyer using disciplines foreign 
to his own, there is also the boon of better understanding one’s own discipline by 
viewing it through the prism of foreign disciplines.54  
 
Of the seven functions55 which comprise the functional method of comparative law, my 
thesis is built on three of them, namely, 1) the critical function of providing tools for the 
critique of law; 2) the evaluative function of determining the better law; and 3) the 
universalizing function of preparing legal unification.  
 
Focusing on the universalizing function above, part of the functional method is to act as 
a tool for the unification of law. One of the traits of functionalism is to identify 
similarities among different laws, thereby enabling legislators to draft an optimal 
uniform law that overcomes and transcends the doctrinal peculiarities of local legal 
systems.56 The draft International Copyright Code57 devised by JAL Sterling in 2001 
54  According to Michaels, an interdisciplinary analysis yields ‘three promises’, namely (1) It 
should enable a (re-) construction of a more theoretically grounded functional method of 
comparative law than is usually presented. (2) It should help formulate and evaluate the 
concept in order to determine how functional the method really is. Just as comparative law 
can borrow from the development of functional methods in the social sciences, so it can 
borrow from the development of critique. (3) The comparison with functionalism in other 
disciplines may reveal what is special about functionalism in comparative law, and why what 
in other disciplines would rightly be regarded as methodological shortcomings may in fact be 
fruitful for comparative law. Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ 
(SSRN, 3 November 2005) 3  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=839826> accessed 17 July 2012.  
55  Namely, 1) the epistemological function of understanding legal rules and institutions; 2) the 
comparative function of achieving comparability; 3) the presumptive function of 
emphasizing similarity; 4) the formalizing function of system building; 5) the evaluative 
function of determining the better law; 6) the universalizing function of preparing legal 
unification; and 7) the critical function of providing tools for the critique of the law. Ibid 19.   
56  Ibid 31. 
57  JAL Sterling, ‘Draft International Copyright Code’ (May 2001)  
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and the gradual establishment of a de facto international copyright code,58 as described 
by Ginsburg in 2000 are both in this mould. Arguably, too, it is only once the functional 
similarities of different laws are realised, that it becomes easier to unify them on the 
basis of those similarities.  
Highlighting as it does, the real and practical difficulties encountered by private 
international lawyers in the application of a certain set of PIL rules to the internet, it can 
be said of this thesis that its nature is both investigative and interpretative. 
An example of comparative methodology in this thesis occurs in chapter 3 on 
transnational IP infringements. In that chapter, I purposely choose recent UK and CJEU 
court rulings to demonstrate firstly, the subject-matter diversity involved in online IPR 
infringement and, secondly, the geographic diversity apparent in such cases. 
Comparative methodology also features prominently in chapter 5 on the applicable law, 
particularly in my analysis on the relative advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
either a country of origin approach or a country of reception approach in the context of 
the applicable law.  
While I certainly wore a comparatist’s hat during the writing of this thesis, I also 
maintained a strong interest in trying to answer practical questions about the application 
of PIL in an online environment. 
Besides the obvious comparative element in this work, I also deployed a fair degree of 
analogy. Sometimes, the source material was quite relevant though somewhat tangential 
to the core issue of this thesis. A good example of this is the Australian ruling in Dow 
Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick, analysed in depth in chapter .59 Clearly, this judgment 
did not involve issues of digital copyright infringement but it did concern an online tort 
(defamation) and the elements of upload and download which, in turn, drew in issues of 
jurisdiction and choice of law. In chapter 6, I critically evaluate Svantesson’s 
<http://www.qmipri.org/documents/icc_english.pdf> accessed 13th August 2012. 
58   Ginsburg argued that national norms were being displaced and gradually superseded by a de 
facto international copyright code elaborated in multilateral instruments such as the Berne 
Convention, the TRIPs Accord and the then pending WIPO Copyright Treaty. Jane C 
Ginsburg, ‘International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a 
Supranational Code?’ (2000) 47 J Copyright Soc’y USA 265, 266. 
59  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56.  
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defamation model to determine whether it is a useful framework for the analysis of 
copyright infringement.      
 Structure of Thesis 1.9
This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction to the 
central theme of the doctorate. Chapter two describes the nature of the internet generally 
and also looks at the internet from the perspective of digital copyright. Trans-border IP 
infringement (principally copyright) forms the core of chapter three. In this chapter, I 
draw on a number of judgments from the UK and EU to demonstrate how multi-state IP 
infringement is becoming more commonplace. Chapters 4 and 5 are closely related as 
they look at the two key constituents of PIL, - jurisdiction and, the applicable law, 
respectively. Chapter 4 contains an indepth analysis of the case law arising from Article 
5 (3), Brussels I and the Brussels Convention, 1968. Almost inevitably, Chapter 5 treats 
the applicable law and does so through a critical evaluation of legal instruments (the 
Rome II Regulation and the Berne Convention) and individual choice of law rules (e.g. 
the country of origin rule and the country of reception rule). Chapter 6 focuses on online 
copyright infringement and its analogue, online defamation. The main objective of this 
chapter is to identify the rules for localising the various torts online and the analysis is 
somewhat nuanced as the author looks at three of copyright’s restricted rights. An 
intermeshing analysis occurs at chapters 7 to 9 inclusive. All three chapters focus on 
jurisdictional issues with chapter 7 dedicated to an examination of elements facilitative 
of the operation of Article 2, Brussels I, while chapter 8 is dedicated to an examination 
of elements non-facilitative to the operation of Article 2, Brussels I. Chapter 9 is 
somewhat distinct from the two previous chapters in that it has as its focus the special 
jurisdiction provision - Article 5(3), Brussels I. Much of this chapter is given over to the 
analysis of the landmark ruling, Dow Jones v Gutnick60 and how the High Court of 
Australia determined the locus of an online defamation. Chapter 10 contains my general 
conclusions and provides answers to the five research questions contained in this 
chapter.  
 Summing Up   1.10
This introductory chapter sets out many of the key elements of this thesis, to include its 
objectives, the rationale for choosing online copyright infringement as the primary 
60 Ibid.  
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research component, the scope of the thesis, my research questions, my original 
contribution to legal science, my methodology and my chapter structure. 
 
*** 
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2.1 The Internet – A network of computers and servers  
 
In essence, the internet is a network of computers and servers,61 a network that, by its 
very nature, crosses sovereign borders. Its transnational character virtually guarantees 
that issues of PIL will arise when disputes are litigated. The internet enables access to 
and communications of information. These bits of information are routed almost 
randomly to their destination in small packets that travel via different routes and are 
reassembled on arrival.62 
 
As the information is sent in digital format, there is hardly any limit to the kind of 
information that can be sent. Digitised data, text, graphics, music, pictures and films are 
capable of dissemination over the internet. All the aforementioned are, of course, 
subject-matter in which copyright may subsist. The internet facilitates the exploitation, 
use and infringement of IPRs on a cross-border and regular basis63 with peer-to-peer 
systems such as Gnutella, eDonkey, FastTrack, and Bit-Torrent being good examples of 
entities which facilitate IP infringement.64 A combination of significant advances in 
personal computing power, increased power of internet connectivity, the emergence of 
portable devices such as smart phones and tablets, increased internet speeds and high 
quality reproductions together create the perfect technological environment for those 
61  Julia Hörnle, ‘The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte 
Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 121. 
62  Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law – The Law and Society (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 21.  
63  See James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) 535.  
64  For a good account of the impact of P2P piracy on today’s digital content landscape, see 
Wan Man Jason Fung and Avnita Lakhani, ‘Combatting peer-to-peer file sharing of 
copyrighted material via anti-piracy laws: issues, trends and solutions’ (2013) 29 Computer 
Law & Security Review 382-402. The following works also treat peer-to-peer in 
comprehensive form: Alain Strowel (ed), Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in 
copyright law (Edward Elgar 2009); Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl and Andrew Charlesworth, 
Information Technology Law (4th edn, Routledge 2012) 333-348; Andrew Murray, 
Information Technology Law – The Law and Society (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 263-291; and Paul 
Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 654 et 
seqq. 
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intent on illegally reproducing and disseminating protected material.65 The proliferation 
of illegal peer-to-peer activity is testament to the use of the internet for unlawful 
activities. 
 
 An Open, cooperative, flexible and decentralised medium   2.1
Since its inception as a commercial medium in the mid-1990s the internet has evolved 
into an open,66 cooperative, flexible and decentralised67 medium. Over the past twenty 
years, it has become a communication and distribution medium par excellence.  
 
It is also presented by stakeholders as a tool for entrepreneurship and commerce. In 
terms of entrepreneurship, e-commerce is particularly strong in the UK. Of all the G20 
countries, it is to the UK economy that the internet contributes the greatest share of 
GDP.68 E-tailers such as Marks & Spencer and John Lewis ensure that the UK retains a 
particularly strong position within the OECD in terms of the proportion of its nationals 
who order/purchase goods or services online (64% in 2011).69 As regards commerce, 
the internet is now the default platform for legal music subscription services such as 
Spotify, Deezer, Napster Unlimited and eMusic.  
65  Wan Man Jason Fung and Avnita Lakhani, ‘Combatting peer-to-peer file sharing of 
copyrighted material via anti-piracy laws: issues, trends, and solutions’ (2013) 29 Computer 
Law & Security Review 382, 383 et seq. 
66  Bellia, Schiff Berman and Post interpret the term ‘open’ as meaning easy to join, with no 
central server that must be informed of a new network participant, in order to communicate 
with others over the internet one need only obtain the necessary software and arrange for a 
connection to any one of the thousands of ISPs worldwide. Patricia Bellia, Paul Schiff 
Berman and David Post, ‘Cyberlaw, Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the 
Information Age’ (3rd edn, Thomson West 2007) 16. 
67  In Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [80], Kirby J in the Australian High Court described 
the internet as a ’decentralised, self-maintained telecommunications network’. See also 
Joanna Kulesza, International Internet Law (1st edn, Routledge 2012) 142.   
68  Hannah Kuchler, ‘UK “leads the world” in e-commerce’ (Financial Times, 19 March 2012) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ef3e1a04-71b4-11e1-8497-00144feab49a.html#axzz2y 
DydFjej> accessed 7 April 2014.  
69  HM Government, European E-Commerce Taskforce, ‘Empowered Consumers, Unleashed 
Business’ (August 2013) 5 <http://dpalliance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/EU-e-
commerce-taskforce-FINAL-REPORT.pdf> accessed 7 April 2014. 
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  Tensions between the internet and copyright 2.2
The coming of each new technology has meant re-thinking and re-balancing copyright 
law.70 In fairly rapid succession, innovations such as the photocopier, the audio cassette 
deck, the VCR, DVDs, CDs and CD-Roms have all challenged that law and with the 
introduction of each new technology, it is tested and evolves accordingly.71 At a more 
sophisticated level of information distribution, satellite broadcasting,72 streaming73 and 
cable (re-) transmission have also posed serious challenges to copyright, particularly so 
given the fact that they frequently possess a transnational character.  
 
Copyright and copyright material have been particularly imperilled since the emergence 
of the internet as a commercial medium in the mid-1990s. Indeed, the internet could, 
with justification, be described as the greatest copying machine ever invented as 
copying of protected works occurs constantly and necessarily.74 Cornish, Llewelyn and 
Aplin go further and describe the relationship between the internet and copyright as ‘the 
most inflamed issue in current intellectual property.’75 They point to the extraordinary 
ease and accuracy with which the internet distributes literary, artistic, musical and audio 
70  For instance, see Isabella Alexander, ‘All change for the digital economy: some observations 
from the history of copyright’ (2010) 28 Copyright Reporter: Journal of the Copyright 
Society of Australia 215-228. 
71  Diane Rowland, Uta Kohl and Andrew Charlesworth, Information Technology Law (4th edn, 
Routledge 2012) 334. 
72  See, for instance, the example given by Paul Goldstein and P Bernt Hugenholtz in their work 
‘International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2013) 127 
(unauthorised transmission of a musical work by satellite to another country).  
73  See Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd [2013] 3 CMLR 1, in which the 
CJEU held that unauthorised streaming of free-to-air television broadcasts to persons within 
the catchment area does amount to a new transmission to the public within Article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive if it is performed by an organisation other than the original broadcasting 
organisation, since it involves the distribution of the broadcast by a different technical means 
from that used for the distribution of the original broadcast. See Mark Hyland, ‘TV 
Broadcasters’ IP rights bolstered by recent CJEU preliminary ruling’ (2013) Law Society 
Gazette 58, 59. 
74  Two common examples include: where a software program is loaded into a computer RAM, 
or a surfer opens up a webpage.  
75  William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, 
Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 858.   
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visual material held in digital format.76 Material accessed on websites, chatrooms, email 
services and social networking sites can be transmitted over and over again without loss 
of quality.77  
 
The reality of the internet is that electronic copying, whether ephemeral or more 
permanent in character, occurs all along the internet chain, from point of upload to point 
of destination. Given the ease of unauthorised dissemination of copyright material 
across sovereign borders, cross-border litigation becomes inevitable and, as a 
consequence, PIL issues arise.  
 
YouTube is a good example of an internet platform upon which copyright laws are 
frequently, though perhaps inadvertently, flouted, while defamatory comments are 
tweeted or posted from/to social media with ever increasing frequency.78 In chapter 6, I 
shall critically evaluate the points of connection and disconnection which exist between  
online copyright infringement and online defamation.  
 
As to the cooperative nature of the internet, its manifestation can be seen in blogs, 
threads, discussion groups and legal peer-to-peer activities. But, the flipside of legal 
cooperation is illegal cooperation, and this is most obvious in peer-to-peer activity 
involving unauthorised file-sharing (both music and movies).  
 
76  Ibid.   
77  Ibid.  
78  As regards Twitter, see the High Court ruling, The Lord McAlpine of West Green v Sally 
Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB); As regards Facebook, the High Court in Northern Ireland 
stated on 6th February 2013 that £35,000 should be awarded against an unknown person who 
libelled two company directors and a staff member on Facebook. BBC, ‘Judge rules three 
were defamed on Facebook’ (BBC News Northern Ireland, 6 February 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21354945> accessed 8 April 2014. There 
is also the Irish High Court ruling handed down by Mr Justice Peart on 16th May 2013, - 
Eoin McKeogh v John Doe and Others (Record No. 2012/254P) - in which an interlocutory 
injunction was granted against Facebook and Google requiring them, YouTube, and a 
number of websites to permanently remove a video and accompanying material which 
wrongly identified a man dodging a taxi fare and defamed him with a series of offensive 
comments.  
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 Border-disregarding 2.3
As a medium of communication, the internet works largely independently of 
geographical borders.79 In this regard, it is very similar to telephone communication, 
and can be contrasted with postal mail which is still dependent on such borders (parcels 
can be intercepted/opened by customs officers at national borders to ensure compliance 
with national quarantine requirements).80   
 
In general, internet communications can flow freely between most countries without 
there being any border checks. However, certain countries such as China, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran choose to exercise a degree of border control which often involves blocking 
access to material held on foreign servers.81  
  The internet in China – a four-tier system82 2.4
The bottom tier (i.e. fourth tier) comprises individual internet users. They connect to the 
internet through the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (tier three). The ISPs connect to 
an Internet Access Provider (IAP) (second tier). In fact, it is the IAPs who actually own 
the physical networks, which are then leased by the ISPs. Finally, the IAPs connect to 
the government’s gateway (first tier) and can thereby access the global internet. What 
79  Taubman describes the internet as being ‘famously blind to national boundaries’. Antony 
Taubman, ‘International Governance and the Internet’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte 
Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 18  
80  Dan JB Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 
2012) 34. 
81  See Nikolaos Koumartzis and Andreas Veglis, ‘Internet regulation: The need for more 
transparent internet filtering systems and improved measurement of public opinion on 
internet filtering’ (2011) 16 First Monday 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3266/3071> accessed 8 April 2014. 
Also see Murray’s account of State filtering/content blocking. He refers to the Open Net 
Initiative which lists substantial filtering in fifteen different countries along with strong 
suspicions that Cuba and North Korea also deploy extensive filtering practices. Andrew 
Murray, Information Technology Law - The Law and Society (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 75 et seq.  
82   Dan JB Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 
2012) 34 et seq. 
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makes this system distinct is the fact that it is the system prescribed by law.83 As a 
consequence, internet users in China are not permitted to connect to the internet via a 
foreign ISP in order to circumvent the system. A similar structure can be found in Saudi 
Arabia. In contrast, most other countries do not exercise any effective border control 
and internet communications, both domestic and foreign, go through a multitude of 
private and public carriers. This ensures the absence of strangle points. Svantesson then 
draws a distinction between the ‘international internet’ which he describes as borderless 
and the domestic sub-internet in China which he describes as borderless only within 
China but not in relation to the rest of the world.84  
 Geographical independence  2.5
Internet communication is available to people regardless of their geographical location. 
For individuals seeking information, the geographical location of that information is 
virtually irrelevant in most forms of internet communication.85 Clicking on a hyperlink 
provides access to the relevant information even if it is stored on a server many 
thousands of miles away. Stated differently, someone using the internet can move 
effortlessly over great geographical distances and between different states.86 Another 
aspect of internet communication is its instantaneousness. There is no great time 
difference between accessing a website hosted on a local server and accessing a website 
hosted on a server located on the other side of the world.87 
 Low-threshold information distribution  2.6
In general, ordinary individuals do not have the technical knowledge or the financial 
ability to use forms of communications such as television and radio broadcasts; these 
forms are ‘reserved’ for more sophisticated operators such as media organisations. 
83  Ibid 35, where he refers to the Interim Rules of the People’s Republic of China on 
International Interconnectedness of Computer-based Information Networks (promulgated on 
25 April 2007).  
84  Ibid. 
85  In the Digital Age, there is no guarantee that digital content will actually be stored in the 
country where its owner resides. This is particularly true in the case of companies which may 
store content on web servers abroad. For instance, see the facts of Dow Jones & Company v 
Gutnick [2002] HCA 56.  
86  Dan JB Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 
2012) 36.    
87  Ibid. 
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However, ordinary individuals can, with relative ease, impart all kinds of information 
via the internet, through social networking or e-mail. Needless to say, sometimes the 
material being disseminated online infringes copyright.  
 
Technical limitations in the form of uploading limits can be imposed by ISPs so that 
internet users are frequently connected to the internet under arrangements that provide 
much greater downloading allowance than uploading allowance. This hampers and 
restricts the user’s ability to disseminate information.88 Subject to this, another 
important aspect of online information distribution is that of re-dissemination. Once an 
individual comes into possession of a copyright work, he can relatively easily re-
disseminate that work without any loss of quality.  
 Portability 2.7
Portability is a key characteristic of the internet; a very simple example of such being 
the e-mail. An e-mail can be sent from an internet-connected device anywhere in the 
world. Mirror websites can be accessed via two or more servers anywhere in the world. 
A particular website might have its text located on a server in New Zealand while the 
photographs are stored on a server in Brazil.89 Naturally, the vast majority of internet 
users will not even be aware of this ‘bifurcation’.  
 
Sometimes the websites are spread between two or more servers so as to ensure a faster 
service for those accessing the service or so as to avoid congestion. Caching servers are 
often used to ‘deliver’ a web page’s ‘heavy’ items, e.g. pictures and video clips. In such 
cases, the original web server will be ‘bypassed’ and the nearest available cache will 
instead be requested.90 Portability causes considerable problems in relation to PIL, 
particularly as regards localisation.   
 Nature of the Internet (as seen from the copyright perspective)  2.8
The internet has established a new form of worldwide communication which guarantees 
international supply and exchange of information in electronic form. Websites are the 
88  Ibid 39. 
89  Ibid 42. 
90  Akamai’s caching services is referred to in ‘Geography and the Net - Putting it in its place’ 
The Economist (9 August 2001); Dan JB Svantesson, Private International Law and the 
Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 42.  
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repositories of huge quantities of material thanks to sophisticated methods of digital 
storage. A work put on the internet can be accessed by individuals in all parts of the 
world and can then be copied and further disseminated.91  
 
But this widescale access to works which have been placed on the internet throws into 
question the concept of publication (putting copies at the disposal of the public) in the 
copyright community. This is linked to the ‘making available’ right (cross reference). 
The economic rights of communication to the public and ‘making available’ to the 
public92 can become quite blurred in an internet context when an unpublished work is 
posted on the internet and then can be accessed simultaneously in many different 
countries.93  
2.8.1. The seamlessness of the Internet  
 
By ignoring national boundaries and operating, by definition, on a cross-border basis, 
the internet’s seamlessness ensures that netizens unconsciously cross state boundaries 
while websites are often as accessible to those living abroad as they are to those living 
in the state which hosts the website.94 However, despite the unquestioned trans-border 
nature of the internet, there are always territorial connections with various states.95 For 
example, both the claimant and the defendant in copyright litigation will be 
resident/domiciled in a particular state, and both the uploading of information 
(infringing material) and the downloading of that information will, of necessity, occur 
in specific States.  
91  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 33. 
92  Both these rights are examined in detail in chapter 6. 
93  Ibid.   
94  The seamlessness of the internet can be viewed from two perspectives - that of the netizen 
(who moves seamlessly between zones governed by differing regulatory regimes in 
accordance with their personal preferences), and that of internet content, which flows 
seamlessly over physical borders. See: Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law - The 
Law and Society (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 49. The seamlessness of the internet is ‘interrupted’ by 
the world’s more authoritarian regimes where filtering and blocking is implemented for a 
variety of reasons. This issue will be analysed later in this chapter.  
95  See, generally, Chris Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn, CUP 2004) 7.1.2.  
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 Characteristics of Infringement over the Internet  2.9
2.9.1. Problems of identity and location of the parties  
 
A claimant who has been the victim of an online IP infringement may not know the 
identity of the defendant or where he is resident. Electronic addresses do not necessarily 
signify a geographical connection. For example, the tortfeasor may have an electronic 
address with a service provider whose domain name comprises a national identifier, 
such as ‘UK’, but that does not mean that he is resident in the UK.  
 
2.9.2 Difficulty in locating where the act of infringement occurred  
 
Frequently, when determining issues of jurisdiction, courts will have to identify the 
place where something has happened or threatens to happen. For example, a court may 
have to pinpoint the place where the tortious act giving rise to damage occurred or the 
place where the tort was committed. This task is problematic enough in non-internet 
cases but the difficulty is exacerbated with online copyright infringement.96 Since 
communication over the internet involves a whole sequence of events between the 
original uploading of infringing material and its eventual downloading abroad, it can be 
difficult to localise the precise point where the actual infringement has happened.97        
Sterling describes the sequence of events as comprising the following: uploading of 
information; digitisation of the work; storage of the digitised form of the work; 
conversion of the digitised form of the work into the carrying signal; transmission of the 
carrying signal; reception of the carrying signal in the receiving machine; downloading 
96  James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) 538.  
97  Ibid. Interestingly, as far back as 1964, FA Mann recognised the problems associated with 
localisation in the context of modern communications technology and cross-border media. 
While his reference was aimed at things like telephone, teleprinter, television and 
international advertising, he pointed out that the distribution of content across a multitude of 
countries might mean that territorial connecting factors were too readily satisfied, and would 
generate dissatisfaction with the rigidity of present rules. Arguably, these deficiencies and 
dissatisfaction have multiplied with the ever increasing use of the internet for cross-border 
transactions and interactions. Frederick A Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in 
International Law’ (1964) 111 Recueil des Cours, 1-162. 
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(storage of information in the memory of the machine); screen display, and, possibly, 
print out of display material. This sequence may involve numerous countries and, in the 
more complex cases, the transmission may travel via intermediate computers located in 
countries outside the originating and destination countries. One could argue that an 
online act of infringement is truly multi-national in character.98 
 
The problem of locating the infringing event can be compounded when the substantive 
law of infringement does not specify sufficiently clearly what the act of infringement is, 
or fails to define certain of its key concepts for an online environment.99 Initially, 
copyright infringements were conceived to occur entirely in one particular country (a 
single act leading to a single effect), but the internet has uprooted that concept entirely. 
However, despite the complex sequence of events, there are still only two really 
significant occurrences in the whole chain – those of uploading and downloading. 
Together, they constitute the two constants that will be apparent if the matter proceeds 
to litigation.100 Between uploading and downloading, the route that the information 
98  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 144, 150 et seqq, 652 
et seq, and 659 et seq.  
99  James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) 542. Two key economic rights under copyright law are those of 
reproduction and communication to the public. But, where will the reproduction take place if 
one sends a request to a server for protected content which is then sent to the requestor and 
displayed on his screen. The requestor’s screen will undoubtedly be a place of where 
reproduction occurs but there may be other reproductions along the way in intermediate 
countries. Likewise, is placing material on a website so that others can access it when they 
wish, an act of communication to the public?   
100  In contrast, in terms of online defamation, following Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, 
the place of download really is the preeminent locus. In the principal judgment in that case, it 
was made clear that damage to reputation can only occur when the defamatory material is in 
comprehensible form. And that only occurs when it is downloaded to the computer of the 
person who has pulled the material from a web browser (the publishee) (see para [44] of the 
judgment). See chapter 9 for a comprehensive treatment of the Dow Jones ruling. There is 
also the interesting High Court ruling Ashton Investments Ltd v OJSC Russian Aluminium 
(Rusal) [2006] EWHC 2545 (Comm) which concerned allegations of computer hacking. 
Like the Australian High Court, the English High Court attached considerable importance to 
place of download. There, the relevant computer server was located in London but the hack 
originated from Russia. Hirst J (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) ruled that 
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(bits) takes can vary greatly from case to case, depending on whether a server is used in 
a third country. In a case where copyright material is downloaded abroad without 
permission from the rightsholder, which court should have jurisdiction over this cross-
border activity? Should it be every state in which the downloading takes place? 
Conceivably, therefore, the courts of approximately 200 countries could assume 
jurisdiction (albeit they would be very unlikely to do so concurrently), each exercising 
jurisdiction over the specific act of copyright infringement occurring in its own 
territory. Arguably the act of uploading makes for a considerably easier localisation as 
the uploading often only takes place in one state.101 Matters can become complicated 
however where one uploads in country A but the infringing material is then placed on a 
server which hosts the relevant website in country B. 
 
 
‘significant damage had occurred in England where the server was improperly accessed and 
the confidential and privileged information viewed and downloaded’ (at para [62]). Ashton 
Investments Limited was recently relied on by counsel for the claimants in Judith Vidal-Hall 
and others v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) [78], a case involving allegations of misuse 
of private information, breach of confidence and breach of the Data Protection Act 1998.     
101  Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 93/83/EEC on Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission 
opts for a practical rule of upload as it localises all communications to the public by satellite 
in the Member State where the programme carrying signals are ‘introduced into an 
uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite’. For a Scottish judgment that 
seems to adopt a place of upload rule in an online copyright context, see Alan MacKie t/a 
197 Aerial Photography v Nicola Askew, Largsholidaylets.co.uk [2009] SLT (Sh Ct) 146. 
The ruling gives the pursuer the right to initiate proceedings in the court of the place where 
the damage occurred or in the court of the place where the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred (i.e. the place where the illegal uploading by the defender of the pursuer’s 
copyright photographs took place). In their analysis of the ruling, Fawcett and Torremans 
argue that the court arguably adopts a place of uploading rule as the presiding Sheriff stated 
that the critical question was the location of a wrong that was committed by way of the 
internet (see para [30] of the judgment). In their view, this could only refer to actions by the 
defendant and, therefore, the crucial action in this sequence of events was the act of upload. 
James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) 561.   
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2.9.3. Ubiquitous and multi-state Infringement 
 
Fawcett and Torremans argue that internet-related cases also inevitably show a high 
incidence of ubiquitous infringement or at least multi-state infringement.102 This 
assertion stands to reason particularly as the internet is a means of communication 
which ignores national boundaries and infringing material can be (and often is) 
disseminated with consummate ease.  
 
A good example of multi-state infringement is the 2013 ruling of EMI Records v British 
Sky Broadcasting.103 The case, a website-blocking application under Section 97A, 
CDPA 1988, concerned three websites. Mr Justice Arnold’s ruling pointed towards a 
high degree of online trans-border copyright infringement. For instance, the operators of 
the copyright infringing websites appeared to be based outside the UK.104 All three 
websites had significant numbers of visitors from the UK with KAT experiencing 3.7 
million visitors in June 2012 alone.105 The same website offered users a choice of 
between 28 different languages which facilitated and encouraged the widest possible 
participation in the use of its services by P2P file-sharers.106 In addition, all three 
websites repeatedly shifted between various ISPs based in different countries. The most 
prolific – KAT – had moved between ISPs based in eight different countries.107 
 
Fawcett and Torremans assert that ‘unregistered rights such as copyright exist globally’ 
and that the illegal posting of a protected work on the internet constitutes an 
102  James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) 549. See also Julia Hörnle, ‘The Jurisdictional Challenge of the Internet’ in 
Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 
2009) 133, where the author states: ‘Since the internet can be accessed from anywhere in the 
world, the harm caused by an information tort committed on the internet may, in some cases 
at least, fall anywhere and everywhere’.  
103  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). Dealt 
with in detail at para 6.10.2, where the ruling is analysed in the context of localisation of the 
communication to the public right.   
104  Ibid [48]. 
105  Ibid [16]–[19]. 
106  Ibid [53]. 
107  Ibid [63]. 
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infringement ‘in every single country in the world’. In my view, their assertion that 
copyright exists globally is exaggerated as copyright subject-matter is just as territorial 
as patents or trademarks, even if there is no requirement for it to be registered. It is not 
for nothing that copyright-protected material is sometimes referred to as a ‘UK 
copyright’ or, a ‘German copyright’, depending on where the material was first 
created/fixated. The territorial nature of copyright is underscored by Article 3 of the 
Berne Convention where the link between copyright protection and Berne Union 
countries is made.  
 
Nor do I agree with Fawcett and Torremans’ argument that an act of posting infringing 
material on a website without the permission of the copyright holder potentially 
constitutes an infringement ‘in every single country in the world’.108 While there maybe 
a slender case for contending that an online infringement may ‘spread’ geographically 
by virtue of Berne Union considerations, there is still some conceptual distance to travel 
before one could accept that the infringement occurs ‘in every single country of the 
world’.  
 
Frankly, it is difficult to see how the posting of infringing material on one particular 
website involves an infringement in every country of the world. A mere accessing of the 
infringing material could arguably create a RAM copy in the accessor’s internet-enabled 
device, but the internet and easy internet access is built on an inevitable ‘system’ of 
implied licences. It is asserted that a primary infringement would be focused on one 
particular country but that conceivably (albeit improbably) a secondary infringer could 
disseminate the infringing material far and wide, potentially making the infringement 
more than just local in nature.   
 
2.9.4. How today’s digital content landscape has been impacted by P2P  
 
The existence and development of P2P file-sharing software has an increasingly 
significant impact on the evolving digital content economy. First used in 1999 under the 
108  James Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) 549.  
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name Napster, P2P technology has more recently manifested itself by way of the 
following programmes: Gnutella, eDonkey, and and Bit Torrent.109 
 
Unlike Napster, which was based on a central server, the BitTorrent protocol operates in 
a decentralised manner. The small-sized ‘packets’ of data into which torrent files are 
broken are handled by both sources (seeders) and downloaders (peers or leechers).110  
The net result of all this is that thousands of torrent files (each containing part of a 
protected work) are being shared without recognition of, payment to, or protection for 
the copyright owner.111 
 
And, as personal computer power increases and the use of portable devices – all of 
which can access P2P networks – intensifies, users can more easily process complex 
content of higher quality such as high-definition movies, music and live multimedia 
experiences.  
 
Nowadays, technological development is such that the quality of reproductions rivals 
that of the original. A deadly combination of increased internet speeds and distribution 
software such as P2P enable users to share files of any size.112 Using readily available 
consumer products, end-users can illegally copy original content and effortlessly 
distribute it far and wide with potentially disastrous consequences for the relevant 
rightholders. 
 
109  See Mark Taylor et al, ‘Digital Evidence from peer-to-peer networks’ (2011) 27 Computer 
Law & Security Review 647. 
110  For a detailed account of how P2P services work (with particular focus on Bittorrent), see 
Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch) [19].  
111  Wan Man Jason Fung and Avnita Lakhani, ‘Combatting peer-to-peer file sharing of 
copyrighted material via anti-piracy laws: issues, trends and solutions’ (2013) 29 Computer 
Law & Security Review 382, 383. 
112 Ursula Smartt, Media and Entertainment Law (1st edn, Routledge 2011) 346. 
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Clearly, the question of copyright law in the digital environment remains a pressing 
one.113 Despite the steady growth in licensed digital music services (such as iTunes, 
Spotify, Deezer (mainly France), JUKE and TDC (mainly Denmark)),114 there is still 
significant evidence of digital piracy and this is borne out by the statistics. According to 
IFPI’s Digital Music Report (2013), the FBI estimated that business generated by 
Megaupload (before its closure by the FBI in February 2012) in terms of its unlicensed 
content file hosting was worth USD175 million while the estimated damage to the 
creative industries was in the region of USD500 million.115 Figures contained in 
MusicMetric’s Digital Music Index Report for the first six months of 2012 point to 345 
million tracks downloaded illegally via BitTorrent.116 Similarly negative figures appear 
in the International Chamber of Commerce-commissioned report ‘Building a Digital 
Economy: The Importance of Saving Jobs in the EU’s Creative Industries’. That report 
focused on the link between internet diffusion and the decrease in recorded music sales. 
It highlighted the 36% fall in physical recorded music sales during the period 2004-
2008, representing financial losses of close to €4 billion in that five year period.117   
113 Hector L MacQueen, ‘”Appropriate for the Digital Age”? Copyright and the Internet: 1. 
Scope of Copyright’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 184. 
114 It is interesting to note that subscription services are now the fastest growth area in digital 
music with subscriber numbers up 44% in 2012 and revenues up 59% in H2, 2012. Spotify’s 
paying subscribers now number more than 5 million up from 3 million in 2011. IFPI, ‘IFPI 
Digital Music Report 2013 – Engine of a digital World’ 14 
<http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2013.pdf> accessed 16 April 2014.  
115  Ibid 31. 
116  See BPI, ‘Digital Music Nation’ (2013) 24-29 
<https://www.bpi.co.uk/assets/files/BPI_Digital_Music_Nation_2013.PDF> accessed 16 
April 2014.  
117 TERA Consultants, ‘Building a Digital Economy: The Importance of Saving Jobs in the 
EU’s Creative Industries’ (International Chamber of Commerce/BASCAP, March 2010) 21 
<http://www.droit-technologie.org/upload/dossier/doc/219-1.pdf> accessed 16 April 2014.  
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2.9.5. Other facets of the Internet 
2.9.5.1.  E-commerce and some of its protagonists  
While the principal focus of this thesis is online torts, another key dimension of the 
internet is e-commerce. Since the emergence of e-commerce in 1991,118 a number of 
companies have become well established in this sector. They are, for instance, eBay 
(consumer to consumer), Amazon (the world’s largest online retailer), Yahoo (its e-
commerce components include Yahoo Shopping, Yahoo Autos, Yahoo Real Estate, and 
Yahoo Travel), and Alibaba (more specifically, Taobao Marketplace). A salient feature 
of 21st century e-commerce is online booking, frequently used by consumers to book 
such things as hotels, cinema, theatre/concert tickets, various modes of travel (air, train 
and ferry), and holidays (package holidays and cruises). 
2.10. The EU’s PIL framework and its protective scheme for consumers  
The EU’s PIL framework encompasses a protective scheme for consumers, based on the 
philosophy that a consumer is in a weaker position relative to a company in a contract. 
This explains why PIL takes a biased position in favour of the consumer.119 This 
protective scheme revolves around two key PIL provisions, namely Article 15(1)(c) of 
the Brussels I Regulation and Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation. Both apply when 
the business (or professional) has pursued its commercial activities in the consumer’s 
habitual residence or directs such activities to that country.  
 
Article 15(1)(c), Brussels I refers to the business/entity which ‘pursues commercial or 
professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any 
means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several Member States 
including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.’ 
118 The start of e-commerce coincided with the National Science Foundation’s decision to lift its 
ban on commercial businesses operating over the internet, thereby paving the way for Web-
based e-commerce.  
119 See for example Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl 
Schlüter GmbH & Co KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, 
para 58, where the ECJ states as follows: ‘As regards the latter provision (Article 15(1)(c), 
Brussels I), the Court has indeed repeatedly held that the special rules introduced by the 
provisions of the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction over consumer contracts serve to 
ensure adequate protection for the consumer, as the party deemed to be economically weaker 
and less experienced in legal matters than the other commercial party to the contract’. 
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Article 6(1) Rome I refers to a contract concluded between a professional and a 
consumer as being governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his 
habitual residence, provided that the professional (a) pursues his commercial or 
professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including 
that country, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities   
 
The notion of directing one’s activities to the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile120 within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of Brussels I was considered in 
Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & 
Co KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller.  
 
Peter Pammer concerned a voyage contract (a consumer contract), which had been 
advertised in particularly attractive terms by a company whose seat was in Germany. 
The claimant, Peter Pammer, was domiciled in Austria and paid for the voyage. 
However, he later refused to embark as he claimed that the company’s description of the 
voyage did not correspond to conditions on the vessel. As Reederei Karl Schlüter only 
reimbursed part of the sum paid, the claimant claimed payment of the balance before an 
Austrian court of first instance.  
 
Hotel Alpenhof also concerned a consumer contract which gave rise to a dispute 
between the claimant, an Austrian hotel and a consumer resident in Germany. The 
consumer, Mr Heller, effected his reservation and confirmation by email. Having found 
120 The notion of directing one’s activities to a specific country is analogous to the concept of 
‘targeting the public’ in a particular country. The latter concept is analysed in depth in 
chapter 6 in the context of analysing the communication to the public right and its 
localisation in an online environment. On a different issue, advances in technology and e-
commerce have enabled e-businesses to use geolocation technologies for content targeting. 
Through the use of geolocation technology, e-businesses are able to direct their websites to 
specific locations or particular Member States, thereby determining the reach of their website 
so as to avoid selected jurisdictions, see Bharat Saraf, Ashraf U Sarah Kazi, ‘Analysing the 
application of Brussels I in regulating e-commerce jurisdiction in the European Union – 
Success, deficiencies and proposed changes’ (2013) 29 Computer Law and Security Review 
127, 134. 
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fault with the hotel’s services, Mr Heller left the hotel without paying his bill. Hotel 
Alpenhof then brought an action before an Austrian court for payment of the sum owed.  
The ECJ stated that it should be ascertained whether before the conclusion of any 
contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites and the trader’s overall 
activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one 
or more Member States, including the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the 
sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with them.121 The ECJ then set out a 
non-exhaustive list of matters which are capable of constituting evidence that the 
trader’s activity is directed to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile. The list 
includes the following:  
 
the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member 
States for going to the place where the trader is established, use of a language or 
a currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member 
State in which the trader is established with the possibility of making and 
confirming the reservation in that language, mention of telephone numbers with 
an international code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in 
order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by 
consumers domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-level domain name 
other than that of the Member State in which the trader is established, and 
mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in 
various Member States. It is for the national courts to ascertain whether such 
evidence exists.122  
 
Factors deemed insufficient by the ECJ to show that a trader’s activity is being directed 
to a certain Member State included: the mere accessibility of the trader’s or the 
intermediary’s website in the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled and,  
the mention of an email address and other contact details or the use of a language or a 
currency which are the language and/or currency generally used in the Member State in 
which the trader is established.123   
121 Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co 
KG; Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, para 92. 
122 Ibid para 93.  
123 Ibid para 94. 
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 This ruling is significant in that it helps to clarify the previously unclear jurisdictional 
concept of ‘directing activities’ to a particular country. As Rome I also contains the 
same concept (in Article 6(1)), the ruling has relevance for that regulation too.  Clearly, 
the issue was considered of particular importance as the case was heard by a Grand 
Chamber. The decision to use a Grand Chamber may have been linked to the fact that 
the notion of ‘directing activities’ was the subject of intense debate by the various EU 
institutions and Member States during the legislative process, without a clear 
compromise being reached. As a consequence, the wording of Article 15 of Brussels I 
and Article 6 of Rome I was left deliberately vague and did not address the internet 
specifically. Ultimately, it was left to the CJEU to assume political responsibility for the 
interpretation of the notion.  
 
2.11. The internet – bordered or borderless?124   
Technology is not the only way of raising borders on the internet. Countries such as 
China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Myanmar apply strict controls (monitoring/censorship) to 
the internet125 which may involve blocking access to material held on foreign servers. 
For instance, China’s State Council Information Office advocates a bordered internet 
based on territorial sovereignty.126 This State-centred policy contrasts with the US State 
Department’s policy which holds that there be a single connected internet that is, to a 
degree, sovereign in its own right.127 The American approach is more an individual-
based, rights-centred, and market driven policy. 
124  For a general overview on the nature of the internet, - bordered or borderless?, see Bernhard 
Maier, ‘How has the law attempted to tackle the borderless nature of the internet?’ (2010) 
18 IJLIT 142-175.    
125 See Nikolaos Koumartzis and Andreas Veglis, ‘Internet regulation: The need for more 
transparent internet filtering systems and improved measurement of public opinion on 
internet filtering’ (2011) 16 First Monday 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3266/3071> accessed 14 May 2014.  
126 Min Jiang, ‘Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s Approach to Internet Sovereignty’ 
(2010) 30 SAIS Review 71, 73.  
127 Ibid.  
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Unfortunately, China’s adoption and promotion of the internet has gone hand in hand 
with its physical manipulation of internet architecture and control of internet use.128 The 
Great Firewall of China, the world’s most advanced national firewall, has blocked 
access to the following over the past five years: YouTube (blocked permanently in 
2009), Facebook and Twitter (blocked since riots in Xinjiang in 2009), and Bloomberg 
and the New York Times (blocked in 2012, after publishing detailed reports on the 
finances of Chinese leaders’ families).129  
Pervasive filtering also occurs in Saudi Arabia where a proxy system is used to block 
requests for banned websites. Most of the blacklisted sites are sexually explicit or about 
religion. But, even seemingly innocuous content about women’s history and women’s 
bathing suits is blocked.130  
Blocking is not just the preserve of developing or autocratic countries. Among 
developed countries, the UK’s Cleanfeed system is a landmark model for large scale 
blocking. Created in 2003 by British Telecom in consultation with the UK Home 
Office, this system is aimed at blocking access to child sex abuse images. The blacklist 
of websites is compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).131  
128 Ibid 75. 
129 ‘The Great Firewall, The Art of Concealment’ (The Economist, 6 April 2013) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574631-chinese-screening-online-
material-abroad-becoming-ever-more-sophisticated> accessed 14 May 2014.  
130 See: OpenNet Initiative, ‘Saudi Arabia’ (2009) <https://opennet.net/research/profiles/saudi-
arabia> accessed 14 May 2014.  
131 A particularly compelling and slightly ironic example of censorship creep occurred in July 
2011 when the English High Court in Twentieth Century Fox Film Productions v British 
Telecommunications plc ordered BT to block access to the Newzbin 2 website (The Pirate 
Bay) using the Cleanfeed system. See: Zack Whittaker, ‘”Censorship creep”: Pirate Bay 
block will affect one-third of U.K.’ (CNET, 16 June 2012) <http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1023_3-57454683-93/censorship-creep-pirate-bay-block-will-affect-one-third-of-u.k/> 
accessed 14 May 2014. Incidentally, the Twentieth Century Fox ruling describes at [71] the 
three methods that ISPs can employ to block access to websites, namely, (i) DNS name 
blocking; (ii) IP address blocking using routers; and, (iii) Deep Packet Inspection-based URL 
blocking using ACLs on network management systems. 
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The UK’s Cleanfeed system became the model for Canada’s Project Cleanfeed which 
was rolled out in November 2006. The activities of Cleanfeed Canada, an undertaking 
of the Canadian Coalition Against Child Exploitation (CCAICE), demonstrates how 
borders can be erected in cyberspace. It only blocks customer access to non-Canadian 
websites which host child pornography. Suspect websites within Canada are 
investigated by Canadian law enforcement.132 Scandinavia, too, saw the implementation 
of a child pornography blocking system in October 2004. It involved the Norwegian 
telecoms company, Telenor, working in conjunction with KRIPOS (The Norwegian 
National Criminal Investigation Service).133 One year later, Telenor was again 
instrumental in implementing another content blocking system, this time in Sweden. 
2.12. Conclusions 
One of the key problems for courts dealing with online torts is to localise the place 
where the act giving rise to the damage occurred, or the place where the damage itself 
occurred. Pinpointing the locus delicti has always been challenging, but in a border-
disregarding, deterritorialised context such as the internet, the challenge is amplified.  
 
The writings of Mann in 1964, demonstrate that the challenge of localisation is not new. 
Back then, however, his references were aimed at communications media now 
considered relatively unsophisticated e.g. the telephone, teleprinter, television and 
international advertising and the risk that trans-border distribution of content would too 
readily satisfy territorial connecting factors.   
 
Sterling’s description of the sequence of events comprising an online copyright 
infringement demonstrates the complexity involved. But, the analysis can be simplified 
by focusing on the two most significant acts in the whole chain – those of uploading and 
downloading. They are, in effect, the two constants in the whole equation. 
 
As regards online defamation, the Australian High Court in Dow Jones v Gutnick 
considered the place of download as the locus delicti, rationalising that damage to 
132 See generally: Canadian Centre for Child Protection Inc, ‘Cleanfeed Canada’ (cybertip!ca) 
<https://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/projects-cleanfeed> accessed 14 May 2014.  
133 Gert Vermeulen (ed), EU quality standards in support of the fight against trafficking in 
human beings and sexual exploitation of children (Exploratory study of the potential and 
feasibility of self-regulation or public-private co-operation) (Maklu 2007) 60. 
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reputation could only occur when/where the defamatory material was downloaded to the 
computer of the publishee who was then in a position to comprehend the defamation.134 
A similar approach, linking place of download with place of damage, occurred in the 
2006 English High Court ruling Ashton Investments Limited135 and this ruling was cited 
very recently by counsel in Judith Vidal-Hall,136 a case concerning the online tort of 
breach of confidence. 
 
In a practical deployment, the rule of upload is used in the Satellite Broadcasting and 
Cable Retransmission Directive, where communications to the public by satellite are 
localised in the Member State where the programme carrying signals are ‘uploaded’ to 
the satellite. In addition, there is the Scottish judgment - Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial 
Photography v Nicola Askew, Llargsholidaylets.co.uk – where the court betrayed a 
preference for place of upload when permitting the pursuer to choose between two 
jurisdictions in terms of initiating proceedings.137 But, in granting the pursuer the 
option, the court was, in effect, following the principle laid down in Bier v Mines de 
Potasse d’Alsace,138 whereby a plaintiff may sue in the courts of the place where the 
damage occurred, or in the courts of the place where the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred.139 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
134 Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [26] and [44]. 
135 Ashton Investments Ltd v OJSC Russian Aluminium (Rusal) [2006] EWHC 2545 (Comm). 
136 Judith Vidal-Hall and others v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB). 
137 Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial Photography v Nicola Askew, Largsholidaylets.co.uk [2009] 
SLT (Sh Ct) 146 [28] et seqq. 
138 This ruling is dealt with in depth at para 4.2.3.2.  
139 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, 
para 25.  
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3.1 The Objective of this Chapter  
The aim of this chapter is to provide some jurisprudential evidence that brings together 
three core elements of my research, namely, the internet, copyright (in particular, digital 
copyright) and PIL. Naturally, as the level of transborder copyright infringement 
increases, so does the likelihood of PIL issues arising. Cognisant of the sophisticated 
and harmonised system of PIL rules prevailing in the EU, I shall only treat UK or CJEU 
case-law in this chapter. I have included in this chapter treatment of the Football 
Dataco140 ruling even though it relates to the database right. The fact that the case 
concerns Article 5(3) Brussels I and that the database right and copyright are proximate 
IPRs, constitute justification for the ruling’s inclusion in this chapter.  
This chapter will also demonstrate that much IPR infringement nowadays is internet-
based and frequently these online torts have a transborder component. Clearly, the 
internet is not the only medium that facilitates infringement of digital copyright in a 
transborder context. Satellite and cable141 are also used to disseminate infringing 
digitised content and this is borne out by the ruling, Football Association Premier 
League v QC Leisure142 which is analysed later in this chapter.  
Related themes are also explored in this chapter such as the tensions that exist between 
the deterritorialised internet and territorial IP and the way that the principle of 
territoriality creates a universal system of self-limitation of national substantive IP Law.  
3.2 The proliferation of transborder copyright infringement 
Without doubt, transnational copyright infringement has become much more frequent in 
the digital age.143 Trade marks too, feature prominently among online IP 
140 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar [2013] CMLR 29. 
141  The Satellite and Cable Directive is dealt with at para 5.4.1.  
142 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC 
Leisure; Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083, para 148. 
143  Clearly, all the principal IPRs are breached online. However, it seems to this author that 
copyright and trademark are subject to the highest rates of online infringement. Fawcett and 
Torremans provide useful examples of online infringements of the three main IPRs. James J 
Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2011) 547 et seq. In addition, they list court rulings that reflect the examples given. As 
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infringements.144 Statistics from China now point to a preponderance (60%) of copyright 
infringement among IP infringements during the first ten months of 2011 and to half of 
the copyright infringements having an online dimension.145 Set against this backdrop of 
rising copyright infringement, it is not entirely surprising that cross-border copyright 
infringement has become significantly more commonplace thanks to such things as the 
internet, advances in Information Communication Technologies (ICT), the whole 
process of digitisation, and the desire (or strategy) of infringers or the facilitators of 
copyright infringement to base themselves outside the EU, in pirate havens, so as to try 
and avoid detection. However, the thing that sets the internet apart in this debate is its 
immense technical potential for communicating IP-protected works around the world. 
The internet has radically shaken up the IP world over the last fifteen years or so.  
regards infringement of a patent online, the authors provide the following example: where a 
computer network user situated in France logs onto the network, accesses a machine that is 
physically situated in England, and runs software that would infringe an English patent. See 
Dan L Burk, ‘Patents in cyberspace: Territoriality and infringement on global computer 
networks’ (1993) 68 TLR 1, 39; James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property 
and Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) fn 90 et seq.   
144  Some good recent examples include the Adwords (or, Keywords) rulings from the CJEU to 
include Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08 Google France and Google Inc v 
Louis Vuitton Malletier; Google France v Viaticum Luteciel; Google France v CNRRH 
[2010] ECR I-2417; Case C-323/09 Interflora Inc, Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer 
plc, Flowers Direct Online Ltd [2011] ECR I-8625; Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA v eBay 
International AG [2011] ECR I-6011. These cases all feature one particular practice for 
which Google has become famous – of selling Adwords (or, keywords) which are identical 
or very similar to registered trade marks to traders who use those keywords for the purposes 
of promoting their own goods/services. The issue then arises: Are the following parties 
guilty of trade mark infringement - the service providers who sell the Adwords; the traders 
who purchase the Adwords; and, lastly, the internet search engines (e.g. Google) and online 
market places (e.g. eBay) whose services are used for the purpose of marketing infringing 
products? See generally, Christopher Morcom, ‘Trade marks and the Internet: Where Are 
We Now?’ (2012) 34 EIPR 40-53.  
145  These statistics were provided by the director of the third civil tribunal of China’s Supreme 
People’s Court in December 2011. Zhao Yinan, ‘Online IPR infringement cases on the rise’ 
(China Daily, 20 December 2011) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-
12/20/content_14294110.htm> accessed 24 June 2012. 
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These elements facilitate easy, immediate and widespread dissemination of digitised 
content. In addition, various other means of dissemination such as satellite broadcasting 
and cable (re)transmissions along with technological developments such as peer-to-peer 
file-sharing, streaming and linking all facilitate transborder transfers of copyright 
material. Given that a certain portion of this online activity will be unauthorised, it is 
almost inevitable that illegal transnational IP disseminations will occur. There seems to 
be a constant flow of case law and statistics from copyright-related sectors which 
indicate serious levels of digital copyright infringement. Many of these scenarios 
involve unauthorised dissemination of content such as text, data, music, pictures, 
graphics and film on the internet. Clearly, this is the stuff of copyright litigation. The 
fact that names and terms such as Napster, Gnutella, FastTrack, Kazaa, peer-to-peer (or, 
file-sharing), and Bit-Torrent have become household names over the past decade or so 
demonstrates clearly how copyright has featured prominently in terms of internet IP 
infractions. In fact, Fawcett and Torremans, citing Ginsburg opine that IP infringement 
over the internet is most likely to arise in cases of breach of copyright.146 
 
Besides the prominent case of illegal file-sharing, other entities like YouTube (video-
sharing), LinkedIn (business network), MySpace (social networking), Facebook (social 
networking), and Twitter (social messaging tool) revolve around copyright-protected 
material. In fact, YouTube’s commercial existence/survival depends on copyright 
material. It is one of life’s realities that some of the copyright content featuring in the 
aforementioned media are used without copyright holder approval and sometimes 
disseminated cross-border.147 
146  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) para 10.40; Jane Ginsburg, ‘Putting Cars on the Information 
Superhighway: Authors, Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace’ (1995) 95 Colum L Rev 
1466, fn 84.  
147  Under proposals set out in the Hargreaves Report, a modernised system of licensing has been 
mooted. This new system would be operated by a Digital Copyright Exchange which would 
establish a network of interoperable databases to provide a common platform for licensing 
transactions. Licensing across delivery technologies would also be accommodated by the 
new body. Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital Opportunities – A Review of Intellectual Property and 
Growth’ (May 2011) para 4.31 <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf> accessed 
24 June 2012. Certain key benefits would flow from the proposed Exchange, eg from the 
creator’s perspective: a clearer understanding of licensing terms and conditions throughout 
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Arguably worse is to come for digital copyright holders as Web 2.0, the participatory 
Web, promises much more interaction and user-created content. Having a close 
association with participatory information sharing, Web 2.0 facilitates interoperability, 
user-centred designs and collaboration on the WWW. Examples of Web 2.0 include 
social networking sites, blogs, wikis, video sharing sites, hosted services, web 
applications, mashups and folksonomies. 
 
In the context of Web 2.0, new IT tools will facilitate the creation of new works. 
Frequently, these will be derivative works, based on existing IP protected works that 
will be transformed in a more or less radical or comprehensive way. The upshot will be 
a set of even more complex IP issues especially as there will almost inevitably be more 
contributors in the transformation chain, in even more different jurisdictions.148 
3.3 Essential elements needed in legal proceedings concerning copyright  
 
To establish a framework for critical review of court rulings with a transnational 
copyright element (treated later in this chapter) and for later chapters, I shall now set out 
the necessary elements. 
 
As a practical matter, in order for a court definitively to rule on a copyright dispute 
(whether in favour of the claimant or defendant), the following elements are needed. 
They are basically the same for offline and online infringement, but when they span 
more than one jurisdiction, the three pillars of PIL come into play. This complexity is 
compounded by the geographical uncertainties of infringement on the internet.  
 
 
the market and increased options to license an individual creator’s works directly; from the 
intermediary right holder’s perspective: automated licensing via standard terms if offered by 
the rights holder and, decreased risk of infringements by providing clarity as to what is 
licensed and what is not via terms checkable at the click of a mouse; and, lastly, from the 
consumer’s perspective: a place where those seeking to use copyright works can quickly 
identify the right holder and secure a licence, either through automation or via a negotiating 
agent. 
148  James J Fawcett and P Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2011) para 10.04. 
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1. A claimant with legal capacity and standing to sue 
The Berne Convention ensures that an original work will be protected in most countries 
in the world. However, the claimant must demonstrate that it has an appropriate interest 
in the relevant copyright(s). For example, in the UK, the owner of the rights may sue,149 
an exclusive licensee of the relevant rights,150 and, in limited circumstances, a non-
exclusive licensee.151 
 
The Berne Convention requires protection for authors and their works; it does not, 
however, govern rules on transfer and ownership. These questions, and indeed which 
law applies in ascertaining the answers, are left to contracting states. The Max Planck 
CLIP152 proposal seeks to settle this in Article 2:205 (jurisdiction over entitlement and 
ownership), Article 3:201 (choice of law on initial ownership), and Article 3:301 
(choice of law on transferability). The ALI proposals153 allow the law of each country 
for which the rights are exercised to determine transferability (Section 314), but tie 
initial ownership to the country where the creator was resident when the work was 
created (Section 313(1)(a)).154 
 
It will be assumed that the legal capacity of the claimant is not a problem.  
 
 
 
 
149  CDPA 1988, s 96. 
150  Ibid s 101. 
151  Ibid s 101A. 
152  The Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property was established in 2004. 
The Group drafted a set of principles on conflict of laws in IP and advanced the Final Text of 
the Principles on 31 August 2011 at a conference on the CLIP Principles in November 2011 
at the Harnack-Haus in Berlin. 
153 ALI, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes (ALI Publishers 2008). 
154  Section 313(1)(a) states that the initial title to IPRs that do not arise out of registration will 
be governed by the law of the creator’s residence at the time the subject matter was created. 
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2. A defendant with legal capacity on whom liability may be imposed, directly 
or indirectly 
 
The problem of minors downloading material in an unauthorised way has exercised 
legislatures (European Parliament), copyright holders, and commentators.155 Again it 
will be assumed in this thesis that the defendant has legal capacity. Arguments as to 
indirect or contributory infringement may be raised against internet service providers, 
the providers of file-sharing software etc. 
 
3. A court with jurisdiction over the defendant and subject-matter 
 
Jurisdiction over a defendant may be personal (defendant’s domicile – Article 2, 
Brussels I), based on the fact of multiple defendants (Article 6, Brussels I), or derived 
from subject-matter jurisdiction (e.g. place of harmful event – Article 5(3), Brussels I) 
or, occasionally, based on the possession of assets in the jurisdiction (e.g. Germany, by 
virtue of Article 23, Code of Civil Procedure of Germany).156 Locating and identifying 
the defendant is crucial – ‘John Doe’ litigation and roving Anton Piller orders are 
problematic in the offline world, let alone online.  
 
Subject-matter jurisdiction may be direct or related to personal jurisdiction (e.g. under 
Brussels I, the court of the defendant’s domicile may confer subject-matter jurisdiction 
for the whole EU). In addition, there may be lis pendens rules preventing multiple 
assumptions of jurisdiction (e.g. Articles 27 and 28, Brussels I).157 
 
4. A cause of action for copyright infringement  
 
This will depend upon the applicable law, but will comprise at least acts restricted by 
copyright, relevant geographical connections and lack of consent. 
 
155  William Patry, ‘Can a Minor be Sued for Infringement?‘ (The Patry Copyright Blog, 28 
September 2006) <http://williampatry.blogspot.co.uk/2006/09/can-minor-be-sued-for-
infringement.html> accessed 15 August 2012. 
156 ‘The Brussels I Regulation (No 44/2001)’ (Dutch Civil Law) 
<http://dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone022.htm> accessed 15 August 2012. 
157 See para 4.2.6. 
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5. Exceptions and limitations 
 
These depend critically upon the applicable law, as witness the closed but non-
mandatory set in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive.  
 
6. Law applicable to substantive issues 
 
7. Evidence  
 
This must be admissible and persuasive under relevant procedural law to establish 
commission of infringement (presumptions may be available under international and 
local law) and any exceptions/limitations relied upon. 
 
8. Availability of remedies 
 
This is a matter decided by the substantive law. A case in point is Lucasfilm Ltd v 
Ainsworth.158 In 2006, the US District Court (Central District of California) awarded 
Lucasfilm $20 million by way of default judgment. However, the whole judgment went 
unsatisfied right up to the English Supreme Court’s ruling in July 2011. While the 
Supreme Court held that it could assume jurisdiction over the case (provided it had in 
personam jurisdiction over the defendant), it made no statement on its attitude to US 
statutory damages. However, conceivably, an English court could award a much lower 
figure than that awarded by the Californian court if, under the pre-Rome II rules,159 it 
were to apply English procedural law when quantifying the damages.160 Going forward, 
one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of US style damages awards in the EU as 
158  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39. 
159  Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s 14 (3), Boys v Chaplin 
[1971] AC 356; Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32. 
160  Daniel Hart, ‘Star Wars Episode III – English Supreme Court decision: A New Hope for the 
enforcement of non-EU copyrights, or a Phantom Menace for UK-domiciled entities?’ 
(Mayer Brown, 13 September 2011) 4 
<http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/66ac2a8d-59e2-4df4-b9a2-
63a0190fd2f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e687d1a6-f0f9-4c52-af8c-
795d4509b1ad/11551.pdf> accessed 23 August 2012. 
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Rome II provides that a foreign law governing a non-contractual claim will also apply 
to the quantification exercise.161 
 
9. Means of enforcement of remedies 
 
This is usually regarded as the third pillar of PIL, after jurisdiction and applicable law. 
However its availability or non-availability may be a relevant factor in a court’s 
assuming or declining jurisdiction. Recent case-law, involving infringements on- and 
offline will be analysed within this framework, and subsequent chapters will investigate 
whether and how various elements may be established. 
 
3.4 Tensions between a deterritorialised internet and territorial IP    
 
One obvious tension that exists is that between the non-territorial (or, deterritorialised) 
internet and the territorial nature of IP.162 The territoriality principle holds that the IP 
laws of one country only apply within that country. As Ginsburg and Lucas note: 
161 Sarah Byrt and Daniel Hart, ‘Copyright Across Borders’ in Mayer Brown, ‘Expert Guide:    
Intellectual Property’ (Corporate Live Wire, December 2011) 17 
<http://www.mayerbrown.com /files/News/766c77f9-5f13-478c-aec1-
17ecc831941e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/59ac67c0-42c9-458d-9fad-
1bbca7f87dda/ART_BYRT_HART_DEC11_COPYRIGHT-ACCROSS-BORDERS.PDF> 
accessed 23 August 2012, referring to Article 15, Rome II, which states that the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation shall govern (among other things) the existence, 
the nature and the assessment of damages or the remedy claimed. 
162  Peukert describes intellectual property law as ‘probably one of the most ”territorial” 
branches of commercial law. Alexander Peukert, ‘Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in 
Intellectual Property Law’ (SSRN, 19 April 2010) 36 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592263> accessed 31 May 2014. 
Rotstein refers to ‘the core principle of territoriality that informs so much of the international 
intellectual property system. Fiona Rotstein, ‘Is there an international intellectual property 
system? Is there an agreement between states as to what the objectives of intellectual 
property should be?’ (2011) 33 EIPR 1, 4. David Vaver states that ‘Copyright law is 
territorial, so in principle only one country’s law should apply to a single act, and users 
should not be liable to overlapping laws.’ David Vaver, ‘Recent Copyright Law 
Developments Reform?’ (2010) 22 IPJ 1, 9.  
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‘Each country determines, for its own territory and independently from any other 
country, what is to be protected as intellectual property, who should benefit from such 
protection, for how long and how protection should be enforced.‘163 
In effect, under the territoriality principle, foreign rights cannot be infringed by local 
activity and local rights cannot be infringed by foreign activity.164 As regards UK 
copyright, Section 16(1) of CDPA 1988 contains a clear rule concerning the territorial 
scope. For UK Copyright Law to apply, the infringing acts must take place in the UK.165 
This rule has been followed in a line of cases to include the rulings in Jonathan Cape 
Ltd v Consolidated Press Ltd [1954],166 Def Lepp Music v Stuart Brown [1986],167 and 
Atkinson Footwear Ltd v Hodgkin International Services Ltd [1995].168 The key element 
is that the infringing copies are actually made in the UK. If they are illegally reproduced 
in the UK with the sole aim of exporting them to foreign countries, the exportation 
element will be irrelevant. The reproductions will still be deemed illegal under UK 
Copyright Law because of the place of reproduction.169 As an extension of this rule, 
illegal reproductions made outside the UK on the basis of an authorisation given in the 
163  Jane C Ginsburg and André Lucas, ‘The Role of Private International Law and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in WIPO, Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of Issues’ 
(WIPO/INT/02, 2002) para 283.   
164  See German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) rulings in the following cases: 
BGHZ 41, 84 (15) (‘Maja’); BGHZ 49, 331 (20) (‘Voran’); IIC 1977, 276 (278) (‘Hummel 
Christmas Plate’); IIC 1995, 573 (575) (‘Folgerecht’). 
165  This situation seems to have changed following the recent ruling in Lucasfilm Ltd v 
Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 in which the UK Supreme Court held that provided there is a 
basis for in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, it would have jurisdiction to hear a 
case where the unauthorised reproduction and sale by the defendant occurred in the US, not 
the UK. UK Patents Law has a provision very similar to CDPA 1988, s16(1). It is Patents 
Act 1977, s 60 which clearly restricts infringing acts to acts committed in the UK. Oddly, the 
UK’s Trade Marks Act 1994 does not contain a territorial restriction but this seems more of a 
legislative oversight than anything else. There is nothing in the Trade Marks Act 1994 to 
indicate that the British Parliament was attempting to rule extra-territorially as well!   
166  Jonathan Cape Ltd v Consolidated Press Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1313. 
167  Def Lepp Music v Stuart-Brown [1986] RPC 273. 
168  Atkinson Footwear Ltd v Hodgkin International Services Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 186. 
169  A similar rule prevails under Dutch Copyright Law. See, eg: NV Gebr Van Zijverden v GF 
Mens [1973] BIE 99.  
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UK, will still fall outside UK Copyright Law due to the place of reproduction. Only an 
authorisation to perform an infringing act in the UK will be actionable under UK 
Copyright Law.170 
 
EU jurisprudence and legislation have also confirmed the territoriality principle. In 
Lagardère Active Broadcast v SPRE and GVL, a case involving a royalties-related 
dispute between a broadcaster (Lagardère Active Broadcast) and two collecting 
agencies (SPRE and GVL), the European Court of Justice stated as follows: 
 
the principle of the territoriality of those rights, which is recognised in 
international law and also in the EC Treaty. Those rights are therefore of a 
territorial nature and, moreover, domestic law can only penalise conduct 
engaged in within national territory.171 
 
In terms of EU legislation, the application of a foreign IP Law is excluded under the 
Electronic Commerce Directive.172 This occurs by virtue of Article 3(3) which states 
170  See ABKCO Music & Records Inc v Music Collection International Ltd [1995] RPC 657, 
660 (Hoffmann LJ). A similar rule exists in US Copyright Law, see Subafilms Ltd v MGM-
Pathe Communications Co, 24 F 3d1088 (9th Cir 1994). 
171  Case C-192/04 Lagardère Active Broadcast v Société pour la perception de la rémunération 
équitable (SPRE) and Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL) 
[2005] ECR I-7199, para 46. This case concerned rental and lending rights (Council 
Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain 
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property [1992] OJ L346/61) and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (Council 
Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15). The ruling was a Preliminary Ruling following a request 
made by the French Court de Cassation (Supreme Court). The transnational component arose 
because Lagardère (established in France) transmitted signals to a satellite, which, in turn, 
transmitted to a transmitter in Felsberg (Germany). The Felsberg transmitter was technically 
equipped to broadcast to France on long wave (and this was carried out by Lagardère’s 
subsidiary, Europe 1).  
172 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce) [2000] OJ L178/1, art 3(3). 
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that the country of origin rule does not apply to IPRs. The principle of territoriality is 
also safeguarded at multilateral convention level. Both the Berne Convention (1886) 
and the Paris Convention (1883) adhere to the principle of national treatment according 
to which each Contracting State accords the rights provided for in the conventions to 
nationals of other Contracting States. Thus, international law in the field of IP confirms 
that IP protection is limited territorially and personally. Given that there are currently 
175 Contracting States of the Paris Convention173 and 167 Members/Contracting States 
of the Berne Convention,174 it is safe to say that objective175 and subjective 
territoriality176 are universally accepted concepts.177 
 
173  WIPO, ‘Contracting Parties Paris Convention’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2> accessed 29 May 
2014.   
174  WIPO, ‘Contracting Parties Berne Convention’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15> accessed 29 May 
2014.  
175  The objective dimension of the territoriality principle refers to the fact that an IP right is 
limited to the territory of the State granting it. The exclusive right can only cover activities 
occurring within the respective territory. Things which are capable of copyright protection 
are subject to a bundle of possibly more than 150 territorial rights of national or regional 
provenance. These rights are independent from each other so that a work may be protected in 
one country but unprotected in another. There are as many property legislations as there are 
IP rights. A comparative survey reveals that this objective territoriality principle has long 
been accepted by the EU, its Member States like Germany or the Netherlands, other 
European countries like Switzerland, common law countries around the globe, Japan and the 
US. Alexander Peukert, ‘Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law’ 
(SSRN, 19 April 2010) 1 et seq, fn 2-13  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592263> accessed 31 May 2014. 
176  Since the territorially limited rights are independent from one another, they may be owned 
by different persons, even if the same subject matter is concerned. National legislation may 
not only grant the rights in the same work to different persons, it may also restrict the 
availability of protection to its nationals and extend it to foreigners only under certain 
conditions, in particular by way of local publication/production or reciprocity requirements. 
This state of affairs is known as subjective territoriality. Ibid 3. 
177  Ibid 4. 
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From a conflicts perspective, one important effect of the principle of territoriality is that 
it creates a universal system of self-limitation of national substantive IP Law. This 
element of self-limitation affects the normal operation of the choice-of-law process. 
Since all possible applicable laws are limited to a territory and none is universal in 
scope, none can apply in another territory. The logical follow-on according to Peukert is 
that only the law of the country for which protection is sought (lex loci protectionis), 
also considered to be most closely related to the issue, will determine whether a right 
exists, whether it has been infringed, and most general aspects concerning the IPR. The 
Rome II Regulation178 bolsters the status of the lex loci protectionis by stating that the 
principle is ‘universally acknowledged’ and that it ‘should be preserved’.179 The 
principle is actually enshrined in Article 8(1), Rome II. The territoriality principle 
signifies a mosaic of independent, territorially and personally limited exclusive rights to 
be applied by local courts.  
 
As the internet is ubiquitous or global in nature, it tends to cross all national borders. Its 
ubiquity ensures that it is not particularly dependent on national borders. Nor is it 
circumscribed by them. These facts virtually guarantee that it will come into conflict 
with IP which is strongly based on the territoriality principle. Somewhat ironically too, 
the internet’s virtual global presence combined with its all-pervasiveness means that it 
is the perfect and natural medium to accommodate trans-national, multi-state IP 
infringement.   
 
It is important to acknowledge in this section of the thesis that the territoriality principle 
is gradually being diluted by the internet and an increasingly global exploitation of 
rights. Viewing territoriality from the perspective of choice of law, Rotstein lists off the 
various approaches she describes as alternatives to territoriality: the US ‘root copy’ 
approach, the ‘nerve centre’ approach, the law of the author’s country of residence or 
place of business, i.e. the place where the harm is ultimately felt, the lex fori and the lex 
mercatoria (for cyberspace).180 
178 See para 5.2.1.  
179  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L 199/40, recital (26).  
180  Fiona Rotstein, ‘Is there an international intellectual property system? Is there an agreement 
between states as to what the objectives of intellectual property should be?’ (2011) 33 EIPR 
1, 4. 
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In an endeavour to demonstrate just how common transborder copyright infringements 
are, the author devotes the second half of this chapter to analysing a number of rulings 
from both the UK and the CJEU.  
I will start my analysis with Lucasfilm, handed down by the UK’s Supreme Court and 
then move onto the CJEU rulings.     
3.5 The UK 
3.5.1 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth181 
 
One of the key issues raised in this appeal from the Court of Appeal ruling (2009) was 
whether an English court could exercise jurisdiction in a claim against persons 
domiciled in England for copyright infringement committed outside the EU in breach of 
copyright law of that country.  
 
The case revolved around alleged breach of artistic works associated with the Star Wars 
film, more specifically, with unauthorised reproduction and sale by Ainsworth in the US 
of the Imperial Stormtrooper helmets. Ainsworth sold $30,000 worth of the goods in the 
US. Lucasfilm obtained judgment against him in the US. It also commenced 
proceedings in the English courts, including claims for infringement of English 
copyright and claims under US Copyright.  
 
While this Supreme Court ruling from July 2011 raised two distinct issues, the 
justiciability issue is the one that is of most relevance to this thesis.182 On the issue of 
justiciability, the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal. It held that provided 
there is basis for in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, an English court does 
have jurisdiction to try a claim for infringement of copyright of a kind involved in the 
present action.183 At an earlier stage in the proceedings, the Court of Appeal ruled that 
the common law rule in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moҫambique184 was in 
181 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39. 
182  The other issue is related to the definition of ‘sculpture’ in the CDPA 1988 and, in particular, 
the correct approach to three-dimensional objects that have both an artistic purpose and a 
utilitarian function.  
183 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [106]. 
184  British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moҫambique [1893] AC 602. 
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fact an example of a general principle which applied to claims for infringement of 
foreign IPRs.185 In Companhia de Moҫambique, an English court was held not to have 
jurisdiction to entertain an action for determination of title to, or the right of possession 
of, foreign land, or the recovery of damages for trespass to such land.186 The respondents 
(Ainsworth et al) argued that the Moҫambique rule (as extended in Hesperides Hotels 
Ltd v Muftizade187) still subsisted and applied to claims for infringement of all foreign 
IPRs including copyright because such claims are essentially ‘local’ and must be 
brought in the place where the rights have been created, irrespective as to whether there 
is any claim to title.188 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the respondents’ argument and found the claim justiciable. 
The court drew attention to the fact that much of the underpinning of the Moҫambique 
rule and the decision in Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd189 had been eroded and the rule 
in Phillips v Eyre190 is gone.191  
185  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 [175]. 
186  British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moҫambique [1893] AC 602. 
187  Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Muftizade [1979] AC 508. 
188  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [105]. 
189 Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1905] VLR 612, affd [1906] 3 CLR 479. Potter is an 
influential decision which is generally regarded as extending the Moҫambique rule to actions 
for patent infringement. Potter obtained a patent in Victoria for the separation of metals from 
sulphide ores and a patent for the same process in New South Wales. Potter claimed a 
threatened infringement of the Victorian patent in Victoria and an infringement by the 
defendant company of its New South Wales patent at its mine in New South Wales. Broken 
Hill argued that an action for the infringement in New South Wales of a New South Wales 
patent was not justiciable in the Victorian courts. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria held that the claim was not justiciable and an appeal to the High Court of Australia 
was dismissed. Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [61].    
190  Phillips v Eyre [1870] LR 6 QB 1. The rule in Phillips v Eyre was generally known as the 
rule of double-actionability. It stipulated that as a general rule, to found suit in England for a 
tort alleged to have been committed abroad, two conditions had to be satisfied: (i) the alleged 
wrong must have been actionable as a tort if committed in England; and (ii) the act must not 
have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done (the act had to be actionable 
in the place where it was committed). The rule was gradually eroded by case-law (Boys v 
Chaplin [1971] AC 356; Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 190) and 
finally abolished by the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.   
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 Nor could the Supreme Court see any scope for the application of the act of state 
doctrine192 in this case. Instead, it highlighted the fact that the modern trend is in favour 
of the enforcement of foreign IPRs. In this regard, the court gave three examples of the 
modern trend. Firstly, Article 22(4) of Brussels I only assigns exclusive jurisdiction to 
the country where the right originates in cases which are concerned with registration or 
validity of rights which are ‘required to be deposited or registered’.193 As copyright is 
rarely if ever deposited or registered (the US being an exception), situations of exclusive 
jurisdiction will be exceptionally rare and the likelihood of local courts assuming 
jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringements will remain a distinct possibility. 
Secondly, the Rome II Regulation plainly envisages the litigation of foreign IPRs.194 
And, thirdly, the professional and academic bodies which have considered the issue – 
the American Law Institute and the Max Planck Institute – clearly favour the 
enforcement of foreign IPRs.195 Besides this modern trend, the Supreme Court also 
191  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [106], [108]. 
192  In the US, the act of state doctrine has been used as a basis for non-justiciability of foreign 
trade marks and patent rights. In the 1956 ruling, Vanity Fair Mills, Inc v T Eaton Co Ltd, 
234 F 2d 633, 646 (2d Cir 1956), 352 US 871 (1956), the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that a US federal court should not rule on the validity of a Canadian trade mark 
because (among other reasons) the act of state doctrine precluded determination of the acts 
of a foreign sovereign done within its own territory, and to rule on validity would create 
conflicts with Canadian administrative and judicial officers. The act of state doctrine was 
invoked more recently in the US as a ground for refusing to allow the addition of claims for 
infringement of parallel foreign patents to claims for infringement of US patents in litigation 
in which validity was in issue. See: Voda v Cordis Corp, 476 F 3d 887 (Fed Cir 2007). 
193  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [109]. 
194  Ibid. 
195  Ibid [94] et seq, [109]. The ALI’s Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, 
Choice of Law and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (ALI Publishers 2008) are referred 
to in the judgment at [94] as applying to transnational civil disputes which involve IPRs. 
Section 211 provides that the court must have subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. The 
judgment also refers at [95] to draft principles prepared by the EU Max Planck Group on 
Conflict of Laws in IP. While these draft Principles contain no specific provision for actions 
for infringement of foreign rights abroad, it is implicit in the Principles that they envisage 
such actions. Within the Principles, the primary law applicable to infringement is the law of 
the State for which protection is sought. European Max Planck Group, Principles for Conflict 
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justified its assumption of jurisdiction in this case by referring to the frequent grant in 
the UK of extra-territorial injunctions against defendants subject to in personam 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was also quick to dismiss the lack of an international 
regime for the mutual recognition of copyright jurisdiction and of copyright judgments 
as a reason for it to refuse to take jurisdiction over an English defendant in a claim for 
breach of foreign copyright.196 Two years earlier, the Court of Appeal had relied on this 
fact to decline jurisdiction in the case.197   
 
Finally, another interesting aspect of Lucasfilm is the Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
issue of justiciability (in foreign copyright infringement cases) in other common law 
jurisdictions. It found that in both New Zealand (High Court)198 and South Africa 
(Supreme Court of Appeal),199 claims for infringement of foreign copyright were held to 
be non-justiciable. However, in a later High Court of New Zealand ruling, KK Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Van Veen,200 that court held that a claim for infringement of 
foreign IPRs (in that case, breach of UK and Hong Kong copyright in PlayStation 2) 
was justiciable if no question of the existence or validity of those rights was in issue.201  
3.6 Court of Justice of the European Union  
3.6.1 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v 
Media Protection Services Ltd 
This case is in fact a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU,202 following references 
from the English High Court (both, Chancery Division and Queen’s Bench Division). 
of Laws in Intellectual Property, The Draft (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 25 March 2011) 19-
21 <http://www.cl-ip.eu/files/pdf2/draft-clip-principles-25-03-20117.pdf> accessed 12 July 
2012.  
196 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [88] et seqq. 
197 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 [174], [183]. 
198  Atkinson Footwear Ltd v Hodgskin International Services Ltd (1994) 31 IPR 186 (Tipping 
J).  
199  Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd [2011] 1 All SA 449 (SCA). 
200  KK Sony Computer Entertainment v Van Veen (2006) 71 IPR 179 (MacKenzie J).  
201 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [101]. 
202 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ  
C115/47; Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)  
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The case is interesting in that it deals with the delicate interface between IP and satellite 
broadcasting. It also looks at IP in the context of the Information Society. 
In this case, the transnational copyright element arose in the context of satellite 
broadcasts (encrypted audiovisual content) of Premier League football matches from 
Greece which were accessed in the UK through the (allegedly unauthorised) use of a 
Greek card and decoder box.203 In terms of the essential elements needed before a court 
can rule on a copyright dispute, discussed earlier in this chapter, the cause of action for 
copyright infringement stands out in this case. Briefly put, the cause of action derived 
from the breach of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive by the owners of the public 
houses. This infringement of the communication to the public right204 provided a cause 
of action to the two main rightholders - FAPL and Multichoice Hellas (the Greek 
broadcaster). 
The original copyright work is produced by the FAPL when it films Premier League 
matches. Subsequently, logos, video sequences, on-screen graphics, music and English 
commentary are added at a production facility. A new copyright is created when the 
signal is sent by satellite to a broadcaster which adds its own logos and possibly some 
commentary. In the instant case, that second broadcaster (or holder of the sub-licence) 
was the Greek entity NetMed Hellas. The ruling acknowledges that ‘two categories of 
persons can assert intellectual property rights relating to television broadcasts - firstly, 
the authors of the works concerned (i.e. FAPL) and, secondly, the broadcasters (such as 
Multichoice Hellas).205  
[2002] OJ C325/33. 
203 The broadcasting was set up on the basis of territorial exclusivity. FAPL exercised the 
television broadcasting rights by granting exclusive (three year) licences to foreign 
broadcasters. Those broadcasters were required under their licence agreement with FAPL to 
ensure that their broadcasts which were capable of being received outside their exclusive 
licence territory were encrypted. In this case, the Greek sub-licensee was NetMed Hellas 
which broadcast the matches on SuperSport Channels on the NOVA platforms, owned and 
operated by Multichoice Hellas. The UK licensee was BSkyB Ltd.  
204 See para 6.10. 
205  Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC 
Leisure; Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083, para 148. 
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The right that was ultimately held to have been infringed was the communication to the 
public206 within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.207 Article 3(1) 
gives authors the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the 
public of their works by wire or wireless means.208  
The CJEU referred to one of its previous rulings in Sociedad General Autores y 
Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA209 where a hotel proprietor was deemed 
to have carried out an act of communication when he gave his customers access to the 
broadcast works via television sets, by distributing in the hotel rooms, the signal 
received carrying the protected works. It was pointed out by the court that such an act 
(intervention) was necessary for customers to be able to enjoy the broadcast works. 
The court drew the analogy between FAPL v QC Leisure and Rafael Hoteles. In the 
former, the owner of a public house intentionally gave the customers present access to a 
broadcast containing protected works via a television screen and speakers. Without his 
intervention, the customers could not enjoy the works broadcast even though they were 
physically within the broadcast’s catchment area.210  
However, when considering whether an infringement has occurred under Article 3(1) of 
the InfoSoc Directive, it is important to ascertain whether the work broadcast was 
transmitted to a new public, that is, to a public which was not taken into account by the 
206 See para 6.10. 
207  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L167/10 is referred to in short as the InfoSoc Directive.  
208 This chapter will not treat in depth the reproduction right and the related acts of reproduction 
which were performed within the memory of the satellite decoder and on a TV screen as they 
were held to fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive (the 
exceptions and limitations provision) and may therefore be carried out without the 
authorisation of the copyright holders concerned. In other words, such acts of reproduction 
were found to be non-infringing by the CJEU. 
209  Case C-306/05 Sociedad General Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA 
[2006] ECR I-11519.  
210  In Rafael Hoteles, the hotel intervenes to give access to the protected work to its customers. 
In the absence of that intervention, the hotel’s guests (although physically within the hotel) 
would not have been able to enjoy the broadcast works. Ibid para 42.   
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authors of the protected works when they authorised their use by the communication to 
the original public. 
In the present case, when the Greek broadcasters authorised a broadcast of their works, 
they considered principally the owners of TV sets who either personally or within their 
own private or family circles received the signal and followed the broadcasts. But, 
where a broadcast work is transmitted in a place accessible to the public for an 
additional public which is permitted by the owner of the TV set to hear or see the work, 
then an intentional intervention of that kind must be regarded as an act by which the 
work in question is communicated to a new public.  
Such a situation transpires when broadcast works are transmitted by the owner of a 
public house to the customers present in the establishment because those customers 
constitute an additional public which was not considered by the authors when they 
authorised the broadcasting of their works.  
The court also attached importance to the fact that the relevant communication was of a 
profit-making nature. In the court’s view, it was indisputable that the proprietor 
transmitted the broadcast works in his public house in order to benefit therefrom and 
that the transmission was liable to attract customers. The natural consequence of all this 
was that the transmission in question had an effect upon the number of people going to 
the establishment and ultimately on its financial results.  
Weighing up all the foregoing points, the CJEU ruled that ‘communication to the 
public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) must be interpreted as covering transmission 
of the broadcast works, via a TV screen and speakers, to the customers present in a 
public house.211 The implication there is that UK public houses which wish to screen 
live Premier League matches may only do so by obtaining the prior permission of the 
copyright owner.   
211  Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC 
Leisure; Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083, para 207.  
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3.6.2 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH 
Another CJEU case involving transnational copyright infringement (albeit offline in 
nature) is that of Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH.212 It is, in fact, a 
preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, delivered on 1 December 2011.213  
This case involves transnational copyright infringement as it concerns copyright in 
photographs214 taken by an Austrian photographer which were later reproduced in 
Germany without the copyright holder’s authorisation.  
 
The case was referred to the European Court by the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial 
Court, Vienna). The referring court asked questions of interpretation regarding 
jurisdiction for related actions in accordance with Article 6(1) of Brussels I. The other 
questions relate to Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the Information Society. 
 
The applicant in the main proceedings is a freelance photographer. In the course of her 
work, she produced portrait photos of the Austrian national Natasha K215 prior to her 
aduction in 1998. The five defendants216 in the main proceedings are newspaper 
publishers. Only the first defendant in the main proceedings is established in Austria. 
The last four defendants are established in Germany. All five defendants published daily 
newspapers in Germany and most of them also published in Austria. 
 
212  Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH [2012] ECDR 6. 
213  The Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak was delivered on the 12 April 2011.  
214  Under Recital (16) and Article 6 of Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights [2006] OJ L372/12, photographs which are original in the sense that they are 
the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected.  
215  Natascha Maria Kampusch (now an Austrian television hostess) is known for her abduction 
at the age of 10 on 2 March 1998. She was held in a secret cellar by her kidnapper for more 
than eight years until she escaped on 23 August 2006.  
216  The five defendants are Standard VerlagsGmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co KG and, lastly, Verlag M DuMont 
Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & Co KG.   
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In 2006, Natasha K escaped from her abductor. The main proceedings concern the 
reporting by the defendants of this event using the applicant’s photos but without 
crediting the applicant. Owing to the place of establishment of most of the defendants, 
many of the contested photos were published in Germany in newspapers and magazines 
such as Der Standard, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Express, Bild, and Die Welt 
(all of which run a news website on the internet). In some of the reports, a photo-fit was 
also published which was intended to show the presumed current appearance of Natasha 
K. It was produced by a graphic artist using a computer programme and based on one of 
the contested photos.  
 
In the main proceedings, the applicant brought an action against the defendants at the 
Handelsgericht Wien in Austria. That action sought, in essence, a prohibitory injunction 
relating to the reproduction of the contested photos/photo-fit without her consent and 
without indicating her as author and payment of remuneration/damages.  
 
As regards the PIL  point referred by the Commercial Court, Vienna, the CJEU held that 
Article 6(1) of Brussels I must be interpreted as not precluding its application solely 
because actions against several defendants for substantially identical copyright 
infringements are brought on national legal grounds which vary according to the 
Member States concerned. The European Court stated that it is for the referring court to 
assess in the light of all the elements of the case, whether there is a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments if those actions were determined separately.  
 
One of the intellectual property points referred by the Viennese court was whether a 
portrait photograph could be protected by copyright under Article 6 of Directive 
2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 12 December 2006 on the 
term of protection of copyright and certain related rights. The CJEU replied in the 
affirmative, so long as the photograph is an intellectual creation of the author reflecting 
his personality and expressing his free and creative choices in the production of that 
photograph. 
3.6.3 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG217  
This preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Brussels I in the 
context of alleged infringed copyright. The main proceedings commenced in the 
217 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECDR 15. 
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Tribunal de grande instance de Toulouse (Regional Court, Toulouse) where the claimant 
sought compensation for damage sustained after the defendant allegedly reproduced 12 
of the plaintiff’s songs without his authorisation. The music works had been reproduced 
on compact discs which had been pressed in Austria by Mediatech and then marketed 
online by UK companies. The relevant websites were accessible from the claimant’s 
residence in Toulouse. 
 
Mediatech challenged the jurisdiction of the French courts. Ultimately the Cour d’appel 
de Toulouse held that the Tribunal de grande instance de Toulouse lacked jurisdiction 
on the ground that the defendant was domiciled in Austria and the place where the 
damage occurred could not be situated in France. 
 
The claimant appealed that judgment, relying on Article 5(3) of Brussels I. He argued 
that the French courts have jurisdiction and that his action was wrongly rejected.  
In those circumstances, the Cour de Cassation decided to stay its proceedings and to 
refer two questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
 
1. Article 5(3) of … [the Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the 
event of an alleged infringement of copyright committed … online… 
-  
- the person who considers that his rights have been infringed has the 
option of bringing an action to establish liability before the courts of 
each Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or 
has been accessible, in order to obtain compensation solely in respect of 
the damage suffered on the territory of the Member State of the court 
before which the action is brought, 
or 
does that content also have to be, or to have been, directed at the public 
located in the territory of that Member State, or must some other clear 
connecting factor be present?   
 
2. Is the answer to Question 1 the same if the alleged infringement of copyright 
results, not from the placing of dematerialised content online, but, as in the 
    
 
87
present case, from the online sale of a material carrier medium which reproduces 
that content?218  
In its analysis of the referred questions, the CJEU referred to two of its fairly recent 
rulings concerning online torts which produced effects in numerous places. The first, 
joined cases eDate Advertising GmbH v X; and Martinez v MGN Ltd219 concerned 
alleged infringement of personality rights on the internet while the second, 
Wintersteiger220 concerned alleged online infringement of trade marks in the context of 
Adwords in the advertising system on Google Internet. 
 
The CJEU identified a number of principles arising from the two aforementioned 
rulings.  
 
Firstly, the place where the alleged damage occurred within the meaning of Article 5(3) 
may vary according to the nature of the right allegedly infringed.221 Secondly, the 
likelihood of the damage occurring in a particular Member State is subject to the 
requirement that the right in respect of which infringement is alleged is protected in that 
Member State.222 Thirdly, in order to attribute jurisdiction to a court to hear an 
allegation of infringement in matters of tort, delict and quasi-delict, the identification of 
the place where the alleged damage occurred also depends on which court is best placed 
to determine whether the alleged infringement is well founded.223  
 
In applying those principles for the purpose of localising the damage on the internet, the 
CJEU has distinguished between infringement of personality rights and infringement of 
intellectual and industrial property rights.224 
 
218  Ibid para H4. 
219  Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X; Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v MGN Ltd [2011] ECR I-10269. 
220  Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH [2013] CEC 
15. 
221  Case C-170/12 Pinckney v KDG Mediatech [2013] ECDR 15, para 32. 
222 Ibid para 33. 
223  Ibid para 34.  
224  Ibid para 35. 
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Where there is an infringement of personality rights (which are protected in all the 
Member States) by way of content placed online, the victim of such infringement may 
bring his action before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content 
placed online is or has been accessible.225 However, such courts’ jurisdiction is 
delimited to the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the court 
seised.226 Staying with the theme of injury to personality rights by content placed online, 
the CJEU suggested that such a case might best be assessed by the court of the place 
where the alleged victim has his centre of interests. Moreover, the alleged victim may 
choose to bring an action in one forum in respect of all the damage caused.227  
 
As regards the second part of the question referred by the Cour de Cassation, pertaining 
to the possible directing at the public of online infringing content, the court stated that 
the localisation of the place where the harmful event giving rise to that damage 
occurred, for the purposes of Article 5(3) Brussels I, cannot depend on criteria which 
are specific to the examination of the substance and which do not appear in that 
provision.228 As the sole condition specified in Article 5(3) is that a harmful event has 
occurred or may occur, there is no requirement that the activity be ‘directed’ to the 
Member State in which the court seised is situated.229 In that regard, Article 5(3) differs 
from Article 15(1)(c) of Brussels I, which was interpreted in Joined Cases C-585/08 and 
C-144/09 Pammer; and Hotel Alpenhof.230  
 
In terms of jurisdiction to hear an action in tort, delict or quasi-delict, that will already 
be established in favour of the court seised if the Member State in which the court is 
situated protects the copyrights relied on by the plaintiff and there is a likelihood that 
the alleged harmful event might occur within the jurisdiction of the court seised.231 That 
225  Ibid para 36.  
226  Ibid para 36; Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X; Olivier 
Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Ltd [2011] ECR I-10269, para 52.  
227  Case C-170/12 Pinckney v KDG Mediatech [2013] ECDR 15, para 36. 
228  Ibid para 41. 
229  Ibid paras 41 and 42. 
230  Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter; Hotel Alpenhof v 
Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527; see para 2.10. 
231  Case C-170/12 Pinckney v KDG Mediatech [2013] ECDR 15, para 43. 
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likelihood arises from the possibility of obtaining a reproduction of the protected work 
from an internet site accessible within the jurisdiction of the court seised.232  
 
The CJEU then seemed to delimit the jurisdiction of the court seised. It stated that if the 
protection granted by the Member State of the seised court is applicable only in that 
Member State, then that court only has jurisdiction to determine the damage caused 
within the Member State in which it is situated.233 The first part of this statement seems 
somewhat tautologous as copyright protection will be, by its nature, territorial in nature. 
Copyright protection provided by a specific EU Member State will be ‘confined’ to the 
territory of that country. It cannot extend beyond the borders of that particular State. 
The rationale for this delimitation of jurisdiction (as to damage) is to ensure that the 
seised court cannot substitute itself for foreign courts particularly when the damage has 
occurred abroad and said courts are best placed to ascertain whether the copyrights 
protected by the Member State concerned have been infringed, and the nature of the 
harm caused.234  
 
This thesis argues that Pinckney fails to address the requirement in Dumez235 and 
Marinari236 for damage under Article 5(3) of Brussels I to be direct before a court may 
assume jurisdiction. On the facts of Pinckney, there is a strong case for arguing that the 
damage alleged in France was indirect in nature as the illegal CDs were pressed in 
Austria (infringing, if anything, the Austrian reproduction right) and then later marketed 
online by UK companies. Any online sales that would ensue would infringe the 
claimant’s distribution rights (under Article 4, InfoSoc Directive)237 in the UK and, 
arguably, in every country to which the illicit CDs are sent. Given that the principal 
damage was occurring outside France, indirect damage was all that could really occur 
within France.  
232  Ibid para 44. 
233  Ibid para 45. 
234  Ibid para 46. 
235  Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA v Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR I-49; see para 4.2.2. 
236  Case C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] ECR I-2719; see para 4.2.3.  
237  Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC provides that Member States shall provide for authors, 
in respect of the original of their works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise 
or prohibit any form of distribution to the public by sale or otherwise.   
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3.6.4 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar238 
 
While admittedly, Football Dataco does not concern digital copyright, it does concern 
digital databases and digitised data. The relevant legal instrument, Directive 96/9/EC 
(the Directive on the legal protection of databases) introduced two forms of protection 
for databases - the sui generis database right and database copyright, but they are 
closely linked. Despite being independent of each other, the two protections may subsist 
in respect of the same database. While acknowledging the structure/contents 
dichotomy239 in terms of databases, one also has to acknowledge the proximity that 
exists between the two distinct but related IPRs of the database right and copyright.  
The relevance of Football Dataco to this thesis derives from a number of factors. 
Firstly, the ruling contains analysis of two key tort PIL provisions, namely, Article 5(3), 
Brussels I and Article 8(1), Rome II. Secondly, the merits and demerits of two classic 
communication theories are well ventilated in the ruling. Thirdly, the issue of localising 
an act of re-utilisation on the internet is discussed and, lastly, the condition of targeting 
persons in a particular territory (analogous to a trader directing its activity to the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile, as per joined cases Peter Pammer; and Hotel 
Alpenhof)240 is laid down by the court in the context of localising an unauthorised act of 
re-utilisation. 
3.6.4.1 The dispute in the main proceedings  
Football Dataco and others are responsible for organising football competitions in 
England and Scotland. Football Dataco Ltd manages the creation and exploitation of the 
data and intellectual property rights relating to those competitions. Football Dataco and 
Others claim to have, under UK law, a sui generis right in the ‘Football Live’ database.  
238  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar [2013] CMLR 29. 
239  The sui generis database right protects the investment employed in obtaining, verifying and 
presenting the contents of a database. Database copyright protects the intellectual creation 
involved in the selection and arrangement of the data within the database, i.e. the structure of 
the database and not the individual contents (although they may be the subject of separate 
copyright protection). See: David Rose and Nina O’ Sullivan, ‘Football Dataco v Yahoo! 
Implications of the ECJ judgment’ (2012) 7 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
792, 793.  
240 See para 2.10. 
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Football Live is a compilation of data about football matches in progress collected 
mainly by ex-professional footballers who work for Football Dataco. Football Dataco 
submits that the obtaining and/or verification of the data requires substantial investment 
and that the compilation of the database involves considerable skill, effort, discretion 
and/or intellectual input.  
 
Sportradar GmbH, a German company, provides results and other statistics relating inter 
alia to English league matches live via the internet. Its service is called ‘Sport Live 
Data’ and it operates a website called betradar.com. Betting companies which are 
customers of Sportradar GmbH entered into contracts with the Swiss holding company 
Sportradar AG, which is the parent company of Sportradar GmbH. Some of the 
customers are companies incorporated under UK law (e.g. bet365) and Gibraltarian law 
(e.g. Stan James) which provide betting services aimed at the UK market. The 
customers’ websites contained a link to Sportradar’s website. When internet users 
clicked on the ‘Live Score’ option, the data appeared under a reference to ‘bet365’ or 
‘Stan James’. The referring court concluded that members of the public in the UK 
clearly formed an important target for Sportradar.  
 
In April 2010, Football Dataco and Others brought proceedings against Sportradar in 
the English High Court (Chancery Division) seeking compensation for damage linked to 
an infringement by Sportradar of their sui generis right. In July 2010, Sportradar 
challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the case. Later that month 
Sportradar GmbH brought proceedings against Football Dataco in the Landgericht Gera 
(Regional Court, Gera) Germany, seeking a negative declaration that its activities did 
not infringe any IPRs held by Football Dataco.  
 
In November 2010, the High Court declared that it had jurisdiction to hear the action 
brought by Football Dataco in so far as it concerned the joint liability of Sportradar and 
its customers using its website in the UK for infringement of their sui generis right by 
acts of extraction and or re-utilisation. By contrast, it declined jurisdiction over the 
action brought by Football Dataco in so far as it concerned the primary liability of 
Sportradar for such an infringement.  
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Both, Football Dataco and Sportradar, appealed against that judgment to the English 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The Court of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings 
and to refer the following question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  
 
Where a party uploads data from a database protected by the sui generis right 
under Directive 96/9/EC ...onto that party’s web server located in Member A 
and in response to requests from a user in another Member State B the web 
server sends such data to the user’s computer so that the data is stored in the 
memory of that computer and displayed on its screen: 
 
1) Is the act of sending the data an act of ‘extraction’ or ‘re-utilisation’ by that 
party?  
2) Does any act of extraction and/or re-utilisation by that party occur  
a) In A only? 
b) In B only; or 
c) In both A and B?241  
 
3.6.4.2 The Territoriality of the Sui Generis Right  
As regards the protection provided by the sui generis right, the CJEU circumscribed this 
by stating that it is ‘limited in principle’ to the territory of the Member State in which it 
is situated so that the person enjoying its protection can only rely on it against 
unauthorised acts of re-utilisation which take place in that territory.  
 
The CJEU noted that the referring court had to assess the validity of the claims of 
Football Dataco alleging infringement of the sui generis right they claim to hold, under 
UK law, in the Football Live database. For that assessment, it would be necessary to 
know whether the acts of sending data at issue fall, as acts taking place within the UK, 
within the territorial scope of the protection by the sui generis right afforded by the law 
of that Member State.  
 
The European Court then proceeded to set out the EU PIL provisions relevant to the 
case. Given the tortious nature of the alleged unauthorised acts of re-utilisation, the 
CJEU identified the special jurisdiction rule - Article 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 - as 
241  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29, para 17. 
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the relevant jurisdictional rule.242 The CJEU believed that the issue of localising the acts 
of sending the data would influence the question of the jurisdiction of the referring 
court, particularly as regards the action seeking to establish the principal liability of 
Sportradar in the dispute before that court.243 
 
In terms of the applicable law, the CJEU identified Article 8(1) of Regulation 864/2007 
(Rome II) as the relevant rule. It relates to IPRs that cannot be classified as unitary 
Community rights and states that the applicable law in cases of IPR infringement will 
be ‘the law of the country for which protection is claimed’.244 In essence, this PIL rule 
confirms the importance of ascertaining whether the infringing acts in the main 
proceedings took place in the UK, the country where Football Dataco claims protection 
for the Football Live database, by way of the sui generis right.245  
3.6.4.3 Re-utilisation by means of a web server 
Referring to the Advocate-General’s Opinion, the court remarked that re-utilisation 
carried out by a web server is characterised by a series of successive operations, ranging 
at least from the placing online of the data concerned on that website for it to be 
consulted by the public to the transmission of that data to the interested members of the 
public, which may take place in the territory of different Member States.246 However, 
the court was at pains to distinguish this method of making available to the public from 
traditional modes of distribution. Unlike traditional modes of distribution, a website can 
be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of internet users throughout the world 
irrespective of any intention on the part of the operator of the website.247 
 
The court concluded that the mere fact that the website containing the data in question is 
accessible in a particular national territory is not a sufficient basis for concluding that 
the operator of the website is performing an act of re-utilisation caught by the national 
law applicable in that territory.248 In other words, the fact that data on Sportradar’s 
242  Ibid para 29.  
243  Ibid para 30. 
244  Ibid para 31.  
245  Ibid para 32. 
246  Ibid para 34. 
247  Ibid para 35. 
248  Ibid para 36. 
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server is sent to an internet user’s computer in the UK is not in itself a sufficient basis 
for concluding that the act of re-utilisation performed by Sportradar takes place in the 
territory of the UK.249  
3.6.4.4 Evidence of an intention to target persons in a different Member State   
Rather, for an act of re-utilisation to be localised in the territory of the Member State to 
which the data is sent, there must be evidence that the act discloses an intention on the 
part of its performer to target persons in that territory.250  
 
The CJEU then offered as examples, elements or circumstances within the main 
proceedings which might constitute evidence of the performer’s intention to target 
persons in the UK. They include the following facts: 1. The data on Sportradar’s server 
related to English football matches;251 2. Sportradar granted by contract the right of 
access to its servers to companies offering betting services to the UK public, if 
Sportradar were aware (or must have been aware) of the specific destination of 
services;252 3. The data placed online by Sportradar is accessible to UK internet users 
(who are customers of the betting companies) in their own language, which differs 
naturally from the languages used in Germany and Switzerland - the States from which 
Sportradar pursues its activities.253   
 
The court held that where such evidence is present, the referring court would be entitled 
to consider that an act of re-utilisation such as that in the main proceedings is located in 
the Member State of location of the user to whose computer the data in question is 
transmitted for the purpose of storage and display on screen (Member State B).254 It 
rejected Sportradar’s argument that an act of re-utilisation must in all circumstances be 
249  Ibid para 38. 
250 Ibid para 39. By analogy, the court alluded to: Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer 
v Reederei Karl Schlüter; Hotel Alpenhof v Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, paras 75, 76, 
80 and 92; Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others 
[2011] ECR I-6011, para 65; and Case C-5/11 Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander 
Jochen Donner (CJEU (Fourth Chamber), 21 June 2012) paras 27 et seqq. 
251  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29, para 40.  
252 Ibid para 41.  
253  Ibid para 42. 
254  Ibid para 43.  
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regarded as located exclusively in the Member State in which the web server from 
which the data in question is sent is situated.255 By doing so, the court also implicitly 
rejected application of the emission theory.  
3.6.4.5 Rejection of the Emission Theory256 
The court then went on to give a number of reasons for its rejection of the emission 
theory. It referred to the frequent difficulties experienced in localising the originating 
server and the risks inherent in applying the emission theory if the infringer’s server is 
located outside the territory of the State whose public is targeted.257 The application of 
the emission theory might also undermine the effectiveness of the protection offered to 
the database, based as it is on the national law of the country where the database is 
located. Moreover, the protection of databases would, in general, be compromised, if 
acts of re-utilisation aimed at the public in the EU were deemed to be outside the scope 
of Directive 96/9 because the server of the website used by the infringer was located in 
a third country.258  
 
In a somewhat ambiguous ruling, the CJEU confirmed that the unauthorised re-
utilisation took place in ‘at least’ Member State B (the State of receipt) so long as there 
is evidence that the act disclosed an intention on the part of the sender of the data to 
target members of the public in that State (and this factor must be assessed by the 
national court). By using the term ‘at least’, the court leaves the door open for a finding 
of localisation in both the State of transmission and the State of receipt. This thesis 
asserts that this lack of certainty assists potential infringers of the database right. They 
can still exploit the relative vagueness of the CJEU’s ruling and migrate their servers 
either to a third country or to an EU Member State whose courts or legal framework 
might favour them. From there, they could still carry out illegal re-utilisations in the 
hope (ultimately) that the act of re-utilisation be localised in the country of emission and 
that any decision as to jurisdiction would follow and be conferred on the courts of the 
country of emission.   
 
255  Ibid para 44.  
256 The Emission Theory is discussed at para 3.6.4.5.  
257  Ibid para 45. 
258  Ibid para 46. 
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In failing to answer the question posed by the referring court as to whether the act of re-
utilisation occurred in both State A and State B, the Court of Justice did not go as far as 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón who, four months earlier, did not choose one of the 
two traditional communication theories over the other. Instead, he opined that the act of 
re-utilisation took place in both Member State A and Member State B.259  
3.6.4.6 Communication Theory or Emission Theory?  
Another way of looking at the CJEU ruling is that it favours the communication 
theory260 over the emission theory, but without fully dismissing the latter either! 
Intriguingly, the court also stipulates the ‘add-on’ of evidence of the sender’s intention 
to target members of the public in the State of receipt. In this regard, the court does 
follow Advocate General Cruz Villalón who describes the ‘idea of the intended target of 
information on the internet’ as a ‘suitable criterion’.261 Importantly, the notion of 
intentional targeting does not seem to jar with the definition of ‘re-utilisation’ under 
Article 7(2)(b) of Directive 96/9 which refers to ‘any form of making available to the 
public the content of a protected database.’ It is interesting to note too that this case 
applies the condition of targeting members of the public in a specific country, to the 
database right. . Previously, the senior EU court had applied this particular condition to 
the areas of e-commerce (Pammer; and Hotel Alpenhof), the offer for sale of goods 
through the use of an unauthorised trade mark (L’Oreal262) and, the directing of 
advertising at members of the public (Donner263). While it may still be a bit too early to 
pass judgment on this development, it does not seem an illogical evolution and there is 
the IP precedent of L’Oreal.  
   
3.7 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have painted a scenario where the three principal elements of this PhD 
feature prominently. Inevitable links arise as between the internet (and ICT more 
259 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco v Sportradar GmbH Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (21 June 
2012), paras 60 et seq.  
260 See para 6.13. 
261  Ibid para 56.  
262 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others [2011] ECR I-
6011. 
263 Case C-5/11 Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander Jochen Donner (CJEU (Fourth 
Chamber), 21 June 2012). 
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broadly), copyright and PIL. Given that both the internet and satellite communication 
frequently involve a transborder element, PIL issues will arise where copyright 
infringing material is disseminated over such media. When one factors in high levels of 
transborder copyright infringement, then it becomes clear that PIL rules will be invoked 
more and more in the Digital Age. 
 
Lucasfilm is a good example of a case concerning transborder copyright issues which 
involved judicial interpretation of justiciability issues. The outcome was somewhat 
surprising as the UK Supreme Court held it did have jurisdiction over a copyright 
infringement which occurred abroad, so long as it could establish in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendant. This seems to contradict Section 16(1), CDPA 1988 
(concerning territoriality) which stipulates that for UK Copyright Law to apply, the 
infringing acts must take place in the UK. The Supreme Court also emphasised the fact 
that the modern trend was in favour of the enforcement of foreign IPRs. 
 
During the analysis of the rulings in this chapter, it became evident that highly relevant 
sub-themes featured prominently. They include: justiciability and in personam 
jurisdiction (Lucasfilm), the complex interface between IPRs and IT (e.g. the instance of 
encrypted audiovisual content in the Football Association Premier League preliminary 
ruling), the ease with which infringing activities can assume a transnational character 
particularly where a common language is at play (e.g. Germany and Austria, in Eva-
Maria Painer (Advocate-General’s Opinion)) and, lastly, the notion of targeting persons 
in a foreign country, as applied in the discrete fields of e-commerce, localisation of the 
act of re-utilisation (database right) (Football Dataco Ltd), and localisation of the 
communication to the public right in copyright.  
 
There seem to be interesting parallels between the Pinckney ruling and the holding in 
Fiona Shevill v Presse Alliance.264 In Pinckney, the CJEU limited the jurisdiction of 
courts situated in the territory where an infringement of personality rights occurred. 
Following on from the eDate Advertising and Martinez ruling, referred to in Pinckney, 
each court only has jurisdiction in respect of damage caused in the country where it is 
264 Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415. The Shevill case is discussed at 
4.2.3.3. 
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situated.265 In a passage of Pinckney ruling that is somewhat unclear, the CJEU seems to 
suggest that the courts of the place where the alleged victim has his centre of interests 
may be permitted to adjudicate in respect of all of the damage caused.266 In Shevill, a 
case concerning alleged libel, the ECJ ruled that the courts of the place where the 
publisher of the defamatory publication is established have jurisdiction to award 
damages for all the harm caused by the defamation (analogous to courts of the place of 
the victim’s centre of interests) while the courts of each of the Member States in which 
the publication was distributed (and where the victim suffered injury to reputation) 
would only have jurisdiction to rule in respect of harm caused in their particular 
Member State (analogous to the situation spelt out in eDate Advertising and Martinez 
above).267    
 
The issue of the localisation of the re-utilisation act is prominent in Football Dataco. It 
seems that the CJEU came down in favour of the communication theory in contrast with 
Advocate-General Villalón who regarded the communication theory and the emission 
theory as being of equal importance. However, the court stipulated that for the 
communications theory to apply, there must also be evidence of an intention to target 
persons in the foreign country. This is interesting in that a similar requirement of 
targeting was laid down by the English High Court in the context of the localisation of 
the communication to the public right in online contexts. The requirement was set out 
by Arnold J in a number of the web-blocking cases which are treated more fully in 
chapter 7, from para 7.3.5. on.    
265 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X; Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v MGN Ltd [2011] ECR I-10269, para 52. 
266 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECDR 15, para 36. 
267 Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415, Operative part 1. 
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’Conflict of laws is regarded as an arcane science far removed from real world 
concerns, and characterized by an esoteric vocabulary, it inevitably attracts speculative 
minds whose forte is not necessarily common sense.’268 
4.1 Introduction  
In many ways, this thesis constitutes a ‘laboratory’ in which the EU tort PIL rules will 
be examined for efficacy in an online environment. Given the natural demarcation 
between jurisdictional issues and applicable law issues, I have decided to treat these two 
main PIL components separately. Therefore, this chapter will be devoted to a ‘survey’ 
of jurisdictional issues while chapter 5 will be devoted to a ‘survey’ of applicable law 
issues. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse and evaluate the EU jurisdictional framework 
with the Brussels I Regulation constituting the main focus. The core of this chapter is, in 
fact, an analysis of Articles 2 and 5(3), Brussels I. The former is the fundamental rule of 
the general jurisdictional framework while the latter is a special jurisdiction provision 
concerning torts, delicts and quasi-delicts. The chapter also covers important case law 
generated under the old Brussels Convention 1968, an analysis of the lis pendens 
provisions of Brussels I (Articles 27-30) and the provisional measures provision of 
Brussels I (Article 31). 
4.2 Jurisdiction 
This section will have as its principal focus the Brussels I Regulation which came into 
force on 1 March 2002 and now applies either directly or indirectly269 in all 28 EU 
268   Friedrich K Juenger, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Transnational Classics in 
International Law, 1) (1st edn, Transnational Pub 2000) ix (emphasis added). 
269 The provisions of the Brussels I Regulation with minor modifications are applied by 
international law to the relations between the EU and Denmark. This is achieved by way of 
the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters [2005] OJ L299/62.   
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Member States. This instrument harmonises to a large extent the jurisdictional rules for 
civil and commercial matters270 within the EU.  
 
Brussels I  
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, also known as Brussels I, the Brussels 
Regulation or the Judgments Regulation,271 was adopted by the EU Council of Ministers 
on 22 December 2000.272 On 1 March 2002, Brussels I entered into force273 when it 
superseded the Brussels Convention 1968.274 The Regulation is directly applicable in all 
28 EU Member States with the exception of Denmark. However, under the 
EU/Denmark Agreement, the provisions of the Regulation, with minor modifications 
270  Brussels I does not cover revenue, customs or administrative matters (Council Regulation 
(EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, art 1(1)).   
271  The Brussels Regulation 44/2001 is referred to as the Judgments Regulation in David 
McClean and Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Morris - The Conflict of Laws (8th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012). 
272  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1. Bénédicte 
Fauvarque-Cosson, ’Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New 
Perspectives on an Old Couple’ (2001) 49 AJCL 407, 418 refers to the ’communitarization 
of conflicts law under the Treaty of Amsterdam’. (This expression was coined by Jürgen 
Basedow, ’The communitarization of the conflict of laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ 
(2000) 37 CMLR 687.) Articles 61 and 65 of the Amsterdam Treaty greatly increased the 
Community’s powers in the field of conflict of laws.  
273  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, art 76. 
Interestingly, the EU chose to achieve its aims by way of Regulation rather than Directive. 
In doing so, the EU ensured that the provisions of the Regulation would be binding and 
directly applicable from the date upon which the Regulation entered into force i.e. 1 March 
2002.  
274  Ibid art 68.      
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are applied by international law to the relations between the Union and Denmark.275 On 
1 January 2010, the new Lugano Convention came into force between the EU Member 
States (including Denmark) and Norway. This new convention reflects the changes 
made by the Brussels I Regulation to the Brussels Convention. As a consequence, the 
old Lugano Convention also had to be revised so as to reflect the changes.   
Described by one commentator as ’the basic jurisdictional statute for the Member 
States’,276 Brussels I covers jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.277 While Brussels I sets out general jurisdiction rules, it should be 
noted that certain EU IP legal instruments contain specific jurisdiction provisions. They 
275  Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2005] 
OJ L299/62, art 2(1). For consequential amendments in the UK see The Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1655. The Agreement applies to legal 
proceedings instituted after its entry into force (on 1 July 2007) in Article 9(1) of the 
Agreement. There is a separate EU/Denmark Agreement, the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the service of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [2008] OJ L331/21, which extends 
the terms of the Regulation (EC) 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial 
documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) 1348/2000 [2007] OJ L324/79, in short referred to as the Service 
Regulation, to Denmark.  
276  Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 58. Morrison and Gillies point out 
that while Brussels I harmonises jurisdictional rules in civil matters within the EU, it will 
have absolutely no effect on copyright issues or jurisdiction in copyright disputes 
originating outside the EU. Alex Morrison and Lorna E Gillies, ’Securing Webcast Content 
in the European Union: Copyright, Technical Protection and Problems of Jurisdiction on the 
Internet’ (2002) 24 EIPR 74, 80.  
277  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, Recital (7) 
circumscribes the scope of the Regulation. It provides as follows: ‘The scope of this 
Regulation must cover all the main civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-
defined matters.’ The scope of the Regulation is governed by Article 1 which provides as 
follows: ’This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of 
the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative 
matters.’  
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are the Community Trade Mark Regulation,278 the Community Design Regulation279 and 
the Community Plant Variety Regulation.280 Each contains a particular jurisdiction 
provision for infringement and invalidity proceedings. Similarly, the European Patent 
Convention has a Jurisdiction Protocol where there is a dispute as to the entitlement of a 
European patent. This Protocol confers jurisdiction on particular contracting states in 
accordance with a set of jurisdiction rules.  
 
Following the establishment of Community competence in the field of PIL, by way of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, Brussels I became one of a number of measures adopted by 
the Community so as to progressively establish an area of freedom, security and justice 
within the Community. These measures relate to judicial co-operation in civil matters 
which is necessary for the sound operation of the internal market.281 Acknowledging that 
differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments 
hamper the sound operation of the internal market, Brussels I was adopted to unify the 
rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to simplify the 
formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments 
from Brussels I Member States.282 
278   Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 December 1994 on the Community trade mark [1994] 
OJ L11/1, art 93 (’International Jurisdiction’ provision).  
279  Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs [2002] OJ 
L3/1, art 82 (’International Jurisdiction’ provision).  
280  Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights [1994] 
OJ L 227/1, art 101 (’Jurisdiction and Procedure in Legal Actions Relating to Civil Law 
Claims’). Article 101(3) provides that proceedings relating to actions in respect of claims for 
infringement may also be brought in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred. In such cases, the courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of infringements 
alleged to have been committed in the territory of the Member State to which it belongs.  
281  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, Recital (1).  
282  Ibid Recital (2).   
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4.2.1 The basic rule of jurisdiction 
The basic rule of jurisdiction based on the defendant’s domicile continues to apply in 
Brussels I.283 It is contained in Article 2(1) of the Regulation and provides as follows: 
’Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their 
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’284  
The Regulation adopts the principle that, in general, persons should be sued in the 
courts of the Regulation State where they are domiciled.285 The words ’shall (...) be 
283  Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 59 where he states: ’as the basic 
principle is that a defendant shall be sued in the courts of the Member State where he is 
domiciled, a provision of the Regulation derogating from this rule will tend to receive a 
restrictive construction.’  
284  From an Internet perspective, this provision makes a lot of sense since frequently, in online 
copyright infringement scenarios, the infringer (defendant) has infringed intellectual 
property rights in a number of different jurisdictions. By stipulating that the defendant be 
sued in the courts of the Contracting State where he is domiciled, Article 2 centralises the 
proceedings in one State even though the defendant’s actions may have negatively affected 
the plaintiff copyright-holder’s interests in a number of different States. However, given the 
ease with which safe haven relocation can occur in an Internet context, perhaps a new 
jurisdiction rule enabling the plaintiff to sue in his country of domicile for the global 
infringement of his rights is now required. Admittedly, such a rule would represent a radical 
departure from existing PIL principles. Torremans suggests that the plaintiff should be 
allowed to rely upon this rule only if he can demonstrate to the court that it is not feasible to 
sue the defendant in his domicile due to the lack in that domicile of intellectual property 
laws that meet the minimum public international law standard that has been established by 
the TRIPs Agreement. Paul Torremans, ‘Private International Law Aspects of IP – Internet 
Disputes’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds) Law and the Internet: a Framework 
for Electronic Commerce (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2000) 235.  
285   Paul Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters [1979] OJ C59/1, 13, 18 et seq. The following is stated at p 
19 of the Report:  
Defendants are usually sued in the courts of the State in which they are domiciled. 
This is true of proceedings in which there is no international element. It is also true 
of proceedings with an international element in which, by application of the 
traditionally accepted maxim ‘actor sequitur forum rei’, the defendant is sued in the 
courts of the State of his domicile. The Convention does not therefore involve a 
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sued’ should not be taken literally. Other bases of jurisdiction make it clear that the 
defendant may, and, in some circumstances, must, be sued in the courts of a Member 
State other than that of his domicile.286 Following Owusu v Jackson,287 Article 2 will 
apply where both the claimant and defendant are domiciled in the same Member State 
but the dispute between them is connected with a non-Member State, rather than with 
another Member State.  
In fact, many of the Regulation’s provisions turn on whether the defendant is domiciled 
in one of the EU Member States.288 The definition of domicile is not uniform.289 It is 
necessary to distinguish natural persons from companies or other legal persons or 
associations of persons, and from trusts.  
Where the defendant is a natural person, reference must be made to Article 59 of the 
Regulation and paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 
2001. Where the defendant is a legal person, reference should be made to Article 60 of 
the Regulation. Where the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled is the UK, 
the Modified Regulation will apply to allocate jurisdiction between the courts of 
England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
general reversal of national rules of jurisdiction nor of the practice of judges and 
lawyers. 
286  James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers and Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 227. It should be noted that where Article 27 (lis 
pendens) applies, it requires the court of Member States, including that of the defendant’s 
domicile, to decline jurisdiction.   
287  Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383, paras 24-37. 
288  Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 63. 
289  Briggs states as follows:  
There has been pressure to provide a single autonomous definition of domicile, or 
to abandon it holus bolus and move instead to the concept of habitual residence, not 
least because of variation in the separate national law definitions of domicile. But 
in the absence of a public register of status, however defined, it is difficult to see 
that such a change would accomplish very much of value. 
  Ibid 64. 
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4.2.2 Special jurisdictional provisions 
Section 2 of Chapter II of Brussels I affords supplementary grounds of jurisdiction. 
Section 2 comprises Articles 5-7. They are referred to as special jurisdiction provisions 
since they enable jurisdiction to be granted to courts other than the courts of the 
Member State where the defendant is domiciled.290 This work will focus on Article 5 
since it is of most relevance to this thesis. These special jurisdiction provisions may be 
chosen at the plaintiff’s option. The plaintiff can only rely on Article 5 if the defendant 
is domiciled in one of the EU Member States.291 The rationale behind the special 
jurisdiction provisions was set out in Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische 
Landesbank292 where it was stated that special jurisdiction is  
 
based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the 
dispute and courts other than those of the State of the defendant’s domicile, 
which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating 
to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of 
proceedings.293  
Article 5 provides that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another 
Member State in seven specified situations.294 The phrase ’may (in another Member 
290  Tactical considerations also play a part in the plaintiff’s decision about where to sue. These 
tactical considerations may have little to do with the subject matter of the conflict of laws. 
For example, judges in one possible forum (the place where suit is brought) may be likely to 
be more sympathetic to the plaintiff’s contentions than judges in another place where suit 
can be brought. Russell J Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (4th edn, 
Foundation Press 2001) 2. 
291  This particular rule has not been changed by the revised Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 
1215/2012), see fn 3.  
292  Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR 
I-49.   
293  Ibid paras 79 et seq. 
294  The seven situations are as follows: 1. Matters relating to contract; 2. Matters relating to 
maintenance; 3. Matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict; 4. In a civil claim for damages 
or restitution based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings; 5. A dispute arising out of 
the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment; 6. In matters relating to a trust;  
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State) be sued’ is not intended to confer on courts a discretion to refuse to take 
jurisdiction. Instead, it means that the plaintiff is permitted, but not required, to sue the 
defendant in a Member State other than that in which the defendant is domiciled. In 
essence, where Article 5 applies, the plaintiff is given a choice of fora. He can sue, by 
virtue of Article 2, in the Member State where the defendant is domiciled or in some 
other Member State or States, by virtue of Articles 5.295  
4.2.2.1 Article 5(3) of Brussels I  
Of the special jurisdiction provisions, Article 5(3) is the one of most relevance to this 
thesis. It is also of particular importance to IP lawyers. The wording of Article 5(3) is: 
’A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued, in 
matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur’. 
Article 5(3) entitles the claimant to sue the defendant in a Member State other than 
where the defendant is domiciled. Nonetheless, the defendant’s domicile is the normal 
place for the trial and Article 5 is an exception to this general rule.296 Its provisions must 
not be given an interpretation going beyond the situations envisaged by the 
Regulation.297  
Since infringement of an intellectual property right is characterised as tortious in 
common law jurisdictions298 and as delictual in civil law systems,299 it falls, accordingly, 
7. In disputes concerning the payment of remuneration claimed in respect of the salvage of a 
cargo or freight.   
295  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) 32.  
296   Case 56/79 Zelger v Salinitri [1980] ECR 89.  
297  Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel [2002] ECR I-
8111, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 33.  
298  House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241 [253] (copyright); Mölnlycke AB v 
Procter & Gamble Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1112, 1117 (patents); James J Fawcett and Paul 
Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 151. 
299  LG Düsseldorf, 4 O 198/97, GRUR Int 1999, 775 (‘Impstoff II’); Christian von Bar, 
Internationales Privatrecht, vol II (2nd edn, CH Beck 1991) 518; James J Fawcett and Paul 
Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 151.   
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within the scope of Article 5(3). In Mölnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd, Dillon LJ in 
the Court of Appeal, stated that ’It is not in doubt that patent infringement falls within 
the rubric of Article 5(3), “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict”.’300 Five years 
later, the same point was made in relation to copyright infringement by Lloyd J in 
Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd,301 a case involving copyright over architectural 
plans and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Fort Dodge Animal 
Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV.302 In Pearce, Lloyd J stated as follows:  
’An action for breach of copyright is plainly within the scope of the civil and 
commercial matters to which the Convention applies’.303  
In addition, there are French decisions applying Article 5(3) in relation to copyright 
infringement304 and a German one applying Article 5(3) in relation to trade mark 
infringement.305  
300  Mölnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1112, 1117. 
301  Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [1997] Ch 293 (Lloyd J). Incidentally, this was the first 
case in which infringement of a foreign proprietary intellectual property right was asserted 
in the English courts under the old Brussels Convention. Stated differently, it was the first 
case where an English court had to decide whether the subject matter limitation in respect of 
foreign intellectual property rights under the traditional English rules applied in a Brussels 
Convention case. James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 215. In Pearce, the plaintiff alleged that two Dutch 
defendants had infringed his copyright in architectural plans for a building, drawn up in 
England, by copying them in designing a building in the Netherlands. It was also alleged 
that the civil engineers retained for the construction of the building and the owner of the 
building infringed his copyright.  
302  Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV [1998] FSR 222. 
303  Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd 1997] Ch 293, 301 (Lloyd J). 
304  See Ideal Clima SpA v SA Ideal Standard Gaz Pal [1982], Somm, 378; D Series I-5.3-B13, 
Cour d’Appel Paris; Wegmann v Société Elsevier Science Ltd [1997] IL Pr 760, Cour de 
Cassation; James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 151.  
305  See German Federal Supreme Court, BGH I ZR 201/86, EEC 1988, 415; NJW 1988, 1466; 
GRUR 1988, 483 (Re Jurisdiction in Tort and Contract); James J Fawcett and Paul 
Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 151. 
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4.2.3 Important case law relating to Article 5(3) 
Before dealing with the new wording of Article 5(3) under Brussels I, it is important to 
set out important case law handed down by the ECJ regarding the interpretation of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 1968. There has been at least one judicial 
exhortation that the Brussels I Regulation should be interpreted in the light of the 
substantial body of case law decided under the Brussels Convention.306 This would 
make eminent sense as many of the rules in the Regulation are the same as those in the 
Convention and their meaning has been previously explained by the Court of Justice 
following a preliminary reference from a Contracting State to the Convention.307   
4.2.3.1 The definition of the term ‘tort’ under the Brussels regime 
The risk existed of Article 5(3) being given a different scope in different Member 
States. The Court of Justice dealt with this risk in Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, 
Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co where it held that the meaning of ’matters relating to tort’ 
should not be interpreted solely by reference to national law. It should be regarded as an 
autonomous concept which ’covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a 
defendant and which are not related to a ‘contract’ within the meaning of Article 
5(1).’308 Thus, the terms ’tort, delict or quasi-delict’ were given an independent or 
autonomous meaning under the Brussels Convention. As a consequence, an action can 
fall within the scope of Article 5(3) even if it is not regarded as tortious by the domestic 
law of the State where the seised court is located. For the purposes of the application of 
306  Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 193 et 
seq, where he refers to Recital (19) in the Preamble to Brussels I which states the necessity 
to ensure continuity between the Convention and the Regulation, particularly as regards the 
interpretation of the Convention by the Court of Justice. AG Léger cautioned against any 
interpretation of the jurisdiction rules which might mark a departure from the copious case 
law of the Court concerning the Convention. Such departure, he argued, would constitute a 
change of direction in the case law which would ’manifestly not be in harmony with the 
Community legislature’s concern to ensure continuity in the interpretation of the two 
instruments.’ 
307  James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers and Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 207.  
308  Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co [1988] ECR 5565, 
5585. 
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the Convention, the concept of ’tort, delict or quasi-delict’ must be interpreted 
principally by reference to the scheme and objectives of the Convention in order to 
ensure that the latter is given full effect.309  
Besides copyright infringement, it has been held that actions for defamation,310 negligent 
misstatement,311 infringement of foreign intellectual property rights,312 passing off,313 
unfair competition,314 and actionable breaches of EU law giving rise to a claim for 
damages315 all fall within the scope of Article 5(3).316   
4.2.3.2 Handelskwekerij G J Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace (the Reinwater case)  
The notion of ’the place where the harmful event occurred’ (the old wording of Article 
5(3), under the Brussels Convention) was examined by the Court of Justice in 
Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA,317 (also known as the 
‘Reinwater’ case).  
The Jenard Report had deliberately left open the question of whether ’the place where 
the harmful event occurred’ referred to the place where the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred or the place where the damage actually occurred. This ambiguity, was, 
to a large extent, resolved in ‘Reinwater’ - a classic example of a case involving various 
elements of a tort being split among different States.  
309  See generally, Christopher Withers, ’Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Antitrust Tort 
Claims’ (2002) 6 JBL 250, 259. 
310  Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415.  
311  Domicrest v Swiss Bank [1999] QB 548.  
312  Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [1997] Ch 293, reversed by [1999] 1 All ER 769 (CA) 
and Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV [1998] FSR 222.  
313  Modus Vivendi Ltd v British Products Sanmex Co Ltd [1996] FSR 790; Mecklermedia 
Corpn v DC Congress GmbH [1998] Ch 40.   
314  Saba Mölnlycke AS v Procter & Gamble Scandinavia Inc [1997] IL Pr 704 - A Lugano 
Convention case.   
315  Schmidt v Home Secretary [1995] 1 ILRM 301.  
316  James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers and Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 247.  
317  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 
1735.  
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 The plaintiff had a horticultural business near Rotterdam in the Netherlands which drew 
water for its crops from the river Rhine. Bier’s seedlings were damaged by the high 
salinity of the waters of the Rhine. The defendant, a French mining company domiciled 
at Mulhouse (Alsace) discharged copious quantities of residual chloride salts into the 
Rhine from its works. These discharges were considered to be the principal cause of the 
high salinity, even as far downstream as Rotterdam. The Dutch plaintiffs wished to sue 
in the Netherlands, so it was necessary to decide on the place where the harmful event 
occurred.  
The case was referred by the Hague Court of Appeal to the ECJ. The latter ruled that 
Article 5(3) was intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred318 and, if 
different, the place of the event giving rise to it, where the two are not identical.319 It 
follows from the Bier ruling that plaintiffs have a wider choice of jurisdiction in 
transnational tort situations. They may sue in either of two places, the State where the 
damage occurred, or the State from where the damage originated.320 
In upholding the jurisdiction of the Dutch court, the ECJ stated as follows: 
318  Briggs argues that ascribing a place to damage can be an artificial exercise, but that the case 
law offers some guidance. In principle, damage occurs where the damage or loss first 
materialises, and not, if this is different, where it or its consequence is subsequently felt. He 
refers to Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank 
[1990] ECR I-49 as authority for the proposition. Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (2nd 
edn, OUP 2008) 79 et seq.  
319  In short, the claimant has a choice where to sue where the places under the causal event limb 
and the damage limb differ. Oren Bigos, ’Jurisdiction over Cross-Border Wrongs on the 
Internet’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 585, 599.  
320  Interestingly, § 32 ZPO (Section 32 of the German Code of Civil Procedure) adopts a 
similar approach. Under this Code, the term ’place of infringement’ is to be understood as 
meaning both the place where the act causing the harm was committed and the place where 
the result occurred (principle of ubiquity). If these places are located in different countries, 
the injured party is given a choice of forum for the recovery of the entire damages from the 
multinational act of infringement. This principle was laid down by the Reich Supreme Court 
in 1936 JW 1291. However, if the defendant is domiciled or has its registered office in a 
Contracting State to the Brussels Convention/Brussels I, Article 5(3) of Brussels I/Brussels 
Convention 1968 will take precedence over Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
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[I]t is well to point out that the place of the event giving rise to the damage no 
less than the place where the damage occurred can, depending on the case, 
constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of jurisdiction. 
Liability in tort, delict or quasi-delict can only arise provided that a causal 
connection can be established between the damage and the event in which the 
damage originates. Taking into account the close connection between the 
component parts of every sort of liability, it does not appear appropriate to opt 
for one of the two connecting factors mentioned to the exclusion of the other, 
since each of them can, depending on the circumstances, be particularly helpful 
from the point of view of the evidence and of the conduct of the proceedings. 
To exclude one option appears all the more undesirable in that, by its 
comprehensive form of words, Article 5(3) of the Convention covers a wide 
diversity of kinds of liability. Thus, the meaning of the expression ‘place where 
the harmful event occurred’ in Article 5(3) must be established in such a way 
as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an option to commence proceedings 
either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event giving 
rise to it.321  
This wide interpretation was justified by the Court in a number of ways.322 First, Article 
5(3) is concerned to give jurisdiction to an appropriate forum. Both, the place of acting 
and of damage, are appropriate places for trial. Secondly, it is designed to give the 
claimant the option of suing elsewhere than in the Contracting State where the 
defendant is domiciled. Applying a place of acting rule on its own would not normally 
allow this. Applying a place of damage rule on its own would ignore cases where the act 
took place somewhere other than in the State where the defendant is domiciled. Thirdly, 
there is artificiality in concentrating on one element in a tort or delict to the exclusion of 
the other elements. Fourthly, the Court explained that both the place of acting and the 
place of damage constitute significant connecting factors that can be particularly helpful 
321  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 
1735, paras 15-19. 
322  James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers and Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 253. 
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from the point of view of the evidence and the conduct of the proceedings.323 This fourth 
point is related to the reason for invoking Article 5(3), described as follows by the ECJ:  
’the existence, in certain clearly defined situations, of a particularly close connecting 
factor between a dispute and the court which may be called upon to hear it, with a view 
to the efficacious conduct of the proceedings.’324 
At first glance, the interpretation favoured by the ECJ seems to give the plaintiff an 
excessively wide choice.325 However, sometimes the courts are willing to circumscribe 
the plaintiff’s choice of jurisdiction. In the English ruling of Henderson v Jaouen,326 
Bier was distinguished and the exception in Article 5(3) was held not to apply. The 
respondent, an English citizen, tried to distinguish between original injuries sustained in 
323  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij  G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 
1735, para 17. 
324  Ibid para 11; For implications of the Bier ruling, see Andreas F Lowenfeld, Linda J 
Silberman (eds), The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments – Records of the 
Conference Held at New York University School of Law on the Proposed Convention, April 
30 – May 1, 1999 (Juris Publishing 2001). Again the position on torts understood by most of 
the world is essentially that established in Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse 
d’Alsace. Most systems consider it fair to summon a defendant either at the place of acting 
or the place of immediate harm, as opposed to the place where secondary or ripple effects 
are experienced. The United States however, has a problem, not so much with the place of 
acting, but with the place of harm unless there has been some ’purposeful availment’ on the 
part of the defendant. Both the European Court and the Supreme Court of the United States 
are concerned with the same problem: to prevent the defendant being hauled before an 
unexpected forum. With regard to ’purposeful availment’, the piece refers to the following 
decisions: Asahi Metal Industry Co Ltd. v Superior Court of California, 480 US 102 (1987) 
and World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson, 444 US 286 (1980).  
325  For a  ruling which applies the principle in Bier, see Haftpflichtverband der Deutschen 
Industrie Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit (HDI) v Sociétée AXA France IARD 
[2007] IL Pr 28, Cour de Cassation. There, the Cour de Cassation confirmed the duality of 
jurisdiction laid down in Bier and held that the damage occurred when defective 
components (manufactured in Germany) were placed in products. As the defective 
components had been inserted into products in a workshop in France, it was held that the 
French courts had jurisdiction (and not the German courts, as argued by the appellant 
German insurance company).  
326  Henderson v Jaouen [2002] EWCA Civ 75 (CA, Wall J). 
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a road accident in France and a deterioration in his condition which occurred mainly in 
England. On the basis of the deterioration (harmful event) occurring in England, the 
respondent argued that the English courts should have jurisdiction to try his claim. The 
Court of Appeal did not agree. In allowing the appeal, the court stated that the term 
‘harmful event’ was an autonomous Convention concept. Crucially, the court ruled that 
the subsequent deterioration in the respondent’s condition was not a fresh tort but, in 
fact, derived from the original tort. The fact that the deterioration created a fresh cause 
of action in French law was deemed irrelevant as the overriding element was that of the 
autonomous Convention interpretation of the term ’harmful event’. In sum, the court of 
appeal ruled against a duality of jurisdiction in this case and found against jurisdiction 
vesting in the English courts.  
Where the harm suffered takes the form of the claimant failing to receive a payment to 
which he was entitled, the harm occurs at the place where the payment should have been 
made.327    
Furthermore, in most cases involving a transnational tort, the place of the event giving 
rise to the damages is likely to coincide with the defendant’s domicile. 
4.2.3.3 Transnational torts and the extent of jurisdiction of courts  
One issue left open by ‘Reinwater’, was the respective extent of the jurisdiction of the 
Dutch and French courts insofar as the latter did not derive jurisdiction from the 
defendant’s domicile.   
The Bier rule was applied by the Court of Justice328 in the very different context of 
multi-state defamation in Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and 
Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA.329  
Shevill involved libel proceedings in England. The defendants were the French 
publishers of the newspaper France Soir. A number of plaintiffs commenced 
327  Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening [2009] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 123. 
328  The rationale applied in the Bier ruling was followed in Australia. The ruling, by the Federal 
Court of Australia, is David Syme Ltd v Grey (1992) 115 ALR 247.  
329  Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415, paras 19 et seqq. 
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proceedings against Presse Alliance after one of the defendant’s articles seemed to 
implicate them in illegal activities. Referring the case to the ECJ, the House of Lords 
sought guidance, inter alia, on the interpretation of the phrase ’the place where the 
harmful event occurred’. 
The Court of Justice held that the definition in Bier also covered injury to reputation.330 
Accordingly, the plaintiff had the option of suing either in the courts of the place where 
the damage occurred or in the courts for the place of the event which gave rise to that 
damage. In other words, the Shevill principles permit the plaintiff to bring proceedings 
in the place where the libel is distributed (place where the damage actually occurs) or in 
the place where the publisher is established (place where the event giving rise to the 
damage occurs).331 
However, the ECJ drew an important distinction between the fora in terms of the 
damages that they could award. The courts of the place where the publisher of the 
defamatory publication is established have jurisdiction to award damages for all the 
harm caused by the defamation while the courts of each of the Member States in which 
the publication was distributed (and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to 
reputation) only have jurisdiction to rule in respect of the harm caused in their particular 
Member State.332 Viewed from the perspective of the victim of the defamatory material, 
he would be significantly better off suing in the Member State where the publisher of 
the defamatory material is established as he would be able to recover damages for all 
the loss suffered.  
The Shevill principles333 were applied by the French Cour de Cassation in Wegmann v 
Société Elsevier Science Ltd.334 Wegmann was somewhat similar to Shevill in that it 
concerned the infringement of copyright by counterfeiting and involved publications 
330  James Fawcett, Janeen Carruthers and Peter North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private 
International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 253.  
331  Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415, para 33. 
332  Ibid. 
333  The Shevill principles apply whenever there is a tort involving a single causative event in 
one State and actual harm in a number of other States. Christopher Wadlow, Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property in European and International Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 98.  
334  Wegmann v Société Elsevier Science Ltd [1997] IL Pr 760 (CC). 
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distributed in several Member States. It was held that the victim could pursue its claim 
for damages either before the courts of the place where the author of the counterfeiting 
has its establishment (which, following Shevill, have jurisdiction to deal with the whole 
damage), or, under the damage part of Article 5(3), before the courts of the Member 
States where the counterfeit goods are distributed (which, again, following Shevill, have 
jurisdiction to deal only with the damage suffered in that State).335  
In Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corp336 the tort in question was negligent misstatement. 
Rix J held that in such a case the place where the harmful event giving rise to the 
damage occurs is where the misstatement originates, rather than where it is received and 
relied on. In the case of a telephone conversation between persons in different countries, 
this is where the words constituting the misstatement are spoken (in the instant case, this 
was in Switzerland), rather than where they are heard (in the instant case, this was in 
England). Accordingly, the English court had no jurisdiction. For these purposes, there 
is no difference between oral or other instantaneous communication and a written 
document.337  
Rix J refused to follow the earlier negligent misstatement case of Minster Investments 
Ltd v Hyundai Precision and Industry Co Ltd.338 In that case, which was decided before 
Shevill, Steyn J decided to use a traditional English formula,339 and ask ’where in 
substance the cause of action in tort arises, or what place the tort is most closely 
connected with’.340 The essence of the action for negligent misstatement was said to be 
the negligent advice and reliance on it. Certificates negligently produced in France and 
Korea were received and relied upon in England, and accordingly there was jurisdiction 
in England. However, as Rix J pointed out, the ’substance’ test does not reflect either 
335  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) 167 and 168 where the Wegmann ruling is discussed along with an 
analysis of applying Shevill in a case of online trade mark infringement (i.e. Castellblanch 
SA v Champagne Louis Roederer SA [2004] IL Pr 41).   
336   Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corp [1999] QB 548.  
337  Ibid 567 et seq. 
338  Minster Investments Ltd v Hyundai Precision and Industry Co Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
621. 
339  Taken from cases on the old tort head of RSC, Order 11 (now CPR, r 6.20).  
340  Minster Investments Ltd v Hyundai Precision and Industry Co Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
621. 
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the wording or the philosophy of the Brussels Convention as laid down in the European 
Court’s decisions.341 The Domicrest approach has been preferred to that in Hyundai by 
other judges at first instance342 and by Mance LJ in obiter dicta in the Court of 
Appeal.343 
In Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV, Advocate General 
Cosmas acknowledged that in certain cases it may be difficult or indeed impossible to 
determine the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.344 Such 
impossibility is illustrated by the facts of the case. A large consignment of pears was 
shipped in refrigerated containers by the defendant maritime carrier from Australia to 
the Netherlands, then taken by road to France where the consignee discovered that the 
goods were damaged. There had been a breakdown in the cooling system in the 
containers.  
The ECJ pointed out that in an international transport operation of this kind, the place 
where the damage occurred cannot be either the place of final delivery (which can be 
changed mid-voyage) or the place where the damage was ascertained.345 
To permit the claimant (consignee) to bring the actual maritime carrier before the courts 
for the place of final delivery or before those for the place where the damage was 
ascertained would in most cases mean attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place 
of the plaintiff’s domicile, whereas the authors of the Convention demonstrated their 
opposition to such attribution of jurisdiction otherwise than in cases for which it 
expressly provides. The European Court was also of the view that such an interpretation 
341  Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corp [1999] QB 548, 566 et seq. 
342  Raiffeisen Zentral Bank Österreich AG v Alexander Tranos [2001] IL Pr 9; Alfred Dunhill 
Ltd v Diffusion Internationale de Maroquinerie de Prestige [2002] IL Pr 13 [31]; 
Sunderland Marine Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v Wiseman [2007] EWHC 1460 (Comm). 
343  ABCI (Formerly Arab Business Consortium International Finance and Investment Co) v 
Banque Franco Tunisienne [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 146 (CA) [41]. 
344  Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR 
I-6511, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 54, where the Advocate General also states that the 
harmful conduct may have lasted for the entire voyage but ’it would (…) not be reasonable 
to require the plaintiff to seise the courts of all the places through which the vessel sailed.’   
345  Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR 
I-6511, para 33-35. 
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of the Convention would make the determination of the competent court depend on 
uncertain factors, which would be incompatible with the objective of the Convention 
which is to provide clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction.346  
In such circumstances, the ECJ held that the place where the damage arose in a case 
involving an international transport operation of the kind at issue (in the main 
proceedings) can only be the place where the actual maritime carrier was to deliver the 
goods.347 In the court’s view, such place meets the requirements of foreseeability and 
certainty imposed by the Convention and displays a particularly close connecting factor 
with the dispute in the main proceedings, so that the attribution of jurisdiction to the 
courts for that place is justified by reasons relating to the sound administration of justice 
and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.348 The ECJ went on to specifically exclude 
the possibility of the place where damage is discovered serving to determine the ‘place 
where the harmful event occurred’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the 
Convention, as interpreted by it.349  
4.2.3.4 Indirect economic loss cannot found jurisdiction 
Indirect financial damage cannot be relied on to found jurisdiction. This principle was 
laid down in two decisions of the European Court of Justice, namely, Dumez France SA 
and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank350 and Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc.351 The 
general rule for torts causing economic loss, is that the existence of indirect parasitic 
damage suffered outside the actual place of infringement or by more than one person, 
346  Ibid para 34; Case C-26/91 Handte v Traitements Mécano-Chimiques des Surfaces [1992] 
ECR I–3967, para 19; Case C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] ECR I-2719, para 
19. 
347  Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR 
I-6511, para 35. 
348  Ibid para 36. 
349  Ibid para 37.  
350  Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR 
I-49, para 22. 
351  Case C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] ECR I-2719, para 21.  
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cannot confer jurisdiction under Article 5(3), even if such damage would be recoverable 
under national law.352 
Following the Dumez ruling, the place of damage will be the place where the relevant 
physical damage or economic loss is directly sustained. The ECJ held that jurisdiction 
must be limited to where the harmful event ’directly produced its harmful effects upon 
the person who is the immediate victim of that event’ and would not normally cover the 
domicile of an indirect victim.353 The facts in Dumez were that the German defendant 
bank had allegedly caused the insolvency of German subsidiary companies of the 
French plaintiffs. The German subsidiary companies were involved in a building project 
and the plaintiffs argued that the defendant bank had withdrawn credit facilities from 
another company on whom the subsidiaries were dependent. Upon withdrawal of the 
credit, the project came to a halt. The French parent company argued that it had 
sustained losses at its registered office and commenced actions in the French courts 
claiming damages against the bank. On a reference from the Cour de Cassation, the ECJ 
held that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention could not be construed as allowing the 
parent companies to bring proceedings in France against German defendants. 
The Bier case, although allowing jurisdiction to be assumed in the State where the harm 
occurs, was concerned with cases where a direct consequence was felt in a Member 
State (this would be in Germany), not an indirect consequence, as occurred in France.  
The European Court pointed out that ’the damage alleged is no more than the indirect 
consequence of the harm initially suffered by other legal persons who were the direct 
victims of damage which occurred at a place different from that where the indirect 
victim suffered harm.’354 The issue therefore, was to decide whether the term ‘place 
where the damage occurred’ can cover a place where the indirect victim of the harm 
discovered the harmful consequences to their own property. The Court decided to limit 
the application of the term to harm suffered by the immediate victims. The court 
clarified that while the phrase may refer to the place where the damage occurred, the 
latter should be taken to mean only the place where the causal event, giving rise to 
352  Christopher Wadlow, Enforcement of Intellectual Property in European and International 
Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 101.  
353  Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR 
I-49, para 20. 
354  Ibid para 14. 
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delictual or quasi-delictual liability, directly produced the harmful effects in relation to 
the person who is the immediate victim. 
The Court summed up its findings as follows:  
the rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the Convention cannot be 
construed as permitting a plaintiff pleading damage which he claims to be the 
consequence of the harm suffered by other persons, who were direct victims of 
the harmful act to bring proceedings against the perpetrator of that act in the 
courts of the place in which he himself ascertained the damage to his assets.355 
The Dumez ruling was followed in Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc (Zubraidi Trading Co 
Intervener),356 which was a simpler case involving direct and indirect damage to the 
same person. In Marinari, the Italian domiciled plaintiff was arrested in England and 
promissory notes were sequestrated. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action in 
Italy, inter alia, for compensation for the damage he claimed to have suffered as a result 
of his arrest, the breach of several contracts and injury to his reputation.  
The ECJ held that the place of damage was to be interpreted as not referring to the place 
where the victim claimed to have suffered financial loss consequential upon initial 
damage arising and suffered by him in another Member State. The Court of Justice was 
concerned to keep Article 5(3) within certain bounds so as to avoid multiplication of 
competent fora.357 It also wanted to avoid the situation where the plaintiff was able to 
sue in the place where he was domiciled.358 Subsequent rulings followed Marinari. For 
355  Ibid para 22. 
356   Case C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] ECR I-2719. 
357  Ibid paras 12-15. The ruling in Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corp [1999] QB 548 is 
consistent with the judicial reasoning used in Marinari. 
358  A case in point is Case C-168/02 Rudolf Kronhofer v Marianne Maier [2004] ECR I-6009, a 
preliminary ruling handed down by the ECJ. In Kronhofer, the European Court ruled that 
the phrase ’place where the harmful event occurred’ did not refer to the place where the 
claimant was domiciled or where his assets were concentrated by reason only of the fact that 
he had suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets that had 
been incurred in another Member State. Referring to Marinari, the court stated at para 19 
that the phrase was not to be interpreted so widely that it could include any place where 
adverse consequences were felt of an event which has already caused damage actually 
arising elsewhere.   
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example, in Kitetechnology BV v Uncor GmbH Plastmaschinen, it was held that in the 
case of breach of confidence, there is no jurisdiction in the Member State where there is 
financial loss consequent on the damage to the claimant’s commercial interests.359 And, 
in Mazur Media Ltd v Mazur Media GmbH, Mr Justice Collins also ruled against 
granting jurisdiction to English courts because damage caused by an inability to exploit 
copyright in sound recordings (due to not having physical possession of the recordings) 
was the kind of consequential loss (under Article 5(3)) which the court in Marinari had 
already ruled out.360 
4.2.4 The new Article 5(3) 
As stated earlier in this thesis, Article 5(3) deals with torts, delict or quasi-delict. Article 
5(3) of Brussels I is virtually identical to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. It 
states that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State 
’in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur’.361 In essence, this means that Article 5(3) applies 
to cases of threatened wrongs as well as wrongs already committed, thereby providing a 
clear ground of jurisdiction for preventive measures.362 Where, for example, a claimant 
seeks an injunction to prevent the commission of an online copyright infringement, 
Article 5(3) confers jurisdiction on the court for the place where the harm would occur 
if the publication were not prevented.363  
359  Kitechnology BV v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen [1994] IL Pr 568, 581 et seq. 
360  Mazur Media Ltd v Mazur Media GmbH [2004] EWHC 1566 (Ch) [44]-[52], in particular 
[52]. 
361  The modification introduced by Brussels I appears in bold.  
362  Referring to Article 5(3) of Brussels I, Tritton states:  
Thus, it makes it clear that quia timet actions are triable in the Member State where 
the harmful event is threatened. It is not clear from ‘may occur’ as to how 
immediate the threat must be. In the United Kingdom, a quia timet action does not 
arise unless there is a serious and immediate threat of invasion of the rights of the 
claimant. 
Guy Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 1176. 
363  CMV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, OUP 2011) 93 (where 
those authors use the example of another tort, defamation, to demonstrate which court may 
assume jurisdiction).   
    
 
122
                                                 
The wording of the new Article 5(3) is slightly curious though, since it seems to require 
the plaintiff to make a choice between the place where the tort was committed and the 
place where the tort may, at some time in the future, be committed. The use of the word 
’or’ in the new Article 5(3) seems to make the two possibilities (available to the 
plaintiff) mutually exclusive. This is unusual since theoretically nothing should stop two 
or more courts in different Brussels I countries assuming jurisdiction over different 
parts/elements of an online tort which occur/may occur on their (respective) national 
territories.  
In providing for preventive actions, Brussels I is consistent with the EU intellectual 
property framework as the Community Patent Convention,364 the Community Trade 
Mark Regulation,365 and the Community Design Regulation.366 All allocate jurisdiction 
to the Contracting State in which an act of infringement was committed or threatened. 
Arguably, Article 44 of the TRIPs Agreement also supports the view that jurisdiction 
can be assumed on the basis of potential threats – it requires judicial authorities to have 
power to prevent an infringement on their territory. 
The new Article 5(3) may have significant implications for jurisdictional issues in 
instances of digital copyright infringement. Since digital copyright material can be 
illegally downloaded or disseminated practically anywhere in the world, the amended 
Article 5(3) introduces a high degree of uncertainty into the equation. Theoretically, the 
new Article 5(3) enables the plaintiff to issue proceedings in any of the Brussels I 
Member States, if he believes his copyright may be infringed there.  
The new wording of Article 5(3) gives the plaintiff an unlimited choice of forum, 
delimited only by the geographic scope of application of Brussels I.367 Relating as it 
364  Agreement 89/695/EEC relating to Community patents - Done at Luxembourg on 15 
December 1989 [1989] OJ L401/1; Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation concerning the 
Infringement and Validity of Community Patents [1989] OJ L401/34, art 14(5). 
365  Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark [1994] 
OJ L11/1, art 93(5). 
366  Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs [2002] OJ 
L3/1, art 81(a).  
367  This unlimited choice of forum is linked to the fact that in an online situation, the defendant 
has no real control over the location of the damaging act, and perhaps even less control over 
the location where the damage is suffered. Svantesson analyses this point about lack of 
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does, to a potential tort, rather than previously committed harm, the new Article 5(3) 
creates an uncertain basis for jurisdiction and undermines the principle of legal 
certainty.368  
4.2.5 How will the new Article 5(3) operate in practice?   
It will be interesting to see how the ‘new’ Article 5(3) operates in practice. It seems that 
Article 5(3) will entitle the copyright owner to issue proceedings on the basis of a 
suspected future infringement of his intellectual property rights. In other words, it 
enables the plaintiff copyright holder to issue proceedings (for example, he may apply 
for a quia timet injunction) in the courts of any of the Brussels I Member States where 
he believes his copyright may be infringed in the future.  
While it might sound odd, it is not implausible (or impossible) for an IP holder to issue 
proceedings in all 28 Member States on the basis of a mere suspicion about threatened 
IP infringement. Through the insertion of the words ’or may occur’ in Article 5(3) of 
Brussels I, the EU legislators have created a hostage to fortune as twenty-first century 
technology enables IP infringers to breach or potentially breach copyright 
transnationally with considerable ease. 
 
Difficulties may arise in relation to Article 5(3) if the defendant is based outside the 
geographic scope of Brussels I but transmits infringing material to a recipient in a 
Brussels I Member State.369 If the defendant has significant assets in one of the Brussels 
control in the context of Internet defamation and states that it constitutes ’the very root of 
the problem of jurisdiction’ in that particular area. Dan Svantesson, ’Jurisdictional Issues in 
Cyberspace; At the Crossroads - the Proposed Hague Convention and the Future of Internet 
Defamation’ (2002) 18 CLSR 191, 193. 
368  Concerns have been raised about the risk of forum-shopping linked to the wording of Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention 1968. For instance, see Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (“Rome II”)’ COM (2003) 427 final 6.  
369  This may not prove troublesome if new proposals to extend the jurisdiction rules of Brussels 
I to third country defendants are put in place. See: Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast)’ COM (2010) 748 final 
8, Recital (16), art 4(2). 
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I Member States, then it may prove worthwhile trying to attach his assets in that 
country.370 Other possible complicating factors in respect of the potentially broad 
prosecutorial scope of Article 5(3) are the Brussels I provisions relating to lis pendens 
and provisional measures.  
4.2.6 Lis Pendens 
Section 9 (Articles 27 to 30 inclusive) of Brussels I relates to Lis Pendens (or related 
actions). Arguably, the most relevant provision in this Section is Article 28. It states that 
where related actions371 are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court 
other than the court first seised may stay its proceedings.372 Also, it is open to one of the 
parties to the action to apply to any court other than the court first seised to decline 
jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its 
law permits the consolidation thereof.373 Under Brussels I, actions are deemed to be 
370   Under the Commission Proposal (see previous fn) it is provided that a non-EU defendant 
can be sued at the place where moveable assets belonging to him are located provided their 
value is not disproportionate to the value of the claim and that the dispute has a sufficient 
connection with the Member State of the court seised.  
371  For a British ruling on the notion of ’related actions’ see Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto 
Corporation [2008] EWCA Civ 153 [25] et seqq. There, the Court of Appeal had to decide 
whether English proceedings and Italian proceedings concerning revocation and declaration 
of non-infringement proceedings (patent) were related for the purposes of Article 28 
Brussels I. Citing the House of Lords case Sario v Kuwait Investment Authority [1999] 1 AC 
32, the Court of Appeal referred at para [28] of its ruling to Lord Saville’s speech in Sario 
[40] et seq in which he propounded a broad test for ’related actions’ based on a common 
sense approach rather than an over-sophisticated analysis of the matter which would be 
complicated by the fact that the court would be dealing not with actual judgments, but with 
what judgments yet-to-be-given would contain. Rochelle C Dreyfuss and Jane C Ginsburg, 
’Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property 
Matters’ (WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property, 
WIPO/PIL/01/7, 2001), Article 13(2) provided that (for the purposes of that particular 
provision/article) actions are deemed to be related where, irrespective of the territorial scope 
of the rights and the relief sought, the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrence. Article 13(2) is titled ’Consolidation of Territorial Claims’.          
372  Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1, art 28(1). 
373  Ibid art 28(2). 
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related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine 
them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings.374 Article 30 of Brussels I sets out the conditions that have to be satisfied 
for a court to be deemed to be seised of an action.  
If a copyright infringer (defendant in an Article 5(3) action) were a corporate with a 
presence in a number of Brussels I Member States, it would be appropriate for him to 
take a lis pendens application under Article 28(2), Brussels I, seeking the court second 
seised to decline jurisdiction. 
The existence of this mere possibility or risk of infringement is sufficient to satisfy the 
’may occur’ part of the newly worded Article 5(3), thereby entitling the copyright 
holder to issue court proceedings in all of the Brussels I countries if he so wishes. 
However, the concept of legal certainty is undermined by two things, the fact that the 
new Article 5(3) captures future potential torts and, the much greater likelihood of 
transnational torts occurring (due to the internet).    
And what if the plaintiff’s suspicions prove unfounded in all or a majority of the 
countries? Considerable court time and resources will have been expended and 
jurisdiction may have been assumed by a number of courts, all in vain.375 There was a 
time when quia timet jurisdiction was viewed as little more than an interesting 
possibility but now, under the new Article 5(3), it is a reality.  
374  Ibid art 28(3).  
375  Article 27 of Brussels I (the Lis Pendens, or related actions provision) may assist here. 
Article 27(1) provides that where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court 
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time 
as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. Article 27(2) provides that where 
the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first 
seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. The usefulness of Article 27(1) may 
be diminished where the plaintiff copyright holder decides to instigate proceedings 
simultaneously in all the relevant jurisdictions. In that scenario, there is a risk that many 
courts become seised of the matter simultaneously or virtually simultaneously.    
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4.2.6.1 Provisional Measures  
Under Article 31, Brussels I, application may be made to the courts of a Member State 
for such provisional, including protective measures as may be available under the law of 
that State even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member States have 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.  
While this provision does not relate to jurisdiction issues per se, it does give potential 
applicant copyright holders some added rights/powers in terms of IP protection. Article 
31 does not seem to preclude the possibility of applicants applying to the courts of a 
number of Member States simultaneously for provisional/protective measures. 
According to the Court of Justice, ’provisional protective measures’ under Article 24 of 
the Brussels Convention (which corresponds to Article 31 of Brussels I) are ones which 
are intended to maintain a legal or factual situation in order to safeguard rights.376 Such 
measures encompass the English freezing (Mareva) injunction and search (Anton Piller) 
order, the Continental saisie conservatoire, an ordinary interlocutory injunction under 
English law377 and a French process of appointing a judicial expert, who investigated 
and protected evidence of facts but could not impose any final solution of the dispute on 
the parties, regarded by French law as interim proceedings.378   
In De Cavel v De Cavel,379 Article 31 was interpreted by the Court of Justice as only 
applying to provisional measures which relate to matters within the scope of the 
Regulation. It has to be asked what rights a provisional measure seeks to protect and, if 
these rights are outside the scope of the Regulation, a provisional measure cannot be 
granted under Article 31.  
376  Case C-261/90 Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner 
Bank [1992] ECR I-2149. 
377  See Kitechnology BV v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen [1994] IL Pr 568 (CA). 
378  Miles Platts Ltd v Townroe Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 145.  
379  Case 143/78 De Cavel v De Cavel [1979] ECR 1055. 
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A party may seek interim relief under Article 31 even if the main proceedings in the 
other Member State have not actually started. All that is required is that the possibility 
of substantive proceedings exists under national law.380     
4.3 Conclusions  
Jurisdiction and more particularly, the Brussels I Regulation, have formed the core of 
this chapter. Within Brussels I, Articles 2 and 5(3) carry most relevance to this thesis. 
Article 5(3), a special jurisdiction provision, is, in effect an exception to the basic rule 
contained in Article 2. By way of the ‘Reinwater’ ruling, the ECJ gave the plaintiff a 
wide choice of jurisdiction where a transnational tort is perpetrated. In essence, where 
the tort is split among different States, the plaintiff may sue in either of two places: the 
State where the damage occurred or the State from where the damage originated. 
Transplanting that principle to an online copyright infringement scenario, it would seem 
that the prejudiced copyright holder could sue in either the courts of the country where 
the copyright-protected content was illegally copied or in the courts of the country 
where his economic or moral rights were negatively affected. 
The ‘new’ Article 5(3) containing the potentially problematical phrase ‘or may occur’ as 
implemented by Brussels I applies to cases of threatened wrongs and provides a clear 
ground of jurisdiction for preventive measures. In a way, one could provocatively argue 
that the EU legislators, when devising the new Article 5(3), overlooked the heightened 
threat/risk posed to digital content by the internet. As digital copyright material can be 
copied and disseminated (illegally) with considerable ease in the twenty-first century, 
one could argue forcefully that the EU legislature has given a hostage to fortune. Under 
Article 5(3), potential claimants could apply for a quia timet injunction in any Member 
State where they fear their copyright will be infringed. While admittedly improbable, it 
is certainly not impossible for a potential claimant to bring quia timet proceedings in all 
28 Member States. Under current proposals to revise Brussels I, defendants domiciled 
in third countries would also fall within the scope of Brussels I meaning that even more 
jurisdictional optionality would be given to the would-be claimant. 
380  Case C-391/95 Van Uden Maritime BV (t/a Van Uden Africa Line) v Kommanditgesellschaft 
in Firma Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-7091, paras 29, 48. In this case it was enough that 
proceedings ’may be commenced’. 
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Nor should it be accepted as a given that the Lis Pendens provision of Brussels I will 
provide a definitive solution as Article 27, Brussels I only applies where the same 
parties are in litigation in different Member States. It is this provision which requires the 
court second seised to stay its proceedings. Where threatened torts are envisaged in 
different countries, it is unlikely that the same potential defendant will be involved in all 
of them.  
After Article 27, Brussels I, the next most likely related actions provision to apply is 
Article 28 but that provision contains no obligation on the second seised court to stay its 
proceedings. It states that the second seised court may stay its proceedings. In brief, 
therefore, parallel preventive proceedings may occur in a number of Member States 
(and, in the future, third States, potentially) without any automatic solution emanating 
from the related actions provisions. 
On the EU front, there now exists, for the first time ever, an applicable law framework 
for non-contractual obligations (Rome II) while Brussels I and Rome I have modernised 
the jurisdiction and applicable law legislative frameworks, respectively. In terms of the 
jurisdictional element, the addition of the words ’or may occur’ to the wording of the 
old Article 5(3), Brussels Convention (1968), is arguably a lot more significant than 
many commentators realise. The amended Article 5(3) creates a new ground of 
jurisdiction for preventive measures, but as Tritton observes, it is not entirely clear how 
immediate the threatened action must be.381 Conceivably, there may be different 
conditions to be fulfilled in the Member States in terms of granting a quia timet 
injunction. For instance, in the UK, a quia timet action does not arise unless there is a 
serious and immediate threat of invasion of the rights of the claimant.382   
As twenty-first century technology enables copyright infringers to infringe remotely and 
disseminate infringing material (widely) with lightning speed, the amended Article 5(3), 
covering as it does, potential torts, creates an uncertain basis for jurisdiction and 
undermines the principle of legal certainty. Theoretically, under the new Article 5(3), 
there is nothing to stop a claimant bringing proceedings simultaneously in all 28 
Member States. While this eventuality may be improbable, it is not impossible. 
*** 
381  Guy Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 1176. 
382  Ibid. 
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5.1 Introduction  
As stated at the beginning of Chapter 4, the jurisdictional and applicable law elements 
would be dealt with separately in this thesis. For that reason, I am devoting this chapter 
to the treatment of the applicable law elements having used the previous chapter to treat 
jurisdictional issues. In this way, an analytical balance is maintained even though a 
demarcation is drawn between jurisdiction and the applicable law. 
In legal proceedings involving a conflict of laws, invariably, both jurisdiction and the 
applicable law have to be decided by the presiding judge. While the applicable law issue 
is, relatively speaking, less controversial than the issue of jurisdiction, it is still 
nonetheless important and needs to be covered to ensure this thesis is both complete and 
balanced. The landmark Rome II Regulation383 receives significant attention in this 
chapter as it governs the applicable law in non-contractual e.g. tortious situations, the 
Rome I Regulation384 as it becomes relevant where there is concurrent liability (tortious 
and contractual). Practically speaking, it is important that Rome I is examined in this 
thesis as it constitutes the third side of the EU conflicts triangle (Brussels I and Rome II 
constituting the two other sides). 
Part of this chapter is also given over to analysis of Article 5(2) of the multilateral 
Berne Convention and the various interpretations of that provision. 
The other applicable law elements dealt with are the SatCab Directive385 (which 
contains a rule of origin), the merits and demerits of applying a country of origin rule, 
contrasting the rule of origin with the rule of reception, the European Convention 
relating to questions on Copyright Law and Neighbouring Rights in the Framework of 
Transfrontier Broadcasting by Satellite 1994, the European Commission’s 1995 Green 
383  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40. 
384  Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6. 
385  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and 
cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15. 
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Paper on Copyright and general choice of law rules and theories,386 some of which were 
specifically formulated for the online world.  
5.2 The Applicable Law   
Generally speaking, private international law involves a two stage process. The two 
stages of jurisdiction and the applicable law are not entirely separate and it is becoming 
increasingly common that a decision on the applicable law be reached at the 
jurisdictional stage of the process.387 The two stage process is not always evident since 
reported cases normally only deal with either jurisdiction or the applicable law, but not 
both of them.  
The first element to be determined is the relevant forum. In other words, which court 
will exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings. Secondly, the court must decide which law 
will be applied in the proceedings - its own (i.e. the lex fori), or that of some other 
jurisdiction. This is called the applicable law, or choice of law.  
5.2.1 The Rome II Regulation 
Introduction  
Regulation (EC) 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II)388 was adopted on 31 July 2007. Its aim is to establish uniform choice of law rules in 
respect of non-contractual obligations389 arising out of a tort or delict. The Regulation 
applies to all the Member States except Denmark390 and the substantive scope and the 
386  Commission, ‘Green Paper: Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society’ COM 
(1995) 382 final. 
387   James Fawcett, ‘The Interrelationships of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Private 
International Law’ (1991) 44 Current Legal Problems 39. 
388  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40.  
389  As the concept of a non-contractual obligation varies from one Member State to another, it 
should be understood as an autonomous concept for the purposes of Rome II. Regulation 
(EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome 
II) [2007] OJ L199/40, recital (11). 
390  Ibid art 1(4) and recital (40).  
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provisions of the Regulation should be consistent with Brussels I and the instruments 
dealing with the law applicable to contractual obligations.391  
In many ways, Rome II is a landmark in private international law. It is the first EU 
instrument of general application harmonizing rules of applicable law and it is the most 
comprehensive instrument of its kind anywhere in the world.392 With its younger sibling, 
the Rome I Regulation (adopted in June 2008) and with the Brussels I Regulation, it 
forms a substantial part of a community rulebook that now covers much of the legal 
territory formerly occupied by national private international law rules in civil and 
commercial matters.  
Rome II has been in force since 11 January 2009.393 The rationale behind Rome II is 
spelt out in Recital (6) which states as follows:  
The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve 
the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable 
and the free movement of judgments, for the conflict of law rules in the Member 
States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court 
in which an action is brought.   
The set of rules contained in Rome II creates a flexible framework of conflict of laws 
rules which, in turn, enables the court seised to treat individual cases in an appropriate 
manner. The regulation provides for the connecting factors which are the most 
appropriate to achieve these objectives. Therefore, it provides for a general rule but also 
for specific rules and in certain provisions, for an ‘escape clause’ which allows a 
departure from these rules where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another country.394   
391  Ibid recital (7). 
392  Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (1st edn, OUP 2008) Preface. 
393  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40, art 
32. Article 29 is excepted. It entered into force on 11 July 2008 (Article 32).   
394  Ibid recital (14).  
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5.2.2 Specific Rules for Special Torts  
Articles 5 to 9 of Rome II set out specific rules for special torts.395 One of the special 
torts covered is the infringement of intellectual property rights, while the others include: 
product liability, unfair competition, acts restricting competition, environmental damage 
and industrial action. The use of specific rules for special torts follows the model 
adopted in a number of European civil law jurisdictions and the US (under its 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)). 
In the United Kingdom, the case for having in the Regulation some of these specific 
rules was not thought to have been made out.396 The European Parliament was also 
unconvinced and unsuccessfully sought the deletion of some of these rules.397  
5.2.3  Article 8 of Rome II and the Infringement of IPRs 
Article 8 provides specific rules for infringement of IPR. Infringement was regarded as 
a special tort because of the significance given under both the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 and the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 to the territoriality principle which attaches 
great importance to the law of the country in which protection is claimed.398  
Article 8 sets out two separate choice of law rules, the first rule is set out in Article 8(1), 
the second in Article 8(2). Article 8(1) relates to intellectual property rights while 
Article 8(2) relates to unitary Community intellectual property rights. Article 8(3) 
precludes the law applicable under Article 8 to be derogated from by an agreement 
under Article 14.399  
395  Ibid recital (19) states that ‘Specific rules should be laid down for special torts/delicts where 
the general rule does not allow a reasonable balance to be struck between the interests at 
stake.’   
396  European Union Committee, The Rome II Regulation (HL 2003-04, 66) paras 106 (referring 
to product liability), 109 (unfair competition) and 134 (violation of the environment). 
397  I.e. the specific rules for unfair competition and acts restricting free competition.   
398  Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”)’ COM (2003) 427 final 20. 
399  Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40, art 
14 permits the parties to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their choice: 
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Under Article 8(1), the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an 
infringement of an IPR (other than a unitary Community IPR) is the law of the country 
for which protection is claimed.400 For the purposes of the Regulation, the term 
‘intellectual property rights’ is to be interpreted as meaning, for instance, copyright, 
related rights, the sui generis right for the protection of databases and industrial 
property rights.401 The slightly outmoded term ‘industrial property’ covers, among other 
things, trade marks and patents.402 
Article 8(1) must be read in conjunction with the first sentence of Recital (26) of the 
Regulation which states as follows:  
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred; or  
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement freely 
negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred.  
The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
circumstances of the case and must not prejudice the rights of third parties.  
400  It would seem that issues relating to the validity of the IPR, and to its ownership do not fall 
within Article 8(1). Article 8(1) is only concerned with determining the law applicable to 
infringement. Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins and Morris: The 
Conflict of Laws, vol 2 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 35-074. Interestingly, 
the ALI used the same wording as Article 8(1) of Rome II in American Law Institute, 
Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in 
Transnational Disputes (ALI Publishers 2008) s 301(1)(b) (‘Territoriality’). The ALI 
eschewed the formulation ‘country where protection is sought’ because of its ambiguous 
meaning: it might mean that the lex fori applies or that the lex loci delicti applies.   
401   Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40, 
recital (26). By employing the term ‘for instance’, the European legislator seems to imply 
that the list is not exhaustive. It is likely that the meaning of intellectual property rights will 
be developed by reference to a principle of autonomous interpretation. Lord Collins of 
Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins and Morris: The Conflict of Laws, vol 2 (15th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 35-076. 
402  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1983, art 1(2) provides as follows: 
‘The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial 
designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of 
origin, and the repression of unfair competition.’ 
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‘Regarding infringements of intellectual property rights, the universally acknowledged 
principle of the lex loci protectionis should be preserved.’  
The suggestion that the lex loci protectionis is a ‘universally acknowledged principle’ 
perhaps goes too far.403 Indeed, prior to the Regulation, there was no consistent practice 
even among the Member States.404 The ‘principle’ however, would appear to originate 
in the idea that IPRs are sovereign in character and operate within territorial limits, with 
each State having the exclusive power to regulate such rights within its territory.405  
The argument based on sovereignty and territoriality appears to have exerted a strong 
influence on the development of Article 8(1) of Rome II. This becomes evident from a 
reading of the European Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for 
Rome II, where the following is stated:  
The treatment of intellectual property was one of the questions that came in for intense 
debate during the Commission’s consultations. Many contributions recalled the 
existence of the universally recognised principle of the lex loci protectionis, meaning 
the law of the country in which protection is claimed on which e.g. the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 and the Paris 
403  Anette Kur, ‘Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for International Regulation – The 
Max-Planck Project on International Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’ (2005) 30 Brook J Int 
L 951. Also, Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins and Morris: The 
Conflict of Laws, vol 2 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) para 35-078, where the 
description of the lex loci protectionis as being a ‘universally acknowledged principle’ is 
deemed extravagant.   
404  Marta Pertegás, ‘Intellectual Property and Choice of Law Rules’ in Alberto Malatesta (ed), 
The Unification of Choice of Law Rules on Torts and Other Non-Contractual Obligations in 
Europe (CEDAM 2006) 221, 229 – 235.  
405  Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (1st edn, OUP 2008) 457. Also, Lawrence Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins 
on The Conflict of Laws (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) para 22-051, where the 
following is stated:  
The essence of an intellectual property right is the owner’s right to take action to 
prevent others from engaging in certain types of activity in a given territory without 
the owner’s permission. Although patents, trade marks and copyright are classified 
as movables, they share some of the characteristics of immovables in the sense that 
the rights which they confer are territorially limited.   
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Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 are built. This rule, also 
known as the ‘territorial principle’, enables each country to apply its own law to an 
infringement of an intellectual property right which is in force in its territory: 
counterfeiting an industrial property right is governed by the law of the country in 
which the patent was issued or the trademark or model was registered; in copyright 
cases, the courts apply the law of the country where the violation was committed. This 
solution confirms that the rights held in each country are independent.406  
5.3 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works  
There is a certain symmetry between Rome II (Article 8(1)) and the Berne Convention 
(Article 5(2)). While there is not absolute consensus that Article 5(2) actually 
constitutes a formal rule, some, such as Fawcett and Torremans argue that it espouses 
the lex loci protectionis. This section of the thesis will be used to analyse the differing 
viewpoints on the actual meaning of Article 5(2), Berne Convention.  
The Berne Convention’s relevance to this work lies in its Article 5(2) which has been 
interpreted by many as an applicable law rule. It should be noted that Article 14bis(2)(a) 
of the Berne Convention also designates the applicable law, but for a very narrow class 
of works, i.e. cinematographic works. In addition, it only governs copyright ownership 
issues in relation to such works. As a consequence, this particular provision has very 
limited relevance to this thesis.  
The convention’s relevance is increased by the fact that it is the oldest of the 
international copyright conventions, having been adopted in 1886.407 The Berne 
Convention creates a union comprising all the signatory states. From its inception, the 
Berne Convention has combined two different techniques: substantive supranational 
minimum rules and national treatment.408 The main basic principles of the Berne 
406  Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”)’ COM (2003) 427 final, art 8.  
407   The Convention has been revised on a number of occasions - in Berlin (1908), in Rome 
(1928), in Brussels (1948), in Stockholm (1967) and most recently by the Paris Act, 24 July 
1971. It was also amended on 29 September 1979.  
408  Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights - The 
Berne Convention and Beyond, vol II (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 1297; Roberto Mastroianni, 
Diritto Internationale e Diritto d’Autore (A Giuffrè 1997) 89 describes national treatment 
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Convention are those of national treatment409 and a guarantee of certain moral rights 
(attribution and integrity) and economic rights (reproduction, public performance, 
broadcasting, etc.).410 Both principles may be invoked by authors to protect their rights. 
There are 167 contracting parties (countries) to the Berne Convention.411 In addition to 
regulating the copyright relations between these States, it also provides international 
standards of protection for all WTO member states, whether or not they are members of 
the Berne Convention.  
 
Some commentators argue that Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is a choice of law 
provision.412 It provides as follows:  
and substantive treaty minima, jus conventionis, as the two ‘pillars’ on which the Berne 
Convention rests.  
409   The principle of national treatment is common to both the Berne Convention (art 5(1)) and 
the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (art 2(1)). Under this 
principle, each member of the Union grants nationals of other Member States the same 
treatment as it grants its own nationals. JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2008) para 3.34. Grosheide raises the much debated question of whether the 
principle of national treatment can also be construed as a private international law rule. He 
looks at both sides of the argument. From a conflicts perspective, the principle of national 
treatment leads to the adoption of the lex protectionis (or lex fori) as the applicable law 
when a court has to rule on an infringement or existence of rights within its territory. The 
other side of the argument is that the principle of national treatment provides no conflict of 
laws rule at all. In cases in which a court is concerned with the existence or infringement of 
rights within its territory, the national treatment principle ensures only that that country’s 
domestic law may govern - national treatment accords mandatory status to the lex 
protectionis. Willem Grosheide, ‘Experiences in the Field of Intellectual Property’ in 
Katharina Boele-Woelki and Catherine Kessedjian (eds), Internet, Which Court Decides? 
Which Law Applies? (Quel tribunal décide? Quel droit s’applique?) (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International 1998).  
410  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) para 18.01. 
411  WIPO, ‘Contracting Parties’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15> accessed 29 
May 2014.  
412   But this viewpoint is not unanimous, e.g. van Eechoud expresses reservations about whether 
Article 5(2), Berne Convention is in fact a real choice of law rule. She states as follows in 
her doctoral thesis:  
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 ‘the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to 
protect his rights shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where 
protection is claimed.’ 
It is important to make a few preliminary points about Article 5(2), Berne Convention.  
First, it should be noted that there is not absolute consensus that Article 5(2) actually 
constitutes a formal conflict of laws rule. However, even among the doubters, there is a 
view that, in practice, this provision generally leads to the application of the principle of 
territoriality, under which the law of each country where the infringement allegedly 
occurs determines protectability, scope and relief.413  
Secondly, the expressions ‘extent of protection’ and ‘means of redress … to protect his 
rights’ appear to limit the application of Article 5(2) to actual infringement proceedings 
which are brought to enforce the rights protected under the Convention. This means that 
this provision will not cover all issues of international copyright, notably, questions of 
authorship, initial ownership and transfers of ownership.414  
5.3.1 Differing Views on the Actual Meaning of Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention  
The phrase ‘the country where protection is claimed’ is ambiguous and it is probably an 
open question as to whether the phrase refers to the country in which the action is 
brought,415 or the country in respect of whose law protection is being claimed (which 
The only true conflict rule in the BC [sic] is in my opinion Article 14bis(2c), which 
clearly provides that the law applicable to the form of an agreement or promise 
between a (creative) contributor to a film and the producer of the film, is governed 
by the law of the country in which the producer resides.  
Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights – Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2003) 127.     
413  Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights - The 
Berne Convention and Beyond, vol I (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 319, fn 289.  
414  Ibid and vol II, 1299. For a comparison of US and UK approaches, see e.g. Paul Goldstein, 
International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (OUP 2001) 91-94. 
415  Van Eechoud concedes that only a few writers are of the opinion that Article 5(2) points to 
the law of the country where the court is seised (lex fori) even though a literal reading of the 
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may not necessarily be the country where the action is brought).416 Article 5(2) would 
have more clearly designated application of the law of the place of the infringement had 
it provided for application of the ‘laws of the country for which protection is claimed’ 
(or, even more clearly, laws of each country for which protection is claimed).417  
Both the English and French texts of the Convention clearly state ‘where’ (‘où’), 
however, which suggests that it may simply have been assumed, that suit would be 
brought in the country in which the infringement allegedly occurred.  
last fourteen words of the provision would seem to support the lex fori. Two writers who 
support the lex fori view are: Gustave Huard, Étude sur les modifications apportées à la 
Convention de Berne par la conférence réunie à Paris du 15 avril au 1er mai, 1896 (Pichon 
1897); and Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (2nd edn, 
Butterworths 1989). These works are referred to in Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in 
Copyright and Related Rights – Alternatives to the Lex Protectionis (1st edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 103, fn 290.  
416  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 145, fn 39. For the 
WIPO viewpoint, see that organisation’s IP Survey ‘The Role of Private International Law 
and Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/ecommerce/ip_survey/chap4.html#_ftn432> accessed 1 
July 2012, where it is stated that while there is hesitation about whether the term ‘country 
where protection is claimed’ should be read to refer to the forum (i.e. the country where the 
court proceedings are brought) or the country where the infringing acts have occurred. The 
latter interpretation is more widely accepted. In making this assertion, the survey cites the 
following: Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works 
and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ (WIPO Forum on 
Private International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 35; André Lucas, 
‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and of the Subject Matters of 
Related Rights Transmitted over Digital Networks’ (WIPO Forum on Private International 
Law and Intellectual Property, WIPO/PIL/01/1 Prov, 2000) 6.     
417  Several commentators have contended that Article 5(2) should be read as meaning ‘country 
for which protection is claimed.’ André Lucas, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the 
Protection of Works and of the Subject Matters of Related Rights Transmitted over Digital 
Networks’ (WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property, 
WIPO/PIL/01/1 Prov, 2000) 12; Silvia Plenter, ‘Choice of Law Rules for Copyright 
Infringements in the Global Information Infrastructure: A Never-Ending Story’ (2003) 23 
EIPR 313, 317 (stating proposition and citing more sources).  
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Professor Ulmer has argued that, despite the formulation in Article 5(2), this does not 
logically imply a reference to the law of the forum (although in most cases, this country 
will be the same as the country where the infringing act occurred).418 He contends that, 
taking general principles of PIL into consideration, it would be consistent for a 
complete rule of conflict of laws to provide that the protection of IPRs should be 
governed by the law of the country in whose territory the infringement took place (lex 
loci delicti).419 And, somewhat ironically, the ambiguity of the Convention’s drafting 
may force national courts to determine the issue for themselves, most probably resulting 
in the application of the lex loci delicti. In most instances, it is likely that national 
choice of court rules will apply the principle of territoriality, and will therefore restrict 
the application of local substantive law to infringements committed within their 
jurisdictions. By the same token, the forum (if it finds the foreign infringement claim 
justiciable) would apply the laws of the foreign territories concerned to infringements 
committed abroad.420 
Another scenario which highlights the (potential) disjunction between the country 
where protection is claimed, and the country for which protection is claimed is the less 
usual occurrence of an author bringing infringement proceedings in a country other than 
the country in which infringement was committed.421 This decision might be influenced 
by the physical location of defendant assets which could be used to satisfy any 
monetary award granted. Such a case might also arise if the plaintiff is bringing in a 
single forum, claims alleging infringements occurring in more than one country. In 
these situations, does Article 5(2) require the court to apply its own law, or may it apply 
418  Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws: a study carried out for 
the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Internal Market 
and Industrial Affairs (Kluwer 1978) 10. Ulmer is not alone in interpreting Article 5(2) as 
meaning the lex loci delicti. See for example, Henri Desbois, André Franҫon and André 
Kerever, Les conventions internationals du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins (Dalloz 
1976) paras 135-9; André Lucas and Henri-Jacques Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire 
et artistique (2nd edn, Litec 2001) paras 1088-90. 
419  Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws: a study carried out for 
the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Internal Market 
and Industrial Affairs (Kluwer 1978) 10. 
420  Ibid 10 et seq.  
421  Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights - The 
Berne Convention and Beyond, vol I (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 320. 
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the law of the country (or countries) where the infringement is alleged to have taken 
place (lex loci delicti)? Desbois et al argue that it would be illogical to insist on the lex 
fori, as it is the law of the country where the infringing act occurred which should be 
taken into account.422  
Fawcett and Torremans argue that Article 5(2) points towards the law of the protecting 
country (lex loci protectionis). This law of the protecting country is the law of the 
country in which the work is being used, in which the exploitation of the work takes 
place.423 In their view, this interpretation follows from the logic of the Convention and 
the fact that Article 5 is actually determining the level of protection for those works that 
had previously qualified for protection under the Convention.424 
Fawcett and Torremans give short shrift to the alternative minority interpretation 
(espoused by Koumantos) that the law of the protecting country refers to the country 
where the author is involved in legal proceedings425 and the suggested link with the law 
of the forum.426 They justify their rejection of the minority interpretation by pointing to 
422  Henri Desbois, André Franҫon and André Kerever, Les Conventions internationals du droit 
d’auteur et des droits voisins (Dalloz 1976) 153.  
423  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) para 12.24. In their argumentation they cite Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws: a study carried out for the Commission of the 
European Communities, Directorate-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs 
(Kluwer 1978) 11 (‘the law of the country in which the work is being used’) and Jane C 
Ginsburg, ‘L’exploitation internationale de l’oeuvre audiovisuelle: France/États Unis’ 
(1994) 4 La Semaine Juridique 49, Doctrine 3734 (‘the law of the country in which the 
exploitation of the work takes place’). 
424  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) para 12.24. 
425  Georges Koumantos, ‘Sur le droit international privé du droit d auteur’ (1979) Il Diritto di 
Autore 616, 635 et seq; Geroges Koumantos, ‘Privat International Law and the Berne 
Convention’ (1988) 24 Copyright 415, 426.  
426  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) para 12.25; citing Hakim Haouideg, ‘Droit d’auteur et droit 
international prive en Belgique’ (2006) 207 RIDA 98, 131; Sam Ricketson and Jane 
Ginsburg, International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights - The Berne Convention and 
Beyond, vol II (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 1299; Yves Gaubiac, ‘La Convention de Berne, encore 
méconnue: commentaire de la decision TGI Paris, 3e ch., sect. B, 20 mai 2008, Sté des arts 
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the fact that in many circumstances, there will not even be proceedings, and also in 
those circumstances the parties may need to know which law is applicable, for example 
in the context of contractual negotiations.427 
The idea that the law of the protecting country could be seen as an application of the 
law of the place where the tort was committed is also dismissed by Fawcett and 
Torremans as Article 5(2) is not primarily concerned with infringement428 but rather 
with any form of exploitation or use of the copyright work. They highlight the 
anomalous situation that has arisen in respect of the French Cour de Cassation in recent 
years. That court has set itself apart from other European jurisdictions by applying the 
law of the place where the tort was committed. The Cour de Cassation’s distinctive 
approach likely derives from the fact that it does not see a choice of law rule in Article 
5(2), Berne Convention, and, in the absence of a specific rule, IPR infringement is seen 
as a kind of a tort. That then brings in the law of the place where the tort was committed 
approach. Fawcett and Torremans level further criticism at the French court’s focus on 
the act giving rise to the damage rather than the place where the damage occurs. They 
argue that this focus conflicts with the Rome II Regulation’s approach429 but it also 
creates the risk of deliberate delocalisation of servers etc. to copyright havens.      
Professors Geller and Ginsburg take a pragmatic view of the wording in Article 5(2). 
Geller suggests that the material part of the provision implies the application of the law 
visuels et de l’image fixe [SAIF] c/SARL Google France, Sté Google Inc’ (2008) 11 
Communication Commerce Electronique 12, 14; and Alexandre Cruquenaire, ‘La loi 
applicable au droit d’auteur: état de la question et perspectives’ (2000) 3 Auteurs & Média 
210, 212.    
427  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011) para 12.25. 
428  Their argument that the primary concern is not infringement conflicts directly with 
Ricketson and Ginsburg’s contention that the application of Article 5(2) is limited to actual 
infringement proceedings which are brought to enforce rights protected under the 
Convention. Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright & Neighbouring 
Rights - The Berne Convention and Beyond, vol II (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 1299. 
429  See also CMV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, OUP 2011) 265 
where they state that the general rule under Rome II is that the law applicable to a tortious 
obligation is ‘the law of the country in which the damage occurs’ (Article 4(1), Rome II).   
    
 
144
                                                                                                                                               
effective where remedies take effect.430 Citing the preamble to the Berne Convention, 
which contains as one of its goals, the protection of authors’ rights ‘in as effective and 
uniform a manner as possible’, Geller argues that the Convention suggests a principle of 
preference - apply the law that most effectively protects the work at issue.431 Ginsburg 
has a similar contention. She suggests that the term may mean the forum country when 
that is the country from which the infringement originated, and which is best placed to 
accord an effective international remedy.432 
Fawcett and Torremans’ contention that the primary concern in the context of Article 
5(2) is the form of exploitation or use of the copyright work, rather than infringement, 
seems to fly in the face of a literal interpretation of some of the words/phrases used in 
Article 5 (2), e.g. ‘extent of protection’, ‘means of redress’ … ‘to protect his rights’ and 
‘where protection is claimed.’ 
 
The reference in Article 5(2) to ‘the laws of the country where protection is claimed’ 
seems to point to the lex fori, assuming that the phrase ‘where protection is claimed’ 
implies the initiation of legal proceedings by the copyright holder. As the claimant will 
most likely issue proceedings in the country where his copyright has been infringed (or 
most significantly infringed), then the lex fori is the likely outcome. While the lex fori 
may produce the most effective international remedy, it is far from certain that it 
coincides with the country from which the infringement originates (as per Ginsburg’s 
assertion). The claimant copyright holder may have strategically focused his litigation 
on a country where pronounced secondary infringement (of his protected works) 
occurred. But such secondary infringement may relate to infringing material which 
originated from a different country.  
 
 
 
430  Paul Edward Geller, ’Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright 
in a Digitally Networked World’ (1996) 20 Colum VLA JLA 571, 595. 
431  Ibid. 
432   Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Comment, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright 
Infringement’ (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 587, 600. 
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5.4 The Rule of Origin versus the Rule of Reception  
 
Having dealt with Rome II and the Berne Convention, I shall now turn to individual 
choice of law rules which have been formulated for the copyright and ICT sectors. In 
this regard, I shall treat the rule of origin433 and its various manifestations (e.g. Article 
1(2)(b) of the SatCab Directive and Article 3(3) of the European Convention relating to 
questions on Copyright Law and Neighbouring Rights 1994), the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the country of origin rule, and the law of the country of 
reception rule.   
The rule of origin has had a relatively chequered history in copyright circles. And, while 
its popularity has waxed and waned over the past fifteen years or so, it may have 
become resurgent once again. Evidence for this is contained in the European 
Broadcasting Union’s document, ‘Modern copyright for digital media. Legal analysis 
and EBU proposals’ published in March 2010.434 In this set of proposals, the EBU 
suggests that the solution adopted for EU-wide licensing for satellite broadcasting 
should be extended to communication to the public of audio and audiovisual media 
services via all electronic communications networks, including online.435  
The rule of origin was initially incorporated into the EU’s SatCab Directive.436 It was 
adopted again in both the European Convention relating to questions on Copyright Law 
and Neighbouring Rights 1994 and the European Commission’s Green Paper of 27 July 
1995 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. However, by 
433  For an analysis of the rule of origin in the context of the E-Commerce Directive, see 
Julia Hörnle, ‘The UK perspective on the country of origin rule in the E-Commerce 
Directive – A rule of administrative law applicable to private law disputes?’ (2004) 
12 IJLIT 333-363.    
434  Stephen Edwards, Pascal Kamina and Karl-Nikolaus Pfeifer, ‘Modern copyright for 
digital media. Legal analysis and EBU proposals’ (EBU, March 2012) 
<http://www.ebu.ch/registration/policy2010/images/EBU%20Copyright%20WHITE
%20Paper_EN_FINAL.pdf> accessed 2 July 2012.  
435  Ibid 34.  
436  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15.  
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November 1996, when the European Commission issued its Communication on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society437 it was clear that the 
Commission had started to reconsider its view on the rule of origin. This new caution 
towards the rule of origin was linked to the Green Paper’s consultation process when 
strong doubts emerged about transposing the approach of the SatCab Directive to the 
internet context. Two factors gave rise to the doubts. First, it may be difficult to identify 
a single point of origin of the transmission, and secondly, the point of origin could be in 
a country which denies any effective protection.438  
5.4.1 The Satellite and Cable Directive  
Under the SatCab Directive, there exists a workable mechanism for rights clearance 
with respect to a cross-border broadcast in the event of communication to the public by 
satellite of broadcasts originating in an EU Member State. This mechanism stipulates 
that any licensing of rights in the case of satellite communication is governed solely by 
the law of the Member State in which the communication of the same programme-
carrying signal originates. In effect, it authorises the implementation of a ‘one-stop-
shop’ for rights acquisition, since satellite communication rights may only be cleared in 
the country of origin.439 
437  Commission, ‘Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society’ COM (1996) 568 final.   
438  Ibid 23 et seq, fn 35; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection 
of Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ (WIPO 
Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 42, fn 136.  
439  A similar type situation prevails in respect of audiovisual services. Under Directive 
2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities [2007] OJ L332/27, art 1.3. (also referred to as the 
Audiovisual Media Services without Frontiers Directive) the former Article 2 of the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive is replaced with a new provision which provides that 
each Member State shall ensure that all audiovisual media services transmitted by media 
service providers under its jurisdiction comply with the rules of the system of law applicable 
to audiovisual media services intended for the public in that Member State.       
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The 1993 Directive does not have an obvious nexus with the internet,440 but it regulates 
an area of transnational communication and it covers communication channels through 
which significant digital copyright material passes. It is clear that its scope of 
application extends over transborder transmissions of digitised material, analogous to 
the workings and contents of internet transmissions. The Directive’s relevance is 
increased by the fact that the physical infrastructure of the internet comprises satellite 
and cable components, for example, VSAT systems (internet over satellite) and fibre 
optic cables (submarine cables).  
While, sensu stricto, the rule of origin in the SatCab Directive is not a rule of private 
international law,441 it has a strong influence on choice of law matters.  
By defining broadcasting in this way, the Directive ensures that only the laws of the 
country from where the broadcast originates will govern any copyright infringement 
relating to that broadcast. The approach in the Directive is to attach more significance to 
the original transmission of the signal than to its reception. The German ‘Felsberg’ 
ruling442 demonstrates how the provision is applied. There, German law was held to 
apply to a broadcast made from Germany, but addressed to a French public and possibly 
received by some Germans, on the basis that ‘control’ of the broadcast was exercised at 
the point of broadcasting in Germany.    
440   Geller argues that there is little analogy between broadcasts or even cablecasts and internet 
transmissions. In broadcasts/cablecasts, one broadcaster or cablecaster alone decides 
whether to communicate a work from any one country to multiple points all at once. In 
internet transmissions, telecommunication is interactively effected among multiple and 
possibly mobile points in cyberspace. In this fluid situation, the courts have not yet 
consistently localised possibly infringing transactions prior to choosing applicable laws. 
Paul Edward Geller, ‘Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership 
Issues’ (2004) 51 J Copyright Soc’y USA 315, 351.   
441  Though note the views of Dinwoodie, Dreyfuss and Kur that the rule in the SatCab 
Directive can be conceptualised as a harmonised choice of law rule, dictating in which State 
the transborder act will be deemed to occur. Graeme B Dinwoodie, Rochelle C Dreyfuss and 
Annette Kur, ‘The Law Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases’ 
(2010) 42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 201, 225, fn 59.  
442  BGH GRUR 2003, 328 (‘Felsberg Transmitter’ decision).   
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5.4.1.1 The Definitional Rule  
The Directive, in effect, ‘localises’443 the act of communication, not in the receiving 
country/countries but ‘solely in the Member State where, under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcasting organisation, the programme-carrying signals are 
introduced into an uninterrupted chain of communication’.444 If one were to analogise 
and apply the country of origin rule to digital transmissions, the initiating act should be 
deemed to take place at the location of the server that hosts the infringing website. 
However, where the relevant server is located in a copyright haven, then the initiating 
act should be deemed to take place in the country of the defendant’s residence or 
principal place of business. Ginsburg argues that where both of the aforementioned 
places are copyright havens, then the ‘initiating act’ point of attachment should not 
apply.445 
5.4.1.2 Third Countries Satellite Communications 
The directive also covers the complicated situation where the act of communication by 
satellite occurs in a third country which does not provide the required minimum level of 
protection set out in Chapter II of the Directive. Generally, the copyright-triggering act 
occurs in the physical place of uplink.446  
But if this place is located outside the EU and it does not provide for adequate 
protection and the uplinking organisation has its headquarters in the EU, then the 
443  Ginsburg actually uses the term ‘localizes’ when analysing the effect of Council Directive 
93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission 
[1993] OJ L248/15, art 1.2.(b). Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Berne Without Borders: Geographic 
Indiscretion and Digital Communications’ (2002) 2 IPQ 111, 116, fn 20.  
444  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and 
cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15, art 1.2.(b).   
445  Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects 
of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ (WIPO Forum on Private 
International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 44. 
446  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and 
cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15, art 1.2.(b). 
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Satellite Directive prefers the intellectual to the physical location of the place of the 
uplink: the Directive provides that the location of the headquarters will trump offshore 
siting of the physical equipment of uplinking.447  
5.4.1.3 Footprint Countries 
Interestingly, it seems that in applying the lex emissionis, account may also be taken of 
the laws of footprint countries. Footprint countries are those in which the broadcast is 
received. Most broadcasters encrypt their signals to avoid unauthorised reception by the 
public and also to limit their potential and thereby restrict the scope of the broadcasting 
rights that they have to acquire in the works involved. For these signals to be decrypted, 
the user has to possess a decoder and in most cases, a smart card as well. Thus the 
criterion for determining whether a specific country should be considered as a footprint 
country must be whether the decoder equipment together with the smart card are 
lawfully available to the public or section of the public of the country in question.448 
447  Jane C Ginsburg, ‘The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights 
in a Networked World’ (1999) 15 Santa Clara Comp & Tech LJ 347, 359. The act of 
communication to the public is ‘deemed to have occurred in the Member State in which the 
broadcasting organization has its principal establishment’. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 
27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ 
L248/15, art 1.2.(d)(ii). 
448  On 4 October 2011, the CJEU handed down its ruling in Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-
249/08 Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure and Others; and Karen Murphy 
v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083. This case concerned foreign decoder 
cards. In short, the Court of Justice held that a licence system for the broadcasting of 
football matches based on absolute territorial exclusivity and which prohibited TV viewers 
from watching broadcasts with a decoder card from another Member State was contrary to 
EU Law. Viewed from a Competition Law perspective, Article 101 TFEU was infringed 
where exclusive licence agreements between an IP holder and a broadcaster obliged the 
latter not to supply decoding devices with a view to their use outside the exclusive licence 
territory. The case also involved important points under Article 56 TFEU (Freedom to 
Provide Services). In the final analysis, the CJEU ruled that a restriction which offended 
Article 56 TFEU could not be justified in light of the objective of protecting IPRs. In 
concluding the fundamental freedoms section of its judgment, the CJEU referred to the 
development of EU Law, in particular the adoption of the Television without Frontiers 
Directive and the Satellite Broadcasting Directive, which are intended to ensure the 
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In two decisions, one French, the other Austrian, and both relating to traditional 
terrestrial broadcasting of copyright-protected programmes, it was held that 
broadcasters must comply with the laws of the footprint countries either because 
damage occurred there (French decision) or because they were intended to be received 
by the audience of that country (Austrian decision).449 The broadcasters, as defendants, 
had argued that the notion of copyright in broadcasting could only be applied to the act 
of emission, and that consequently the only applicable copyright law was the one 
enjoyed by right owners.  
5.5 The European Commission’s 1995 Green Paper on Copyright450    
The relative popularity of the rule of origin is further demonstrated by the fact that it 
was contained in the European Commission’s 1995 Green Paper on Copyright.451 The 
Commission published its Green Paper in July 1995, almost a year after the US 
published its own Green Paper. The EU Green Paper contains a short section entitled 
‘Applicable Law’. It describes how community law affects questions relating to the 
applicable law and refers to the SatCab Directive. In recognising the importance of 
determining which law is to apply in cross-border situations, it recommends the use of 
transition from national markets to a single programme production and distribution market. 
See generally Mark Hyland, ‘The Football Association Premier League ruling – the Bosman 
of exclusive broadcasting rights?’ (2012) 17 Comms L 7-13. 
449  Philippe Kern, ‘The EC “Common Position” on Copyright Applicable to Satellite and 
Cable’ (1993) 8 EIPR 276, 279 et seq. The cases are: Radio Périphériques v SNEP (2009) 
144 RIDA 215, Cour d’Appel de Paris; Oberster Gerichtshof 28.5.1991, 4 Ob 19/91; OGH 
ÖBl 1991, 181; GRUR Int 1991, 920 (‘Tele Uno III’ decision). In ‘Tele Uno III', it was held 
that in addition to the law of the country of emission, the copyright laws of all those 
countries situated at least to a considerable extent within the regular reception scope of such 
broadcasts must be applied. Paul Edward Geller, ‘Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: 
Infringement and Ownership Issues’ (2004) 51 J Copyright Soc’y USA 315, 350, fn 160.     
450  Commission, ‘Green Paper: Copyright and related rights in the information society’ COM 
(1995) 382. 
451  Ibid and 38-43. This contrasts with the 2008 Commission, ‘Green Paper: Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy’ COM (2008) 466/3 which does not refer to the rule of origin or to the 
applicable law for that matter.  
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the country of origin rule.452 It acknowledges that a community rule on the applicable 
law seems to be indispensable and that such a rule should be along the lines of that 
which is contained in the SatCab Directive.453  
However, in applying this rule, judges would be obliged to apply the law and 
regulations of countries with which they are not entirely familiar, a principle thought to 
have been long rejected in international copyright.454 In addition, the apparent simplicity 
of the rule belies real difficulties in determining the origin of a work on the internet. An 
example of such a difficulty is the use of anonymous remailers where indicators of a 
work’s source are removed.455 
Interestingly, the Commission’s views had changed considerably by November 1996 
when it issued its Communication on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
452  Schønning analyses the differences between a country of origin approach and a country of 
destination approach as regards determining the applicable law in online copyright 
scenarios. Where a country of destination approach is used, the law of the country where the 
transmission is received will apply. Schønning acknowledges that ‘there are arguments for 
both options and that there is as yet, no international solution.’ But he believes that the 
country of reception rule is preferable from the copyright owner’s perspective: ‘For authors, 
it would without doubt be preferable to choose the country of reception. Using the law of 
the country of reception, it is possible to evade so-called copyright havens, ie the possibility 
of transmitting legally unauthorized material from countries with no protection of copyright 
or authors’ rights’. Peter Schønning, ‘Licensing Authors’ Rights on the Internet’ (2000) 31 
IIC 967, 973 et seq. Schønning’s preference for the country of reception rule may be 
somewhat misguided as it is always open to the infringer to target/send the infringing 
material to recipients who are based in, or deliberately base themselves in copyright havens 
knowing full well that the illegal transmission will be covered by the law of the destination 
country.   
453  Commission, ‘Green Paper: Copyright and related rights in the information society’ COM 
(1995) 382, 42.  
454  Stephen M Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (2nd edn, 
Butterworths 1989) 185: ‘The history of copyright reflects the development of technology’. 
Stewart analyses the failure of the Montevideo Convention of 1889 and the avoidance of 
this ‘mistake’ by the Berne Convention. 
455  Daniel Akst, ‘Postcard from Cyberspace: The Cutting Edge, The Helsinki Incident and the 
Right to Anonymity’ LA Times (Los Angeles, 22 February 1995) D1. 
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Society.456 While the Commission acknowledged that new means of communication 
(internet/new digital satellites) would increase the relevance of applicable law issues, it 
made it clear that during the Green Paper’s consultation process, strong doubts had 
emerged about transplanting the approach of the SatCab Directive to the internet 
context. Two factors gave rise to the doubts. First, it may be difficult to identify a single 
point of origin of the transmission and, (cross ref defamation analogue) secondly, the 
point of origin could be in a country which denies any effective protection.457 This latter 
factor also arose in relation to the Council of Europe Convention on Copyright and 
proposed limitations being placed on its rule of origin. 
5.6 Advantages Associated with the Country of Origin Rule    
Proponents of the country of origin theory point to its simplicity.458 Provided the rule 
incorporates a workable definition of the place from where a communication to the 
public originates, a country of origin rule offers greater predictability than choice of law 
rules linked to the place of reception, or, more ambiguous still, to the economic impact 
of an act of exploitation.459 From the plaintiff copyright holder’s perspective, the 
456  Commission, ‘Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society’ COM (1996) 568 final.  
457  Ibid 23 et seq and fn 35; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the 
Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ 
(WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 42, 
fn 136.  
458  There is no doubt but that a choice of law rule that designates the law of a single country to 
govern the ensemble of internet copyright transactions would considerably simplify the 
legal landscape and possibly promote internet commerce. Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Copyright Use 
and Excuse on the Internet’ (2000) 24 Colum VLA JLA 1, 44.   
459  Laurence GC Kaplan and Joseph R Bankoff, ‘Of Satellites and Copyright: Problems of 
Overspill and Choice of Law’ (1993) 7 Emory Int’l L Rev 727, 741. The law of the country 
of origin was applied by the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian 
Kurier, Inc, 153 F 3d 82 (2d Cir 1998) despite the fact that the court labelled it the law of 
the country with ‘the most significant relationship’ to the work. Paul Torremans, ‘Private 
International Law Aspects of IP – Internet Disputes’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte 
Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet: a Framework for Electronic Commerce (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2000) 244, fn 98. 
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application of the country of reception460 principle is unsatisfactory since it would result 
in the application of a different copyright law in each set of national proceedings, where 
the infringing material is received in all twenty-eight EU Member States. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that copyright laws differ significantly as between the twenty-eight 
EU Member States. Nor is the hypothesis that the infringing material be received in 
every EU Member State an unrealistic one. After all, the internet is accessible from 
virtually every country in the world.    
It would seem that a combination of the country of origin and the country of reception 
rules would not assist the conflicts lawyer since it would only increase legal uncertainty. 
It would, in effect, lead to the application of more than one law in most cases and this 
would destroy the desired objective of creating a situation where only one law is 
deemed to be the applicable law.461        
460  Torremans refers to this country as the ‘country of receipt’. Paul Torremans, ‘Private 
International Law Aspects of IP – Internet Disputes’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte 
Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet: a Framework for Electronic Commerce (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2000) 245.  
461  Torremans puts forward alternative points of attachment. They are, as follows:   
1. The normal rule should be that any infringement issue is governed by the law of the 
country in which the server that hosts the allegedly infringing content is located. 
2. If the law that is applicable under the normal rule does not meet the minimum standards 
that have been laid down in the Berne Convention, the TRIPs Agreement and the WCT, 
that law should be replaced by the law of the country in which the operator of the 
website that contains the allegedly infringing material has its residence or its principal 
place of business.  
3. If the law that applies under 2 also does not meet the minimum standards that have been 
laid down in the Berne Convention, the TRIPs Agreement and the WCT, the law of the 
forum will be the applicable law if the law of the forum meets the minimum standards 
that have been laid down in the Berne Convention, the TRIPs Agreement and the WCT. 
Paul Torremans, ‘Private International Law Aspects of IP – Internet Disputes’ in Lilian 
Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet: a Framework for Electronic 
Commerce (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2000) 245. This approach is also suggested by Jane C 
Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of 
Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ (WIPO Forum on Private 
International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 44 et seq.  
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But what if the copyright material is downloaded in country Y (having been sent from 
country X), copied and modified without the owner’s authorisation, and then uploaded 
with the specific intention of dissemination over the internet. Which law would apply to 
this infringement? The law of the country from which the material was originally 
requested (X), or, the law of the country where the infringing material was created and 
then transmitted online? I would argue that the relevant law for the act of transmitting 
infringing material is the new country of transmission (i.e. country Y) as the illegal 
copying/modification in country Y constitutes a fresh tort.   
5.7 Disadvantages Associated with the Country of Origin Rule    
The rule is not without its critics. Some argue that the rule of origin facilitates the 
extraterritorial application of foreign copyright law. The copyright law of the state of 
origin will apply no matter where the copyright material is sent on the internet. Another 
difficulty may arise in determining the exact point from where the infringing material 
originated. Though, this particular problem may be soluble through the application of 
geolocation technology.   
One considerable disadvantage of applying the country of origin rule is that it results in 
different copyright laws governing works in the same country. This becomes 
problematical for people who exploit these rights since, in effect, they have to know the 
country of origin of each work and are obliged to have comprehensive knowledge of a 
potentially large number of national copyright regimes. Is this expectation realistic? 
Where the country of origin rule is applied, the rights of copyright holders may be 
undermined when individual infringers and suspect ISPs deliberately relocate to 
jurisdictions with weak copyright laws, safe in the knowledge that their illegal online 
transmissions will be subject to the local law.462 This application of the local law (the 
462 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects 
of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital Networks’ (WIPO Forum on Private 
International Law and Intellectual Property, GCPIC/2, 1998) 42; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘The 
Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights in a Networked World’ 
(1999) 15 Santa Clara Comp & Tech LJ 347, 359. In this article, Ginsburg analyses the 
issue of the point of departure. Is it the place where the server is located, or the place where 
the website operator has its residence or headquarters? Under the SatCab Directive, the 
copyright-engaging act occurs in the physical place of uplink. A point of origin approach 
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rule of origin) is tantamount to localising an infringing act in the country of 
transmission (or source country). One runs the risk however of unreliably ‘exporting’ 
that country’s purely local copyright policies into other countries whose markets and 
audiences are impacted by the transmission.463 Suppose, for example, that country A 
provides less protection than country B in a given case: applying A’s laws to outgoing 
transactions that target B’s market would impose standards of protection on B lower 
than B’s legislature intended for its home market in that case, just as applying B’s law 
to outgoing transactions that target A’s market would have the opposite effect in A.464 
To safeguard against the relocation of intellectual property infringers to underprotective 
‘copyright havens’, the EU and other copyright-producing States have resisted the point 
of origin approach for internet transmissions involving copyrighted material.465.  
may also spark a ‘race to the bottom’ among copyright pirates as they gravitate to States 
with substandard copyright laws. In addition, this approach can have the effect of extruding 
the country of origin’s copyright policy choices to the detriment of copyright policies in the 
other countries of receipt. Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet’ 
(2000) 24 Colum VLA JLA 1, 44. In his analysis of localization issues in the domain of 
online copyright, Geller distinguishes between ‘initiating acts’ and ‘consummating acts’. He 
propounds the following rule of thumb: ‘Localize any allegedly infringing act in a given 
country only if the transaction including that act is incoming relative to that country.’ 
(emphasis added). Paul Edward Geller, ‘Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement 
and Ownership Issues’ (2004) 51 J Copyright Soc’y USA 315, 339.      
463  Paul Edward Geller, ‘Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership 
Issues’ (2004) 51 J Copyright Soc’y USA 315, 339.  
464  This brings into play the distinction between incoming and outgoing transactions relative to 
any given country. Generally speaking, a transaction is incoming relative to a given country 
if it tends to impact the market or audience in that country, and it is outgoing if, starting in 
that country, it tends to impact the market or audience in another country. Geller argues that 
localization of any infringement in a particular country should only occur if the transaction 
including that act is incoming relative to the country in question. See Paul Edward Geller, 
‘Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues’ (2004) 51 J 
Copyright Soc’y USA 315, 338 et seq.  
465 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Berne Without Borders: Geographic Indiscretion and Digital 
Communications’ (2002) 2 IPQ 111, 116. It is worth noting that Article 3(1) of the E-
Commerce Directive  contains a rule of origin. However, a derogation from the effects of 
Article 3(1) has been granted to copyright, neighbouring rights and industrial property 
rights. See the Annex (‘Derogations from Article 3’) to the Directive where the following is 
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While the country of origin rule could undoubtedly be exploited by copyright infringers, 
it may also serve the copyright owner’s purposes and guarantee a certain level of 
copyright protection. When used constructively by the copyright owner, it gives rise to 
an author-centric approach to copyright protection. The author can choose a safe 
jurisdiction (i.e. a jurisdiction applying high levels of intellectual property protection) 
from which to disseminate copyright works over the internet. In doing so, the copyright 
holder can publish on the internet, safe in the knowledge that the copyright law of that 
jurisdiction will apply, no matter where in the world he sends the material.   
5.8 Points of Attachment     
A difficulty may arise with the identification of a meaningful point of attachment. If a 
country had a particularly significant relationship to the creation or communication of 
the work, its law could govern all issues from protection through to infringement. And, 
given the effects of digital communications, perhaps the only fixed point in the equation 
is the author. For example, the country of the author’s residence (at the time of the 
work’s first public disclosure) could be deemed the country of origin. The law of the 
author’s residence could then be deemed the governing law when adjudicating claims of 
copyright ownership and multi-territorial infringements.466 A possible objection to this 
proposal is that it may promote a peculiar variant of what American conflicts scholars 
call the ‘race to the bottom’.467 The variant here would be the opposite: authors would 
stated: ‘As provided for in Article 3(3), Article 3(1) and (2) do not apply to: – copyright, 
neighbouring rights, rights referred to in Directive 87/54/EEC(1) and Directive 96/9/EC(2) 
as well as industrial property rights’.     
466  Ginsburg argues that the author’s residence may be a more convincing criterion since the 
internet drastically compromises the place of first publication point of attachment. It also 
extravagantly multiplies the countries of exploitation/infringement. Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Berne 
Without Borders: Geographic Indiscretion and Digital Communications’ (2002) 2 IPQ 111, 
121.  
467  The ‘race to the bottom’ connotes that persons subject to the law’s regulation will seek the 
most forgiving jurisdiction possible, such as the Cayman Islands in financial matters. The 
phenomenon arises too in the area of tax competition, where European tax havens such as 
the islands of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man lead the way by offering zero tax rates to 
both resident and non-resident companies. Bruno Gurtner and John Christensen, ‘Beyond 
Bretton Woods: The Transnational Economy in Search of New Institutions - The Race to the 
Bottom: Incentives for New Investment?’ (tax justice network, 15-17 October 2008) 
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flock to the jurisdiction offering the most author-favourable norms. Countries might 
actually vie with one another to attract authors to their shores. A possible example is 
France and its author-friendly copyright laws which have attracted many American 
writers.468 
If one views international copyright as simply a collection of national markets, each of 
which is subject to local definition, then the countries with the most significant 
relationship to the harm are the countries whose markets the unauthorised digital 
communication disrupts. This view leads to the application of the laws of the countries 
of receipt, possibly tempered by a presumption as to the similarity of their content with 
the substantive copyright law of the forum.  
If, by contrast, one considers that the country from which the infringement originated, 
either physically or intellectually, as the country with the most significant relationship 
to the ensuing harm, then one is likely to favour application of the law of the server or 
of the initiator’s residence/principal place of business, at least so long as this country is 
not a ‘copyright haven’.      
As regards online copyright infringements, perhaps the best approach is one which 
combines certain aspects of the SatCab Directive with alternative points of attachment, 
such as:    
1. The law applicable to the entirety of a defendant’s alleged internet infringement 
is the law of the country in which the server that hosts the alleged infringing 
content is located, so long as this country’s domestic copyright law is consistent 
with Berne Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaty norms.  
2. If the law of the country identified in paragraph 1 is inadequate, then the law 
applicable to the entirety of the defendant’s alleged internet infringement is the 
<http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Bruno-John_0810_Tax_Comp.pdf> accessed 2 
July 2012.     
468 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Berne Without Borders: Geographic Indiscretion and Digital 
Communications’ (2002) 2 IPQ 111, 120. In the same article (also at page 120), Ginsburg 
goes on to point out that the proposal covering the law of the author’s residence, brings us 
full-circle to the nineteenth century debate (at least in France) over whether the State of the 
Author, or the State of the first publication, or the State where the alleged infringement 
occurs is the relevant point of attachment for international copyright.  
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law of the country in which the operator of the website on which the allegedly 
infringing content is found has its residence or principal place of business, so 
long as this country’s domestic copyright law is consistent with Berne 
Convention and WIPO Copyright Treaty norms.  
3. If the law of the country identified in paragraphs 1 and 2 is inadequate, then the 
law applicable to the entirety of the defendant’s alleged internet infringement is 
the law of the forum, so long as the forum is a member of the Berne Union or 
WTO (or WIPO Copyright Treaty), but the parties may demonstrate that, for 
particular countries in which alleged infringements occurred, the domestic law is 
either more or less protective than the copyright or related rights law of the 
forum.  
As can be seen from the above three suggested solutions, the principal point of 
attachment for determining the choice of law is the site of the defendant’s server or his 
residence/place of business. Where neither is adequate, the law of the forum will prevail 
provided it meets with minimum international standards.  
5.9 An Alternative – The Law of the Country of Reception     
An alternative to the rule of origin is to apply the law of the country of reception. 
However, this approach may be problematical since it is technically feasible for there to 
be one or more points of reception in every one of the twenty-eight EU Member States. 
Were this to occur, each Member State would constitute a country of reception. 
Consequently, each court in a country of reception would apply its own law.469 Another 
469  A country of reception rule would become even more difficult to apply if its geographic 
scope of application were ever to extend beyond the EU. Since most countries in the world 
have internet facilities (albeit with wide divergences between developed and developing 
countries’ penetration rates), it is conceivable that material posted on the Internet could be 
simultaneously received in countless countries. If the internet transmission featured 
copyright-infringing material, the governing law would be that of the place where the 
material was finally received by an internet user. It would seem that if separate sets of legal 
proceedings were instituted by the copyright owner, each set would be governed by a 
different law, depending on where the infringing material was finally received. This would 
be an unsatisfactory situation from the copyright holder’s perspective since, while his rights 
would have been infringed, he would have no control over which law would be the 
applicable law in the proceedings. Where this rule applies, the chances of the copyright 
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line of thinking holds that this approach may involve the cumbersome consequence of 
the competent court applying the laws of every country in the world where the internet 
can be received.470 This raises the issue of whether a national forum would have 
jurisdiction to hear the full geographical scope of copyright infringement claims against 
a foreign defendant, who has made a work available in every country of the world, but 
who neither resides in, nor has made the work available from the forum in question (for 
example, the defendant sends the infringing work to a webpage hosted by a server in the 
country where the seised court is situated). 
The application by each court (in a country of reception) of its own law would certainly 
prove convenient for the individual courts. However, it may not be so convenient for the 
plaintiff since what begins as a single copyright infringement, transmitted via the 
internet, may develop into at least471 twenty-eight separate sets of proceedings, with 
each court applying its own copyright law. Furthermore, EU copyright law has not been 
fully harmonised and the disparities between national copyright systems will increase 
further under Directive 2001/29/EC.472 And, looking beyond the EU, let us take the 
following hypothetical case. Buster Keaton’s silent film classic ‘The General’ is 
colourised by an online service without the permission of the copyright holder. It is 
holder’s own law constituting the governing law in proceedings would be very slim indeed. 
Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Berne Without Borders: Geographic Indiscretion and Digital 
Communications’ (2002) 2 IPQ 111, 116 et seq.             
470  Jane C Ginsburg, ‘The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights 
in a Networked World’ (1999) 15 Santa Clara Comp & Tech LJ 347, 349 et seq, fn 4 at 350.  
471  The term ‘at least’ has been used since the infringing material may be downloaded by more 
than one person in the country of reception. In addition, certain Member States comprise 
more than one jurisdiction, e.g. the UK, whilst the complicated federal structure in 
Germany, Belgium and Austria may generate various sets of legal proceedings in the 
different federal regions within those particular Member States.   
472  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L167/10, art 5 contains exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right set 
out in Article 2 of the directive. In summary, Article 5 lists twenty cases where the Member 
States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right. Generally, see the 
views of  Thomas C Vinje, ‘Should We Begin Digging Copyright’s Grave?’ (2000) 22 EIPR 
551; and Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly 
Invalid’ [2000] EIPR 499, 500 et seq. 
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stored on a computerised database in the US and end-users are allowed to download the 
work on demand through a global network: end-users receive the work at their private 
terminals worldwide. However, while the work is in the public domain in the US, it is 
still protected by copyright in Germany and, though unprotected by economic rights in 
France, still protected by moral rights there. To the extent that these transactions are 
incoming relative to Germany and France, infringement could be localised there. But, in 
applying the rule of reception very different levels of copyright protection are provided.   
Another risk associated with the application of a rule of reception is that it may cause a 
race to underprotective copyright havens in reverse. If such a rule were to prevail, 
copyright pirates would direct their infringing material to jurisdictions with lax 
intellectual property laws473 in the full knowledge that a weak copyright law will be 
applied by the judge in the court proceedings. 
5.10 Conclusions 
Despite the fact that the lex loci protectionis was not exactly the ‘universally 
acknowledged principle’ it was described as (in Recital (26) of Rome II), it is arguable 
that  it produces a higher degree of legal certainty than the situation which prevailed 
pre-Rome II. However, the trade-off for that certainty is an increased regulatory burden 
for commercial parties, requiring more extensive investigation of national IPRs both 
when planning new cross-border business activity and, in the event of a dispute, prior to 
commencing or defending litigation. Adoption of the lex loci protectionis in Rome II 
may yet prove to be a stop-gap solution pending further consolidation of IPRs or the 
associated rules of PIL at a European or international level.474  
473  According to ’Imitation v Inspiration’ The Economist (US, 14 September 2002) 11: ‘Most of 
the world’s people live in countries which either do not have, or do not enforce, intellectual 
property rights.’ However, this situation will not prevail for much longer. TRIPS requires 
even the least-developed countries to have some minimum protection in place by 2006, 
though some of the world’s least developed countries have argued that they need till 2016 to 
implement certain forms of intellectual property protection e.g. the adoption and 
enforcement of patents on pharmaceuticals. All countries joining the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) must also sign up to TRIPS (Trade-related aspects of intellectual-
property rights).   
474  Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (1st edn, OUP 2008) 460. 
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The ambiguous wording of Article 5(2) Berne Convention has provoked considerable 
debate about its precise meaning and nature (i.e. is it a real choice of law rule? (van 
Eechoud)). Having examined the views of a large number of commentators I believe 
Article 5(2) points towards the lex fori, assuming that the phrase ‘where protection is 
claimed’ implies the initiation of legal proceedings by the copyright holder. If the place 
of the legal proceedings coincides with the place of infringement, then both lex fori and 
lex loci delicti will point to the same applicable law. 
Ginsburg is also of the view that the term may mean the forum country provided that it 
is the country from which the infringement originated and it is best placed to accord an 
effective international remedy.475 I do not agree with Ginsburg’s two conditions, 
particularly the first, as in a large number of cases, there will be no obvious 
nexus/overlap between the forum country and the country from which the infringement 
originated. Instead, the claimant will have chosen to issue legal proceedings in the 
forum country for strategic reasons.     
The cyclical nature of some of the applicable law principles is demonstrated by the re-
emergence in March 2010 of the rule of origin in a set of EBU Proposals. The proposals 
recommended that the solution adopted for EU-wide licensing for satellite broadcasting, 
in short, a rule of origin, should be extended to communication to the public of audio 
and audiovisual media services via all electronic communications networks, including 
online.476 
475  Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Comment, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright 
Infringement’ (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 587, 600.  
476  Stephen Edwards, Pascal Kamina and Karl-Nikolaus Pfeifer, ‘Modern copyright for digital 
media. Legal analysis and EBU proposals’ (EBU, March 2012) 34 <http://www.ebu.ch/regis 
tration/policy2010/images/EBU%20Copyright%20WHITE%20Paper_EN_FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 2 July 2012.  
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Chapter 6. Models and analogues for online copyright infringement, 
how compelling is the defamation analogue? 
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6.1 The aim of this chapter    
The aim of this chapter is to critically evaluate and compare the two online torts which 
form the backbone of my research, namely online copyright infringement (the case 
study) and the analogue - online defamation - and to determine how compelling (or not) 
the defamation analogue actually is. Copyright will be divided up into three of its 
constituent restricted rights, namely, the reproduction right, the communication to the 
public right and the making available right. As regards the defamation component, since 
libel is the permanent form of defamation, and is usually deemed by statute to occur by 
broadcasting and related forms of communication,477 I shall be focusing on this branch 
of defamation. At various points in the chapter, I shall highlight the points of connection 
(crossover points) and points of disconnection between the two torts.   
  
Another important theme running through this evaluation is that of localisation of the 
relevant tort. As will become evident, jurisprudence has a key bearing on the criteria 
used for localisation. In terms of online defamation, I have drawn considerably from the 
Australian High Court ruling in the defamation case of Dow Jones v Gutnick.478 Despite 
its falling outside my primary jurisdictional focus, it remains a landmark judgment and 
is too important and influential to omit. Importantly, it is cited by Sterling as relevant to 
locating acts of online copyright infringement.479 As regards the right of communication 
477  Perhaps surprisingly, the question whether internet communications amount to libel or 
slander appears to have attracted comparatively little attention in the case law. 
Communications from an internet site (such as a web page) would seem to come within 
Section 201(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act 1990 [and hence constitute libel under s 166] 
(because they are sent by a telecommunications system for reception at two or more places). 
Richard Parkes, Alastair Mullis and Godwin Busuttil, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 3.12 . 
478  Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
479  JAL Sterling, World Copyright  Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 152, where Sterling 
states as follows:  
While the Gutnick case concerned an action for defamation, it is thought that, in 
the context of infringement on the internet, it provides notable support for the 
proposition that, since liability for tort will arise at the place where the infringing 
act occurs or where the consequent damage arises, liability for infringement of 
copyright/author’s right/related rights arises in the case of the internet, at the place 
where the infringing act occurs or where damage flows from the act. Transmission 
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to the public, the web-blocking case law under s. 97A CDPA 1988 (see 7.3.5.) has 
proven pivotal in establishing important criteria to determine whether a communication 
to the public can be localised in the UK or not. Later in this chapter (from para 6.10 
onwards), I critically evaluate the criteria adopted by the English High Court to 
determine whether a communication to the public can be localised in the UK or not.  
 
6.2 Push/Pull dichotomy   
Before moving onto copyright’s exclusive rights, I shall mention the push/pull 
dichotomy in information technology, outlined by Svantesson.480 
 
Put briefly, pushed communications are synchronous (that is available only at a 
particular time) while pulled communications are asynchronous (i.e. available at the 
time of the consumers’ choosing). To give some examples, World Wide Web 
communications are considered a form of pull technology while television, radio 
broadcasts and emails are considered a push technology. Push technology can also be 
amenable to user preference: an internet user may subscribe to, say, a news service, 
indicating in advance the topics on which he wishes to receive information.   
 
The ‘ecommerce technology’ web site has this to say: 
 
“Currently, one of the most fashionable technologies within the Internet is 
“Push” technology. Contrary to the “Pull' world of web pages where users 
request data from another program or computer, via a web browser, “Push” 
enables services to be targeted at the user, without them having to initiate the 
information collection activity. Instead, information finds the user. In other 
words, an automated retrieval of data from the Internet, corporate data sources 
to or from a server site will (if unauthorised) involve the infringing act of 
reproduction, so liability will automatically arise at all actual or potential points 
where the protected material is made available.    
480  For the distinction between push technology and pull technology, see Dan Jerker B 
Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 46 et 
seqq; Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘The Characteristics making internet communication 
challenge traditional models of regulation – What every international jurist should know 
about the internet’ (2005) 13 IJLIT 39-69.  
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and e-commerce web sites, is delivered directly to specific user populations in a 
personalised manner.481 [emphasis added] 
 
‘Pull’ technologies transmit data in response to an initiating and contemporaneous 
request from the user. On the internet, pull technologies are used when a user accesses a 
website; another example is network computing. In practice, many internet activities 
combine both forms of technology: email is transmitted to server by ‘push’ but the 
recipient’s email programme uses ‘pull’ to call for messages from the server.  
 
Later in this chapter, I shall highlight aspects of push/pull technology in the context of 
the various torts committed. In my analysis of the torts, I shall try to separate out the 
various stages of the torts generally, and also, where appropriate, comment on whether 
they involve push or pull. In this regard, I have prepared a table (see Appendix 2)  
which sets out the three relevant torts and their various stages. For each of the stages of 
a tort, the table contains commentary on whether an infringement has actually been 
committed.  
 
I feel it would be worthwhile, even at this early stage of the chapter, to give some brief 
examples of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ in the context of two of the rulings  examined more 
closely later in the chapter.  
 
Disseminating a number of defamatory emails is almost certainly push (given the 
generally accepted view that emails are push technology), but if the defamatory material 
is merely uploaded to a server (servicing a website) or to a blog, then that content needs 
to be pulled by a publishee before publication (and the related defamation) can occur. 
This ties in with the general view that Dow Jones482 is authority for the proposition that 
digital content hosted on a web server is only deemed published at the point of access, 
481  Ecommerce Technology, ‘Push-Pull Technology’ 
<http://ecommercetechnology.org/english/data/70.htm> accessed 3 June 2014.  
482  Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56.  
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not at the point of storage.483 In other words, the publication and the attendant 
defamation only occur after a pull (by the publishee).484  
 
Turning to the pivotal Football Dataco v Sportradar,485 and looking at the key notion of 
‘reutilisation’ and its definition under Article 7 Database Directive, it has all the 
appearances of push. The definition refers to ‘any form of making available to the 
public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, 
by renting, by online or other forms of transmission...’. However, later in the judgment, 
in particular at paragraph 21, the court refers to a person sending ‘by means of his web 
server, to another person’s computer, at that person’s request, data previously extracted 
from the content of a database protected by the sui generis right’. Despite the ruling 
referring to a person sending the data, it is not always entirely clear from the judgment 
if the data is sent by automated means or through the intervention of some individual. 
At this point, the process takes on more the appearance of pull. Furthermore, the 
resonance with copyright’s exclusive rights then becomes clear when the court states 
‘by such a sending, that data is made available to a member of the public’.486  
6.3 Copyright’s exclusive rights   
Copyright is divided into a number of exclusive (or ‘restricted’) rights under both the 
UK and EU regimes. Under the UK copyright regime, and, more particularly, s 16 
CDPA, 1988, copyright breaks down into six exclusive rights, namely: 
 
1. The right to copy the work (defined in terms of reproduction in s 17);  
2. The right to issue copies of the work to the public;  
3. The right to rent or lend the work to the public;  
4. The right to perform, show or play the work in public;  
483  Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law, The Law and Society (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 
175.  
484  Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [44], where it is stated in the principal judgment that 
‘….material on the World Wide Web is not available in comprehensible form until 
downloaded onto the computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the material 
from the webserver’ (emphasis added). 
485   Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29. See para 3.6.4. 
486  Ibid para 21. 
    
 
168
                                                 
5. The right to communicate the work to the public (defined in s 20 as including 
broadcasting and making available to the public by electronic transmission, 
etc.); and,  
6. The right to make an adaptation of the work or to do any of the foregoing in 
relation to an adaptation. 
It is interesting to note that the EU’s topology for the exclusive rights, set out in Articles 
2-4 inclusive of the InfoSoc Directive is quite different from the UK’s. Article 2 refers 
to the reproduction right (equivalent to the right to copy a work under the UK regime). 
The communication to the public right and the making available right are bundled 
together in Article 3 with the making available constituent represented as a sub-
component of the communication to the public right; this is the same as section 20, 
CDPA 1988, but no specific mention is made of performance in public. The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, which the InfoSoc Directive implements,487 refers to communication 
and making available in the context of Arts 11, 11bis and 11ter Berne Convention 
(respectively, public performance/communication to the public, broadcasting, 
recitation). Lastly, Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive refers to the distribution right. 
6.4 The scope of my analysis in this chapter 
My analysis will be restricted to the three exclusive rights that feature most prominently 
in UK/EU jurisprudence with a decided online character, namely, the reproduction right, 
the communication to the public right and the making available right.488 It should be 
noted from the outset that under both the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the Information 
Society Directive, the  right of making available to the public is categorised as one 
487  See InfoSoc Directive,  recital (15). 
488  Sterling argues that the two exclusive rights most affected by the internet are the 
reproduction right and the right of communication to the public. JAL Sterling, World 
Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 653.   
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component of the more general right of communication to the public.489 This fact was 
reiterated very recently by the CJEU in the Svensson ruling.490 
 
The making available right and its localisation in an online environment feature 
prominently in the 2013 European Commission Study on the Application of Directive 
2001/29/EC on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society.491 Later in this 
chapter, I critically evaluate the study’s analysis of the making available right and the 
criteria it puts forward to localise this particular right in an online environment.  
 
For reasons appearing in footnote format alongside each of the rights, my analysis will 
not cover the following UK exclusive rights: 
 
• The right to issue copies of the work to the public492  
• The right to rent or lend the work to the public493  
• The right to perform, show or play the work in public494  
489 Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, ‘Report and Opinion on the making 
available and communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking 
techniques on the internet’ European Intellectual Property Review (2014) 36 EIPR 149, 150. 
The specific provisions which provide for this situation are: Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive.   
490  Case C-466/12 Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB (ECJ (Fourth Chamber) 13 February 2014), 
paras 19 et seq. 
491  Severine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 
2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> 
accessed 5 May 2014. 
492  This right applies only to tangible copies, see also Agreed Statement concerning Articles 6 
and 7 WCT.   
493  This right applies only to tangible copies.  
494  As the term ‘performance’ is defined by Section 19(2)(b) of the CDPA as including ‘any 
mode of visual or acoustic presentation, including presentations by means of a sound 
recording, film or broadcast of a work’ it would appear, at first sight, that this exclusive right 
falls within the scope of my thesis. However, as demonstrated by the treatment of this 
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• The right to make an adaptation of the work or to do any of the foregoing in 
relation to an adaptation495  
6.5 Conceptual Models 
Both Svantesson and Sterling have propounded conceptual models which set out the 
various stages in an online defamation case and an online copyright infringement case, 
respectively. Svantesson’s model is adequate to represent the situation in the UK,496 as 
restricted right by Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, ‘Intellectual Property Law’ (3rd edn, 
OUP 2009) 146 et seqq, most of the related case law is from the 1880s through 1940s. In 
their analysis, Bently and Sherman do not cite any court ruling from the digital age. The 
sorts of scenarios that have been litigated under this right include the playing of a radio in the 
defendant’s lounge (which could also be heard in a neighbouring  restaurant) (PRS v Camelo 
[1936] 3 All ER 557); the operation of a jukebox (where the music played was not 
authorised); the performance of a play by an amateur dramatic club at Guy’s Hospital (Duck 
v Bates [1884] 13 QBD 843), and, the performance of a musical work at the Embassy Club, 
London (Harms (Incorporated) Ltd v Martans Club Ltd [1927] 1 Ch 526). Given the clear 
pre-internet character of these rulings, it does not make sense to treat this exclusive right.          
495  Under Section 21(3)(b) of the CDPA 1988, the term ‘adaptation’ (in relation to a musical 
work) is defined very narrowly to mean ‘an arrangement or transcription of the work’. The 
terms ‘arrangement’ or ‘transcription’ have similar meanings and both imply an adaptation 
of a composition often involving the rewriting of a piece of music possibly for an instrument 
other than the instrument for which it was originally intended. Frequently, an arrangement 
involves significant changes to aspects of the original piece. A ruling that neatly 
encapsulates the key elements of an adaptation (in the context of a musical work) is Francis 
Day & Hunter v Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587. The principal elements mentioned therein were: the 
conscious or unconscious taking of a number of bars from the original work for use in a 
separate (allegedly infringing) work; considerable similarity between the two musical works; 
a requirement of proof of de facto similarity with the work alleged to be copied, and the 
principal musical influences of the alleged infringer. As the adaptation right, as defined by 
the CDPA 1988, has no obvious or natural connection with the BitTorrent file-distribution 
system, it seems appropriate not to analyse it in this chapter. While the author concedes that 
physically the files are ‘delivered’ in small portions (and said files emanate from a number of 
different downloaders), they will be ‘collected’ and reconstituted to create the original work, 
not an adapted version of the original work.                   
496  Svantesson’s model is set out at pages 333 et seqq of his work, Private International Law 
and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012). As the model appears in the chapter titled 
‘Acritique of current rules of private international law’ and has not been ‘attributed’ to any 
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is Sterling’s, but the latter’s model is restricted to the reproduction right. I shall use their 
models but critique same as I go along.   
6.6 A definition of defamation and how it evolves through the case-law 
Before examining Svantesson’s conceptual model, I feel it would be beneficial to 
examine the tort of defamation and how it has evolved over the years, 
 
Defamation involves a sequence of events with the actual primary or reputational harm 
really only occurring when the publishee reads (and comprehends) the defamatory 
material, and then only if it renders the publishee likely to hold the subject in ‘hatred, 
ridicule or contempt’, to cite the classic definition given in Parmiter v Coupland.497 The 
2010 ruling of Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd contains a good analysis of how 
the meaning of the term ‘defamatory’ has evolved over the decades.498 In Thornton, 
Tugendhat J defined ‘defamatory’ in the context of a statement as ‘something which 
substantially affects in an adverse manner the attitude of other people towards the 
victim, or has a tendency to do so.’499 
 
Tugendhat J also observed that the word ‘attitude’ in this definition ‘makes clear that it 
is the actions of right-thinking persons that must be likely to be affected (so that they 
treat the claimant unfavourably, or less favourably than they would otherwise have 
done) not just their thoughts or opinions.500 Although the definition of what is 
defamatory has evolved considerably over the last hundred years or so, by virtue of the 
case-law, it has always been premised on the perception of the publishee.501   
of seven States treated in Svantesson’s work, one can assume that the model is neutral in 
character and does not ‘belong’ to any one of the seven countries. That said, there is 
absolutely nothing to suggest that the model is inappropriate to or unsuitable for the UK.    
497  Parmiter v Coupland [1840] 6 M & W 105, 108, per by Lord Wensleydale (then Park B). 
498  Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [28]. 
499  Ibid [95]. McBride and Bagshaw argue that the definition of ‘defamatory’ laid down by 
Tugendhat J in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group, is likely to be accepted as providing the 
core definition of what is defamatory. Nicholas J McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law 
(4th edn, Pearson 2013) 530.  
500 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [91]. 
501  Selected rulings which demonstrate the evolution include: Tournier v National Provincial 
Union Bank of England Ltd [1924] 1 KB 461, 477 (Scrutton LJ said that he did not think that 
Lord Wensleydale’s classic definition was sufficient in all cases, because words could 
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6.7 Online Defamation   
 
The steps in an online defamation case, as set out in Svantesson’s conceptual model, 
follow hereunder.502 Many of these steps are, in fact, an extension of Svantesson’s 
model. My ‘additions’ can be seen by setting out the differences between Svantesson’s 
model and the model which I have created. For instance, Svantesson starts his analysis 
with the offline world, I give primacy to the online world. His model does not refer to 
any case law while I enlist Dow Jones v Gutnick,503 the Lord McAlpine ruling504 and 
Bier v Mines de Potasse505 to highlight certain aspects or types of online defamation 
and, to give an example of a tort (albeit offline) which spreads beyond the borders of 
one country (e.g. Bier). For steps five and six, I provide a deeper level of analysis and 
provide a much larger number of examples of manifestation of harm to reputation and, 
consequential effects of defamation. Lastly, for each step, I confirm whether or not a 
defamation has actually been committed. 
 
My analysis of each step comprises three elements: 
a. The online situation  
damage the reputation of a man as a business man which no one would connect with hatred, 
ridicule or contempt); Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 
581, 587 (Slesser LJ expanded the Parmiter v Coupland definition to include words which 
cause a person to be shunned or avoided); Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (Lord 
Atkin expressed the view that the definition in Parmiter v Coupland was probably too 
narrow. He proposed a new test: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation 
of right-thinking members of society generally?); and Drummond-Jackson v British Medical 
Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094, 1104 (Lord Pearson stated that in some cases, it is 
necessary to consider the occupation of the plaintiff as ‘words may be defamatory of a 
trader/business man or professional man if they impute lack of qualification, knowledge, 
skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional 
activity...’ (even if they do not impute any moral fault or defect of personal character)). 
502  Dan Jerker S Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 333 et seqq. 
503  Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
504  Lord McAlpine of West Green v Sally Bercow [2013] EWHC 981 (QB). 
505  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735. 
See para 4.2.3.2. 
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b. The offline situation (the offline equivalent of ‘a’)   
c. A statement on whether a defamation has occurred.  
Step One 
Online:  
The defamatory material is composed. The composer drafts a defamatory email or drafts 
a defamatory piece and saves same on an electronic file with the intention of publishing 
it on a blog or online bulletin board the following day.  
 
Offline:  
The defamatory material is written in a letter or is published in a magazine. In the 
former case, the letter is placed in an envelope but is not yet posted. In the latter case, 
the magazines are stored in the warehouse of the publisher, awaiting delivery to 
newsagents. 
 
Has defamation occurred? 
As the defamatory material has not yet been sent to potential publishees, there has been 
no publication and therefore no defamation.  
 
Step Two  -  The defamatory material is disseminated or dispatched  
 
Online:  
The author clicks on ‘send’ on his email (or, tweets the defamatory statement,506 or, 
posts same to facebook or writes same on a blog). In each case, the defamatory material 
is posted to a server somewhere. 
 
Offline equivalent:  
The letter containing the defamatory material is posted to a third party or the magazines 
containing the defamatory material are loaded onto vans for delivery to newsagents. 
 
Has defamation occurred? 
At this point, the defamatory material is being transmitted but has not yet been received 
or comprehended by the publishee. Therefore, no defamation has yet occurred. 
506  See generally, Lord McAlpine of West Green v Sally Bercow [2013] EWHC 981 (QB).  
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 Step 2 A  
Online: 
The defamatory material is stored on a server. This step is not included in Svantesson’s 
model, but I have included it due to it being an intrinsic part of the technological 
process and the fact that there is an important parallel in the context of online copyright 
infringement. The server may be located locally or abroad. Just because the material is 
uploaded in country A does not necessarily mean that it will be stored on a server in 
country A. Later in this chapter, in my analysis of the making available right, it will 
become evident that there can be a disconnect between location of upload and location 
of storage of the uploaded material.   
 
 
Offline: 
The defamatory material is stored in the newsagents’ warehouse or, in the case of the 
defamatory letter, is stored in the Royal Mail’s sorting office.     
 
Has defamation occurred? 
At this point, the defamatory material has not yet been comprehended by the publishee. 
Hence, no defamation has occurred.  
 
Step Three 
Online: 
The publishee takes possession of the defamatory material. For instance, the recipient 
receives the e-mail in his inbox, or accesses the relevant website, but has not yet 
read/comprehended the email or the content of the website.  
 
Offline equivalent: 
The publishee buys the newspaper or retrieves his post containing the defamatory 
statement(s), but decides to read it later. 
 
Has a defamation occurred? 
No defamation has occurred as the publishee has not yet read or comprehended the 
defamatory material. 
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Step Four 
Online: 
The publishee reads and comprehends the defamatory material (the material enters his 
mind). He reads the e-mail or, he accesses the blog/discussion board and reads the 
defamatory material. 
 
Offline equivalent:  
The purchaser of the newspaper reads the relevant article or the letter is read by its 
recipient.    
 
Has a defamation been committed? 
At this stage, a defamation has usually been committed as the defamatory material has 
been comprehended by the publishee.507   
 
Step Five  
The harm to reputation starts to manifest itself.508 In effect, the publishees and those 
with whom they communicate start to hold the subject in hatred, ridicule or contempt. 
The nature and degree of the harm can vary. It is surmised that the harm could range 
from the ridiculing or criticising of the victim in an intemperate or exaggerated fashion, 
to the victim’s views not being taken seriously by his peers (with consequences for his 
credibility, both privately and professionally 
 
507  The principal judgment in Dow Jones v Gutnick is very clear on this point. It states ‘harm to 
reputation is done when a defamatory publication is comprehended by the reader, the 
listener, or the observer. Until then, no harm is done by it’. Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] 
HCA 56 [26]. Later in the principal judgment (at [44]), the court states that defamation is to 
be located at the place where the damage to reputation occurs. Ordinarily, that will be where 
the allegedly defamatory material is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, 
that the person defamed has in that place a reputation, which is thereby damaged. 
Then, referring explicitly to ‘material on the World Wide Web’ (also at [44]), the court states 
that such material is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded onto the 
computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the material from the webserver. 
It is where that person downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done.  
508  Under UK defamation law, libel is actionable in itself without adducing additional evidence. 
Injury to the plaintiff’s reputation is sufficient.    
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Step Six  
The plaintiff feels the effects of the consequences.  
 
Unlike the previous steps, step six is less specific and may comprise a number of 
different acts. Step six occurs when the effects of the consequences of the defamation 
are felt by the victim. For example, the defamed victim may lose his job. He may lose 
business opportunities. His business may suffer without actually becoming insolvent 
(sales, profitability, or turnover may decrease). His marriage or personal relationships 
may suffer and, his credibility among the wider business community/society in general 
may be affected. In addition, the victim of the defamation may suffer emotional injury, 
depression or even suicidal ideation.  
 
If the victim has business ventures in a number of different States and all are negatively 
affected by the defamatory comments, then the harmful effects are felt in multiple 
jurisdictions. In a way, the harmful effects are ‘localised’ in each country where the 
victim has business interests. From a tort perspective, defamation can only occur in a 
jurisdiction if the claimant (victim) has an established reputation there. As regards the 
issue of multi-state torts, the ECJ ruling in Handelskwekerij G J Bier v Mines de 
Potasse d’Alsace SA509 is particularly relevant as the defendant’s negligent actions in 
France resulted in harmful effects downriver in the Netherlands. It is also one of the key 
conflicts rulings in that it gives claimants a greater choice in terms of where to sue, 
under Article 5(3), Brussels I.    
6.8 Online Copyright Infringement  
In this section, I will deal with the second element in the critical evaluation - online 
copyright infringement. I shall focus initially on the principal exclusive right, the 
reproduction right, and later treat the communication to the public right, and the making 
available right. Fortunately, as regards the reproduction right, I can draw on Sterling’s 
conceptual model,510 though arguably it is not quite as comprehensive as Svantesson’s 
defamation model. That said, it does indicate the loci of unauthorised reproductions. 
 
509  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, 
and treated in depth at para 4.2.3.2. 
510 JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 659 et seq.  
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My research will demonstrate the different criteria used by the courts to localise 
infringements of the 3 selected exclusive rights. More importantly, it will highlight 
points of disconnection as between online defamation and online copyright 
infringement and, indeed, between the exclusive rights inter se when it comes to 
localising the respective torts. It will become apparent that different rules and criteria 
are used to localise infringements of the three different exclusive rights.   
 
Sterling’s conceptual model provides a succinct and clear analysis of the loci of 
infringements of the reproduction right in an internet context. The model refers to illegal 
reproduction occurring at five different stages of the unauthorised transmission or 
incorporation of copyright material.511 I have introduced a sixth stage, referring to the 
effects of the consequences of copyright infringement. This is to maintain the symmetry 
with the online defamation component.     
 
Step One 
Reproduction occurs where protected material is incorporated into the uploader’s 
computer (in the hard drive or RAM or both). 
 
This is most likely to be an infringement of the rightholder’s reproduction right as it 
involves the initial copying without authorisation. However, if the reproduction were to 
fall under one of the permitted acts under sections 28A to 31 of the CDPA 1988 or 
under one of the copyright exceptions due to come into force in the UK on 1st June 
2014, then it would be legal notwithstanding lack of authorisation. A good example of a 
form of reproduction that would be saved by the new set of exceptions is the creation of 
personal copies for private use.512 
 
511  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 659. 
512  The changes to the copyright exceptions in the UK are introduced by way of secondary 
legislation in the form of five statutory instruments that amend relevant sections of the 
CDPA 1988. The five S.I.s are: The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies 
for Private Use) Regulations 2014; The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation 
and Parody) Regulations 2014; The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Disability) 
Regulations 2014; The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Research, Education, 
Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014; and The Copyright (Public Administration) 
Regulations 2014.    
    
 
178
                                                 
Step Two 
Reproduction takes place in the transmission process between the infringer’s computer 
and the server site. This occurs when a copy of the infringing material passes through a 
number of intermediary servers513 on its way to the server site.  
 
This thesis argues that the inherent unlawfulness of the initial reproduction persists the 
whole way through the transmission process right up to the point at which the infringing 
copy reaches the server site or, final destination. Stated differently, once the initial 
reproduction is an unauthorised one, all subsequent incidental reproductions along the 
digital chain of distribution (i.e. copies created on the intermediary servers) take on an 
illegal character too and are not saved by the exceptions provided for in Article 5(1) of 
the InfoSoc Directive.514  
 
Viewing the above situation from the perspective of an ISP, it is submitted that an ISP 
would, most likely, be in a position to avail of the ‘mere conduit’ and ‘hosting’ safe 
harbour exemptions provided by Articles 12 and 14 respectively of Directive 
2000/31/EC (the E-Commerce Directive) provided of course it satisfies the conditions 
therein.  
 
Article 12 specifically refers to the ‘automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the 
information transmitted’. The provision goes on to specify that the storage takes place 
for the ‘sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network’ 
and that the information is ‘not stored for any period longer than is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission’. It is submitted that this is the type of storage that occurs 
on an intermediary server and, for that reason, the ISP will not be liable for the 
information transmitted. 
 
513  Sterling refers to these points as the intermediary transmission points. See JAL Sterling, 
World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 666.  
514  Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive creates an exemption to the reproduction right in 
respect of temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or incidental in nature, form an 
integral part of a technological process, whose sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a 
network between third parties by an intermediary, and which have no independent economic 
significance. 
    
 
179
                                                 
In terms of the exemptions for hosting provided by Article 14, it is argued that an ISP 
operating intermediary servers which store (host) unauthorised transient reproductions 
could avail of the hosting exemption. The key condition is that the ISP does not have 
actual knowledge of the illegality of the material hosted and that it is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent (Article 
14(1)(a)). As it is very unlikely that an ISP would have actual knowledge of transient 
illicit reproductions on its intermediary servers, it would, almost certainly, satisfy the 
conditions for an exemption under Article 14. At this juncture, it is important to 
distinguish between actual knowledge (of illegal activity) and presumed awareness on 
the part of the ISP.  
 
Most ISPs are presumably aware of the fact that transient reproductions occur on their 
intermediary servers as a matter of course. These reproductions are part and parcel of 
the technological process and, in this regard, similar to the copies that are created on a 
laptop’s RAM when its owner accesses websites. Clearly, ISPs are aware of this fact but 
can this general awareness of technological realities be equated with actual knowledge 
of illegalities? It is contended that such an equating would be both unreasonable and 
unfair.  
 
A general awareness of the existence of infringing copies on one’s intermediary servers 
is still a far way off ’actual knowledge of illegal activity’.515 To develop the point, if an 
ISP were required (by law, for instance)516 to instantly identify infringing copies on one 
or more of its intermediary servers, it would, most likely, experience significant 
difficulties in doing so. For one, it can really only know what constitutes an infringing 
copy if it also knows what the (original) copyright material is. But there is an additional 
step. It must also know that the original material was copied without the licence of the 
rightsholder. To expect this level of knowledge and awareness on the part of the ISP is 
unrealistic and the ISP’s position is assisted by the following three elements: 
 
• Article 15(1) E-Commerce Directive (no general obligation to monitor);  
515  E-Commerce Directive, art 14(1)(a). 
516  Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive permits Member States to establish obligations 
for information society service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities 
of alleged illegal activities undertaken by recipients of their service.  
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• the CJEU’s rulings in Scarlet v Sabam517 and Sabam v Netlog518 in which it 
held that an ISP and the owner of an online social network respectively 
could not be obliged to install a general filtering system in order to prevent 
its subscribers from unlawfully using protected works; and 
• the Opinion of Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the recent ruling, UPC 
Telekabel v Constantin Film in which he stated: ‘It would constitute such an 
inadmissible measure if the court had ordered the ISP actively to seek copies 
of the infringing page among other domain names or to filter all the data 
carried in its network in order to ascertain whether they constitute transfers 
of specific protected film works and to block such transfers’.519     
 
Step Three 
Reproduction taking place at the server site.  
 
Once again, viewed from the perspective of an ISP, this form of reproduction is most 
likely to fall under the scope of the hosting immunity contained in Article 14, E-
Commerce Directive. This form of reproduction is also likely to result in a more 
permanent form of storage and it is interesting to note that both Article 12 (mere 
conduit) and Article 13 (caching) of the E-Commerce Directive refer to ‘intermediate 
and transient storage’ and ‘intermediate and temporary storage’ respectively, but this 
type of temporary/transient storage is not referred to at all in Article 14. 
So long as the ISP which is providing the hosting service under Article 14 of the E-
Commerce Directive (‘storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’, in 
the words of Article 14) does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information and is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent, then it will not be liable for the information stored at the 
request of a recipient of the service. The immunity under Article 14 will be lost if the 
517  Case C-70/10 Scarlet v Sabam [2011] ECR I-11959. 
518  Case C-360/10 Sabam v Netlog [2012] 2 CMLR 18. 
519  Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (26 
November 2013) para 78. 
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ISP, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of infringing material on its server, fails to 
act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material.520 
 
 
Step Four  
Reproduction taking place in the transmission process between the server site and the 
point of access.  
 
In reality, this could be classified as a retransmission as the infringing material 
originated at a point other than the server.521 It is argued that such temporary 
reproduction could avail of the exception under Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
This provision holds that temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or 
incidental, an integral part of a technological process, and which have no independent 
economic significance are exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 
2 of the InfoSoc Directive.522  
 
Step Five 
Reproduction which takes place in the accessor’s computer (in the RAM or hard disk) 
or on the receiving PC’s/laptop’s/smart device’s screen. 
520  It should be noted that from June to September 2012, the European Commission engaged in 
a public consultation titled ‘A Clean and Open Internet’ on procedures for notifying and 
acting on illegal content hosted by online intermediaries.  
521  Sterling argues that the issue of whether a transmission originates at the server site or is 
retransmitted from that locus will influence questions of liability for unauthorised use, either 
at the originating point, or, in the case of retransmissions, at the initiating point or at the 
retransmission point or at both points. See, JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 150.  
522  Hector L MacQueen, ‘Appropriate for the Digital Age? Copyright and the Internet: 1 Scope 
of Copyright’ in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2009) 192. There are some interesting parallels between the temporary 
reproductions which occur along the transmission process between server and point of 
access, and the act of browsing the internet. As regards temporary copies produced while 
browsing the internet, the UK Supreme Court held in Public Relations Consultants 
Association Limited v the Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited [2013] UKSC 18 [33] that 
such temporary copies (whether for private or commercial use) do not infringe copyright.    
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 Step Five is further nuanced by the issue of local rightholder’s authorisation. If the local 
rightholder has not granted authorisation for use in each of the receiving countries, then 
infringement of the reproduction right may be held to occur at every point of 
unauthorised access to, or recording of material by means of access to a server site.523  
 
Step Six  
While the consequential effects of online copyright infringement are not explicitly 
described in Sterling’s conceptual model, they do arise. The effects may negatively 
impact the rightholder’s financial wellbeing or, his reputation. This is the consequential 
harm, which needs not be proven to establish liability for copyright infringement but 
rather goes to quantum. Unauthorised copies, disseminated free of charge online, may 
erode actual or potential royalties payable to the copyright owner. Where the piracy is 
significant, possibly of a commercial scale, and this becomes public knowledge, this 
fact may undermine licensing opportunities for the rightholder. Where the rightholder is 
a large body corporate, widescale piracy may damage company reputation and 
goodwill, with knock-on effects for external financing such as equity stakes and seed 
capital. If the rightholder is a listed company, the share price may fall. Furthermore, it is 
possible that sufficiently proximate ‘downstream’ damage will found jurisdiction in the 
State where it occurs, under Article 5(3), Brussels I.  
 
6.9 Points of connection/disconnection between online defamation and online 
infringement of the reproduction right 
6.9.1 Points of Connection:  
From the viewpoint of an ISP and the exemptions available to it under the E-Commerce 
Directive, there is a perfect crossover between online defamation and online copyright 
infringement. The Article 12 (‘mere conduit’) and Article 14 (‘hosting’) exemptions are 
available in cases of both defamatory material and copyright infringing material 
provided the relevant conditions under those provisions are satisfied by the ISP. As 
regards the mere conduit exemption, this would extend to the ‘automatic, intermediate 
and transient storage’ of the infringing material (whether defamatory or, copyright 
infringing) on the communication network (Article 12(2), E-Commerce Directive). 
523  JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 660.  
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6.9.2 Points of Disconnection:  
One significant disconnect between online infringement of the reproduction right and 
online defamation is the ‘delayed’ harmful event in the latter. In effect, in defamation 
cases, injury only occurs after the publishee has comprehended the defamatory material. 
In an online context, a considerable amount of time may elapse before the recipient 
(publishee) opens the defamatory email. For example, he may be on holiday and 
therefore not accessing his email or there may be a technical fault with his laptop, 
thereby preventing him from accessing his email. But, the crucial point is that the cause 
of action does not accrue to the victim until the harm has been committed (i.e. the 
publishee has comprehended the defamatory material). This potentially delayed cause of 
action contrasts with an online copyright infringement where the cause of action arises 
the instant the protected material is infringed. In other words, the online copyright 
infringement becomes actionable at an earlier stage (potentially, much earlier stage) 
than the online defamation. 
 
In addition, in copyright infringement cases, there is no requirement that there be third 
party involvement (i.e. the publishee). Infringement of copyright material occurs once 
the act of primary infringement occurs – there is no requirement that a recipient takes 
possession of the infringing material. The commission of the tort in an online IPR 
scenario is more immediate than in an online defamation scenario.  
 
One could argue that the immediate actionability of the online copyright infringement is 
more theoretical than real, but, with the growing number of torrent tracking sites, this 
increases the likelihood of infringing copies being discovered soon after their creation. 
Interestingly, a 2012 study conducted by Birmingham University indicates that an 
illegal file-sharer downloading popular content would be logged by a monitoring firm 
within three hours.524 
 
In the UK, another disconnect exists by virtue of the single publication rule contained in 
section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013. This rule replaces the old multiple publication 
rule and ensures that republications of the original defamatory statement (or, 
524  BBC, ‘BitTorrent study finds most file-sharers are monitored’ (BBC New Technology, 4  
September 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19474829> accessed 24 May 
2014.  
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substantially the same statement) fall within the initial time limit (for the purpose of the 
Limitation Act 1980) as the original defamatory statement. This contrasts with peer-to-
peer infringements where one infringing content file can constitute the basis of a 
number of distinct actionable claims. In general in the UK, a copyright owner will have 
a right of action under section 17 (the reproduction right) and section 20 
(communication to the public) of the CDPA 1988.525 
6.10 Communication to the Public 
I now turn to the second exclusive right that I shall deal with, the communication to the 
public, and the relationship of the general concept with its subcomponent, the making 
available right. 
 
The issue of localising unauthorised online communications to the public has been 
considered at length by Arnold J in the web-blocking judgments critically evaluated at 
in chapter 7 (from para 7.3.5 onwards). To date, there have been five such judgments.  
 
Not all of these rulings deal with the issue of localisation and some analyse the issue in 
more depth than others. In effect, there are three rulings which are of particular 
relevance to the issue of localisation. They are, in chronological order: 
 
Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting,526  
EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited,527 and  
Football Association Premier League Limited v British Sky Broadcasting.528 
 
It would be fair to say that whilst Dramatico ventilated the issue of localisation of the 
communication to the public right, it did so without engaging in a particularly deep 
analysis. To use the well-worn colloquialism, it got the ball rolling in terms of 
considering the localisation of this exclusive right in an online environment, and 
highlighted the lack of clarity in the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence.  
525  See Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) 
[40]–[43] (the reproduction right) and [44]–[71] (communication to the public right). 
526  Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch).  
527  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).  
528  Football Association Premier League Limited v British Sky Broadcasting [2013] EWHC 
2058 (Ch).  
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 In contrast, both EMI Records and Football Association Premier League, genuflecting 
as they do to Football Dataco,529 engage in a comprehensive analysis of the matter of 
localisation, placing particular emphasis on the notion of targeting the public in the UK 
and the various factors that indicate that targeting has taken place. I shall now analyse 
each of the three relevant rulings.  
6.10.1 Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting  
The first of the rulings to examine the issue of localisation in the context of the 
communication to the public right is Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky 
Broadcasting.530 
 
In that case, Arnold J, referred to the UK Court of Appeal’s reference to the CJEU in 
Football Dataco v Sportradar.531 Despite that case relating to the Database Directive 
(Directive 96/9/EC), it was, in Arnold J’s mind, relevant, as the national reference was 
essentially asking whether an extraction and/or re-utilisation of data from a database 
occurs in the location from where the data is transmitted (the emission theory532) or in 
the location where it is received (the transmission theory).  
 
While he acknowledged that those questions did not concern Article 3(1) of the 
Information Society Directive (which provides for the communication to the public 
right), he did draw an important parallel between the two principal questions referred to 
the CJEU in Football Dataco and the confusing and inconsistent jurisprudence of the 
CJEU in relation to Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive.533 Mr Justice 
Arnold summed up the parallel by referring to the claimants’ contention that under 
Court of Justice case-law, it was unclear whether a communication to the public under 
Article 3(1) occurs where the communication originates or where it is received (or 
perhaps both).534 This consideration was important in Dramatico Entertainment Limited 
529  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29. 
530 Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch). 
531 See para 3.6.4.   
532 Or ‘push’ in the terminology outlined previously.  
533  Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) [67]. 
534  Ibid [67]. 
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in the context of the claim against the operators of The Pirate Bay website (under 
Section 20, CDPA 1988) as The Pirate Bay’s servers were located outside the UK.535 
 
However, ultimately, Arnold J accepted the claimants’ submission that the stark choice 
between place of origination and place of reception was immaterial as the evidence 
made clear that the UK users were involved as both uploaders and downloaders.536 But, 
that begs the question, would Arnold J have felt compelled to make a choice between 
place of origination (Step 2 in the scheme used above) and place of reception (step 4) if 
say, there had been no uploaders in the UK or, alternatively, no downloaders in the UK?  
Dramatico also emphasised a distinction between Art 3(1) of the Infosoc directive, 
which provides authors with redress against communication to the public, and Art 3(2) 
which provides the owners of copyright in entrepreneurial works (related rights) with 
redress only against making available.537 In subsequent paragraphs, it was stated that the 
right of communication should be construed broadly. Where the cases do not clearly 
distinguish between the two, it is suggested that the court’s findings are probably 
directed to the making available right. In Dramatico itself, the first claimant represented 
holders of rights in sound recordings. 
6.10.2 EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited538  
Again, the claimants in this case were relying on rights in sound recordings. The High 
Court examined the issue of communication to the public from two perspectives: that of 
the users of the websites and, that of the operators of the websites. 
 
As regards the users of the websites, described as ‘uploaders’ by Arnold J, the judge had 
no difficulty finding that they communicate the claimants’ sound recordings to the 
public since they make the recordings available by electronic transmission in such a 
way that members of the public could access the recordings from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them,539 in this case actively mediated by the peer-to-peer 
software. In terms of determining whether the act of communication to the public 
occurred in the UK, the claimants contended that localisation in the UK occurred in two 
535  Ibid. 
536  Ibid [68].  
537  Ibid [67]. 
538  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).  
539  Ibid [39]. 
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situations: (i) where the person making the work available (the uploader) is located in 
the UK (step 2); and (ii) where the recipient of the work (the downloader) is located in 
the UK (step 4).540  
 
In a passage of his ruling which is somewhat unclear,541 Arnold J, influenced by the 
court ruling and the Advocate-General’s Opinion in Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar 
GmbH,542 states that localisation in the UK of the act of communication to the public 
occurs where the uploader is located in the UK (i.e. Step 2).543 He then expresses doubt 
that there is an act of communication in the UK where the recipient of the work is 
located in the UK (step 4), as he was unconvinced that the acts of communication by the 
uploaders were targeted at members of the public in the UK.544 This requirement of 
targeting members of the public (a notion that featured prominently in an IP context in 
Football Dataco)545 is amplified at a later stage in the judgment when Mr Justice 
Arnold applied it separately to website operators. It is submitted that this ‘targeted push’ 
analysis actually takes into account both step 2 and step 4; this becomes apparent when 
one looks at the criteria used to assess ‘targeting’. It is consistent with the definition of 
the making available right, which refers to demand from users. 
 
In his examination of the issue of communication to the public from the perspective of 
website operators,546 Mr Justice Arnold addressed the matter of whether the acts of 
communication to the public had occurred in the UK547 and whether they had been 
targeted at a public in the UK. 
540  Ibid [41].   
541  Ibid [33]-[41].  
542  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29; Case C-173/11 
Football Dataco v Sportradar GmbH, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (21 June 2012).  
543  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) [41].  
544  Ibid. 
545  Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] CMLR 29, paras 39–47.  
546  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) [44]–[51].  
547  Para 63 of the judgment is particularly revealing as to the truly international character of the 
three P2P file-sharing websites’ activities. For example, in the three years prior to this ruling 
and in a bid to frustrate international investigations and evade copyright enforcement actions, 
KAT repeatedly shifted between different service providers in eight different countries, 
namely France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. This 
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 Referring to Football Dataco v Sportradar, Arnold J believed that it was relevant to 
take into account, by analogy, criteria which the CJEU had considered as relevant to the 
issue of targeting the public in a number of other mainly non-copyright contexts. In that 
regard, he listed the following relevant rulings: Joined Cases Pammer v Reederei Karl 
Schlüter, and Hotel Alpenhof v Heller;548 L’Oreal SA v eBay International549 and, 
Donner.550  
 
Mr Justice Arnold then proceeded to refer to a key passage in Pammer and Hotel 
Alpenhof551 in which the ECJ set out a non-exhaustive list of matters capable of 
constituting evidence that a trader’s activity is being directed to the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile.552    
 
form of jurisdiction hopping was also embraced by both H33T and Fenopy, with the latter 
showing a particular penchant for the US, Japan and Canada.   
548  Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter, and Hotel Alpenhof 
v Heller [2010] ECR I-12527 (Article 15 of Brussels I - when is a trader’s activity on a 
website directed to the Member State where the consumer is domiciled?). 
549  Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International [2011] ECR I-6011 (Article 5 of Council 
Directive 89/104/EEC (the Trade Marks Directive), and Article 9 of Council Regulation 
207/2009/EC (The Community Trade Mark Regulation) – An offer for sale of goods 
(involving an unauthorised use of a trade mark) targeted at consumers located in the territory 
covered by the trademark. Targeting was evident in this case by way of the offer for sale 
being accompanied by details of the geographic areas to which the seller was willing to 
dispatch the product (para 65 of the judgment).    
550  Case C-5/11 Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander Jochen Donner [2012] OJ 
C250/05, para 29 (Article 4 of the Information Society Directive - A trader directing his 
advertising (both online and offline) at members of the public. The goods advertised were 
illegal replicas of copyright-protected furnishings in the so-called Bauhaus style. The 
directing or targeting was denoted by the following factors: the existence of a German 
language website, the content and distribution channels of Dimensione’s advertising 
materials and its cooperation with Inspem, as an undertaking making deliveries to Germany).  
551  Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter, and Hotel Alpenhof 
v Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, para 93. 
552  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) [50]. See 
para 2.10 of this thesis in relation to the non-exhaustive list of matters.  
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This thesis argues that the analogy of an e-trader directing his activities to a specific 
country is not particularly strong. This is linked to the fact that the matters accepted by 
the court in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof as constituting evidence of trader activity 
being directed to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile are, quite understandly, 
peculiar to the world of e-commerce. But, this in a way begs the question: how useful 
would such evidential factors be in the distinct and significantly different world of 
digital copyright infringement?    
 
Objectively speaking, some of the evidential factors deemed acceptable in Pammer and 
Hotel Alpenhof (listed at para 93 of that judgment) seem either too generic or irrelevant 
to be of much use in the specific context of online communications to the public. 
Examples of such evidential factors include: 
• The international nature of the activity 
• The mention of itineraries from other Member States for going to the place 
where the trader is established 
• Mention of telephone numbers with an international code  
• Use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which 
the trader is established  
• Mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in 
various Member States.  
Admittedly, the factors of foreign language and currency were deemed to constitute 
good evidence of directing activities to/targeting the public in both Pammer/Hotel 
Alpenhof and EMI Records but that is meagre commonality in the overall scheme of 
things.  
 
Another consideration weakens the analogy of the e-trader/e-commerce. The notion of 
activity ‘directed to’ (in Article 15(1)(c) Brussels I) is not defined in that regulation. 
Nor was it defined in the predecessor Brussels Convention. It must therefore be 
interpreted independently, by reference principally to the system and objectives of the 
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regulation.553 The absence of a clear definition dilutes the parallels and makes the 
analogy both weaker and less dependable.   
 
Returning to the specific issue of localisation of the communication to the public, 
Arnold J accepted the claimants’ contention that the communications to the public 
occurred in the UK by virtue of their being reasonably clearly targeted at the public in 
the UK.554 The factors that influenced the court as to targeting were as follows: 
 
1. There was a large number of users of each website in the UK; 
2. A substantial portion of the visitors to each website were from the UK;  
3. The recordings listed on each of the websites include large numbers of both (a) 
recordings by UK artists and (b) recordings that are in demand in the UK;  
4. The default language of each of the websites was English;  
5. In addition, in the case of KAT, it included advertisements with prices in sterling.555  
 
6.10.3 Football Association Premier League Limited v British Sky Broadcasting556  
In this case, the offending website, FirstRow, operated as an indexing and aggregation 
portal to streamed broadcasts of sporting events. Mr Justice Arnold had to determine 
whether the communication to the public actually took place in the UK as FirstRow’s 
website was hosted in Portland in Sweden,557 a well-known haven for pirate sites. 
 
Referring back to his ruling in EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Arnold 
J reiterated that if the communication originates from outside the UK, then it must target 
the public in the UK for it to be localised in the UK.558 The claimant, FAPL, relied on 
the following matters as evidencing an intention on the part of the operators of FirstRow 
to target the public in the UK:  
 
553  Case C-96/00 Rudolf Gabriel [2002] ECR I 6367 para 37. 
554  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) [51]. 
555  Ibid. 
556  Football Association Premier League Limited v British Sky Broadcasting [2013] EWHC 
2058 (Ch).  
557 Ibid [21].  
558 Ibid [31].  
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I. The website is an English language website. 
II. The advertising on FirstRow includes adverts for companies located in the UK 
and products consumed in the UK. 
III. FirstRow provides access to a large number of competitions which are extremely 
popular with UK audiences. In particular, the amount of Premier League content 
on the website is up to 11% whilst a Premier League match is being played. 
IV. FirstRow is a very popular website in the UK.  
V. Between 12 and 13.7% of the worldwide traffic to FirstRow’s website comes 
from the UK.  
VI. FirstRow is discussed on internet blogs and forums, where a significant 
proportion of the internet traffic to those blogs and forums comes from the 
UK.559 
Arnold J had no difficulty accepting the foregoing elements as evidencing an intention 
by FirstRow to target the public in the UK. Ultimately, Arnold J held that there was 
both an unauthorised communication to the public by FirstRow in the UK and an 
infringement by it of FAPL’s copyrights.560  
6.11 Points of connection/disconnection 
One significant point of disconnection between the localisation of online 
communication to the public and online defamation is the requirement that there be a 
targeting of the public in the former. In the Section 97A cases analysed earlier, it was 
this targeting of a UK public that localised the tort in the UK, thereby justifying 
assumption of jurisdiction by the UK courts.  
 
In applying the ‘targeting the public’ test, the English High Court uses predominantly 
commercial and social/cultural factors, for example, language; advertising, popularity of 
the website, origin of internet traffic to the infringing website and, blogs/forums which 
discuss the infringing website. Once these verifiable factors are proven, then it is almost 
certain that localisation will ‘follow’ these factors. This appears to be a hybrid analysis 
when compared with defamation and reproduction, but it is consistent with the principle 
559  Ibid [45]. 
560  Ibid [46] et seq. 
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that infringements are best stemmed as close to source as possible. It tends to point to a 
single location, or at least fewer locations than a download criterion. Online defamation, 
on the other hand, may be quite a bit more difficult to prove and localise. 
 
In effect, with defamation, the tort only occurs when a defamatory publication is 
comprehended by the reader, listener or the observer.561 In terms of online defamation, 
there is the requirement that the defamatory material be available in ‘comprehensible 
form’ and this really only occurs when the material is downloaded onto the computer of 
the publishee (the publishee will pull the material from the webserver).562 In short, the 
place of download is where the damage to reputation will occur. As a corollary, the 
place of download is equivalent to locus delicti. 
 
But, the commission of an online defamation invariably occurs in a private setting, 
where the publishee downloads the defamatory material on his PC, laptop, i-Phone etc. 
Given that the commission of the tort is dependent on a private and discrete act by the 
publishee (i.e. accessing/downloading the defamatory material), then arguably it is less 
easy to localise compared with a communication to the public, where, the relevant 
factors are more public and therefore more easily ascertainable.     
 
For example, in EMI Records, factors deemed relevant to deciding whether there was an 
intention to target the public included (among others): the language of the website; the 
nature of the advertising on the offending website and, the popularity of the website. All 
of these factors are easily verifiable. The website’s popularity can, for instance, be 
checked using the online measurement company, Nielsen. All in all, therefore, the 
process of localisation for communication to the public is a simpler and more 
straightforward process.  
 
It is somewhat ironic too that it is not a copyright case that provides inspiration for the 
targeting of the public requirement, rather a database right case – Dataco v Sportradar. 
Further, Mr Justice Arnold looked beyond Football Dataco v Sportradar and 
highlighted EU rulings relating to e-commerce, unauthorised use of a trade mark and, 
561  Dow Jones & Company v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [26]. 
562  Ibid [44]. 
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online/offline advertising of goods which infringed copyright, all of which dealt with 
criteria on targeting of the public.      
 
6.12 Right of making available to the public: the views of various commentators 
As stated earlier,563 the right of making available to the public is categorised as one 
component of the more general right of communication to the public. As there is no 
formal guidance on localisation of this right in the relevant legal instruments, it is left to 
law practitioners and academics to postulate theories about the localisation of the online 
act of making available. 
6.13 Possible application of the communication theory and the emission theory   
Sterling submits that the communication theory (formulated originally in the context of 
broadcasting) should be applied to determine localisation in the context of making 
available.564 In short, this theory holds that the making available to the public takes 
place, inter alia, at the point of reception, or Step 4 in the scheme of my earlier analysis. 
This approach is also consistent with any factual, logical or linguistic interpretation of 
the circumstances. In reality, where digital copyright material is transmitted over the 
internet and received by members of the public such material is made available to the 
public where reception takes place. As the making available right is an on-demand right, 
the making available occurs when the public accesses the material from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them, as per the wording of Article 3(1) of the Information 
Society Directive. In effect, this means that when infringing material is placed on a 
website, it will be made available at every point where there is a computer, smartphone, 
tablet etc which can access the infringing material.  
 
The alternative to the communication theory is the emission theory. However, its 
application in an online environment would be neither practical nor practicable. Unlike 
a satellite broadcast transmission system which involves an identifiable transmission 
point, the internet involves multiple transmission points.565 Locating the point of initial 
transmission for an internet communication may be exceedingly difficult to achieve. To 
exacerbate matters, the relevant material may have been stored on multiple servers 
(mirror servers) and/or physically located in a country other than the country where the 
563 At para 6.3 
564 JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 469. 
565  Ibid. 
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relevant service provider is located. In some ways, the ruling in Dow Jones & Company 
v Gutnick is apposite. There, the appellant loaded its material for its online journal onto 
six different servers. As it happened, all six servers were located in the same jurisdiction 
i.e. the state of New Jersey, but the situation could have been very different. It is not 
unknown for websites to be run off servers located in different countries.    
6.14 Where the making available right takes place according to Sterling   
Sterling argues that making available on the internet takes place at the following three 
places: 
1. At the place where the content provider transmits material to a server site, or 
provides material for online transmission to an end user  
2. At the server site 
3. At the reception point or points at which an item of subject matter which is 
available online is or may be accessed.566  
 
While the places described at ‘2’ and ‘3’ can, with justification, be considered places of 
making available, the author finds it difficult to understand how the places mentioned in 
‘1’ can be used to, in effect, localise an online act of making available. 
 
In terms of ‘1’ above, it has to be borne in mind that the act of making available occurs 
once the public has the possibility to access the content.567 It is difficult to see how the 
mere transmission of content to a server site or the mere provision of material to an end 
user actually constitute making available. The former example is but a provision of the 
material to the website. That material still has to be uploaded/loaded onto the website 
(by the operators of that website) before it can be accessed by the public and before an 
actual act of making available occurs. Once uploaded, the material becomes actually or 
potentially available to the public.  
 
566  Ibid 471 et seq.  
567  Séverine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 2013) 33 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> accessed 
5 May 2014. See also, Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996 
(Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2002) 108. 
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As regards the latter example, it refers to provision of material to just one end-user. This 
thesis argues that the provision of material to an individual is unlikely to be deemed a 
making available to the public. A number of ECJ rulings have indicated that the term 
‘public’ means a fairly large number of people.  
For example, in June 2005, in its ruling in Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de 
Media568 in the context of television broadcasting, the ECJ described the ‘public’ as ‘an 
indeterminate number of potential television viewers to whom the same images are 
transmitted simultaneously’.569 One month later, in Lagardère Active Broadcast v 
SPRE,570 the ECJ in the context of satellite broadcasting used the same formula again 
(‘an indeterminate number of potential listeners’) to describe the public. However, it 
went further in that it stated that a ‘limited circle of persons’ cannot be regarded as part 
of the public.571 
Even more compelling is the CJEU’s ruling in Società Consortile Fonografici v Marco 
Del Corso572 where the court was interpreting the concept of communication to the 
public in the context of the InfoSoc Directive. At paragraph 84 of its judgment, the 
CJEU refers to its earlier rulings in Mediakabel, Lagardère Active Broadcast and 
SGAE573 and sums them up as implying that the term ‘public’ means a ‘fairly large 
number of persons’.574  In attempting to define ‘public’, the court refers to the WIPO 
Glossary which interprets the concept of communication to the public as meaning 
‘making a work...perceptible in any appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, 
not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private group’.575  
568  Case C-89/04 Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de Media [2005] ECR I-4891. 
569  Ibid para 30. 
570  Case C-192/04 Lagardère Active Broadcast v SPRE [2005] ECR I-7199. 
571  Ibid para 31. 
572  Case C-135/10 Società Consortile Fonografici v Marco Del Corso (ECJ (Third Chamber) 15 
March 2012) . 
573  Case C-306/05 Sociedad General Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA 
[2006] ECR I-11519. 
574  Case C-135/10 Società Consortile Fonografici v Marco Del Corso (ECJ (Third Chamber) 15 
March 2012), para 84. 
575  Ibid para 85. 
    
 
196
                                                 
Returning to the criterion of ‘a fairly large number of people’, the CJEU states that this 
notion is intended to indicate that the concept of public encompasses ‘a certain de 
minimis threshold, which excludes from the concept groups of persons which are too 
small or insignificant’.576 
Cumulatively, MediaKabel, Lagardère and Società Consortile Fonografici send out a 
clear signal about the meaning of the term ‘public’. Small, insignificant groups of 
persons do not constitute a ‘public’ and a de minimis threshold will apply. Clearly, 
therefore, an individual will not constitute a ‘public’. 
6.15 European Commission’s Localisation Criteria for the Making Available 
Right 
 
A 2013 European Commission-funded study on the application of the InfoSoc Directive 
proposes comprehensive localisation criteria for the making available right. The study 
proposes three different localisation criteria for the making available right. They are:  
1. Where the servers are located on which the works are hosted 
2. Where the uploader has his centre of interests; and 
3. Where the material act of upload has taken place.577  
I shall now examine and critically evaluate the three criteria in the light of Sterling’s 
older proposed places of localisation.  
6.16 Criterion No. 1 - Location of the servers upon which the works are hosted 
(step 3) 
 
The European Commission’s views this criterion negatively. It points out that it may be 
difficult to determine in which country the servers are located.578 In addition, the works 
576  Ibid para 86. 
577  Séverine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> accessed 
5 May 2014. 
578  Ibid 135. This point was also made in Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar 
[2013] CMLR 29, para 45.   
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may be ‘spread’ over different servers in different countries, meaning that one act of 
making available would be situated in several countries (in effect, no single location).579 
Practically speaking, even the uploader may not be aware of the country in which the 
servers are located. Also, an infringer could exploit this criterion by using servers 
located in a Member State whose laws offer weak protection to rightholders in terms of 
judicial remedies.580   
6.17 Criterion No. 2 – Centre of activities of the uploader: establishment, 
domicile or habitual residence (no correspondence with the ‘step’ analysis)   
 
This criterion proposes that the act of making available be localised at the uploader’s 
‘centre of activities’. The European Commission Study posits that a legal person has its 
centre of activities ‘at its establishment’ (this would most likely equate with the English 
law notion of the seat of the company) while a natural person has his centre of activities 
at his domicile or habitual residence.581  
 
Applying this criterion, it matters not where the uploader was actually physically 
situated when the material act of making available was effected.582 The legal act of 
making available will be localised in the Member State where the individual has his 
579  Séverine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 2013) 135 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> accessed 
5 May 2014.  
580  Ibid. 
581  Ibid. Interestingly, the SatCab Directive also applies an establishment criterion in cases 
where there is ‘no use of an uplink station situated in a Member State’, but a broadcasting 
organisation established in a Member State has commissioned the act of communication to 
the public by satellite. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the 
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related copyright applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15, art 1(2)(d)(ii). 
582  Séverine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 2013) 135 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> accessed 
5 May 2014. 
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domicile/habitual residence or, where the company has its place of establishment.583 
The types of scenario envisaged are the following: 
 
• A music service provider with a complex, international structure, established in 
Member State A (localisation criterion) but whose acts of upload are performed 
in Member State B 
• An individual is domiciled in Member State A (localisation criterion) but he 
uploads material in Member State B (while holidaying there or whilst on a 
business trip there).584 
In both instances, the localisation criterion (centre of activities) will have no link with 
the material acts that defined the act of making available.  
6.17.1 The Advantage of using this criterion 
The advantage of this approach is that the act of making available is localised in just one 
Member State even if it has effects in a number of Member States (the effects may 
include commercialisation or accessibility of the work abroad). In addition, the place of 
upload is disregarded in favour of place of domicile/habitual residence, or 
establishment. As the uploader’s centre of activities is generally relatively easy to 
determine, this criterion increases legal certainty.585 
 
The benefits of this legal certainty become apparent in certain situations. For example, 
take the example of the commercial exploitation of a particular work (to which the 
making available right relates) across the territories of several Member States without 
the targeting of a public in a specific country. Another example is where several 
national exploitations are arranged in respect of the same work. In both cases, use of the 
protected work occurs in more than one EU Member State but, by virtue of this 
criterion, its making available right is localised in the Member State which constitutes 
the uploader’s centre of activities. 
583  Ibid. 
584  Ibid 136.   
585  Ibid 135. 
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6.17.2 Some problems arising from use of this criterion 
The use of this criterion is not without its problems. If Member State A is the uploader’s 
centre of activities but Member State B is the place of actual upload, then the latter will 
be deprived of any regulatory power or influence over the act of upload even though the 
upload occurred on its territory. Moreover, there may be no significant link between the 
country of establishment and the country where the work is actually made accessible to 
the public by virtue of it being uploaded.  
 
To many, it may seem counterintuitive that the country of exploitation (upload) is 
relegated in terms of importance and ‘displaced’ by the country of establishment. 
Furthermore, this criterion delinks localisation from effects (of the making available 
right). For some, this disconnect between localisation and effects (of one of copyright’s 
exclusive rights) may seem illogical and inconsistent, particularly in the light of the key 
tort jurisdictional rule contained in Brussels I.  
 
This rule, contained in Article 5(3), Brussels I, refers to cases of tort or delict and gives 
the plaintiff the right to sue the tortfeasor ‘in the courts for the place where the harmful 
event occurred or may occur’. This thesis argues that under Article 5(3), jurisdiction is 
linked to the harmful event but that there is only a thin demarcation between the 
harmful event and the effects that flow from same. In short, the tort (the harmful event) 
and its effects are strongly intertwined.  
 
It follows that Article 5(3) indirectly attaches considerable importance to the effects of 
the commission of a tort. In the light of this PIL rule, the criterion of the uploader’s 
centre of activities, which de-emphasises effects and which opts instead for the 
uploader’s establishment/domicile/habitual residence seems to be somewhat of an 
outlier. To conclude, another risk associated with applying the centre of activities-
criterion is that a copyright infringer could purposely choose to establish its centre of 
activities in a Member State with relatively weak copyright protection in terms of 
judicial remedies, etc. The net effect of such establishment-shopping is that any 
infringement of a making available right would be localised in that particular Member 
State (of establishment) and would therefore be subject to the weaker copyright law 
prevailing there.   
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6.18 Criterion No 3 – Where the material act of upload is initiated (Step 2)  
According to this criterion, the act of making available takes place where the material 
act of upload of the works is initiated. This is the place where the user/uploader is 
actually based when he transmits the protected work to the server, knowing that it will 
lead to the work being available to the public.586 To use a practical example, the upload 
process for YouTube entails accessing the video file upload page, signing into one’s 
YouTube account, clicking the yellow ‘Upload’ button, locating the relevant video file 
(which one wishes to upload) on one’s PC, etc. and then opening same. Once the 
spinning circle appears, one knows that the upload process has begun. In this example, 
the act of making available takes place in the country where the uploader is physically 
located when he engages in the above described process.   
 
It goes without saying that the act of upload may occur at a location other than the place 
of establishment of a company or the domicile/habitual residence of a natural person. 
For example, a company may have a place of establishment in Member State A, but 3 
further operational branches in Member States B, C, and D. For operational reasons, the 
company may decide to upload protected material in Member State D. In such a case, 
the making available is effected from a country other than the uploader’s place of 
establishment. Important too is the fact that the place of upload is not always 
coterminous with the place where the server is located as a work can be uploaded in 
Member State A, but stored on a server in Member State B.587 
 
Arguably this criterion represents an attempt to return to the unitary-right model first 
assayed by the Cable and Satellite Directive, whereby the location of a broadcast for 
copyright/licensing purposes was identified as the single State of uplink. As Hugenholtz 
observed, encryption and licensing practices prevented the hoped-for single market in 
broadcasting from developing from this.588 Hugenholtz also predicted that the Cable and 
Satellite Directive would be overtaken by digitisation. Thus, rights would follow the 
InfoSoc Directive, which, in his view ‘reflects a traditional territorial approach’. 
However, his observation on encryption has been addressed by the CJEU in FAPL  v 
586  Ibid 137. 
587  Ibid. 
588 Bernt Hugenholtz, 'Copyright without Frontiers: is there a future for the Satellite and Cable 
Directive' (IViR, 2005) 
<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/copyrightwithoutfrontiers.pdf> accessed 13 June 
2014 
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QC Leisure589 and related caselaw. Furthermore, as my research has shown (at 6.10 to 
6.10.3), by adopting a ‘targeted push’ model of online communication to the public, the 
web-blocking cases have avoided the most fragmented version of the purely territorial 
approach that would flow from following Dow Jones v Gutnick.590 These cases have put 
online communication to the public on a jurisdictional footing similar to cable and 
satellite, in a way which is compatible with the ‘new public’ approach of FAPL v QC 
Leisure (analysed at para 3.6.1.).   
6.18.1 Some problems associated with this criterion 
Like criterion number 2, this criterion is not problem-free when it comes to its 
application. For example, it may be difficult to pinpoint the country where the act of 
upload took place. For a commercially significant service provider running, for example 
a trans-European music service or online video service, acts of upload may be 
performed at different locations in different Member States.591 As a consequence, its 
operations will be governed by several laws which the service provider needs to factor 
into its commercial operations. A similar problem may transpire in the case of user 
platforms whereby the platform provider concludes an agreement with rightholders for 
content uploaded by individual users.592 Once again, the likelihood exists that the 
content could be uploaded in different Member States so it would be difficult to indicate 
one location for the upload. Lastly, this criterion is susceptible to location shopping 
whereby uploaders (especially commercial service providers) may structure their 
organisation taking into account the weakest copyright protection.593   
6.19 Points of connection/disconnection between Sterling and the European 
Commission Study on the making available right  
6.19.1 Points of connection 
Both Sterling and the European Commission suggest that the making available right 
could be localised at the place where the server (upon which the works are hosted) is 
located, though the European Commission views this criterion rather negatively due to 
the possible difficulties in actually determining the location of the servers. Separately, 
589 At para 3.6.1. 
590 This ruling is analysed from para. 9.3.1. on  
591  Ibid 138.  
592  Ibid. 
593  Ibid 139.  
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the European Commission also foresees problems from a localisation perspective where 
the relevant material is ‘spread’ over different servers in different countries.     
6.19.2 Points of disconnection  
Sterling draws some inspiration from the broadcasting sector and considers both the 
communication theory and the emission theory in the context of localising the making 
available right. In endorsing the communication theory, he, in essence, implicitly 
accepts that the making available takes place at the point of reception. In rejecting the 
emission theory, Sterling essentially reject’s the theory’s lack of practicality in an online 
setting. The absence of an identifiable transmission point and the real risk of the 
infringing material being stored on multiple servers are both problematical for 
localisation, in Sterling’s eyes. In contrast, the European Commission’s study makes no 
reference to either the communication theory or the emission theory.    
 
 The only criterion for localisation that focuses on a person rather than a location is the 
European Commission’s criterion of: Where the uploader has his centre of interests. In 
elaborating on this criterion, it is unfortunate that the Commission seems to regard the 
notions of ‘domicile’ and ‘habitual residence’ as being one and the same. To a certain 
extent, this is understandable as Brussels I (at Article 60) uses the connecting factor of 
domicile while Rome I (at Recital (39) and Article 19) and Rome II (at Article 23) use 
the connecting factor of habitual residence. In a way, the Commission’s study has 
created an ‘amalgam’, but, most likely, an imprecise one! This is explicable by the 
differences in definition of the terms ‘domicile’ and ‘habitual residence’ in the EU’s 
PIL framework. For example, the term ‘domicile’ (for the purposes of a company), as 
defined in Article 60, Brussels I, is broader than the definition for ‘habitual residence’ 
under Rome I and Rome II. Under Brussels I, a company’s domicile can mean its 
statutory seat, or, its central administration or, its principal place of business. In 
contrast, under Rome I and Rome II, the habitual residence of a company is defined 
more narrowly as ‘place of central administration’.  
6.20 Conclusions  
6.20.1 Reproduction right versus Defamation  
As regards online infringement of the reproduction right and online defamation, there 
are more points of disconnection than points of connection. In short, it would seem that 
online defamation does not read so easily onto online infringement of the reproduction 
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right. The principal point of connection between the two torts exists at the level of the 
ISP. Under the E-Commerce Directive, the ISP could avail of exemptions under 
Articles 12 (mere conduit) and 14 (hosting) for both defamatory material and content 
which infringes the reproduction right in copyright. 
 
One significant disconnect between infringement of the reproduction right and 
defamation is the ‘delayed’ harmful event in the latter. Defamation cases require the 
publishee to comprehend the defamatory material before the injury arises. This 
(necessary) third party involvement can slow down the commission of the tort and have 
a negative knock on effect for the cause of action. This potentially delayed cause of 
action contrasts with an online copyright infringement where the cause of action arises 
the instant the protected material is infringed. In sum, the infringement of the 
reproduction right potentially becomes actionable at a much earlier stage than 
defamation. Analysed from a different angle, online copyright infringement cases do not 
require the ‘intervention’ of a third party (i.e. publishee, in the case of defamation) for 
the cause of action to accrue.      
 
Nor should the benefit of immediate actionability of online copyright infringement be 
dismissed lightly. The recent growth in the number of torrent tracking sites increases the 
likelihood of a rightholder discovering quite quickly that his copyright material has 
been infringed, particularly if he uses the services of a monitoring firm.  
 6.20.2 Online Communication to the public versus online defamation  
One significant point of disconnection between the localisation of online 
communication to the public and online defamation is the requirement that there be a 
targeting of the public in the former. In the Section 97A cases analysed in chapter 7, it 
was this targeting of a UK public that localised the tort in the UK, thereby justifying 
assumption of jurisdiction by the UK courts.  
 
When applying the ‘targeting the public’ test, the English High Court uses 
predominantly commercial and social/cultural factors, for example, language; 
advertising and origin of the internet traffic. As these factors are readily verifiable, a 
decision on localisation can be taken speedily.  
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In contrast, when it comes to online defamation, the commission of the tort often occurs 
in a private setting. The tort takes place when the publishee downloads (and 
comprehends) the defamatory material. But, this will often involve a discrete and 
private act by the publishee, something considerably less verifiable than the factors 
outlined for targeting the public above. In essence, this means that localising an act of 
online defamation is more difficult to achieve than localising an online communication 
to the public, primarily because the factors to be verified in the latter are more public 
and therefore more ascertainable.   
6.20.3 The Making Available Right   
 
Sterling versus European Commission Study  
 
There is commonality between Sterling and the European Commission in terms of 
possibly localising the making available right at the place where the server (upon which 
the works are hosted) is located. However, the European Commission also expresses 
some scepticism about this criterion as it acknowledges possible difficulties in 
determining the actual location of the servers. These difficulties could be exacerbated if 
the infringing material is spread over different servers in different countries. While 
Sterling considers the two classic broadcasting theories – the communications theory 
and the emission theory – in the context of localising the making available right, he 
ultimately rejects the emission theory as he does not believe it to be practicable in an 
online setting. Factors that make the emission theory unworkable according to Sterling 
are: the absence of an identifiable transmission point and the risk of the infringing 
material being stored on multiple servers. In endorsing the communications theory, 
Sterling implicitly accepts that the making available takes place at the point of 
reception. In contrast with Sterling, the European Commission makes no reference to 
either of the broadcasting theories in its study.  
*** 
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Chapter 7. Jurisdictional Issues: Article 2, Brussels I 
Facilitative Elements 
 
’On the Internet, nobody knows that you’re a dog.’594 
Regularly, when the law is challenged by new technical developments, the question 
arises whether the same technology causing the problem can also provide the means for 
their solution.595 
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter and the subsequent two chapters, I shall focus on the practical difficulties 
of applying the tort jurisdictional rules (contained in Brussels I) to the internet. In 
essence, this intermeshing analysis, spanning all three chapters, will cover two 
provisions of the Brussels I Regulation, namely, Article 2 and Article 5(3). As 
defendant identification is a key element of Article 2, I have divided the analysis into 
both facilitative elements and non-facilitative elements. To ensure the demarcation, I 
have devoted a separate chapter to each of the two elements. Consequently, facilitative 
elements are treated in this chapter and non-facilitative in the next. The term 
‘facilitative’ refers to factors which facilitate the application/operation of Article 2 
while ‘non-facilitative’ means the converse. 
This chapter will argue that, in reality, Article 2, Brussels I is reliant on a number of 
‘props’ for its efficacy - technology (geolocation technology), Norwich Pharmacal 
relief, and data retention legislation (inspired by the EU but transposed into domestic 
law). As regards the last-mentioned element, considerable confusion now reigns after 
the recent CJEU ruling which held Directive 2006/24 to be invalid.  
594  Citation from a cartoon by Peter Steiner, ‘On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog’ 
(1993) 69 The New Yorker 61 (emphasis added). It is used by Myriam van Dellen, 
’Anonymity on the Internet. What does the Concept of Anonymity Mean?’ (2002) 9 EDI LR 
1 to indicate that in principle we are anonymous on the Internet.  
595  Dorothee Thum and Torsten Bettinger, ‘Territorial Trademark Rights in the Global Village – 
International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark disputes on 
the Internet: Part 1’ (2000) 31 IIC 162, 164 (emphasis added).  
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The ‘undercurrent’ of technology runs through this chapter and the next. These two 
chapters demonstrate that technology can potentially be used by both the IP owner (as 
claimant) and the infringer to assist their aims/actions. For example, geolocation 
technology may assist the claimant while the dynamic allocation of IP addresses 
(discussed in chapter 8) may assist the infringer in that it can make the obtaining and 
production of strong digital evidence more challenging. In effect, chapters 7, 8, and 9 of 
this thesis constitute a synthesis of the relevant technologies, laws and common law 
relief that can be used by the copyright holder to bring a civil case against infringers and 
by the infringer to potentially evade detection/prosecution. 
 
The provisions in Brussels I that will be examined in this series of three inter-related 
chapters are:  
1. Article 2, Brussels I (facilitative elements) [this chapter]; 
2. Article 2, Brussels I (non-facilitative elements) [chapter 8]; and  
3. Article 5(3), Brussels I [chapter 9].  
 
Each of the aforementioned elements is contained in a discrete chapter. In terms of 
Article 2, Brussels I, I have decided to examine the facilitative elements before the non-
facilitative elements primarily because the ‘evidence’ supporting the facilitative 
elements is stronger than the evidence supporting the non-facilitative elements. As 
Article 2 constitutes the basic jurisdictional rule in the Brussels I regime, it is both 
logical and practical to examine it before treating the special jurisdiction rule in Article 
5(3), the latter being an exception to the fundamental principle of suing the defendant in 
the place of his domicile. As is the norm in most cases involving PIL, jurisdiction is 
decided before the applicable law  and I shall honour that tradition in this thesis.    
7.2 Article 2, Brussels I  
I shall now proceed to analyse the basic rule in the EU jurisdictional framework, 
namely, Article 2, Brussels I. This rule provides that the defendant shall be sued in the 
courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled.596 This provision presupposes that 
the defendant has already been identified. But the identification of the infringer is 
596  The actual wording of Article 2, Brussels I is ’Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled 
in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member 
State.’ 
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considerably more complicated in the online world than in the offline world.597 Stated 
more forcefully, the process of establishing a person’s offline identity from their online 
identity constitutes a significant evidentiary and legal hurdle.598 To give a practical 
example: a copyright infringer may use several computers or several infringers may use 
the same computer, thereby making identification of the culprit very difficult. 
Difficulties may also arise with local networks. There, several computers in a local 
network are connected to the internet through a gateway or firewall which performs 
network address translation (NAT). They all appear to have the IP address of the 
gateway or firewall, which is responsible for redistributing the traffic coming from the 
internet (using ports). 
In an internet environment, personal computers, WAP-enabled mobile phones and 
PDAs with internet connectivity can all act as a smokescreen from the perspective of the 
online copyright infringer. Nor is it unknown for online infringers to access a modem in 
another country or State (in the case of the US) by way of a long-distance phone call.599 
All these elements make user identification extremely challenging.   
It may be possible for the injured copyright holder using geolocation technology600 and 
the IP address601 of the infringer to trace the copyright infringement to a geographic 
597  See for example, Mark D Evans, ’Protection of Data on the Internet’ (2002) 1 IPQ 50, 74 
where the author states:  
The law is willing to provide recourse for those in situations where even sophisticated 
technological remedies have failed to protect website content. As has been shown, two of the 
most commercially important markets to British business, Europe and America, have 
developed various means to do so. To gain access to such recourse, one must first know 
whom to sue, and this is often not a trivial issue, given the worldwide accessibility of the 
Internet. 
598  Ian Walden, ’Forensic Investigations in Cyberspace for Civil Proceedings’ (2004) 18 Int’l 
Rev L Computers & Tech 275 et seq.  
599  Dick Thornburgh and Herbert S Lin, ’A Global Internet’ in Dick Thornburgh and Herbert S 
Lin (eds), Youth, Pornography and the Internet (National Academy Press 2002) 66; Henrik 
Spang-Hanssen, Cyberspace & International Law on Jurisdiction: Possibilities of Dividing 
Cyberspace into Jurisdiction with Help of Filters and Firewall Software (DJØF Publishing 
2004) 338, fn 1190.    
600  Geolocation services attempt to pinpoint Internet users’ locations based on their network 
addresses. In other words, the technology enables the linking of Internet Protocol (IP) 
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location. On the basis of scholarly writings on geolocation technologies, it seems that 
this technology has become increasingly more sophisticated and perhaps now accurate 
down to street level.602  
Of course, narrowing the possibilities to a certain street is one thing but that still leaves 
the injured copyright holder with the difficult task of determining the identity of the 
infringer who disseminated the infringing material online or via an internet-enabled 
mobile phone.603 Unfortunately, for the copyright holder, internet communications (and 
non-subscription-based mobile phones) allow a high degree of anonymity to be 
achieved.604  
addresses to physical addresses (countries, cities and even postcodes). ’Geography and the 
net – Putting it in its place’ The Economist (9 August 2001) 18-20. 
601  This procedure may also require the co-operation of a potentially large number of separate 
ISPs who would play a role in tracing the Internet routes of infringing data packets. 
However, the situation in the EU is quite confusing now following the recent CJEU ruling in 
[name of case]. Following the CJEU’s finding that the Data Retention Directive was invalid, 
there is an element of uncertainty as to what implications this ruling will have for the 
individual data retention regimes in the EU and for ISPs in general; . The intricate nature of 
the tracing process is demonstrated by the fact that even viewing a small web page may 
require thousands of data packets to be transmitted and each packet would need to be tracked 
individually, as the paths taken by the individual packets are quasi-random and dependent on 
many factors. Mark D Evans, ’Protection of Data on the Internet’ (2002) 1 IPQ 50, 60.  
602  Dan Jerker Svantesson, ’Geo-Location Technologies and other Means of Placing Borders on the 
”Borderless” Internet’ (2004) 23 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 101, 137; Dan Jerker B 
Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 399 
where that author argues that geolocation technologies are sufficiently accurate to be taken into 
account for legal purposes.    
603   The Freedom Phone is a totally anonymous mobile phone. Its anonymity is safeguarded 
by the fact that it contains no spy chip (receiver) amenable to the GPS satellite navigation 
system. It is sold by the company PT Shamrock. PT Shamrock, ‘PT Freedom Phone™- 
Anonymous Mobile & (GSM) Sim Card – The hassle of anonymous call sending and receiving 
SOLVED’ <http://www.ptshamrock.com/auto/freedomphone.htm> accessed 5 July 2012.  
604  Chris Nicoll, ’Concealing and Revealing Identity on the Internet’ in C Nicoll, JEJ Prins and 
MJM van Dellen (eds), Digital Anonymity and the Law: Tensions and Dimensions - Information 
Technology & Law Series 2 (1st edn, Asser Press 2003) 100, where the author states as follows:  
As a general rule, Internet communications exist at the end of the anonymity spectrum most 
favourable to concealing identity and face-to-face contact exists at the least favourable end. 
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A determined copyright infringer can achieve online anonymity with relative ease. In 
addition, tracing internet traffic requires the assistance of ISPs. Even if an ISP is able to 
trace certain internet communications (transmission of infringing material) to a specific 
computer, the copyright holder will still face problems if the computer in question is a 
public computer (located for instance in an internet café, transport hub (airport/train 
station), public or university library). Where the trace leads to a privately owned 
computer, the injured copyright holder is in a stronger position as hopefully the ISPs 
logs would be sufficient to inculpate the infringer.605 If not, a forensic analysis of the PC 
could be carried out but this could take six months before the results are known.   
 
Before proceeding to examine the facilitative elements, it is helpful to firstly describe 
the three main components which make up the facilitative element. They are: 
 
1. Norwich Pharmacal relief;  
2.  Geolocation Technology; and 
3. Data Retention  Legislation  
 
 
 
 
’POT’ or ’plain old telephone’ is somewhere in between but closer to least favourable - a rough 
placing it shares with orthodox mail. On the other hand, cellular phones of the disposable 
variety can provide high levels of anonymity.  
For a decidedly theoretical analysis of the concepts of anonymity and identity, see MJM van 
Dellen, ’Anonymity on the Internet. What does the Concept of Anonymity Mean?’ (2002) 9 
EDI LR 1-6. To obtain an insight into the concepts of anonymity and identity, the author 
distinguishes between the following five categories: a. non-perceptibility of the subject; b. 
legally non-relevant anonymity, c. legally relevant anonymity, d. legally non-relevant identity, 
and, e. legally relevant identity.    
605  See Polydor Limited v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 where it was held that a father who had 
no knowledge that his children had downloaded P2P software and copied music files 
containing copies of copyright works in a shared directory onto his computer, was liable for 
infringement under CDPA 1988, s 20 on the basis that he had breached the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to communicate the work to the public.  
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7.3 The Facilitative Elements  
7.3.1 The First Facilitative Element - Norwich Pharmacal Relief  
The first facilitative element lies in the English rules of civil procedure. The standard 
procedure for a claimant to obtain identification information is through the so-called 
Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction.606 This judge-made relief was established by the House 
of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commissioners. In that case, 
Reid LJ stated the principle upon which the doctrine was based as follows: 
If through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of 
others so as to facilitate their wrongdoing, he may incur no personal liability, but 
he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him 
full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.607  
Norwich Pharmacal orders will not be available where the information may be obtained 
by other means.608 
This form of equitable relief was placed on a statutory footing in the UK (at least for 
Scotland) by virtue of the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2006 
which transpose the Enforcement Directive609 into local law.610 
606  So-called after the House of Lords decision in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs & Excise 
Commissioners [1974] AC 133. Now formalised in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 
1988/3132, r 31.18: ‘Rules 31.16 and 31.17 do not limit any power which the court may 
have to order (a) disclosure before proceedings have started; and (b) disclosure against a 
person who is not a party to proceedings.’ A Norwich Pharmacal Order will protect the ISP 
from claims that it is in breach of the confidentiality and privacy agreements that it has with 
its customers. Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ (2004) 15 C & L 9.    
607  Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, 175.  
608  Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch) [24]. 
609  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45 (in short referred to as the 
Enforcement Directive). 
610  The Intellectual Property (Enforcements, etc) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028; Kirstin 
Huniar, ’The Enforcement Directive – its effects on UK Law’ (2006) 28 EIPR 92-99 (with a 
section on Norwich Pharmacal Orders on p 97). 
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Regulation 4 of these regulations implements Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive 
(’Right of Information’)611 in Scotland while no provision was deemed necessary to 
implement that particular obligation in England & Wales or Northern Ireland due to the 
existence of the House of Lords ruling in Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners. 
In England, a Norwich Pharmacal order is granted at an interlocutory stage in a lawsuit 
while under the Enforcement Directive, the relevant information can be obtained by 
requesting a court order. This request does not have to be made at an interlocutory stage 
of the proceedings. A discovery order can be sought before an infringement action has 
begun as well as after. Clearly where the internet is concerned, an ISP could be viewed 
as facilitating a subscriber’s wrongdoing, merely through the provision of access.  
 
7.3.2 `````````Case law featuring Norwich Pharmacal relief   
This section will set out general principles established by the courts in respect of this 
form of equitable relief. While not all the case law analysed will be IPR-centric, there 
will be a special focus on torts (IPRs and defamation). Disclosure can be ordered where 
the claimant requires the disclosure of crucial information in order to bring a claim or 
where the claimant requires a missing piece of the information. 
 
The rulings below are being treated in chronological order. 
 
7.3.2.1 Coca Cola Company v British Telecommunications plc  
611  The Intellectual Property (Enforcements, etc) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028, reg 4; 
Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2009 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16, art 8(1)(c) 
provides as follows:  
Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an 
infringement of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and 
proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may order that 
information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or services which 
infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the infringer and/or any other 
person who (…) was found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in 
infringing activities.  
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Coca Cola Company v British Telecommunications plc612 concerned the application of 
the Norwich Pharmacal procedure in a communications environment. BT challenged a 
Norwich Pharmacal order requiring it to deliver-up one of its subscribers (mobile phone 
customer) details, for the purpose of proceedings relating to infringement of Coca 
Cola’s IPRs. The court ruled that the information held by BT was critical to the 
successful pursuance of Coca Cola’s civil rights and therefore the information had to be 
disclosed.613 
 
7.3.2.2 Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd  
Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd:614 Website operators should disclose the identity of 
wrongdoers (in this case, an offender posting defamatory material on a website 
operator’s discussion board). The House of Lords emphasized that the Norwich 
Pharmacal line of authority, developed by 2001, was not restricted by Section 35 of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). It remains in the court’s discretion whether or not to 
grant a Norwich Pharmacal order, which depends, among other things, on the strength 
of the claimant’s case and whether the defendant had a confidentiality policy for 
website users.615 
 
7.3.2.3 Takenaka (UK) v Frankl Ltd  
Takenaka (UK) v Frankl Ltd616 involved a defendant who had gone to considerable 
lengths to hide their identity. The case concerned defamatory e-mails but thanks to a 
series of Norwich Pharmacal proceedings against various ISPs, including Hotmail and 
CompuServe, the claimants came to the conclusion that the infringing computer was 
located in Turkey. The claimants were able to link that computer to the defendant.  
 
The general principle upon which Norwich Pharmacal relief is founded was set out by 
Lord Woolf in the House of Lords in Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd617 where 
he stated as follows: 
 
612  Coca Cola Company v British Telecommunciations plc [1999] FSR 518. 
613  Ibid 523 et seq. 
614  Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1233. 
615  Ibid [19] et seq, [23]. 
616  Takenaka (UK) Ltd v Frankl [2001] EWCA Civ 348.  
617  Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2033. 
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The Norwich Pharmacal case clearly establishes that where a person, albeit 
innocently, and without incurring any personal liability, becomes involved in a 
wrongful act of another, that person thereby comes under a duty to assist the 
person injured by those acts by giving him any information which he is able to 
give by way of discovery that discloses the identity of the wrongdoer.618 
 
7.3.2.4 Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd  
Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd:619 The following conditions must be 
satisfied before a Norwich Pharmacal order can be granted: (1) a wrong must have been 
carried out or allegedly carried out by a wrongdoer; (2) there must be the need for the 
order to enable action to be brought against the wrongdoer; and (3) the person against 
whom the order was sought must be somehow involved in the wrongdoing so as to have 
facilitated it, and must be able or likely to be able to provide the information necessary 
to enable the wrongdoer to be sued.620 
 
7.3.2.5 Grant v Google UK Ltd  
Grant v Google UK Ltd621 involved a Trust (The Individuals Self-Discovery Trust), 
which owned the copyright of an unpublished work entitled ’Unlock Reality’. Without 
the Trust’s consent, an early draft of the work had been made available on the internet 
through an advertisement generated by the Google search engine. This advertisement 
led ultimately to a website at Realityunlocked.com. The Trust sought Google's 
assistance in the identification of the advertiser but it declined to comply, saying it 
could not do so, perhaps because of a perceived duty of confidentiality to its customers. 
Google did, however, suggest that the Trust should apply for an order requiring Google 
to make the requested disclosure, which it would not oppose. The Trust applied for such 
order and the relief sought was granted by Rimer J in the Chancery Division of the 
English High Court. The relief was granted because Google had become mixed up in 
the apparent wrongdoing of others but it was still in a position to disclose the identity of 
those others to the Trust. 
618  Ibid 2039. 
619  Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch). 
620  Ibid [24]. 
621  Grant v Google UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 3444 (Ch). 
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 7.3.2.6 Smith v ADVFN plc  
Smith v ADVFN plc:622 The Court of Appeal considered the proper ambit of a Norwich 
Pharmacal order and, in particular, the coherency and quantity of the evidence 
supporting a Norwich Pharmacal order. 
This case concerned alleged defamatory postings (done under cover of pseudonyms) on 
a bulletin board on a financial services website. In refusing the appellants request for 
Norwich Pharmacal relief, it was held unreasonable to expect the judge, in the short 
time available, to assess without proper guidance each and every alleged instance of 
defamation, given the volume and incoherence of the material which he had been 
expected to consider.623 In short, the court scrutinises the presentation of the evidence 
and there is an onus on the applicant to provide the courts with a coherent body of data 
from which an allegation of wrongdoing could properly be assessed.   
This judgment may serve as a corrective and may reduce the tendency among judges to 
grant the application without proper consideration of whether the material complained 
of was, in fact, defamatory. The case confirms that Norwich Pharmacal relief 
applications should be used with caution. If the claimant can get the documents from 
another source or by other means, the court will not grant the orders and the claimant 
may find itself facing the third party’s legal costs. 
 
7.3.2.7 Media C.A.T. v Adams and Others  
Media C.A.T. v Adams and Others624 
Despite being a ruling from one of the UK’s junior courts, its importance may be 
significantly greater than its rather humble provenance! Judge Birss considered the 
appropriateness of the Norwich Pharmacal Order and when it should be used. In short, 
he was quite critical of the use of NPOs as he believed that there was a lack of 
safeguards (governing) the use of the information obtained under NPOs. While the 
622  Smith v ADVFN plc [2008] EWCA Civ 518. 
623  Ibid [14]. 
624  Media C.A.T. v Adams and Others [2011] EWPCC 6.  
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Media C.A.T. case has not altered the rules or law on the obtaining of a NPO, it has 
raised a number of questions about the operation of NPOs. 
The case concerned allegations of copyright infringement in the context of pornographic 
films. The claimants argued that the defendants had used P2P file-sharing software on 
the internet to carry out the infringements.  
Following the grant of NPOs by Chief Master Winegarten, the names and addresses of 
tens of thousands of people were disclosed by ISPs. Armed with this information, ACS 
Law sent out speculative invoicing letters to suspected copyright infringers while Media 
C.A.T., through ACS Law, wrote to all those identified through the NPOs, claiming 
£495 for breach of copyright. The claimant and their legal advisor tried to intimidate the 
defendants into making payment for supposed copyright infringement even when they 
were not entirely sure they were pursuing the correct people. In his ruling, Birss J stated 
that when a NPO is made, it may well be worth considering how to manage the 
subsequent use of the identities disclosed.625 He suggested that consideration be given to 
the making of a Group Litigation Order under CPR ((Civil Procedure Rules)) Part 19 
from the outset and the provision of a mechanism for identifying test cases at an early 
stage before a letter writing campaign begins.626  
Using the example of Anton Piller orders, he also suggested the appointment of a 
neutral supervising solicitor whose task it would be to ensure that the NPO is not 
abused. 627  
This ruling represents a more critical interpretation of Norwich Pharmacal relief in 
which the presiding judge is live to the real risk of the (successful applicants) 
‘beneficiaries’ under a NPO abusing the information disclosed under the order. It will 
be interesting to see whether Birss J’s suggestions will be accepted in the future. Indeed, 
they may act as a ‘brake’ on the granting of NPOs.     
While Media C.A.T. does not alter the rules or law on the obtaining of a Norwich 
Pharmacal Order, it has certainly raised questions that need to be borne in mind by 
members of the judiciary when considering future applications. Potentially, the ruling 
625 Ibid [112].  
626 Ibid.  
627 Ibid. 
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could act as a catalyst for a complete re-examination of the Norwich Pharmacal 
jurisdiction.  
Following Judge Birss’ suggestions, courts may well include in their orders the 
appointment of a supervising solicitor. Indeed, they may even go further by placing 
restrictions on information disclosed under Norwich Pharmacal Orders or even require 
the parties to return to the judge who made the original order so that he/she could 
provide directions upon use once the information has been obtained and can be 
considered. 
 
7.3.2.8 Rugby Football Union v Viagogo Ltd  
Rugby Football Union v Viagogo Ltd:628 The RFU alleged that Viagogo had permitted 
a large number of tickets for international rugby matches to be advertised on its website 
for sale at prices far above the face value of the tickets. The RFU alleged that Viagogo 
had become innocently involved in such wrongdoing and that the court should make a 
Norwich Pharmacal order requiring Viagogo to identify the persons advertising and 
selling such tickets. At first instance, Tugendhat J ruled that the court should exercise its 
discretion in favour of granting Norwich Pharmacal relief.629 In the Court of Appeal, 
Viagogo argued that the order sought involved an interference with the fundamental 
rights of individuals under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, namely Articles 7 
(respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection of personal data). They also 
invoked Section 35, DPA 1998. In support of their argument, Viagogo relied upon two 
decisions of the CJEU, C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunen Markkinaporssi Oy630 
and Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut 
Eifert v Land Hessen.631 The Court of Appeal affirmed Tugendhat J’s decision and ruled 
that the disclosure was both necessary and proportionate.632 Delivering the judgment, 
Longmore LJ concluded that the RFU had no available means of finding out the 
628  Rugby Football Union v Vivagogo Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1585. 
629  Ibid [78]. 
630  Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunen Markkinaporssi Oy [2008] ECR I-9831. 
631  Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v 
Land Hessen [2010] ECR I-11063. 
632  Rugby Football Union v Vivagogo Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1585 [79] et seq. 
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information it was seeking other than through Viagogo and that the making of the 
Norwich Pharmacal order was therefore necessary.633 
There was a further appeal by Viagogo (in liquidation) to the Supreme Court.634 In the 
UK’s highest court, Lord Kerr held that the appropriate test of proportionality under 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union involved 
weighing the benefit of the information being sought by the RFU against the impact that 
disclosure was likely to have on the individual concerned.635 The court acknowledged 
that there should be an intense focus on the rights claimed by the individuals concerned 
but this was not a case where disclosure would result in oppressive or unfair 
treatment.636 The only information sought was the names and addresses of individuals 
who had bought and sold tickets in clear breach of the RFU’s ticket policy.637   
The Supreme Court acknowledged that in ‘some limited instances’, the particular 
circumstances affecting the individual whose personal data will be revealed on foot of a 
NPO may displace the interests of the applicant for the disclosure of the information.638 
But, in the case before the court, the impact that could reasonably be apprehended by 
the individuals, whose personal data was being sought, was simply not of the type that 
could possibly offset the interests of the RFU in obtaining that information.639 For that 
reason, the court dismissed the appeal.   
 
7.3.2.9 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd  
Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd:640 This was a claim by Golden 
Eye (International) Ltd and thirteen other claimants for a Norwich Pharmacal order 
against Telefonica UK (trading as 02). The object of the claim was to obtain disclosure 
633  Ibid [79]. 
634  Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Limited (Formerly Viagogo 
Limited) (In Liquidation) [2012] UKSC 55. 
635  Ibid [33]-[36]. 
636  Ibid [45].  
637  Ibid [43] et seqq.  
638  Ibid [46].  
639  Ibid. 
640  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch). 
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of the names and addresses of customers of 02 who allegedly committed copyright 
infringements through peer-to-peer files-haring using the BitTorrent protocol. The 
subject-matter of the alleged infringements was pornographic films, owned by the 
claimants. The case raised fundamental questions as to the operation of the Norwich 
Pharmacal regime, the legitimacy of speculative invoicing, the issue of whether there is 
a duty of full and frank disclosure on a Norwich Pharmacal application641 and, how to 
balance the rights of copyright owners and consumers.  
On the issue of necessity, Arnold J held that it was plainly necessary for the information 
sought to be disclosed for the claimants to be able to protect their copyrights.642 As 
regards the issue of proportionality, Arnold J referred to Article 3(2) of the Enforcement 
Directive which imposes a general obligation to consider the proportionality of 
remedies for the infringement of IPRs including orders for the disclosure of the 
identities of infringers.643 He went on to state that the CJEU had ruled that, when 
adopting measures to protect copyright owners against online infringement, national 
courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of IPRs guaranteed by Article 
17(2) of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the protection of the fundamental 
rights of individuals who are affected by such measures, and in particular the rights 
safeguarded by Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.644 Ultimately, 
641  Ibid [84] et seqq. Arnold J stated that it was an issue to be decided in another case, not this 
one. He went on to say that such a duty normally comes into play when the respondent to the 
application applies to set aside the order on the ground of non-compliance with that duty. It 
is also well established that a court may set aside an order made on a without notice 
application and decline to grant a fresh one if the applicant has not complied with the duty. 
However, at the stage of the without notice application, the court will normally assume that 
the applicant is complying with the duty (para [86]). Mr Justice Arnold did highlight the fact 
that Golden Eye had not explained to counsel for Consumer Focus why it discontinued at 
least two claims. This failure to explain is something that a court could and should take into 
account (para [88]).    
642  Ibid [114] et seq. 
643  Ibid [116]. Arnold J also cited Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG [2011] 
ECR I-6011, paras 139-144.  
644  For a good example of a national court attempting to strike a fair balance between protection 
of IPRs and privacy rights, see the Irish High Court ruling from 2012, EMI Records (Ireland) 
Limited & Ors v The Data Protection Commissioner & Anor [2012] IEHC 264. The context 
was unauthorised sharing of copyright material and legal proceedings brought against 
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Arnold J held that the claimants’ interests in enforcing their copyright outweighed the 
intended defendants’ interest in protecting their privacy and data protection rights and 
thus it was proportionate to order disclosure provided that the order and the proposed 
letter of claim were framed so as to properly safeguard the legitimate interests of the 
intended defendants and in particular the interests of intended defendants who have not 
in fact committed the infringements in question.645 Accordingly, he made a Norwich 
Pharmacal order in favour of Golden Eye and its exclusive licensee, Ben Dover 
Productions, but declined to make an order in favour of the other claimants. The Other 
claimants appealed the High Court’s decision not to extend Norwich Pharmacal relief 
to them. They contended, before the Court of Appeal,646 that it was both illogical and 
inconsistent for the judge to deny the self-same relief to them merely because they had 
chosen to pursue their claims with the assistance of Golden Eye under arrangements 
which the judge had previously found to be both lawful and not part of a speculative 
invoicing scheme.647 
 Lord Justice Patten identified the reason for Arnold J’s refusal to grant relief to the 
Other Claimants – it was, in essence, that judge’s disapproval of the recovery sharing 
arrangements with Golden Eye. Patten LJ found Mr Justice Arnold’s reasoning difficult 
to follow. In fact, Patten LJ’s assessment was rather blunt. He reasoned that where the 
arrangements between Golden Eye and the Other Claimants were neither unlawful nor 
simply a money-making exercise designed to take advantage of the vulnerability of the 
subscribers (rather than a genuine attempt to protect the rights the Other Claimants), 
then he could see no justification for refusing relief based on a disapproval of those 
arrangements.648 Indeed, he found it difficult to articulate what the disapproval could be 
based on. Factoring in the safeguards put in place by Arnold J to protect the intended 
Ireland’s largest ISP, Eircom, by some of Ireland’s record companies. The relevant part of 
the ruling is para [8.10] where Charleton J considers the ‘proportionality of an injunctive 
remedy’ in the context of ‘the mischief of the improper use of intellectual property online’.   
645  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch) [145]. 
646  For a detailed analysis of the Court of Appeal ruling in Golden Eye, see Mark Hyland, ‘The 
seductive interface between adult entertainment and Norwich Pharmacal relief’ (2013) 18 
Comms L 56-59.    
647  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1740 [25].  
648  Ibid [28]. 
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defendants, Patten LJ considered that the balance had been tipped in favour of making 
the order.649 He therefore allowed the appeal.     
 
7.3.3 Digital Economy Act 2010  
Theoretically, under the DEA 2010, there are a number of provisions that safeguard the 
position of copyright owners. They include Section 3 (obligation on ISPs to notify 
subscribers of reported infringements), Section 4 (obligation on ISPs to provide 
infringement lists to copyright owners), Section 9 (Obligations on ISPs to take technical 
measures against subscribers for the purpose of preventing or reducing infringement of 
copyright by) and Section 10 (Obligations to limit internet access). However, in reality, 
given the serious delays in the implementation of the DEA 2010,650 these provisions are 
increasingly being viewed as ineffective.    
It is now likely that the first warning letters from ISPs to copyright infringers (under 
Section 3 of the DEA 2010) will only go out in 2016 at the earliest and, with a general 
election coming up in the UK next year, there is no certainty that the next government 
will demonstrate as much resolve in tackling online copyright infringement.  
From a rightholder’s perspective, the DEA 2010 was further weakened by the 
government’s announcement in June 2012 to repeal sections 17 and 18 of the Act, 
referring in the process to the Ofcom report651 and the fact that rightholders have 
successfully used Section 97A, CDPA 1988 to secure website blocks (e.g. Newzbin2 
and Pirate Bay).652 Under Section 17, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport has the power to make provision about blocking injunctions which would prevent 
access to locations on the internet which are being used or likely to be used in 
connection with copyright infringement. 
649  Ibid [29]. 
650  BBC, ‘UK Piracy warning letters delayed until 2015’ (BBC News Technology, 6 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22796723> accessed 8 May 2014. 
651  Ofcom, ‘“Site Blocking” to reduce online copyright infringement, A review of sections 17 
and 18 of the Digital Economy Act’ (27 May 2010) 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf> accessed 8 May 2014. 
652  Department for Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Next steps to tackle internet piracy’ (26 June 
2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/next-steps-to-tackle-internet-piracy> 
accessed 3 June 2014; See para 7.3.5. (below) for treatment of web-blocking cases. . 
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 7.3.4 Technical Measures Legislation in France and the Republic of Ireland  
7.3.4.1 France  
The UK was not the only EU Member State to introduce technical measures legislation, 
often colloquially termed ‘three strikes legislation’. In October 2009, the HADOPI law 
was passed in France. The law created a new independent public body - the Haute 
Autorité pour la Diffusion des œuvres et la Protection des droits d'auteur sur Internet 
(HADOPI) (in English, the High Authority for the Distribution of Works and the 
Protection of Rights on the Internet). During the first three years of the HADOPI’s 
existence, only 14 cases were forwarded to prosecutors. Of those, only one resulted in a 
conviction carrying a financial penalty.653 The new body has attracted considerable 
criticism, principally along the lines of whether it is good value for money. 
Little wonder then that the body recently had its budget slashed and that rumours 
circulate that its role and powers may soon be transferred to the Conseil Supérieur de 
l’Audiovisuel (Audiovisual High Council).654 
 
7.3.4.2 The Republic of Ireland  
The Republic of Ireland introduced a voluntary three-strikes policy (the Graduated 
Response Protocol) in August 2010 but not all ISPs have signed up to this protocol. In 
2012, the protocol survived a challenge from the Irish Data Protection Commissioner.655 
Recent truculence by UPC Communications, Ireland’s second largest ISP, raised the ire 
of Mr Justice Peter Kelly. UPC’s reluctance to implement a graduated response similar 
to that being operated by Eircom, the Republic’s largest ISP, resulted in Mr Justice 
653  Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law, The Law and Society (2nd, OUP 2013) 284. 
654  Laura Bérard, ‘Intellectual Property Rights Protection on the Internet in France: The End of 
Hadopi?’ (LSE, 29 January 2014) 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/01/29/intellectual-property-rights-
protection-on-the-internet-in-france-the-end-of-hadopi> accessed 3 June 2014. 
655  EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd and ors v The Data Protection Commissioner & Anor [2012] 
IEHC 264. 
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Peter Kelly deciding on 10th February to fast-track in the Commercial Court an action 
being brought by three of Ireland’s music companies against UPC Communications.656  
 
7.3.5 Section 97A CDPA 1988 and Blocking of Websites 
Ever since the 2011 High Court ruling in Twentieth Century Fox v British 
Telecommunications,657 there has been a gradual judicial expansion in terms of Section 
97A CDPA 1988 and this, despite the restrictive CJEU ruling in Scarlet Extended SA v 
SABAM.658 This judicial expansionism, combined with Arnold J’s bullish approach to 
Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive,659 effectively means that the DEA 2010 is 
being bypassed.    
I shall now examine the six High Court cases on web-blocking. I shall deal with them in 
chronological order, starting with Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications 
(Newzbin 2).660 In each case, the remedy sought by copyright owners has been a 
blocking order imposed against an ISP and requiring it to block access to one or more 
copyright infringing websites. The latest ruling in this line of authorities - Paramount 
Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting661 – was handed 
down on 13 November 2013. It involved the blocking of two websites - TubePlus and 
SolarMovie, both of which were providing access via an online database to a large 
number of television programmes and films without the rightholder’s authorisation. 
656  Mary Carolan, ‘Legal action to stop UPC users downloading illegally’ (The Irish Times, 10 
February 2014) <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/legal-action-to-
stop-upc-users-downloading-illegally-1.1686474> accessed 8 May 2014. 
657  Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
658  Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs 
(SABAM) [2011] ECR I-11959. In short, in Scarlet Extended, the CJEU held that ISPs could 
not be required to filter and block access by its customers to files containing infringing 
copies of musical works as such a requirement would amount to a general monitoring 
obligation, which is explicitly prohibited by Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive.    
659  Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive obliges Member States not to impose a general 
monitoring obligation on ISPs in terms of information which they transmit or store while 
providing e-commerce services.  
660  Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
661  Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting [2013] 
EWHC 3479 (Ch). 
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All the blocking orders are granted under Section 97A, CDPA 1988 which empowers 
the High Court to grant injunctions against any service provider which has actual 
knowledge of a person using its services to infringe copyright.662 
7.3.5.1  Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications    (Newzbin 2) 
In Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications plc663 ((Newzbin 2)), BT was 
ordered by the High Court to block access to www.newzbin.com using its ‘Cleanfeed’ 
system, a system usually used to block access to child sexual abuse material on the 
internet (in collaboration with the Internet Watch Foundation). The Newzbin website 
(which has since closed down) acted as a search engine directed to Usenet, a platform 
for posting and retrieving large binary content such as films, TV shows etc., much of 
which was infringing material. 
In granting the order against BT, Arnold J held that in terms of the knowledge 
requirement what had to be shown was that the ‘service provider has actual knowledge 
of one or more persons using its service to infringe copyright’ as opposed to ‘actual 
knowledge of a specific infringement of a specific copyright work by a specific 
individual’.664  
This ruling is significant as it is the first time that a site-blocking order was made by the 
English courts. Its precedential value has been proven over the last three years as 
copyright owners now seem more inclined to go the Section 97A route than the 
Norwich Pharmacal route.  
7.3.5.2 Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications (No 2)  
The form of the order (against BT) is set out in Twentieth Century Fox v BT (No 2)665. 
This ruling also contains an interesting debate on the differences between Section 97A, 
CDPA 1988 and Norwich Pharmacal orders.  
662  S 97A, CDPA 1988 implements Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC into UK law. Article 
8(3) provides that ‘Member States shall ensure that rightsholders are in a position to apply 
for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related right’. 
663  Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecom [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
664 Ibid [148]. 
665  Twentieth Century Fox v BT (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch). 
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By way of the order, BT was required within 14 days to adopt a prescribed technical 
means to block or attempt to block access by its customers to Newzbin2 (accessible at 
www.newzbin.com), its domains and sub-domains and any other IP address or URL 
whose sole/predominant purpose was to enable or facilitate access to the Newzbin2 
website. The prescribed technical means included  
(i) IP address re-routing in respect of each and every IP address from 
which the said website operates (this could be achieved using 
Cleanfeed), and  
(ii) DPI-based URL blocking utilising at least summary analysis in 
respect of each and every URL available at the said website and its 
domains and sub-domains.666 
The analysis of the distinctions between an order under Article 8(3) and a Norwich 
Pharmacal Order occur at paragraphs 27-31 of the ruling. The two most important 
distinctions drawn by counsel for the applicants (and accepted by Arnold J) are, firstly, 
that Article 8(3) confers on rightholders a legal right to the substantive remedy of a final 
injunction whereas applicants for Norwich Pharmacal Orders have no such right where 
the respondent is innocent of wrongdoing.  
Secondly, a Norwich Pharmacal application is a preparatory step for the bringing of 
proceedings against the wrongdoer. In contrast, an order under Article 8(3) is not 
preparatory to proceedings (or other steps) against the infringer but may well follow 
such proceedings. 
7.3.5.3 Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited (2 
rulings; February and May 2012)  
In the two rulings of 2012, both involving Dramatico Entertainment as claimant,667 the 
targeted (offending) website was The Pirate Bay. On 27 April 2012, Arnold J made an 
order under Section 97A, CDPA 1988 requiring five of the six largest UK ISPs to block 
access to The Pirate Bay website, self-described as ‘the world’s largest BitTorrent 
666  Ibid [56]. 
667  Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch) [20 February 2012] and Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting 
Limited [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch) [2 May 2012]. 
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tracker’.668 The more interesting of the two related rulings is that on the merits, handed 
down on 20th February 2012.  
Two of the more interesting components of the February ruling relate to the restricted 
act of communication to the public and, the notions of authorisation/joint tortfeasance. 
In considering whether users of The Pirate Bay communicated such recordings to the 
public, Arnold J posed two questions. Firstly, do the users communicate the recordings 
by electronic transmission? He answered that in the affirmative and added that this was 
done in such a way as to allow members of the public access the recordings from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them (within the meaning of section 20(2)(b), 
CDPA 1988). Mr Justice Arnold added that in any event, it is clear from the CJEU’s 
ruling in Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure669 (analysed at para. 
3.6.1.) that the concept of communication must be construed broadly.670 
The second question was: do the Pirate Bay users communicate the recordings to a new 
public, that is to say a public which was not taken into account by the rightholders when 
authorising the distribution of the recordings, in essence, applying the test laid down by 
the CJEU in a line of cases starting with Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de 
España (SGAE).671 Once again, Arnold J answered in the affirmative as, in his 
judgement, copies of sound recordings were made available to users who had not 
purchased them from an authorised source.672 
As for the notion of authorisation, Mr Justice Arnold referred to expert evidence 
adduced by John Hodge, BPI’s Head of Internet Investigations, in which the functions 
668  Hogan Lovells and Alastair Shaw, ‘Pirate Bay watch: UK ISPs ordered to block The Pirate 
Bay’ (ACC, 20 July 2012) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29d6e1b2-2c1a-
40b8-92f9-0e53a166dd93> accessed 7 May 2014. 
669  Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure; 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083, para 93. 
670  Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch) [69]. 
671  Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de España (SGAE) [2006] ECR I-
11519.  
672  Dramatico Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2012] EWHC 268 
(Ch) [70].  
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and features of The Pirate Bay website were highlighted.673 He held that the operators 
of the Pirate Bay did authorise its users’ infringing acts of copying and communication 
to the public. This was done by going ‘far beyond merely enabling or assisting’. In 
Arnold J’s view, they sanctioned, approved and countenanced the infringements of 
copyright committed by its users.674 
As for the issue of joint tortfeasance, having considered Kitchin J’s analysis of the law 
in Twentieth Century Fox v Newzbin, Arnold J was of the view that the operators of The 
Pirate Bay induced, incited or persuaded its users to commit infringements of 
copyright.675 Moreover, they and the users acted pursuant to a common design to 
infringe. In short, the Hon Mr Justice Arnold found both parties to be jointly liable for 
the infringements committed by users.676 
The Newzbin2 and Dramatico rulings demonstrate that rightholders (or their 
representatives) will not hesitate to invoke Section 97A, CDPA 1988 particularly if the 
whereabouts of the operator of an offending/authorising website is not known (eg The 
Pirate Bay). Cynically, one could argue that they have no option given that the anti-
piracy measures contained in the 2010 Digital Economy Act have yet to be 
implemented. Following Dramatico, it is becoming increasingly clear that ISPs have 
considerable responsibility in the whole area of copyright infringement by their users – 
it behoves them to take a more active role in infringement prevention. 
 
7.3.5.4 EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited (2013)677 
Like the previous cases, the claimants here are record companies claiming on their own 
behalf and in a representative capacity on behalf of other members of the British 
Phonographic Industry (BPI) and the Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL). The 
defendants are the six main ISPs in the UK. The claimants sought an injunction against 
the defendants pursuant to Section 97A, CDPA 1988 to block or at least impede access 
673  Ibid [75]. 
674  Ibid [81]. 
675  Ibid [83]. 
676  Ibid.  
677  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
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by their customers to three P2P file-sharing websites called KAT, H33T and Fenopy 
(hereafter, the websites). As well as operating as BitTorrent indexing websites, the three 
websites also offered so-called magnet links, which are a different means of using the 
relevant torrent file to obtain the content. 
One aspect of the application that is revealing is the list of entities which supported the 
claimants’ application, namely, the MCPS-PRS Alliance Ltd, the Motion Picture 
Association, the Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television, the Association for UK 
interactive Entertainment and the Publishers’ Association Ltd. The industries 
represented are most likely setting down a marker as to their possible future reliance on 
Section 97A!  
A significant portion of the ruling is given over to the principle of proportionality. 
Adverting to his ruling in Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd,678 Mr 
Justice Arnold re-stated the two reasons why it is necessary to consider the 
proportionality of orders in the field of IP Law. Firstly, Article 3(2) of Directive 
2004/48/EC (the Enforcement Directive) imposes a general obligation to consider the 
proportionality of remedies for the infringement of IPRs. Secondly, the CJEU has held 
that, when adopting measures to protect copyright owners against online infringement, 
national courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of IPRs guaranteed by 
Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such measures 
and in particular the rights safeguarded by the applicable articles of the Charter.679 
Arnold J’s approach to considering proportionality (as set out in Golden Eye680 at [117]) 
is recapitulated as are the relevant legal instruments (and relevant provisions) under 
which both the copyright owner and users of infringing material derive rights.681  
678  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch). 
679  See Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España 
SAU [2008] ECR I–271, paras 61-68; Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des 
auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM) [2011] ECR I-11959, paras 42-46, 50-53; and 
Case C-360/10 Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM) v Netlog NV 
[2012] 2 CMLR 18, paras 41-51. 
680  Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch). 
681  EMI Records Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) [92]. 
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Towards the end of his judgment, Arnold J addressed some practical considerations of 
the website blocking jurisdiction/regime. He stated that the proportionality of a blocking 
order is bound to be a context sensitive question and that the English High Court does 
not make such orders without a thorough consideration of whether it is appropriate to 
make an order in the light of the specific facts of each case.682 Interestingly, Mr Justice 
Arnold is of the view that a blocking order is justified even if it only prevents access by 
a minority of users.683 He believes the efficacy of the orders is linked to the form that 
they take684 while the evidence in his view indicates that the blocking orders are 
reasonably effective. The proof of this is the order made in Italy with regard to The 
Pirate Bay (referred to in Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications at [197]) 
which resulted in a 73% reduction in audience accessing The Pirate Bay in Italy and a 
96% reduction in page views.685  
One interesting part of this decision is the pragmatic approach/attitude of Mr Justice 
Arnold where the specific facts of the case are a determinant and blocking orders are 
viewed as a real possibility even if they will ‘only’ affect a minority of the users of the 
relevant website. Allusion to percentage reduction in access to offending websites, 
falling website rankings (compiled by Alexa, the Web information company), and page 
views creates hard data which is difficult to refute.686 
7.3.5.5 The Football Association Premier League v British Sky Broadcasting Limited  
This is a significant ruling since it is the first time in the UK that a site-blocking order 
under s 97A, CDPA 1988 has been granted in respect of streamed content rather than 
file-sharing websites. The English High Court granted an injunction requiring the 6 
largest UK ISPs to block end-user access to the First Row Sports website, an indexing 
and aggregation portal, which provides unauthorised streams to live sports events 
including Premier League football matches. 
 
682  Ibid [100].  
683  Ibid [104]. 
684  Ibid [105]. 
685  Ibid [106]. 
686 Ibid. 
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Intriguingly, the relevant website was hosted in Sweden and the alleged 
communications to the public originated from a host server in that country. Therefore, 
in order to establish the English High Court’s jurisdiction, it was necessary to show that 
the operators of FirstRow intended to target the public in the UK. 
FAPL relied on the following matters as evidencing such an intention: 
i. The website was an English language website 
ii. The advertising on FirstRow included adverts for companies located in 
the UK and products consumed in the UK  
iii. FirstRow provides access to a large number of competitions which are 
extremely popular with UK audiences. In particular, the amount of 
Premier League content on the website is up to 11% whilst a Premier 
League match is being played 
iv. FirstRow is a very popular website in the UK  
v. Between 12% and 13.7% of the worldwide traffic to the site comes from 
the UK  
vi. FirstRow is discussed on internet blogs and forums, where a significant 
proportion of the internet traffic to those blogs/forums comes from the 
UK.687  
Mr Justice Arnold accepted that those matters evidenced an intention to target the public 
in the UK and that there was a communication to the public in the UK. He was also 
satisfied that FirstRow communicated FAPL’s copyright works to the public in the UK 
and thereby infringed FAPL’s copyrights in those works.  
Another key element of the ruling concerned the principle of proportionality. FAPL put 
forward 5 reasons why the orders sought would be proportionate and Arnold J was 
satisfied by these reasons. The five reasons are as follows:  
• As between FAPL and the defendants, the defendants did not oppose the making 
of the orders and the terms of the orders have been agreed between FAPL and 
the defendants. In addition, the costs to the defendants of implementation were 
modest and proportionate 
687  The Football Association Premier League v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 
2058 (Ch) [45]. 
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• The orders are necessary to protect the copyrights of FAPL and the supporting 
rightholders, which are being infringed on a large scale. Given the difficulty of 
identifying let alone bringing proceedings against the operators of FirstRow, no 
other effective remedy was open to FAPL in the jurisdiction of England & 
Wales. 
• The orders are also necessary or at least desirable in order to protect the sporting 
objectives which lie behind the Closed Period688 and, in that sense, are in the 
public interest. 
• While FirstRow features international content some of which may not be 
protected by copyright or may be licensed, the vast bulk of the content which is 
likely to be of interest to UK users infringes the rights of FAPL and the 
supporting rightholders. 
• The orders are narrow and targeted ones, and they contain safeguards in the 
event of any change of circumstances. While they are unlikely to be completely 
efficacious, since some users will be able to circumvent the technical measures 
which the orders require the Defendants to adopt, it is likely that they will be 
reasonably effective. The orders require IP address blocking of the IP address 
for FirstRow’s domain name firstrow1.eu but FAPL’s evidence is that this will 
not result in over-blocking since that IP address is not shared.689 
 
Arnold J went on to state that the interests of FAPL and the supporting rightholders in 
enforcing their copyrights clearly outweighed the rights of the users of the websites 
under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union690 (the 
688  The notion of ‘Closed Period’ is explained in para [9] of the judgment. It refers to a two and 
a half hour period each week during which the broadcasting of football matches is 
prohibited. The purpose of this is to encourage attendance at football matches and support 
the sport of football. Article 48 of the Statutes of UEFA provides for the Closed Period and, 
in the UK, the Football Association has designated 2.45pm to 5.15pm on Saturdays as the 
Closed Period in England.  
689  The Football Association Premier League v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 
2058 (Ch) [55] et seq.  
690  This is the freedom of expression provision. Article 11(1) states as follows:  
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Charter), who could have obtained the copyright works from lawful sources. They even 
more clearly outweighed the Article 11 rights of the operators of the websites who were 
profiting from infringement on a large scale. Lastly, they also outweighed the 
defendants’ Article 11 rights to the extent that they were engaged. 
The significance of this ruling is linked to the fact that it breaks new ground. Previously, 
s 97A site-blocking orders were dominated by claimants in the music and film sectors 
whose rights had been undermined by illegal peer-to-peer file sharing activities. This 
judgment demonstrates that the s 97A remedy is also available to broadcasters of sports 
events who are trying to tackle unauthorised streaming of their broadcasts. The case 
suggests that section 97A orders will be available to an ever expanding group of 
rightholders though it imposes even heavier responsibilities on ISPs who are 
increasingly relied on to prevent piracy.   
7.3.5.6 Paramount Home Entertainment v British Sky Broadcasting  
The latest website-blocking ruling concerned two websites located at 
www.solarmovie.so and www.tubeplus.me. Both websites provided access to streams of 
a large range of unauthorised films and TV programmes. The mode of operation of the 
websites is broadly similar to that of the FirstRow website described in Football 
Association Premier League v British Sky (at [14] –[19]). Like the FirstRow website, 
the relevant websites do not host the content in question. Rather, they ensure that the 
content is comprehensively categorised, referenced, moderated and searchable. 
Users who wish to access content via one of the websites are provided with a number of 
links. Clicking on a link enables the user to view a stream of the chosen content on an 
embedded player. 
One novel and helpful aspect of this ruling is that Arnold J sets out the series of nine 
CJEU judgments691 in which that court considered the concept of communication to the 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. 
691 See Paramount Home Entertainment v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 3479 
(Ch) [11]. Starting with Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
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public along with 18 principles (relating to the exclusive right) which have been 
established by the CJEU.692  
Arnold J acknowledged that there were three references pending before the CJEU which 
bore upon the issues in Paramount.693 In two of the cases, the referring courts were 
posing a similar question, i.e. if someone other than the copyright owner supplies a 
clickable link to a copyright work, does that constitute communication to the public 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC? The third case, BestWater 
International, was slightly more complex as it involved both linking and framing, with 
Arnold J speculating that an embedded stream (rather than downloading) was used to 
display the copyright film on the defendants’ respective websites.  
Interestingly, the three references to the CJEU (in particular, Svensson) have acted as a 
catalyst for academic debate on the subject of hyperlinking and communication to the 
public.694 Such debate includes an Opinion (published February 2013) from the 
European Copyright Society695 and a Report and Opinion (published September 2013) 
adopted by the Executive Committee of the Association Littéraire et Artistique 
Internationale.696 
(SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] ECR I-11519 and running right up to the 2013 ruling in 
Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd [2013] 3 CMLR 1. 
692 Paramount Home Entertainment v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 3479 
(Ch) [12]. 
693 They are: Case C-466/12 Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB (ECJ (Fourth Chamber) 13 
February 2014); Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment AB v Sandberg (Request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen (Sweden) 22 May 2013); and Case C-348/13 
BestWater International GmbH v Mebes, Potsch (Request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) 25 June 2013). 
694 Paramount Home Entertainment v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2013] EWHC 3479 
(Ch) [29]. 
695 Lionel Bently, et al, ‘Opinion on The Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson’ 
(European Copyright Society, 15 February 2013) <file://fs-home-l/home-
009/sop01b/Windows_Data/Downloads/SSRN-id2220326.pdf> accessed 7 May 2014. 
696 ALAI, ‘Report and Opinion on the making available and communication to the public in the 
internet environment – focus on linking techniques on the Internet’ (16 September 2013) 
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In the final analysis, Mr Justice Arnold found that there had been a communication to 
the public by UK users of the websites. But, he came to that conclusion by looking at 
the combined effect of provision of hyperlinks and the uploading of content to the host 
site by users. Together, these two acts amounted to communication to the public. 
Adopting the same approach to the assessment of proportionality as taken in EMI v 
British Sky Broadcasting, Arnold J found that the orders sought by the claimants were 
proportionate and, accordingly, made the blocking orders. 
Of the blocking cases, Paramount Home Entertainment is the first to analyse whether a 
clickable link constitutes a communication to the public. Arnold J’s circumspect 
approach to this issue may not, however, be the final word as the CJEU has yet to rule 
on the three referred cases. It is also interesting to observe the gradual evolution in the 
blocking case-law, initially featuring BitTorrent and peer-to-peer file-sharing as the 
means of infringement, but, more recently featuring illegally streamed content.  
From the rightholder’s viewpoint, the ‘tactic’ of blocking the infringing website is a 
more practical and straightforward solution than reliance on a Norwich Pharmacal 
Order. As a Norwich Pharmacal Order only constitutes a preparatory step, the 
successful applicant (the prejudiced rightholder) must commence a fresh set of 
proceedings once he is armed with the relevant information (subscriber’s name, address 
etc.) from the ISP. More compellingly, a website like The Pirate Bay attracts a very 
large number of users. An attempt to identify all the users using the Norwich Pharmacal 
route, while probably feasible, would be a very costly exercise. The next step – that of 
serving them all – might be deemed wholly disproportionate by some judges. All in all, 
the blocking of a copyright infringing website short circuits matters considerably for the 
rightholder and with an ever-expanding series of Section 97A precedents, it is difficult 
to see why one might opt for Norwich Pharmacal relief nowadays (unless of course 
there were evidential difficulties in terms of proving actual knowledge on the part of the 
ISP).  
<http://www.alai.org/assets/files/resolutions/making-available-right-report-opinion.pdf> 
accessed 7 May 2014. 
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7.3.5.7 Overblocking  
Website blocking can also be dangerous because it brings with it significant risks of 
accidental 'over-blocking', the possible degradation of internet service, and it may lead 
to the wider, everyday use of encryption and avoidance measures. Website blocking is 
not always conducive to the building of vibrant digital markets but, with the warnings 
and data-throttling provisions in the DEA 2010 in abeyance, prejudiced rightholders 
may be more than happy to rely on section 97A CDPA 1988. There is quite a good 
discussion in the Newzbin2 ruling697 as to the appropriate level of blocking. In short, 
Arnold J was open to the idea of granting a blocking order that ‘should permit the 
Studios (the rightholders) to notify additional IP addresses and/or URLs to BT in future 
in order for those to be subject to the same blocking measures as www.newzbin.com’ 
(para 10 of the ruling). But, the risk then exists that more websites than absolutely 
necessary may be blocked. Counsel for BT had argued that each additional blocking 
should be subject to a separate judicial determination (para 11 of the ruling).  
7.3.6 The Second Facilitative Element – Geolocation Technology  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the second facilitative element in identifying the 
defendant copyright infringer is technological in character, more precisely, geolocation 
technology. 
Geolocation technology constitutes one of those technical developments the aim of 
which is to place geographical borders on the internet. 698 From a conflicts perspective, 
it is a happy coincidence that this important technical advance coincides with the 
harmonisation of private international law at EU level. These technological 
advancements were frequently motivated by perceived business advantages. For 
example, if a website operator could see where access-seekers are located, suitable 
advertisement (from a cultural and linguistic perspective) could be specifically targeted 
at those individuals. Other perceived advantages might flow in terms of ensuring 
regulatory compliance, spam minimisation, reducing fraud risk and keeping licensed 
697 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v British Telecommunications plc [2011] EWHC 
2714 (Ch) [10] et seqq.  
698  In Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1st edn, Basic Books 1999) the 
author argues that the internet is being regulated both through law and technical 
developments.  
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content within geographical boundaries. Governments should, rationally speaking, 
welcome technology which facilitates the erection of geographical borders on the 
internet as such borders might stem the currently overly-wide extraterritorial 
jurisdiction claims.699      
I shall now outline some of the uses that geolocation technology can be put to.  
 
7.3.7 The Various Uses of Geolocation  
After its initial use in the advertising sector, geolocation technology began to be 
employed by those who were attempting to comply with territorially-defined regulation. 
Regulation continues to be territorial in nature even in the field of copyright which is 
quite well harmonised internationally. Geolocation assists with the tailoring of 
accessibility of content on the internet to the requirements and limitations of individual 
countries. Some website operators use geolocation technology to comply with various 
regulatory requirements. For instance, Microsoft deployed geolocation tools ’to comply 
with US regulations prohibiting the export of strong encryption Web browser 
software’.700 Copyright licences too will have a strongly territorial dimension as the 
licensed material will only be permitted to be used in a specified geographic territory.     
 
7.3.8 Geolocation as an enforcement tool  
In reality, geolocation technology serves multiple purposes to include, for example, 
compliance with copyright licensing issues, the implementation of differential pricing, 
the localisation of advertising and internet searching. Increasingly, geolocation is used 
by governmental bodies as an enforcement tool in a bid to force internet actors to 
comply with regulatory decisions and court orders.701 For example, in Italy, an operator 
applying for an online gaming licence is required to confirm during the application 
699  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 396 et seq. 
700  Michael Geist, ‘Cyberlaw 2.0’ (2003) 44 BCL Rev 323, 334.  
701 Marketa Trimble, ‘The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of 
Geolocation’ (2012) 22 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 567, 589.   
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process which geolocation technology it intends using.702 By deploying geolocation 
tools, the website operator will be able to identify the geographical origin of the 
individual attempting to access its gaming website. Accordingly, individuals accessing 
the website from Italy will be prevented from accessing non-authorised sites managed 
by the same operator.703 Similarly, in America, the US Department of Justice made it a 
condition of its agreement with PokerStars, an online gaming company operating from 
the Isle of Man, that the company utilise geographic blocking technology relating to IP 
addresses. In Germany, several courts have unequivocally accepted geolocation as ‘a 
viable and technically feasible method of determining website visitors’ locations704 and 
ordered online gaming operators to utilise geolocation tools to limit access to certain 
content from particular German states.   
While Italy continues to expand the types of online gaming permitted in the country, the 
experience and lessons of the Italian system are being closely watched by many 
countries considering regulating online gaming for the first time. For example, France 
has studied Italy's model and has developed a similar system which it is hoping to bring 
on stream soon. As more and more jurisdictions learn from Italy's experience, it is likely 
that some form of geolocation component will become a necessary part of newly 
regulated online gaming markets. 
7.3.9 Ensuring compliance with territorially-limited copyright laws  
Geolocation technology also has a valuable part to play in terms of ensuring compliance 
with territorially-limited copyright laws. For example, a website operator may secure a 
702  Neustar, ‘IP Geolocation Can Ensure Compliance with New iGaming Regulations’ 
<http://www.neustar.biz/resources/whitepapers/ensure-uigea-compliance-
whitepaper#.U030lvl_s3I> accessed 16 April 2014 (Neustar was formerly called Quova).   
703 A hypothetical example might be as follows: an operator with a global brand and website 
called www.tournament.poker.com would be required to have geolocation technology in 
place to prevent access by players located in Italy. In contrast, a licensed site 
www.tournamentpoker.it would be accessible to players located in Italy.   
704  See OVG Nordrhein-Westfalen [Higher Administrative Court] 02.07.2010, 13 B 646/10, 
[36] (the decision refers at para [37] to other German cases in which the German courts 
agreed that geolocation may be used to comply with their territorially-limited decisions), See 
generally Marketa Trimble, ‘The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of 
Geolocation’ (2012) 22 Fordham Intell-Prop Media & Ent LJ 567, 590 (and fn 89). 
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licence for certain copyright content, but said licence may be restricted to one country 
or a limited number of countries. These geographically restricted licences may be 
preferred over a worldwide licence for a number of reasons. Firstly, the licensee might 
not have the necessary financial resources to pay for worldwide rights.705 Secondly, the 
licensor may decide not to license content in certain markets if the licensor plans to 
launch a country-specific version of the same content and does not want competition 
from foreign versions.706 Thirdly, the licensor may wish to implement a strategy for 
releasing the work in different countries in various media at various times.707 Lastly, 
copyright in a particular work might not be held by the same right-holder in all 
countries, and as a result there might be high transaction costs associated with locating 
all of the right-holders and negotiating licences with all of them, and right-holders in 
some countries might simply not agree to a licence.708   
Given the territorially delimited nature of copyright licences, website operators and 
other licensees use geolocation technology to limit access to licensed content to users 
located only in the countries for which they have secured a licence. 
The key issue really is whether geolocation tools (designed to prevent access to or 
certain uses of a copyright work) can be considered a technological protection measure 
(TPM). TPMs are described somewhat matter of factly in the Information Society 
Directive as ‘effective technological measures’.709 The same phrase (‘effective 
technological measures’) is also used in the relevant UK legal provision, i.e. Section 
296ZA of the CDPA 1988. 
What becomes determinative then is whether the geolocation tools meet the required 
standard of effectiveness. In the UK, a measure is considered ‘effective’ if it ‘achieves 
the intended protection’ by providing the copyright owner control of the use of the work 
‘through...an access control or protection process...[or] a copy control mechanism.’710 
Trimble, referring to the German Copyright Act of 9th September 1965 (as amended), 
705 Marketa Trimble, ‘The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of 
Geolocation’(2012) 22 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 567, 611.  
706 Ibid. 
707 Ibid.  
708 Ibid. 
709 InfoSoc Directive, art 6(1).  
710 CDPA 1988, s 296ZF(2). 
    
 
240
                                                 
contends that in Germany, geolocation tools that allow the restriction of access to users 
from certain countries would probably qualify under the definition of an effective 
technological measure as ’an access control’.711  
The condition of ‘effectiveness’ most likely reflects the wish of lawmakers to avoid 
granting protection to obsolete devices or, devices the circumvention of which is too 
easy. The condition possibly also encapsulates the legislature’s intention that the TPM 
be proportionate to the aim that it pursues. Presumably, a TPM will not be deemed 
effective if it negatively interferes with the operation of playing or reading equipment. 
Conversely, it will be deemed effective if it controls the use of protected work through 
an access or copy-control mechanism (See Article 6(3) InfoSoc Directive). A TPM 
which prevents access helps reduce illegal reproduction as the mere accessing of a 
digital work can ‘generate’ a temporary copy in the user’s random access memory 
(RAM). In addition, access controls underpin the communication and distribution rights.  
7.3.10 Limiting access to online content from abroad  
Certain TV stations and other online content providers may use geolocation tools to 
limit access to content. For example, American Netflix accountholders will not be able 
to download a film if they attempt to access their accounts from outside the US.712 In 
addition, sometimes online gaming websites use geolocation tools both to comply with 
local gaming regulations and to prevent fraud.713 Geolocation is used to ensure that 
customers do not access gaming sites from countries that impose prohibitions or 
limitations on internet gaming. For example, the online bookmaker William Hill uses 
geolocation to prevent US players from accessing its gaming products where access 
would expose the players to liability in their home country.  
7.3.11    
 
 
711 Marketa Trimble, ‘The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of 
Geolocation’ (2012) 22 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 567, 613, fn 185.  
712  Ibid 588, fn 79.   
713  See generally Julia Hörnle and Brigitte Zammit, Cross Border Online Gambling Law and 
Policy (Edgar Elgar 2010).  
    
 
241
                                                 
 
7.3.12 The Accuracy of Geolocation Technology 
As the accuracy of geolocation products is hard to gauge,714 it is difficult to be 
categorical about how useful such product will be to private international lawyers. 
While the manufacturers of the product indicate the potential accuracy to be very high, 
it has to be borne in mind that they will not be the most unbiased commentators and 
there may be a tendency to talk the product up.  
Some manufacturers of the technology (e.g. Quova) when attempting to parry 
objections founded on privacy issues, have claimed that accuracy is limited to zip code 
level and therefore does not pinpoint individual user locations. However, this seemingly 
modest (and possibly inaccurate) assertion is dismissed by some who claim that Quova 
is incorporating GPS, Wi-Fi and wireless tower triangulation through Mexens 
Technology which means that pinpointing of users could be a lot more accurate than 
mere ZIP code level.715 It would seem too that a PricewaterhouseCoopers report issued 
in October 2009 would give the lie to such modesty. That report independently 
confirmed particularly high levels of country (99.9%) and US State (98.2%) accuracy of 
Quova’s product.716  
Similar levels of accuracy are attributed to server-side geolocation technologies by King 
in an article written in 2011 and that author observes that that year’s accuracy rates 
reflect substantial increases on those of 2004 when popular geolocation tools were only 
714  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 402.  
715 Chris Silver Smith, ’Geolocation: Core to the Local Space and Key to Click-Fraud 
Detection’ (Search Engine Land, 13 August 2007)  
<http://searchengineland.com/geolocation-core-to-the-local-space-and-key-to-click-fraud-
detection-11922> accessed 6 July 2012. 
716  Kevin F King, ‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: the Pervasive Legal 
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies’ (2011) 21 Alb LJ Sci & Tech 61, 70 et 
seq, fn 21; Marketwire, ‘PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Completes Annual Audit of Quova 
IP Geolocation Data’ (14 April 2009) <http://www.marketwire.com/press-
release/pricewaterhousecoopers-pwc-completes-annual-audit-of-quova-ip-geoloca tion-data-
1233911.htm> accessed 21 August 2012. 
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80% to 94% accurate at state level. As recently as 2011, server-side technologies could 
pinpoint a user’s location within a twenty to thirty mile radius.717 
Besides the strong endorsement of the technology by PricewaterhouseCoopers, it seems 
that the technology has achieved sufficient levels of accuracy to be used for legal 
717   Kevin F King, ‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: the Pervasive Legal  
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies’ (2011) 21 Alb LJ Sci & Tech 61, 68; 
Marketwire, ‘Quova’s Geolocation Data Helps Continental Airlines Improve Web Banner 
Click-Through Rate by 200 Percent’ (24 March 2009) <http://www.marketwire.com/press-
release/quovas-geolocation-data-helps-continental- 
  -improve-web-banner-click-through-nyse-cal-1237066.htm> accessed 21 August  
 2012. King does however enter a number of important caveats to these calculations. Firstly, 
server-side accuracy calculations tend to omit consideration of particularly troublesome 
addresses, such as those associated with America Online (which masks all its users behind 
proxy servers). Secondly, those calculations assume the absences of users who are 
intentionally attempting to circumvent the geolocation system via anonymisation tools such 
as Tor. Thirdly, many accuracy studies do not make allowances for technologies such as 
wireless Internet access cards and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) which may cause a user 
to appear to be connecting from work when the user is in fact travelling in another city or 
country. Kevin F King, ‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: the 
Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies’ (2011) 21 Alb LJ Sci 
& Tech 61, 71. 
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purposes.718 This became clear in the Yahoo! case719 and in the lower court in the 
Australian ruling, Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc.720 
In Yahoo!,721 Vinton Cerf, the networking guru722 appointed by the presiding judge to 
the panel of experts advised the judge that determining an individual user’s country of 
origin was unlikely to be possible more than 90% of the time.723 Justice Gomez 
concluded that geolocation technologies were sufficiently effective to allow the 
defendant to implement them to prevent access-seekers located in France from 
accessing the Nazi memorabilia in question. The perceived existence of feasible 
technical solutions was determinative in Yahoo!724 In addition, the technology was also 
touched upon by one of the lowers courts - the Supreme Court of Victoria - in Gutnick v 
Dow Jones & Co Inc.725 In Gutnick, Hedigan J apparently was of the view that a 
webserver could distinguish between different users’ requests based on their physical 
718  Dan Jerker Svantesson, ’Geo-Location Technologies and other Means of Placing Borders on 
the ”Borderless” Internet’ (2004) 23 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 101 et seq; Dan Jerker 
B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 
421 et seq.   
719  International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA), French Union of Jewish 
Students (UEJF) v Yahoo! Inc, Yahoo France, Interim Court Order, 20 November 2000, 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Country Court of Paris); Yaman Akdeniz, ‘Case 
Analysis of League Against Racism & Antisemitism (LICRA), French Union of Jewish 
Students (UEJF), v Yahoo! Inc, (USA), Yahoo France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 
(The County Court of Paris), Interim Court Order, 20 November, 2000’ (2001) 1 Electron 
Bus Law Rep 110-120; Andreas Manolopoulos, ‘Raising “Cyber-Borders”: the interaction 
between law and technology’ (2003) 11 IJLIT 40, 44. On the Yahoo! ruling generally, see 
Uta Kohl, ‘The rule of law, jurisdiction and the internet’ (2004) 12 IJLIT 365 – 376. 
720  Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305 [19], [41] et seq.  
721 Yahoo!, Inc v LICRA, 169 F Supp 2d 1181 (ND Cal 2001). 
722  Nicknamed the ‘father of the Internet’. ‘Geography and the Net – Putting it in its place’ The 
Economist (9 August 2001) 20.  
723  Adopting the pragmatic viewpoint that all borders are slightly porous, the French judge in 
Yahoo! decided that a 90% accuracy rate was good enough. ‘Geography and the Net– Putting 
it in its place’ The Economist (9 August 2001) 20.  
724   Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 421. 
725 Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305. 
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location. It is unfortunate that Justice Hedigan did not provide any support for his 
conclusion, or indeed, discuss the controversial issues associated with such practice. 
Further, the matter was not discussed in the subsequent High Court judgment.726 
In enhancing localisation on the internet, geolocation technologies directly and 
inevitably transform the internet from a border disregarding dimension into a medium 
that takes account of geographical and legal borders. From the perspective of internet 
regulation, matters may be enhanced by geolocation technology as it makes it possible 
and practical to consider location online. By helping to define legal borders online, 
geolocation assists with the application of PIL rules on the internet.  
 
7.3.13 Accuracy of Geolocation Technologies Impugned 
Two factors together affect the accuracy of geolocation technologies. They can be 
divided into two categories: source problems and circumvention problems.727  
(i) Source Problems: These are the problems associated with building up and/or 
collecting accurate geolocation data. As regards IP addresses, there is no real 
equivalent to the address registers listing physical addresses, or the phone 
registers listing phone numbers, at least not currently. Consequently, the 
ones creating databases of geolocation information must rely on other, less 
straightforward, methods. Clearly, the accuracy of the material in the 
geolocation databases depends on, and can never be better than, the accuracy 
of the collection of that data. Thus, the collection of background material is 
vital. Common methods of collecting relevant material include, for example, 
gathering data from registration databases,728 network routing information, 
726  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 421 et seq. 
727  These two sets of problems are dealt with comprehensively in Dan Jerker B Svantesson, 
Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 406 et seq.  
728  For example, Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE, ‘Welcome to the 
RIPE Network Coordination Centre’ <www.ripe.net> accessed 14 August 2012), American 
Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN, ‘ARIN at a glance’ 
<www.arin.net/about_us/overview.html> accessed 14 August 2012); Asia Pacific Network 
Information Centre (APNIC, ‘About APNIC’ <www.apnic.net/about-APNIC/organization> 
accessed 14 August); Latin American and Caribbean IP Address Regional Registry 
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DNS systems, host name translations, ISP information and Web content. As 
discussed in detail by Edelman, all of these sources may provide inaccurate 
information.729 
(ii) Circumvention Problems: Geolocation technologies can be circumvented by 
several methods ranging from the technologically advanced (deep linking to 
streaming video content without accessing the HTTP server) to those easy 
enough to be used by virtually anyone (anonymizing techniques). One 
method is inherent in the system structure itself, i.e. tunnelling methods.730 
Arguably, the simplest way to circumvent geolocation technologies is 
through the use of so-called anonymizers. As the name suggests, 
anonymizers are applications designed to allow web-users to visit websites 
anonymously. Anonymizers act as an added layer – a buffer – between the 
web-surfer and the websites he visits. 
Where an anonymizer is used, the IP number of the relevant web-surfer is 
only transmitted to the provider of the anonymizer. A new IP number is then 
assigned to the web-surfer by the provider and this new IP number will apply 
in relation to any websites visited by the web-surfer. A web-surfer may 
request an IP number which indicates a certain country, if the user wishes to 
give the impression of being physically based in that particular country. 
(LACNIC, ‘LACNIC Acerca de LACNIC’ <lacnic.net/sp/sobre-lacnic/> accessed 14 August 
2012).  
729 Benjamin Edelman, ‘Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet 
Retransmissions of Over-the-air Television content to Canadian Internet Users’ 4 et seq, 11 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_content/people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2010. 
730  Tunnelling methods involve repackaging entire IP packets so as to send them to their 
destination via a remote tunnelling server, thereby hiding a user’s actual location and causing 
the user to appear to hold the IP address of her tunnelling server. These methods are widely 
deployed in the context of corporate networks and the end user’s necessary client software is 
included with recent versions of Microsoft Windows operating system. Ibid 9.  
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While geolocation technologies may be circumventable, this fact must be 
seen in the context of general and inevitable regulatory slippage which is a 
fact of life in both worlds - the online and offline.731   
 
7.3.14 The Growing Influence of Geolocation Technology in the Courts 
The courts are to an increasing degree taking account of geo-identification.732 In some 
fairly recent cases, the courts have recognised the value of existing geolocation 
technologies. For example, in National Federation of the Blind v Target Corporation, 
the court stated the following: 
Pataki asserts that someone who puts content on the internet has ‘no way to 
determine the characteristics of their audience...[such as] age and geographical 
location.’ Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 167. This is simply incorrect. It is common 
practice for websites, for entities operating in multiple countries to have a single 
site that directs customers to different versions based upon language. Websites 
can determine the location of a user from information they provide, such as a 
credit card number, or from the internet service provider that an individual uses. 
It may or may not be prohibitively expensive for a website to tailor its content 
based on the location of its users, but it is certainly technically feasible.733  
731  Ibid 4 et seq, 9. Goldsmith and Sykes argue that the presence of imperfections in a particular 
technology is not necessarily synonymous with infeasibility/ineffectiveness. They point out 
that regulation works by raising the cost of the proscribed activity, and not necessarily by 
eliminating it. While computer savvy users might always be able to circumvent identification 
technology, they do so at a certain cost and that cost is prohibitive for most. Jack L 
Goldsmith and Alan O Sykes, ’The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2001) 110 
Yale LJ 785, 812.   
732  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 422; Kevin F King, ‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: 
the Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies’ (2011) 21 Alb LJ 
Sci & Tech 61, 71. 
733  National Federation of the Blind v Target Corp, 452 F Supp 2d 946, 961 et seq (ND Cal 
2006)  
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In the 2007 ruling, Hageseth v Superior Court,734 the court took note of the emergence 
of geolocation technologies and demonstrated that it was clearly eager to encourage the 
development of technologies which it saw as helpful to law enforcement. The case 
concerned the alleged illegal prescription (over the internet) of medicine by an out-of-
state medical practitioner. The dispute related to whether a Californian court could 
exercise jurisdiction over the Colorado-based doctor.735 The court stated as follows: 
The prospect of other technological developments counsels judicial caution in 
accepting technology-based arguments against the assertion of jurisdiction, as 
that would eliminate incentives for technology developers to innovate in ways 
that would facilitate law enforcement and support public values.736  
Two German internet gambling cases from 2008 involve discussion of geolocation 
technologies. In the VGH Bayern, 10 CS 08.2399 ruling,737 handed down by the 
Bavarian Administrative Court, banner advertising for private sports bookmakers was at 
issue. The court held that the enforcement authorities of a federal state (‘land’) could 
order a cessation of banner advertising for lawful, private sports bookmakers but that 
the order had to be limited to the territory of the particular federal state (Bavaria). The 
court accepted an expert report by Professor Thomas Hoeren that geolocation tools were 
effective on a nationwide basis for about 99 per cent of cases. In effect, the court upheld 
the enforcement order on the basis that providers could use geolocation tools to restrict 
the effects of the prohibition and manage their compliance risks (so that the 
advertisement could still be seen, for example in other countries, where such 
advertisements might be legal).738 The vacillating fortunes of geolocation tools is 
demonstrated by the OVG Thüringen decision739 in which the Higher Administrative 
Court in Thuringia found that the internet gambling prohibition could not be enforced 
734  Hageseth v Superior Court of San Mateo County, 150 Cal App 4th 1399; 59 Cal Rptr 3d 385; 
Cal Daily Op Service 5647 (2007).  
735  Account of this case taken from Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the 
Internet (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 423.  
736  Hageseth v Superior Court of San Mateo County, 150 Cal App 4th 1399; 59 Cal Rptr 3d 385; 
Cal Daily Op Service 5647 (2007) [54].  
737  Handed down 20th November 2008. 
738  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 424 et seq. 
739 OVG Thüringen 03.12.2008, 3 EO 565/07. 
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against an out-of-state provider, as geolocation tools were deemed not sufficiently 
precise.740 
It is not just the courts which have taken account of geolocation technologies. Certain 
statutes have been drafted in a way which suggests that the legislator expects website 
operators to apply some form of geo-identification. Examples frequently arise in the 
context of regulation of online gambling. A good example is Section 6(1) of the 
Australian Interactive Gambling Act 2001, which reads as follows: 
‘For the purposes of this Act, a prohibited Internet gambling service is a gambling 
service, where: (...) (c) an individual who is physically present in Australia is capable of 
becoming a customer of the service.’ 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act shows that the drafters were aware of 
geolocation technologies.741 
As to the future of geolocation technology, it has been argued that the new version 
Internet Protocol - IPv6 – would enhance the accuracy of geolocation technologies. In 
fact, it has been said that IPv6 would make the identification of the physical location of 
an internet user a rather trivial task.742 Jacobus contends that by expanding the IP 
address system, IPv6 would make people more easily identifiable by assigning serial 
numbers to each computer’s network-connection hardware.743 
740  Svantesson also makes the point that any assessment of the value of geo-identification must 
be context-specific. Thus, courts may well conclude that geolocation technologies are 
sufficiently accurate in one context, but not in another context. Svantesson believes that it 
would be an error for a court to dismiss geolocation technologies as insufficiently accurate 
where such a dismissal is guided only by another court having reached such a conclusion 
before it - Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, 
Wolters Kluwer 2012) 425.  
741  The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Interactive Gambling Bill 2001 Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum’ (1998-1999-2000-2001) 54 
<http://www.archive.dcita.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/11536/Interactive_Gambling_
Bill_2001_Revised_Explanatory_Memorandum.pdf> accessed 14 August 2012.  
742  Stefanie Olsen, ’Geographic tracking raises opportunities, fears’ (CNET News, 8 November 
2000) <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-248274.html> accessed 6 July 2012. 
743  Patricia Jacobus, ‘Building fences, one by one’ (CNET News, 19 April 2001) 
<http://news.cnet.com/2009-1023-255774-2.html> accessed 6 July 2012. 
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While the ultimate plan may be to replace IPv4 with IPv6, the transition is progressing 
very slowly and IPv4 is still the dominant version in use.744 2014 statistics prepared by 
Google indicate that IPv6 penetration is somewhere between 3% and 4%, and this 
despite the fact that the version is now 16 years old.745 It is widely expected that IPv4 
will be supported alongside IPv6 for the foreseeable future. (IPv4-only nodes are not 
able to communicate directly with IPv6 nodes, and will need assistance from an 
intermediary.) 
Importantly, there is not absolute consensus that IPv6 will actually improve the 
accuracy of geolocation technologies. Diminished accuracy may arise from the fact that 
IPv6 will allow ISPs to dynamically reassign their address ranges at any time.746 With 
no actual geographic constraint under IPv6, these IP address blocks could be reassigned 
to a new area at any time that demand shifts. As the internet continues to expand and the 
need for renumbering grows, blocks of IP addresses will be shifted geographically with 
increasing regularity. Keeping track of all the growing number of reassignments of IP 
addresses may overwhelm geolocation software’s capabilities. In addition, during the 
multi-year global transition to IPv6, dual sets of router table data will have to be 
maintained for both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The need to translate and correlate 
between tables may also introduce latency that negatively impacts the ability to conduct 
real time analysis.747  
744  Penn Computing, ‘IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) at Penn’ (University of Pennsylvania) 
<http://www.upenn.edu/computing/ipv6/> accessed 14 August 2012.  
745  Google, ‘IPv6 Statistics’ (1 June 2014) 
<https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics/html> accessed 3 June 2014.  
746  One view is that the vast amount of address space available under IPv6 will likely eliminate 
the need for ISPs to assign dynamic IP addresses. The shift from dynamic to static will in 
turn make it easier to focus on the individual user via IP-based geolocation. Kevin F King, 
‘Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: the Pervasive Legal Consequences 
of Modern Geolocation Technologies’ (2011) 21 Alb LJ Sci & Tech 61, 120. 
747  Tinabeth Burton, ‘US industry group white paper says geolocation technologies are not 
precise enough to identify taxing jurisdiction reliably, rendering EU VAT rules unworkable’ 
(THE, 29 October 2002) <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode 
=172460&sectioncode=26> accessed 30 June 2010 which refers to Information Technology 
Association of America (ITAA), ’ECommerce Taxation and the Limitations of Geolocation 
Tools’ 7 <http://www.sethf.com/nitke/geolocationpaper.pdf> accessed 14 August 2012.  
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Edelman agrees with the contention that geolocation technology’s accuracy is likely to 
decrease in the future.748 It should be borne in mind however that his discussion paper 
referred to retransmission of over-the-air television on the internet and was written on 
behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters (Canada). The reasons he relies on 
are, however, persuasive and include a perceived rise in the deployment of proxy 
servers, tunnelling systems and terminal services, an increase in the deployment of 
mobile network devices and a likely increase in the availability of automated tools or 
generally known methods for circumventing geolocation technologies. 
There is a risk too that the improvements in and development of geolocation technology 
may be sub-optimal. This arises from the fact that Digital Envoy, a geolocation service 
provider, was granted a patent749 in mid-2004 which Digital Envoy claims covers the 
core methods used by geolocation technologies focused on IP numbers. Digital Envoy 
stated that it plans to defend its patent aggressively750 and one of the company’s co-
founders said that it was unlikely that any other provider would be able to offer accurate 
geolocation solutions without infringing Digital Envoy’s patent. Such utterances imply 
one dominant player in the sector which may not bode well for a fast evolution of the 
technology.  
 
7.3.15 Possible Legal Obstacles to the use of Geolocation Technology  
Besides the accuracy issue, another potential obstacle to the widespread use of 
geolocation technologies is if IP addresses were considered ‘personal data’ or ‘personal 
748  Benjamin Edelman, ‘Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet 
Retransmissions of Over-the-air Television content to Canadian Internet Users’ 11 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_content/people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2010. 
749  United States Patent 6,757,740 titled ‘Systems and Methods for Determining, Collecting and 
Using Geographic Locations of Internet Users’. 
750 Stefanie Olsen, ‘Digital Envoy wins geotargeting patent’ (CNET News, 29 June 2004) 
<http://www.news.cnet.com/Digital-Envoy-wins-geotargeting-patent/2110-1032_3-
5251844> accessed 30 June 2010. 
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information’ for privacy purposes. If so, their collection, use and disclosure could be 
seriously restricted.751 
In its Opinion 4/2007, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party confirmed that they 
consider IP addresses as constituting data relating to an identifiable person.752 Referring 
to the example of dynamic IP addresses in their Opinion, the Working Party use the 
example of internet access providers and managers of local area networks who, ‘using 
reasonable means’, are able to identify internet users to whom they have attributed IP 
addresses as they normally systematically ’log’ in a file the date, time, duration and 
dynamic IP address given to the internet user. The same argument can be made in 
relation to ISPs who keep logbook on the HTTP server. The Article 29 Working Party 
considers the IP addresses provided by internet access providers and ISPs to constitute 
personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a), Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.753 
751  Perhaps naturally, the developers of geolocation technologies argue that their products are 
’non-invasive’ and ’privacy safe’. As regards the ‘non-invasive’ assertion, see Digital 
Envoy, ‘Digital Envoy Alliance with Melbourne IT gives global boost to innovative internet 
marketing and eCommerce technology; hoping to avoid “Cookies” controversy, Australian 
firm embraces NetAcuity as the emerging standard for non-invasive web tracking and 
customer service activities’ (9 April 2000) 
<http://www.digitalenvoy.net/news/press_releases/2000/pr_040900.html> accessed 14 
August 2012; as regards the ‘privacy safe’ assertion, see Quova, ‘Technical Overview of 
GeoPoint’ <http://www.quova.com/technology/quova_tech_whitepaper.pdf> accessed 30 
June 2010. 
752  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’ 
(1248/07/EN, WP 136, 20 June 2007) 16 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/ 
wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf> accessed 6 July 2012. 
753  For two Paris Appeals Court rulings (2007) holding that IP addresses do not facilitate the 
identification of persons who used the computer since only LEAs may obtain user identity 
from the ISP, see a summary of Anthony G v SCPP in French: Legalis, ‘Cour d’appel de 
Paris, 13ème chambre, section B, Arrêt du 27 avril 2007’ (LEGALISnet, 27 April 2007) 
<http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=1954> accessed 6 July 
2012; and see a summary of Henri S v SCPP in French: Legalis, ‘Cour d’appel de Paris 
13ème chambre, section A, Arrêt du 15 mai 2007’ (LEGALISnet, 15 May 2007) 
<http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=1955> accessed 6 July 2012. 
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In the Information Commissioner’s Office’s (ICO) Good Practice Note titled 
’Collecting Personal Information Using Websites’,754 a distinction is drawn between 
dynamic IP addresses and static IP addresses. In the ICO’s opinion, dynamic addresses 
without any other identifying or distinguishing information cannot be covered by the 
UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 since only ISPs can link the IP address to an individual. 
In contrast, the ICO deems a static address and its related profile (the linking of an IP 
address to a particular computer which is, in turn, linked to an individual user) to 
constitute personal information and are therefore covered by the provisions of the 1998 
Act.  
In January 2008,755 Germany’s data protection commissioner, Peter Scharr, told a 
European Parliament hearing on online data protection that when someone is identified 
by an IP address, then it should be regarded as personal data. Mr Scharr was speaking in 
his capacity as leader of the EU group tasked with the job of preparing a report on how 
well the privacy policies of internet search engines operated by Google, Yahoo, 
Microsoft and others comply with EU privacy law.756  
 
As regards the situation in the US, in State of New Jersey v Reid,757 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled (in April 2008) that an IP address could constitute ’personally 
identifiable information’ (PII) (the US equivalent term for personal data) and 
consequently ISPs were not entitled to disclose such addresses to the police without a 
754  Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Good Practice Note - Collecting personal 
information using websites’ (3 June 2007) 3 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/coll
ecting_personal_information_from_websites_v1.0.pdf> accessed 30 June 2010.  
755  Aoife White, ‘IP Addresses Are Personal Data, E.U. Regulator Says’ (The Washington Post, 
22 January 2008) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/21/ 
AR2008012101340.html> accessed 30 June 2010. 
756  For a recent Irish High Court ruling (16 April 2010) holding that an IP address does not 
constitute personal data under Ireland’s Data Protection Acts, 1988-2003, see EMI Records 
& Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010] IEHC 108 [25] (Charleton J).   
757  State of New Jersey v Shirley Reid, 194 NJ 386, 954 A2d 503 (NJ 2008) (Rabner CJ), 
writing for a unanimous Court. 
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grand jury subpoena.758 Interestingly, the New Jersey court’s analysis went beyond IP 
addresses and seemed to indicate that clickstream data associated with particular 
addresses might attract privacy protection as well. However, the situation became 
somewhat confused in 2009 when the US District Court for the Western District of 
Washington759 held that IP addresses do not constitute PII. The ruling, Johnson v 
Microsoft Corp, involved a claim that Microsoft had collected consumer IP addresses 
during the Windows XP installation process, an action that the plaintiffs argued violated 
the XP End User License Agreement.760 In granting summary judgment in favour of 
Microsoft, US District Court Judge Richard A Jones found that ’In order for ”personally 
identifiable information” to be personally identifiable, it must identify a person. But an 
IP address identifies a computer’.761 
 
As for US legislation, it is arguable that a clearer picture emerges when one analyses the 
term ’personal information’ contained in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
of 1998 (COPPA). Under Section 1302(8) of that statute, the term ’personal 
information’ means ‘individually identifiable information about an individual collected 
online’, to include such things as first and last name, a home or other physical address 
including street name and name of a city or town, an email address, a telephone number 
and ’any other identifier that the Commission762 determines permits the physical or 
online contacting of a specific individual’ (category (F)). It is almost certain that IP 
addresses would fall under (this) category (F) of Section 1302(8).763  
758  Wendy Davis, ‘Court Rules Web Users Have Expectation of Privacy’ (MediaPost, 24 April 
2008) <http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=81306> 
accessed 1 July 2010.  
759  at Seattle. 
760  The XP End User License Agreement stated that Microsoft would not collect PII without the 
user’s consent. The Plaintiffs referenced Microsoft’s own online glossary to support their 
claim that IP addresses should be considered PII. The glossary defined ’personally 
identifiable information’ as ’any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual. Such information may include (...) IP address.’  
761  Johnson v Microsoft Corp, C06-0900RAJ-WD Wa 06/23/09, 2009 WL 17934400, III B 3. 
762  Federal Trade Commission. 
763  This point is made by the Electronic Privacy Information Centre under the heading ’Key 
Definitions’ / ‘Personal Information’. EPIC, ‘Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA)’ <http://epic.org/privacy/kids/> accessed 3 July 2010.  
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 What implications flow from a situation where IP addresses are deemed by the courts to 
constitute personal data/PII? In brief, companies that use IP addresses for business 
purposes (e,g, manufacturers of geolocation technology) would be required to comply 
with data protection laws. Additionally, the internet users to which the IP addresses 
relate would have important data subject rights under general data protection legislation. 
For example, in the UK, the internet users could rely on data protection principles 1 and 
6 (contained in Schedule 1, Part 1) of the DPA 1998.764 They provide as follows: that 
personal data be processed fairly and lawfully (’processing’ includes disclosure of the 
data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available)765 (Principle 1), and 
that the personal data be processed in accordance with the rights of the data subject 
under the Act (Principle 6). 
 
7.3.16 Some Conclusions on Geolocation Technology 
Weighing up the benefits and disbenefits of geolocation technology and then coming up 
with an overall verdict is not an easy task. It seems clear enough that the technology has 
attained high levels of accuracy but sometimes even the accuracy rates can justifiably be 
impugned as in the instance of PricewaterhouseCooper’s audit of its own client’s 
technology. Such a scenario does not really engender thoughts of independent, objective 
assessment. 
The other worrying issue about accuracy levels is that doubt has been expressed about 
whether IPv6 would actually enhance accuracy levels within geolocation technologies. 
But, worryingly, even if IPv6 would enhance accuracy, this new protocol is being rolled 
out at glacial speeds.   
On the plus side, the technology seems to have established an important foothold in 
legal proceedings as demonstrated in the Yahoo! and Gutnick cases. Svantesson 
correctly observes that the courts acknowledgement and use of the technology will 
create a strong incentive for its development. In time, this should create a virtuous circle 
764  For a comprehensive treatment of the data protection principles, see Ian Lloyd, Cyber Law in 
the United Kingdom (Kluwer Law International 2010) 181 et seq; Ian J Lloyd, Information 
Technology Law (6th edn, OUP 2011) ch 5.  
765  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Sections 1302(4), 1303(a)(1). 
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whereby likely improved accuracy levels will influence the courts to attach even greater 
importance to the technology. 
In his work, Private International Law and the Internet Svantesson states that  
geolocation technologies should not be seen as an alternative to using private 
international law to erect protective borders on the internet. Rather, the 
application of private international law must recognise the value of both 
geolocation technologies and non-technical geo-identification for the 
identification of geographical location.766  
This, in fact, is a very pragmatic approach to a situation which should lead naturally to a 
symbiotic relationship between the law (PIL) and technology (geolocation technology). 
It would seem that there is a golden opportunity for conflicts lawyers to embrace a 
technology that may assist them greatly to establish physical borders in the online 
world. Given the serious and undeniable challenges of applying PIL rules to the 
internet, private international lawyers need all the assistance they can get. It may well be 
that geolocation technology improves to such an extent that the IP addresses of 
infringing computers, tablets, i-Pads etc can be traced, thereby giving copyright 
holders/private international lawyers a distinct advantage in terms of trying to localise 
the locus delicti.  
One potential weakness with geolocation technology is the strengthening viewpoint that 
IP addresses constitute personal data/PII. While there have been court rulings in the US, 
France and Ireland upholding the counter-argument, the consensus now seems to point 
towards IP addresses constituting personal data. 
This includes an Article 29 Working Party Opinion.767 Serious implications flow from 
the consensus. If the collectors/providers of the geolocation data hold IP addresses, then 
they will be subject to onerous data controller duties (also involving costly data 
protection outlays).  
766  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 441. 
767  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’ 
(1248/07/EN, WP 136, 20 June 2007) 16 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/ 
wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf> accessed 6 July 2012. 
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7.4 The Third Facilitative Element – Data Retention Legislation   
The aim of this part of the chapter is to set out data retention legislation that may assist 
(or facilitate) a prejudiced copyright owner in terms of suing an IP infringer. In my 
analysis, I shall focus on the specific provisions that potentially assist the copyright 
owner the most. Any potential assistance to the copyright owner will be evidential in 
nature and most likely corroborative in nature. Such evidence will take the form of data 
(internet/mobile phone) retained by ISPs and Telcos under their data retention 
obligations, originally prescribed by Directive 2006/24/EC, a legal instrument recently 
held to be invalid by the CJEU in Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications; and Kärntner Landesregierung.768 
However, for the hypothetical assistance (retained data) to evolve into tangible 
assistance (evidence to be adduced in a civil case), a court order such as a Norwich 
Pharmacal Order would ultimately be needed by the rightholder to oblige the ISP to 
disclose the relevant data. In turn, this data (name and address of a subscriber to an ISP 
service, for example) could be used to institute court proceedings against that subscriber 
who is suspected of copyright infringement.  
Despite the momentous ruling by the EU’s most senior court in April, it is important to 
bear in mind that the UK’s transposing regulations are still valid (though the option 
remains for national courts and administrations to dis-apply these national provisions if 
they wish). While there is no automatic effect on national legislation following the 
Luxembourg decision, Member States seem to have the alternative between:  
- Abrogating the entire national data retention legislation; or  
- Modifying the national data retention legislation so as to meet the 
proportionality concern of the CJEU  
Given the finding of invalidity against the Directive, there does not seem to be much 
point in analysing it. Instead, what I propose doing is to analyse the most important 
provisions of the UK transposing legislation and then to take a look at the CJEU’s 
recent ruling and its general implications for data retention in the EU.   
768 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and Kärntner Landesregierung (CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) 8 April 2014). 
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As the UK data retention obligations are inspired (and required!) by EU legislation, it is 
my intention to first treat Directive 2006/24/EC and then examine how this Directive 
has been transposed into UK legislation.  
I shall then critically evaluate the relevant provisions of the UK legislation, the 
objective being to assess how potentially useful they are from a prejudiced rightholder’s 
perspective. This all links back to the key task of determining the identity of the online 
infringer, so as to allow Article 2, Brussels I, to apply.  
It is acknowledged that the usefulness of the data retention obligations (from the 
perspective of a prejudiced rightholder) is somewhat fortuitous/serendipitous, given that 
the rationale behind the now invalidated Directive 2006/24/EC was to ensure that data 
be available for the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.769. But, 
frequently, legislation adopted to achieve a particular purpose can have happy 
unintended consequences for individuals or sectors of society not originally envisaged 
by the drafters of said legislation. 
 
7.4.1 How Directive 2006/24/EC was implemented into UK law   
The Data Retention Directive was transposed into UK law by way of secondary 
legislation. The first set of Regulations (SI 2007/2199) was adopted in July 2007 and 
came into force on 1st October 2007. However, these excluded retention of records from 
internet communications. After a somewhat tortuous process, the 2007 Regulations 
were eventually superseded by Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (SI 
2009/859) from April 2009.770 
769 See the view of Bob Stankey, ‘UK ISPs to begin storing Internet traffic data’ (ACC, 19 
February 2009) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0abfe79d-00a2-4532-8dea-
5e6281efef64> accessed 16 April 2014. He states that whilst the original rationale for 
communications data retentions was to help prevent terrorism, investigate murders and 
prosecute other serious crimes, they will also allow the authorities to use the information to 
crack down on online piracy and copyright infringements. He goes on to state: ‘this means 
that ISPs can be asked for IP addresses and subscriber names and addresses in order to take 
action against illegal file-sharers’.     
770 Interestingly, in its draft Legislative Programme, (Cm 7372, 2008) the UK government 
included a proposal for a Communications Data Bill. The proposal was linked to the 
government’s Intercept Modernisation Programme and the Bill would have provided for the 
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 7.4.2 Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009  
The 2009 Regulations complete the transposition of Directive 2006/24/EC into 
domestic law in the UK. They came into force on 6 April 2009. In effect, the 2009 
regulations make the retention of communication data mandatory rather than voluntary. 
There are two key provisions within the 2009 Regulations. They are Regulation 4 which 
obliges public communications providers to retain communications data specified in the 
Schedule to the Regulations and Regulation 5 which specifies the retention period with 
which public communications providers must comply. They are obliged to retain the 
data for a period of 12 months from the date of the communication in question. 
Under the 2009 Regulations, the type of data that must be retained includes data 
generated or processed by means of mobile telephony, internet access, internet e-mail 
and internet telephone. Given that the four means of communication just mentioned are 
all conducive to digital copyright infringement, data generated therefrom could 
potentially constitute strong, albeit indirect evidence of digital copyright infringements.  
 
7.4.3 The communications data to be retained under the Schedule to the 
Regulations  
Part 3 of the Schedule relates to internet access, internet e-mail or internet telephony. In 
terms of data necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication, the 
following data must be retained under paragraph 11 of Part 3:  
- The user ID allocated  
- The user ID and telephone number allocated to the communication 
entering the public telephone network 
collection and retention of further communications data not required by the Directive. 
Controversy ensured however when it was reported that the creation of a central database of 
all electronic communications was to be part of the programme. The government dropped 
the proposed Bill in the face of rising opposition. See Alex Hunt, ‘David Cameron wants 
fresh push on communications data’ (BBC News Politics, 30 January 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25969918> accessed 3 June 2014. 
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- The name and address of the subscriber or registered user to whom an IP 
address, user ID or telephone number was allocated at the time of the 
communication   
Data necessary to identify the destination of a communication is covered by paragraph 
12 of Part 3. As regards internet telephony, the user ID or telephone number of the 
intended recipient of the call must be retained. In the case of e-mail, the name and 
address of the subscriber or registered user and the user ID of the intended recipient of 
the communication must be retained. 
Paragraph 13 of Part 3 pertains to data necessary to identify the date, time and duration 
of a communication.771 The provision divides the data into 2 categories, firstly data 
relating to internet access and secondly, data relating to e-mail or internet telephony:  
As regards the former, the following (data) must be retained: 
- The date and time of the log-in and the log-off from the internet access 
service, based on a specified time zone  
- The IP address, whether dynamic or static, allocated by the internet access 
service provider to the communication, and   
- The user ID of the subscriber or registered user of the internet access 
service 
As regards e-mail or internet telephony, the data to be retained includes the date and 
time of the log-in to and log-off from the e-mail or internet telephony service, based on 
a specified time zone. 
Data necessary to identify the type of communication is governed by paragraph 14 of 
Part 3. It provides that in the case of internet e-mail or internet telephony, data relating 
to the internet service used, must be retained.  
Data necessary to identify users’ communication equipment must also be retained. 
Paragraph 15 states that in the case of dial-up access, the calling telephone number must 
be retained while in all other cases, the digital subscriber line (DSL) or other end point 
of the originator of the communication must be retained.  
771 These requirements are set out in provision 13 of Part 3 of the Schedule.  
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Importantly, the phenomenon of ‘scope creep’ may affect the 2009 regulations,  
whereby data retained for one purpose – law enforcement – can also be used for other 
purposes. Lobbying by industry which might instigate such scope creep has already 
occurred in the UK. There, the Creative and Business Media Association (CMBA) 
representing the digital content industry demanded that access to retained data should 
also be granted for the purpose of investigating other crimes, such as IP infringement. 
This could lead to a situation where an instrument brought in as an anti-terrorist 
measure may, in the future, be used to prosecute illegal file-sharers.772  
 
7.4.4 CJEU’s ruling in Digital Rights Ireland    
 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources and Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and 
others.773 
 
This landmark ruling represents a privacy victory that makes subsequent drafting of 
data retention rules in a copyright environment problematical insofar as concern for 
fundamental rights may not have been adequately factored into earlier case law in 
England and Wales in particular. 
 
In drafting a replacement Data Retention Directive, the European Commission will have 
to acknowledge the strength of the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter and ensure that they are not disproportionately interfered with.  
 
7.4.5 A Preliminary Ruling concerning the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC    
 
This request for a preliminary ruling concerned the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC on 
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
772  Judith Rauhofer, ’The Retention of Communications Data in Europe and the UK’ Lilian 
Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 
596.  
773 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and Kärntner Landesregierung (CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) 8 April 2014). 
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available electronic communications services or of public communications networks. 
One of the requests was made by the Irish High Court while the other was made by the 
Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court).  
 
In essence, the referring courts were asking the CJEU to examine the validity of 
Directive 2006/24 in the light of Articles 7,774 8,775 and 11776 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.777  
 
The CJEU examined the question of whether the interference caused by Directive 
2006/24 is limited to what is strictly necessary. It was observed that by virtue of its 
Articles 3 and 5(1), the directive requires the retention of all traffic data concerning 
fixed telephony, mobile telephony, internet access, internet e-mail and internet 
telephony. It therefore applies to all means of electronic communication, the use of 
which is very widespread and of growing importance. Furthermore, by virtue of Article 
3, the directive covers all subscribers and registered users. It therefore entails an 
interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population.778     
 
The court was critical of the directive’s overbroad application which affects persons 
using electronic communication services even if there is little prospect of criminal 
prosecutions occurring. The directive’s lack of exceptions also meant that it would 
apply to persons whose communications were subject to the obligation of professional 
secrecy.779  
 
774 Article 7 refers to respect for private and family life. It states that ‘everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, home and communications’.   
775 Article 8 refers to the protection of personal data. It provides that everyone’s personal data 
should be protected and that data must only be processed fairly for specified purposes and on 
a consensual basis. It also specifies that compliance with the data protection rules be subject 
to control by an independent authority.    
776 Article 11 enshrines the right to freedom of expression and information.   
777 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01. 
778 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and Kärntner Landesregierung (CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) 8 April 2014), para 56. 
779 Ibid 58. 
    
 
262
                                                 
7.4.6 The General absence of limits  
 
Secondly, the CJEU referred to the ‘general absence of limits’ in the directive and its 
failure to lay down any objective criterion by which to determine the limits of access by 
the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use.780 Article 4 of 
the directive, which governs the access of the national authorities to the data retained 
does not expressly provide that that access and the subsequent use of the data in 
question must be strictly restricted to the purpose of preventing and detecting serious 
offences or of conducting criminal proceedings relating thereto.781 
 
Problematical too was the fact that access by the competent national authorities to the 
data retained was not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an 
independent administrative body, whose decision would seek to limit access to the data 
and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective 
pursued.782 
  
7.4.7 The data retention period 
 
Thirdly, as regards the data retention period of between 6 months and 24 months, no 
distinction is made between the categories of data set out in Article 5 of the directive on 
the basis of their possible usefulness. Nor is the determination of the period of retention 
based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly 
necessary.783  
 
7.4.8 Interference with the fundamental rights set out in the Charter  
 
In what is probably the most compelling passage of the ruling, the CJEU, at paragraph 
[65], criticised the Directive for not laying down clear and precise rules governing the 
extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter. The court then went on to hold that Directive 2006/24 involves a wide-
780 Ibid 61. 
781 Ibid. 
782 Ibid 62. 
783 Ibid 64. 
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ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal 
order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by 
provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary.784 
 
7.4.9 The rules relating to security and protection  
 
The CJEU was also critical of the rules relating to security and protection of data 
retained by providers of publicly available electronic communications services. It ruled 
that Directive 2006/24 does not provide for sufficient safeguards as required by Article 
8 of the Charter, to ensure effective protection of the retained data against the risk of 
abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data.785 Elaborating on this, the 
court held that Article 7 of Directive 2006/24, the provision governing data protection 
and data security, does not lay down rules which are specific and adapted to (i) the vast 
quantity of data whose retention is required by that directive, (ii) the sensitive nature of 
the data and (iii) the risk of unlawful access to that data. Such rules, if implemented, 
would serve to govern the protection and security of the data in question in a clear and 
strict manner in order to ensure their full integrity and confidentiality.  
 
Assessing Article 7 of Directive 2006/24 in conjunction with the Article 4(1) of 
Directive 2002/58 and Article 17(1) of Directive 95/46, the court stated that 
cumulatively, the three provisions did not ensure a ‘particularly high level of protection 
and security’.786 The CJEU was also particularly critical of the fact that Directive 
2006/24 does not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data 
retention period.787  
 
Staying with the issue of security and protection of data, the court noted that the 
directive does not require the data in question to be retained within the European Union. 
As a consequence, the directive failed to comply with Article 8(3) of the Charter which 
requires that compliance with the protection of personal data rules be ‘subject to control 
784 Ibid 65. 
785 Ibid 66. 
786 Ibid 67. 
787 Ibid. 
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by an independent authority’.788 This reference to an independent authority is to the 
national data protection authority operating in each of the 28 Member States. If the data 
were retained outside the borders of the EU, then the power, control and influence of the 
EU data protection authorities would be negligible. As stated in Commission v Austria 
previously, such control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component 
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.789  
 
7.4.10 Outcome of the case  
 
Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the CJEU ruled that by adopting 
Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature had exceeded the limits imposed by compliance 
with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1)790 of the 
Charter.791 As a consequence, the court found Directive 2006/24 to be invalid. 
 
7.4.11 Implications of the ruling  
The Digital Rights Ireland judgment is undoubtedly a landmark ruling. It is only the 
second time ever that the CJEU has struck down an EU directive792 and the ruling comes 
at an important time when there is an ongoing debate in both the EU and US, sparked 
by Edward Snowden’s revelations of the spying activities of the US National Security 
Agency. Tangibly, the ruling will serve to limit blanket government surveillance of 
communications data, which was permitted under the directive. 
 
788 Ibid 68. 
789  Case C-614/10 European Commission v Austria [2013] 1 CMLR 23, para 34. 
790 Article 52(1) of the Charter refers to the scope and interpretation of rights and principles. It 
provides that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
All limitations are subject to the principle of proportionality and may be made only if they 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.  
791 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and Kärntner Landesregierung (CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) 8 April 2014), para 69. 
792  On the other occasion, the ECJ held that the legislation prohibiting tobacco advertising had 
been established on improper grounds.  
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A period of legal uncertainty is inevitable particularly as the court held that the 
declaration of invalidity would take effect from the date on which the directive entered 
into force. This element of retrospection could seriously impact the outcome of 
proceedings long since concluded where the evidence relied on was data retained under 
the directive. There is also a strong likelihood that national legislation transposing the 
directive will now be challenged in domestic courts.  
 
As the Directive is entirely invalid, the immediate consequence is that we return to the 
status quo before 2005. This means that Member States have an option, not an 
obligation to retain data pursuant to the e-Privacy Directive.  
 
It is difficult to see domestic legislation avoiding censure if it reflects the elements of 
the Directive which have already been found wanting by the EU’s most senior court. 
The prospect of the EU legislature adopting a replacement directive in early course is 
unlikely. However, if there is to be a new Directive, it may be included in the main data 
protection package being negotiated by the EU institutions.793 
 
While there is no obvious silver bullet for this imbroglio, the ruling may well help to 
steel the resolve of those in Europe who have been clamouring for a Digital Bill of 
Rights which would enshrine the right of privacy for digital citizens using the internet.  
Somewhat ironically, such data was already being retained by some service providers 
under the voluntary Code of Practice on the Retention of Communications Data (2003), 
a code which had been established under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act (ATCSA). I shall now examine the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001  
793 This comprehensive reform of the EU’s data protection rules was announced by the 
European Commission on 25th January 2012 so as to strengthen online privacy rights and 
boost Europe’s digital economy. Two legislative proposals are included in the reforms – a 
Regulation setting out a general EU framework for data protection and a Directive on 
protecting personal data processed for the purposes of prevention, detection, investigation or 
prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities. See European Commission 
press release titled ‘Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection 
Rules to Increase Users’ Control of their data and to cut costs for businesses’ (IP/12/46, 25 
January 2012) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm> accessed 16 April 
2014.     
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 7.4.12 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
Separately, there has existed for quite some time in the UK, a distinct piece of 
legislation which provides a legal basis for the retention of communications data for 
certain purposes, namely, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
(Part 11 thereof). This Act provides for a scheme under which communication service 
providers would retain ‘communications data’ for specified periods of time, either 
voluntarily or mandated, for the purpose of safeguarding national security.794 While it is 
difficult to be categoric about it, it may be possible for injured IP owners to rely on data 
retained under the 2001 Act as evidence in cases against possible infringers. 
 
Section 102, ATCSA requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice relating 
to the retention by communications providers of communications data obtained by or 
held by them. A Code of Practice795 setting out a variety of retention periods for 
different types of communications data, was laid before Parliament on 11 September 
2003. An Order (The Retention of Communications Data (Code of Practice) Order 
2003),796 bringing the code of practice into, force was made on 5 December 2003. 
Section 104 of the 2001 Act empowers the Secretary of State to give directions about 
the retention of communications data to communications providers generally or 
particular communications providers. The order must specify the maximum period for 
which a communications provider may be required to retain the communications data. A 
sunset provision (contained in Section 105) states that Section 104 will cease to have 
effect two years after the Act’s passing, but Section 104’s period of operation was 
extended by the Secretary of State.797 
 
794  Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 102 et seq.  
795  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Draft Voluntary Code of Practice on Retention of 
Communications Data under Part 11 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(2002-03, HL 181, HC 1272). 
796  The Retention of Communications Data (Code of Practice) Order 2003, SI 2003/3175. 
797  This was done by way of The Retention of Communications Data (Extension of Initial 
Period) Order 2003, SI 2003/3173, art 2; The Retention of Communications Data (Further 
Extension of Initial Period) Order 2005, SI 2005/3335, art 2. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
Undoubtedly, one of the chief challenges with online copyright infringements is 
identifying the tortfeasor. And, if defendant identification cannot occur, for whatever 
reason, then application of Article 2, Brussels I becomes a dead letter.  
In this chapter, we saw that an amalgam of judge-made relief, data retention legislation 
and technology can potentially assist IP claimants with their task of identifying online 
defendants.   
In terms of the Norwich Pharmacal component, the rulings in Smith v ADVFN and 
Media C.A.T. are correctives and are, arguably, authority for the proposition that this 
form of equitable relief will be granted with more circumspection by the courts going 
forward. Following Smith v ADVFN, it looks as if the judiciary will have to carefully 
consider whether the material complained of is, in fact, defamatory. In addition, if a 
claimant can obtain the documents from another source or by other means, then the 
court is unlikely to grant a NPO.  
Judge Birss’ critical approach to the use of NPOs in Media C.A.T. may presage a greater 
scrutiny of the safeguards governing the use of the information obtained under NPOs. 
Conscious of certain weaknesses in the system, Birss J used the example of the Anton 
Piller orders to propose the appointment of a neutral supervising solicitor to ensure that 
the NPO is not abused. This ruling represents a more critical interpretation of Norwich 
Pharmacal relief in which the presiding judge is aware of the real risk of the successful 
applicants abusing the information disclosed under the order. There is, of course, the 
possibility that this ruling will act as a catalyst for a complete reappraisal of the 
Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. It may well transpire in the future that restrictions will 
be placed on information disclosed under NPOs and that the granting judge will provide 
directions on the use of the information disclosed.  
Until 8th April 2014 (the date on which the Digital Rights Ireland ruling was handed 
down by the CJEU), the data retention facilitative component seemed to offer 
considerable assistance to prejudiced rightholders. However, following the CJEU 
judgment, the situation has become unclear and confused. Importantly, from a 
rightholder’s perspective, the UK’s transposing legislation is still part of the law of the 
land. The Luxembourg ruling has no automatic effect on the relevant national 
legislation. But, in the light of Digital Rights Ireland, the UK may decide to abrogate 
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the transposing legislation, or, modify it so as to comply with the concerns expressed by 
the CJEU. Possibly more pertinent still will be the attitude of the UK’s ISPs and Telcos. 
Seeing that the local secondary legislation might well be challenged in domestic courts, 
the ISPs’ erstwhile diligence in retaining data may begin to wane. This would not 
benefit the position of prejudiced rightholders.  
The UK courts will be cognisant of the now impugned EU data retention legal 
framework. As the Data Retention Directive was declared by the CJEU to be invalid 
from the date it entered into force, this element of retrospection could potentially 
undermine, in a serious fashion, many previous court rulings which turned on data 
evidence. Naturally, UK courts will be very aware of the now impugned EU data 
retention framework and the element of retrospection. These factors too might make UK 
courts less inclined to grant NPOs while the legal landscape is so uncertain.  
Geolocation technology can provide private international lawyers with considerable 
assistance when it comes to identification of geographical location on the internet. This 
has already been demonstrated in the Yahoo! and Gutnick798 cases, where geolocation 
technology was deployed as an evidential tool. The technology is gradually 
transforming the internet into a medium that takes account of geographical and legal 
borders.799 Importantly, too, courts have started to take account of geolocation 
technologies and this development can only have a positive effect. The technology has 
been acknowledged and endorsed in two US rulings – National Federation of the Blind 
v Target Corporation, and Hageseth v Superior Court - along with one German ruling – 
VGH Bayern, 10 CS 08.2399.800 As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, geolocation 
service providers will strive to improve the accuracy of their geolocation technology 
and this improved accuracy will persuade courts to attach even greater importance to 
these technologies.801 According to Olsen and Jacobus, the roll-out of IPv6 should also 
assist geolocation greatly. Given the clear localisation challenges thrown up by the 
798  LICRA, UEJF v Yahoo! Inc, Yahoo France, Interim Court Order, 20 November 2000, 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Country Court of Paris); Yahoo!, Inc v LICRA, 169 F 
Supp 2d 1181 (ND Cal 2001); Gutnick v Dow Jones [2001] VSC 305. 
799 Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 414.  
800 Handed down 20th November 2008.  
801 Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 414.  
    
 
269
                                                 
internet, it would be short-sighted of conflicts lawyers to ignore the potential benefits 
offered by geolocation technology.  
The use of geolocation technology is not problem-free. Doubts remain about the 
accuracy levels of the technology and there is a growing jurisprudential trend which 
views IP addresses as personal data. This latter point could place quite serious legal and 
commercial strictures on geolocation service providers. 
On balance, however, geolocation technology constitutes a fillip for both the courts and 
copyright owners (claimants), a fillip that is likely to grow rather than diminish with the 
passage of time. 
*** 
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8.1  The Objective of the Chapter  
 
The objective behind this short chapter is to introduce a sense of balance into the 
analysis of Article 2, Brussels I. While the previous chapter focused on elements 
facilitative of the operation of Article 2, this chapter focuses on the non-facilitative 
element of leasing or dynamic allocation of internet protocol (IP) addresses. In other 
words, it examines a factor that could impede defendant identification. The author 
acknowledges the non-facilitative nature of anonymising software/techniques but they 
will not be discussed in any detail in this chapter.   
 
Dynamic allocation of IP addresses is a fact of life, explicable by the aim of making 
better use of diminishing internet protocol space. From an evidential viewpoint, the 
dynamic allocation of IP addresses militates against the successful tracing of online 
copyright infringements. 
 
8.2 Tracing Internet Traffic 
It may be possible to identify an online copyright infringer by tracing the internet traffic 
which relates to the infringing material. If the infringing material had been sent via e-
mail, valuable information (from an evidential perspective) will be contained in the e-
mail’s header. This information will have been provided by the author’s computer, 
intermediate computers through which the e-mail passed, and the recipient’s computer. 
In most e-mail applications, the e-mail header will be hidden from view but it can be 
accessed if required. It is the information in the e-mail header that is required to enable 
the author of the e-mail message to be traced.802 The author’s ISP will be deducible from 
the information contained within the header. The author’s ISP can then be contacted and 
provided with a number of elements from the e-mail header which can typically be 
correlated with the IP address allocation logs and additional logged data, to identify the 
account that was used to send the message.  
Often, considerable resources are dedicated to tracing internet traffic, but investigators 
will in many instances reach a ‘dead end’ particularly if the person being traced has the 
incentive and knowledge to hide his tracks. Even if the trace proves successful, it may 
802  Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ (2004) 15 C & L 8.  
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not provide the level of forensic reliability to satisfy even the civil standard of proof. 
This can be explained as follows. First, the IP address often relates to a particular 
segment of a network rather than to a particular computer. Secondly, in many situations 
where unlawful behaviour is alleged, it is not sufficient merely to link an individual to a 
particular computer since a computer is only a tool that can be used by anyone having 
physical access to it or, indeed having remote access to it.  
As regards the first point in the previous paragraph, it is the MAC address803 which is 
the immutable identifier linked to a particular piece of hardware, not the IP address. As 
a general rule, these hardware-encoded addresses are immutable but it must be borne in 
mind that it is a simple matter to substitute the Network Interface Card (NIC) in a 
computer with another card for as long as it takes to do whatever it is that one wants to 
do anonymously. Some networks are configured to deny physical connection to any 
computer not having a particular MAC address but, on the other hand, very many are 
not.  
Also, a single IP address may mask a range of private IP addresses. IP addresses can be 
static or dynamic. The significance of the static or dynamic configuration is as follows: 
If the address is static in the sense that it is an address always given by an ISP to a 
particular customer, the accounting or the other records of the ISP can be useful 
evidence in proving that a message from that static address was at least likely to have 
been sent from that customer’s computer. If, on the other hand, the address is 
dynamically allocated by the ISP’s DHCP server it may be almost useless information 
from an evidential viewpoint. This is because at a time when internet access is often 
offered at a set monthly charge for unlimited time and volume, there will be no financial 
incentive for an ISP to keep records of what telephone link or number called from 
corresponds to any particular IP number within the ISP’s allocated range.    
As mentioned earlier, the internet works by the packet switching system. Connections 
are established by a series of ’hops’ from one router to another. Fortunately, from the 
tracer’s perspective, it is in the interests of those who run systems representing 
intermediate ’hops’ to keep records of connections to them. This is seldom done to aid 
traceability of internet traffic. It is more often done for reasons of network or system 
803  In addition to having an IP address, each connected device also has a unique 48-bit Media 
Access Control address or ’MAC’. The MAC is sometimes termed the ‘hardware’ address.   
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efficiency, routing efficiency and system security. Nevertheless, there are some positive 
effects for the tracer.  
The ISP will normally keep a series of ’logs’ or records about connections, etc. These 
are created automatically by their server(s). Some logs are configured to collect more 
complete information about ’callers’ as, for example, details of the web browser used or 
details of ’cookie’ files on the calling computer. But, at the very least, it is usual for 
time-stamped IP source address information to be collected.  
The upshot of this is that a message received at its destination should be traceable by 
one ’hop’ at least to the receiver’s ISP. At that stage, one begins the difficult task of 
working backwards: securing any log information retained by that ISP to determine the 
next hop and so on in the hope that the trail will not be lost. Unfortunately, there is great 
scope for losing the trail although, at least these days with the move to a more 
hierarchical routing architecture and geographical allocation of IP addresses, it is much 
easier to link a particular address with a particular country.804 Also, there are still a 
significant number of IP addresses still being routed that were not allocated according to 
the new regime and which are not easily amenable to geographical resolution. 
One significant problem encountered by tracers is that while ISPs may collect the 
desired information, they may not keep it for very long.805 After all, there is little 
incentive for them to do so because the information, once it ceases to be of use in terms 
of monitoring the efficient workings of a particular network, just takes up valuable 
space and puts considerable strain on their data storage facilities. In fact, there is every 
804  See <http://where-is.info/>. 
805  After the recent CJEU ruling in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd v Minister for Communications, and Kärntner Landesregierung, there will be less 
incentive for ISPs to retain public electronic communications data for lengthy periods after 
the EU’s most senior court held the Data Retention Directive to be invalid. Admittedly, the 
implications of this ruling are still being worked out, but the CJEU (at paras 63 and 64 of its 
ruling) is quite critical of the data retention period contained in the Directive (i.e. minimum 
of 6 months, maximum of 24 months). The court points out how the retention period is not 
based on objective criteria. It is also critical of the absence of any distinction being made (in 
a retention context) between the various categories of data (set out in Article 5 of the 
Directive) in terms of their possible usefulness for the objective being pursued.    
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incentive to destroy out-of-date data as soon as possible to avoid being bothered by 
court-assisted tracers such as LEA.  
Another obstacle in the way of tracers is that even if records are kept, they will often be 
stored in other jurisdictions through which the message has passed. To obtain the logs 
from these distant relay points will usually involve an application to the court in that 
particular country. In some countries, internet law has not developed to the point where 
the local courts have any jurisdiction to assist even if they wanted to.  Significantly, 
online copyright infringers will use this to their advantage.  
Anonymous remailers strip out identifying information from IP datagrams. Their policy 
of offering anonymity means they will not keep log records that would be of any use to 
a tracer. Moreover, they will often be situated in precisely the jurisdictions that cannot 
or will not respond in a timely or helpful way to a tracer’s requests for assistance.806 
While it is possible to trace the route a data packet takes on its journey if it has been 
configured, it would require a potentially large number of individual ISPs (across many 
jurisdictions) to co-operate and divulge the structure of part of their network, and this 
may be highly sensitive information. Also, looking at the situation from a very practical 
point of view, is it really in the interests of an ISP to assist a copyright holder who is 
alleging copyright infringement?807 Countless acts of online copyright infringement are 
committed every day throughout the world. 
806  See the discussion of the <anon.penet.fi> anonymous remailer in Paul A Strassman, ’Risk-
Free Access into the Global Information Infrastructure via Anonymous Re-mailers’ 
(Symposium on the Global Information Infrastructure: Information, Policy & International 
Infrastructure, Cambridge, MA, 28-30 January 1996) 
<http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/anon-remail.html> accessed 5 June 2014.    
807  This voluntary form of ISP assistance should be contrasted with ISPs’ legal obligations 
arising from the E-Commerce Directive. For instance, under Article 13 (the ’caching’ 
provision) of the Directive, the ISP must ’act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
information’ (in this case, infringing material) which it has stored upon obtaining actual 
knowledge of the fact that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement. Similarly, under Article 14 (the ’hosting’ provision) of the Directive, the ISP is 
obliged to ’act expeditiously to remove or disable access to information’ that it has stored 
upon obtaining knowledge or becoming aware of the fact that the information stored is 
illegal or linked to an illegal activity. Generally speaking, the ISP enjoys immunity under the 
’mere conduit’ (Article 12), ’caching’ (Article 13) and ’hosting’ (Article 14) provisions of 
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8.2.1 The ’Leasing’ or Dynamic Allocation of IP Addresses  
The phenomenon of the ’leasing’ of IP addresses808 also militates against the successful 
tracing of online copyright infringements and it has special relevance for the subject of 
anonymity. Leasing of IP addresses began in the 1990s in an endeavour to make better 
use of fast diminishing IP space. ’Leasing’ is linked to the fact that during the early days 
of the internet, a large proportion of internet users connected through a dial-up 
connection with an ISP.809 These internet users did not have a permanent connection.  
For example, it is clear that if an ISP had one million customers, they could not all be 
online at the same time. It would have been inefficient to allocate an IP address to each 
customer. Hence, the number of probable users at any one time was estimated and an 
equal or greater number of addresses was allocated to a ’pool’. Instead of the connected 
dial-up host having a ‘static’ IP address, it had an address allocated dynamically, as 
the E-Commerce Directive provided it complies with certain conditions. For example, the 
ISP enjoys immunity in cases of transmission on a communication network (mere conduit 
provision) on condition that (a) it does not initiate the transmission; (b) it does not select the 
receiver of the transmission; and (c) it does not select or modify the information contained in 
the transmission. In addition, storage by the ISP of information transmitted over its network 
is legal provided ’the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission’ (Article 12(2)).     
808  The phrase ’leasing of IP addresses’ is used by Chris Nicoll, ’Concealing and Revealing 
Identity on the Internet’ in C Nicoll, JEJ Prins and MJM van Dellen (eds), Digital Anonymity 
and the Law: Tensions and Dimensions - Information Technology & Law Series 2 (1st edn, 
Asser Press 2003) 104.   
809  Broadband internet access (cable and DSL) soon began to eclipse dial-up connections thanks 
to significantly higher connection speeds. In 2008, a Pew Internet and American Life Project 
study found that only 10% of American adults still used dial-up internet access. Some of the 
reasons for retaining dial-up access were lack of infrastructure and high broadband prices. 
Sometimes, ISPs refused to roll-out high speed internet due to fears about profitability and 
costs associated with building infrastructure. Interestingly, from 2009 on, as the global 
recession took hold, a resurgence in dial-up access occurred in the US. This trend is linked to 
pricing with the standard dial-up package sometimes costing almost 60 per cent less (per 
month) than the standard DSL and Cable package.  
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needed, from that pool by a service such as DHCP810 or BOOTP.811 The DHCP service 
was run by the ISP’s logon server when the dial-up connection was made.  
A valid IP address was then given to the customer. When the customer disconnected, 
his address was returned to the pool so that it would be available for another customer. 
There were implications for anonymity as the IP address used by a particular customer 
while online was of little use in tracing the origin of a message because there was no 
administrative link between the customer’s identity and the IP address used by that 
customer – his address was commonly allocated at random. The challenge presented by 
dynamic allocation of IP addresses has also arisen in the investigation of online 
paedophilic activity.812  
A good example of a ruling concerning dynamic allocation of IP addresses is the 
Canadian judgment, BMG Canada Inc v John Doe,813 is instructive in relation to the 
dynamic nature of most IP addresses.814 A motion was brought by members of Canada’s 
810  The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. For example, to determine whether an IP address 
is dynamic or static on a Microsoft Windows workstation, one must view the selected 
TCP/IP options in <Control Panel><Network>.  
811  Christian Czychowski and Jan Bernd Nordemann, ’Use of Retained Data and Copyright Law 
in Germany – the German Data Protection Problem to Fight Internet Piracy’ (2010) 32 EIPR 
174, where it is stated that internet access providers generally do not ascribe non-corporate 
clients a permanent IP address. Instead, these receive a so-called dynamic IP address that 
renews itself each time the user logs onto the internet. This dynamic IP address can generally 
be ascertained by third parties. The identity of the client, however, remains anonymous. The 
client can only be traced by the provider consulting client data to determine who was 
ascribed the relevant dynamic IP address at the time of the infringement. Without the 
provider consulting this data, the identity of the copyright infringer cannot be ascertained 
and the infringement, be this criminal or civil infringement of copyright, cannot be pursued.     
812  See Matthieu Latapy, Clémence Magnien and Raphaël Fournier, ‘Technical Report on 
Quantification of Paedophile Activity in a Large P2P System’ (2009) 7 
<http://antipaedo.lip6.fr/T24/TR/quantification.pdf> accessed 4 July 2012. 
813  BMG Canada Inc v John Doe [2004] FC 488.  
814  For a more recent account of dynamic allocation of IP addresses see the 2013 Irish Supreme 
Court ruling in EMI Records (Ireland) Limited v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] 
IESC 34 [3.6] where the following is stated (in the context of Ireland’s Graduated Response 
Protocol):  
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recording industry seeking disclosure from five Canadian ISPs815 of the identity of 
certain customers who, it was alleged, had infringed copyright laws by illegally trading 
in music downloaded from the internet.816 The following passage is taken from para 19 
of the judgment:   
Because the frequency of visits and duration of time spent online differs from 
user to user, the IP addresses are not assigned to the MAC addresses 
sequentially. As a result of this functionality, IP addresses are not associated 
with any one account holder nor are they allocated in any predetermined 
pattern (the use of the term ‘IP address’ is perhaps confusing in the 
conventional sense because it is not an address, as one understands a house to 
have an address). It is therefore not possible to directly identify an account 
holder merely from an IP address. Moreover, searching for the IP address is not 
straightforward. 
The affidavits filed by the five ISPs reveal that it is not an easy task to provide the name 
and address of the account holder who used a specific IP address at a given time.817 At 
The IP address of any particular subscriber is allocated typically on a daily basis by 
an ISP, so that a user will have a different IP address from one day to the next. The 
record companies, through their agents, receive IP addresses of internet users who 
have allegedly uploaded material to the internet where the intellectual property 
rights of such material belongs to the record companies. The record companies or 
their agents cannot identify the alleged wrongdoer as they cannot link the IP 
address to any individual subscriber. The record companies, therefore, 
communicate this information and the respective IP addresses to Eircom who do 
have the ability to link the allegedly offending IP addresses with the appropriate 
subscribers.       
815  Shaw Communications Inc, Rogers Cable Communications Inc, Bell Sympatico, Telus Inc 
and Vidéotron Ltée.  
816  The plaintiffs are unable to determine the name, address or telephone number of the 29 
Internet users in question as they operate under pseudonyms associated with software which 
they use, eg Geekboy@KaZaA. However, they conducted an investigation through which 
they submit, it was discovered that these individuals used Internet Protocol addresses (IP 
addresses) registered with the ISPs which are the respondents to this motion. BMG Canada 
Inc v John Doe [2004] FC 488 [2].  
817  Similarly, where a block of IP addresses has been allocated by an ISP to a subscriber who 
provides either anonymous public services (cyber café) or, does not maintain a historical log 
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para 33 of the judgment, reference is made to the contents of an affidavit filed by one of 
the TELUS employees. In this affidavit, the employee describes the process as follows:   
To attempt to obtain that information requested, TELUS employees will be 
required to conduct searches of at least three different databases and cross-
reference the information found, to locate the likely account holder. This 
process is not done in the normal course of business and thus there are no 
existing lists, files, records, or documents containing the information requested. 
In addition, none of the TELUS staff would know the information requested as 
a result of their normal duties. TELUS does not monitor the content of what 
account holders access on the Internet.818  
The only way to locate the account that accessed the Internet using the IP 
address in question would be to cross-reference the IP address at the date, time, 
network and time zone to a database of MAC addresses and then cross-
reference the MAC address with the account database, assuming that the 
information still exists and is recoverable. As discussed below, the more 
historic a search is, the less reliable the information will be, as records are kept 
in different ways for different systems.819  
The TELUS employee goes on to aver in his affidavit how difficult it is for an ISP to 
identify a user of its services and he emphasises the importance of the prejudiced 
copyright holder (or other requester) lodging a request with an ISP soon after an online 
copyright infringement is suspected.    
Please note that TELUS can never identify the ’user’, ie, the person actually 
using the computer at the time of the alleged infringement. TELUS can only 
identify the person who opened up the TELUS account associated with the 
MAC address. As will be discussed below, the account holder and the user are 
not always the same, or even known to each other. With respect to the account 
holder, if the request is made within 30 days of when the internet was accessed 
of IP address allocation, it will be very difficult to match the IP address to a specific user. Ian 
Walden ’Forensic Investigations in Cyberspace for Civil Proceedings’ (2004) 18 Int’l Rev L 
Computers Tech 275, 276.   
818  BMG Canada Inc v John Doe [2004] FC 488 [33] sub-para 16. 
819  Ibid sub-para 17. 
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for the peer-to-peer sharing activity, TELUS has a good chance of identifying 
the account (depending on the particular TELUS internet system the customer 
was using). However, for requests concerning customer activity 30 days or 
more before the request, the information becomes less reliable to the point of 
being non-existent.820        
While the TELUS employee refers to a 30 day period, others would argue that in the 
case of e-mails (transmitting infringing material), the ISP ought to be contacted within 
14 days of the mail passing through/being received at its servers. This is because the IP 
address allocation logs and other relevant logged data are typically only stored by the 
ISP for a fortnight.821 An important distinction should also be drawn between the 
dynamically allocated IP addresses, usually employed in the case of home users or 
small businesses and, static IP addresses, often owned or leased (on a long-term basis) 
by corporate users and which do not change over time.  
In BMG, the plaintiffs’ motion requiring the defendant ISPs to disclose their customers’ 
identities was dismissed by the Federal Court. The court justified its decision by the fact 
that the plaintiff music companies failed to limit acquisition of information to copyright 
infringement issues.  
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal,822 the appellants (plaintiffs) once again failed 
in their bid to obtain an order under Federal Courts Rules, 1998,823 rr 233, 238 to 
compel the ISPs to disclose names of customers who allegedly infringed copyright 
online. The appellants’ case was weakened by the fact that much of their evidence was 
hearsay, thereby failing to comply with rule 81 (of the Federal Courts Rules, 1998) 
which requires affidavits to be confined to personal knowledge. Privacy considerations 
were important in the appeal hearing. In essence, the Court of Appeal decided that for a 
disclosure order to be made against the ISPs, the public interest in favour of disclosure 
would have to outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns of the ISPs’ customers. This 
delicate balance between privacy interests and the public interest would have as its 
backdrop the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
820  Ibid sub-para 22. 
821  Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ (2004) 15 C & L 9.  
822  BMG Canada Inc v John Doe [2005] FCA 193.  
823  Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, Federal Courts Act, Rules for Regulating the Practice 
and Procedure in the Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. 
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2000 which prohibits ISPs from voluntarily disclosing personal information such as 
identities requested except with the customer’s consent or pursuant to a court order.  
However, even with static IP addresses, a company can enable multiple computers on a 
network to utilise the same IP address (via Network Address Translation). With this 
service, each computer can still uniquely request and receive information from the 
internet: a computer on the corporate network is used to perform a ‘translation’ between 
the internal, private address that each computer on the network is allocated, and the 
external, public IP address that enables data on the internet to be accessed.824 Given the 
more stable character of the static IP address system, it might be easier for prejudiced 
copyright owners (or some entity on his behalf) to trace the originating computer 
provided assistance were provided in terms of the Network Address Translation. 
The inescapable conclusion is that it is seldom, if ever, possible to trace a datagram 
encapsulated using IPv4 where the sender is determined to avoid tracing and has taken 
various simple precautions to remain undetected and hence anonymous. For instance, 
there are a number of software applications, online re-mailing and anonymising 
services825 and other more advanced techniques that can be used to obfuscate an 
individual’s IP address, thereby potentially preventing it from being traced.826 
Alternatively, a successful IP spoofing attack827 on a system that is insufficiently 
protected may provide a suitable springboard to attacking other systems.  
824  Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ (2004) 15 C & L 7 et seq.  
825  Effected via an intervening anonymising server often located in an ’inhospitable’ 
jurisdiction.  
826  Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ (2004) 15 C & L 9.  
827  Spoofing occurs when a hacker logs in to a computer under a different identity. This will be 
possible if the hacker has previously obtained actual passwords, or has created a new identity 
for himself by fooling the computer into thinking he is the system’s operator. Clive Gringras 
and Elle Todd, Gringras: The Laws of the Internet (3rd edn, Tottel 2008) 339, para 5.6.2.1.2., 
237. IP Spoofing can take place because authenticated communication between two 
computers occurs solely on the basis of their respective IP addresses. For example, a person 
may login to a remote UNIX system without any form of username or password verification 
provided (a) the ’rlogin’ service is activated on the remote system and (b) the login 
originates from a computer which appears to have an ’approved’ IP address. As a practical 
matter, ’approval’ is achieved by the system administrator’s listing the IP address of the 
remote computer in the target computer’s ’.rhosts’ file. If the target computer is fooled into 
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It also has to be said that a successful trace using the IP address leads the tracer to a 
computer – not necessarily to the user of that computer!828 However, further action 
could be taken by the tracer on the basis of this information. For instance, the tracer 
could seek an order for the delivery up of the computer(s) that are configured with the 
name of the computer showing up in the trade results. Tracing involves establishing the 
beginning and the end of one or more ’hops’. Such ’hops’ often span different countries 
and, hence, different jurisdictions. To be investigated properly they depend on the 
availability of records kept by independent third parties who are seldom interested in the 
dispute under investigation.  
While the courts in some countries will assist in obtaining the necessary access where it 
appears unlawful activity has taken place, the transnational nature of much online IPR 
infringement will often frustrate the investigation insofar as these remedies are not 
universal or consistently applied.829   
8.3 Conclusions 
As regards the dynamic allocation of IP addresses, BMG Canada v John Doe 
demonstrates how IP addresses are not assigned to the MAC addresses sequentially. 
Accordingly, IP addresses are not associated with any one account holder nor are they 
allocated in any predetermined pattern. Consequently, it is not possible to directly 
identify an account holder merely from an IP address. Evidence adduced by the ISP’s 
thinking the originating computer bears the approved IP address serious damage can be 
caused to the target and the perpetrator can remain anonymous. Indeed, once the perpetrator 
gains access to the target, he can use it as a springboard to other systems – particularly those 
that ’trust’ the target. Chris Nicoll, ’Concealing and Revealing Identity on the Internet’ in C 
Nicoll, JEJ Prins and MJM van Dellen (eds), Digital Anonymity and the Law: Tensions and 
Dimensions - Information Technology & Law Series 2 (1st edn, Asser Press 2003) 106 et seq.     
828  The account details that are provided by the ISP may not necessarily be indicative of the 
author of the e-mail in question, as they will only record the contact details of the individual 
who opened the account with the ISP. Craig Earnshaw and Sandeep Jadav, ’E-Mail Tracing’ 
(2004) 15 C & L 9.   
829  The information contained in the sections on Tracing Internet Traffic is derived from Chris 
Nicoll, ’Concealing and Revealing Identity on the Internet’ in C Nicoll, JEJ Prins and MJM 
van Dellen (eds), Digital Anonymity and the Law: Tensions and Dimensions - Information 
Technology & Law Series 2 (1st edn, Asser Press 2003) 116-119.  
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employees revealed that the task of linking a name and address of an account holder to a 
specific IP address is far from straightforward and would involve cross-referencing the 
IP address to a database of MAC addresses and then cross-referencing the MAC address 
with the account database. To compound problems, the more historic the search, the less 
reliable the information. It seems that requests relating to customer activity which is at 
least 30 days old are highly likely to be unreliable. 
*** 
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9.1 Introduction  
Following on from my analysis of both facilitative and non-facilitative elements in the 
context of Article 2, Brussels I, in chapters 7 and 8, I shall now turn to the other 
important jurisdictional provision within Brussels I, namely Article 5(3). This is a 
special jurisdictional rule, applying to torts, delicts and semi-delicts. 
This chapter has two objectives. They are: 
1. To demonstrate how the new wording of Article 5(3), Brussels I, by providing 
for prospective torts and quia timet proceedings, creates difficulties for conflicts 
lawyers. Arguably, under the revised wording of Article 5(3), there is now a 
triality of jurisdictional possibilities open to the plaintiff (claimant).  
2. Using the analogue of online defamation, determine how the courts have 
interpreted the issue of locus delicti in such situations.  
9.2 Article 5(3), Brussels I 
Article 5(3) of Brussels I constitutes another possible jurisdictional route for the 
plaintiff copyright holder. It is an exception to the basic jurisdictional rule (contained in 
Article 2) and provides the plaintiff with an alternative to suing in the courts of the 
place of the defendant’s domicile. Under Article 5(3), the plaintiff can sue in a number 
of different fora - in the place where the tort occurred or in the place or places where the 
tort may occur. This new jurisdictional possibility was introduced under Brussels I 
when the wording of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention was changed to the effect 
that the words ‘or may occur’ were added to the end of that particular provision. Article 
5(3) now reads as follows: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued  
‘in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur.’   
Arguably, the effect of the ’new’ Article 5(3) creates three distinct connecting factors, 
namely, the place where the harmful event (damage) occurred, the place of the event 
giving rise to the harmful event (damage) and the place where the harmful event may 
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occur. Under the Bier formula,830 a duality of jurisdiction existed whereby the plaintiff 
could sue the defendant in either the jurisdiction where the damage occurred or in the 
jurisdiction where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.831 Following the change 
in wording of Article 5(3), this duality has now become a triality! 
I will now examine the application of Article 5(3) to an online situation. In applying 
Article 5(3) however, we will first have to assume that the defendant has already been 
identified (a not altogether easy task) and the plaintiff has opted not to sue (under 
Article 2) in the courts of the place where the defendant is domiciled. If the plaintiff is 
going to invoke Article 5(3), he must decide where he is going to institute proceedings. 
In essence, he can sue in the Member State where his copyright has been infringed or in 
the Member State or Member States where he believes his copyright may, at some 
future time, be infringed. 
Given the instantaneous and simultaneous nature of the internet, it is of course possible 
that the copyright holder’s rights be infringed in a number of different jurisdictions at 
the same time or within a very short space of time. The new wording of Article 5(3) 
830   The Bier ruling is analysed at para 4.2.3.2. 
831  This dual approach has been applied, or at least acknowledged, by the European Court of 
Justice in matters, ia of water pollution (Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines 
de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, para 24); liability of a maritime carrier (Case C-
51/97 Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR I-6511, 
para 32); defamation through a newspaper article (Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora 
Trading Inc, Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA 
[1995] ECR I-415, paras 20, 23); wrongful industrial action of a trade union (Case C-18/02 
Danmarks Rederiforening, acting on behalf of DFDS Torline A/S v LO 
Landesorganisationen I Sverige, acting on behalf of SEKO Sjöfolk Facket för Service och 
Kommunikation [2004] ECR I-1417, para 40); liability of investment consultants (Case C-
168/02 Rudolf Kronhofer v Marianne Maier [2004] ECR I-6009, para 16). In Réunion 
Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV, the ECJ noted that there may be 
cases of international transport operations where ‘the place where the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred may be difficult or indeed impossible to determine’, in which case 
Article 5(3) would only allocate jurisdiction to the place where the damage occurred. In 
addition, the court stated that the place where damage occurred could not be either the place 
of final delivery (which can be changed mid-voyage) or the place where damage was 
ascertained. Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV 
[1998] ECR I-6511, para 33. 
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would cover onward transmission of works. This occurs where a digital work is illegally 
copied and sent to a third party, in exchange for payment. This would amount to a 
commercialisation of the work, thereby constituting a secondary infringement of 
copyright. If the infringing work is transmitted onwards, it may be used by someone 
who knows that it is infringing material.  
As regards analysis of the term ’harmful event’, the first step involves working out what 
the term means in the context of copyright infringement. Since copyright actually 
comprises a bundle of rights,832 infringement by the copyright pirate of any one or more 
of these constituent rights would probably qualify as a ’harmful event’.    
9.2.1 The New Wording of Article 5(3), Brussels I and Challenges for Conflicts 
Lawyers  
The addition, under Brussels I, of the words ’or may occur’ to Article 5(3)833 creates an 
unclear situation for conflicts lawyers and especially for those dealing with conflicts in 
an online context. The simple truth is that copyright infringements, whether committed 
online or offline, may occur anywhere in the twenty-eight Brussels I States.834   
832 See para 6.3 
833  In the October 2002 ruling in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel, the 
European Court of Justice, when interpreting Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 1968, 
ruled that said provision covers actions which seek to prevent the occurrence of damage. 
Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformationen v Karl Heinz Henkel [2002] ECR I-
8111, paras 44-48. See also ruling of the ECJ in Case C-18/02 Danmarks Rederiforening, 
acting on behalf of DFDS Torline A/S v LO Landesorganisationen I Sverige, acting on 
behalf of SEKO Sjöfolk Facket för Service och Kommunikation [2004] ECR I-1417, paras 
27-34. For a Scottish ruling confirming that Article 5(3) applies to threatened delicts as well 
as to completed delicts see Bonnier Media Ltd v Smith; sub nom Bonnier Media Ltd v Kestrel 
Trading Corp [2002] SCLR 977 [12]. This case involved allegations of the use of a business 
domain name with the aim of passing off as other organisations.  
834  Brussels I applies to all Member States of the EU including Denmark. While Brussels I is 
not directly applicable to Denmark, it has effectively been extended to Denmark by a 
separate agreement between the EU and Denmark (Agreement between the European 
Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2005] OJ L299/62) which took 
effect on 1 July 2007. 
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The instantaneous nature of the internet combined with the ease with which near-perfect 
illegal digital copies can be created online, makes the new wording of Article 5(3) all 
the more problematical for private international lawyers. The addition of the words ’or 
may occur’ to Article 5(3) will have greater consequences for online IP infringement 
than for offline IP infringement. This is linked to the significantly greater potential for 
infringing online than offline, given such factors as the truly global reach of the internet 
and the exponential character835 of online IP infringement. By way of example, an 
illegal copy of a book remains just one copy even if it is sent from one country to the 
next. By contrast, an illegal digital copy of a work, if posted online, may be replicated 
with considerable ease by a large number of internet users and then further disseminated 
across national borders. In turn, recipients of such work may further disseminate or 
make new changes and then disseminate. Together, digitisation and the medium of the 
internet, facilitate wholesale IP theft which is frequently trans-border in character. 
9.3 Establishing the Locus of the Tort – the 2002 Dow Jones v Gutnick ruling      
In attempting to establish where the act of illegal copying takes place, one may have to 
proceed by way of analogy since precedents in the area of online copyright are 
relatively rare. It may prove beneficial to examine the act of publication and some of the 
case law on the issue, arising from the Australian High Court ruling Dow Jones & 
Company Inc v Gutnick836 which involved online defamation.   
9.3.1 Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick  
In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick,837 the Court had to consider two opposing 
points of view relating to alleged online defamation. The question before the court was 
835  By ‘exponential’, the author is referring to the almost domino-like effect that online 
infringement creates. By introducing one illegal digitised copy onto the Internet, the 
copyright pirate is almost ensuring that the infringing copy will be replicated manifold times 
and disseminated far and wide to be re-copied and re-transmitted to other online users, or 
possibly just posted on bulletin boards for further anonymous, unauthorised use.        
836  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
837  Ibid. 
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whether the online publication occurred in the jurisdiction where the article was 
downloaded or in the jurisdiction where it was uploaded onto a server.838  
Mr Joseph Gutnick, a prominent businessman, with a reputation in philanthropic, 
sporting and religious circles was an international entrepreneur with substantial 
connections in the US. Gutnick resided and had business headquarters in the Australian 
State of Victoria. He brought proceedings against Dow Jones, the printers and 
publishers of the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s newspaper and operators of WSJ.com. 
Gutnick contended that the article ‘Unholy Gains’ appearing on Barron’s online edition 
(28th October 2000) defamed him and he sought damages in Victoria.839 
Dow Jones, invoking the principle of forum non conveniens,840 argued that the 
Australian courts did not have jurisdiction. They further contended that jurisdiction 
838  This analysis should be contrasted with the analysis in the ‘Cristal’ case (Castellblanch SA v 
Champagne Louis Roederer SA [2004] IL Pr 41). In that case, the court had to determine 
where the causal event occurred in the context of an online trademark infringement. The 
court opted for the place of upload (by the infringer) rather than the place of download. 
Stated differently, the court ruled that for the purpose of the application of Article 5(3), the 
causal event is located at the place where the alleged infringer has its establishment. A 
parallel could be drawn between the aforementioned solution and the approach used in the 
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission Directive, which defines the act of 
broadcasting as ’the act of introducing the programme-carrying signals in the chain of 
communication’. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of 
certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ L248/15, art 1(2)(b); Arnaud Nuyts, ’Suing 
at the Place of Infringement: The Application of Article 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 to IP 
Matters and Internet Disputes’ in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual 
Property and Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 121.  
839  The reasons for doing so were recorded by the primary judge that he ‘is indifferent to the 
other substantial parts of the article and desires only that the attack on his reputation in 
Victoria as a money-launderer should be repelled and his reputation re-established.’ Dow 
Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [6]; Campbell Deane, ‘Jurisdiction and 
Online Publishing’ (2002) 8 Comms L 237.  
840  Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court has a discretion in cases involving 
both natural and legal persons to stay proceedings if the defendant is able to show that there 
is another more appropriate forum. The basis of the doctrine is appropriateness rather than 
simply convenience.    
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should vest in the US courts since the article on Barron’s online was published in South 
Brunswick, New Jersey, where it was available on servers maintained by Dow Jones.  
The Australian High Court stated that the principal issue in the case, which was relevant 
to all three challenges mounted by Dow Jones was where the allegedly defamatory 
statement had been ’published’. This inquiry stemmed from the fact that the law to be 
applied to the case was the law of the country where the tort occurred – the lex loci 
delicti. If it were deemed to have been committed in Victoria, Victorian law would 
govern the case and there would be a basis for jurisdiction in Victoria and a compelling 
reason to dismiss Dow Jones’ inconvenient forum claim. Dow Jones argued that the law 
of New Jersey should apply to the case, as it was in that state that the Dow Jones server 
uploaded the offending article onto the World Wide Web. In fact, there was no relevant 
connection to New Jersey apart from the presence of the server. Dow Jones was neither 
incorporated in nor maintained its principal offices in New Jersey. Rather, the company 
was incorporated under the laws of Delaware and had its main office in New York.841  
Determining the place of publication was of crucial importance, as the law of 
defamation in Victoria is substantially different from that of New Jersey.842 In Dow 
Jones, the place of publication, the defamatory act and damage to reputation were 
intertwined. Harm to reputation, however, is the gravamen of Australian defamation 
law. The High Court in Dow Jones ruled that damage is done when a defamatory 
publication is comprehended by the reader, the listener or the observer.’843 Chief Justice 
Gleeson reasoned as follows:  
841  Richard L Creech, ’Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant Down Under: A Comparison 
of Australian and American Approaches to Libellous Language in Cyberspace’ (2004) 22 
JMarshall JComputer & InfoL 553, 556, fn 9.   
842  In both Australia and the US, the law of defamation is controlled by state law, and within 
each country the law varies from state to state in many, sometimes significant ways. Putting 
domestic variation aside, however, even more pronounced differences are evident when 
Australian defamation law is compared to American law. Ibid 556.   
843  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [26]. On the point of allegedly 
defamatory material being in comprehensible form, see Raymond SR Ku and Jacqueline 
Lipton, Cyberspace Law – Cases and Materials (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2010) 92 et seq 
where they state:  
It is only when the material is in comprehensible form that the damage to reputation 
is done and it is damage to reputation which is the principal focus of defamation, 
    
 
290
                                                 
In the case of material on the World Wide Web, it is not available in 
comprehensible form until downloaded onto the computer of a person who has 
used a web browser to pull the material from the web server. It is where that 
person downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done. 
Ordinarily, then, that will be the place where the tort of defamation is 
committed.844   
Dow Jones’ argument that New Jersey should be deemed the place of publication, to the 
exclusion of all other places was driven heavily by the so-called ’single publication 
rule’, which is a peculiar rule of American defamation jurisprudence, created to deal 
with widely disseminated publications such as books and newspapers, and later radio 
and TV broadcasts.845 Originally under common law, one could say that if one thousand 
copies of a defamatory article were made and distributed to one thousand different 
people, there have been one thousand different publications, and a plaintiff would have 
one thousand different claims against the defendant. Naturally, this could make the 
litigation of defamation claims rather complicated especially when publication had 
occurred in multiple jurisdictions. To simplify matters, American courts developed the 
single publication rule, which provides that any single edition of a book, newspaper, or 
so forth, is deemed to constitute a ’single publication’, and a plaintiff is allowed only 
one action to recover damages for that publication. In that single action, however, he 
may recover all damages suffered in all jurisdictions.846 The single publication rule is 
followed in at least 27 US states, including New Jersey, and it has been held applicable 
to defamatory publications on the Internet.847  
not any quality of the defendant’ s conduct. In the case of material on the World 
Wide Web, it is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded onto the 
computer of a person who had used a web browser to pull the material from the 
web server. 
844  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [44] (Gleeson CJ). 
845  The single publication rule was codified as the Uniform Single Publications Act in 1952 and 
was intended to address the shortcomings inherent in the common law ’multiple publication 
rule’ which allowed numerous and stale lawsuits to stem from a single defamatory statement.  
846  Richard L Creech, ’Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant Down Under: A Comparison 
of Australian and American Approaches to Libellous Language in Cyberspace’ (2004) 22 
JMarshall JComputer & InfoL 553, 558.   
847  The rule was first held to be applicable in internet scenarios in Firth v State of New York, 706 
NYS 2d 835, 841 (2000). This view was maintained in a line of subsequent rulings ie Van 
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On the basis of the single publication rule, Dow Jones argued that what was 
determinative in the case was its own act of placing the article on a server in New 
Jersey, which constituted a single act of publication, and not the reading of the article in 
multiple jurisdictions around the world. Under the single publication rule, Gutnick 
could only bring one action against Dow Jones to recover all damages for injury to his 
reputation and, Dow Jones contended, Victoria was an inappropriate place to litigate all 
such claims, especially when, in its view, it was the law of New Jersey which was to 
apply to the case.  
Significantly for Dow Jones, however, the single publication rule is not a legal doctrine 
followed in Australia. Instead, the Australians apply the multiple publication rule, 
sometimes termed the rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer,848 or the repeat publication 
rule. This rule states that each communication of defamatory matter to a publishee is, in 
law, a separate publication. The rule has implications for limitation purposes as time 
will start to run again whenever the defamatory matter is communicated afresh. This 
poses special difficulties for defendants who publish material on the internet, which 
may remain accessible for many years after it was first made available.849 
 In Gutnick, the consequences of this were  that where publication of defamatory 
material occurred in each Australian state and territory, then each publication 
constituted  a separate actionable wrong,850 a principle which stems from Australia’s 
concern with an individual’s right to his reputation and his interest in vindicating it 
wherever it is assailed.  
Buskirk v New York Times Co, No 99 Civ 4265 (MBM), 2000 WL 1206732; 28 Media L Rep 
2525 (SDNY 2000); 325 F 3d 87 (2nd Cir 2003); Mitan v Davis, 243 F Supp 2d 719 (WD Ky 
2003); The Traditional Cat Association v Gilbreath, 13 Cal Rptr 3d 353, 359 (Cal Crt App 
2004).  
848  Duke of Brunswick v Harmer [1849] 14 QB 185. 
849  As for the multiple publication rule and its effect on the internet, see Brian Neill et al, 
Duncan and Neill on Defamation (3rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2009) para 8.07. 
850  Clearly the application of the rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer in the context of internet 
libel puts the libeller in a very precarious position as he is potentially vulnerable to multiple 
actions in different jurisdictions. This rule was considered in Lewis v King where it was 
observed that the High Court of Australia (in Dow Jones v Gutnick) ’firmly rejected a 
challenge in the context of internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as 
that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick’. Lewis v King [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 [29] et seq. 
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Dow Jones argued strenuously that the High Court should reformulate Australian 
defamation law so as to incorporate the single publication rule, and to designate the 
location of the server as the place of single publication.851 It further contended that the 
advent of the internet was a sufficiently revolutionary technological advancement so as 
to warrant a reconsideration of the law governing the elements of the tort of 
defamation.852 As regards the place of wrong for choice of law purposes, Dow Jones 
argued that this should be ascertained by reference to where in substance the cause of 
action arose. In the appellant’s view, the cause of action arose in either New Jersey or 
New York.853 
The Australian High Court found numerous problems with this submission. Kirby J was 
of the view that where a person or corporation publishes material which is potentially 
defamatory of another, it is not too excessive a burden to ask the publisher(s) to be 
cognisant of the defamation laws of the place where the person resides and has his 
reputation.854 Callinan J used the analogy of multinational business and pointed to the 
manufacturers of popular brands of motor car. He pointed out that where they wish to 
sell their cars abroad, they are obliged to comply with the laws and standards of those 
jurisdictions.855 He continued and used the example of people wishing to do business in 
or indeed travel to, or live in, or utilise the infrastructure of different countries. In such 
situations, he noted, they could hardly be absolved from compliance with the laws of 
those countries.856 Later in his ruling, Callinan J highlighted the risk involved for 
someone who publishes in a multiplicity of jurisdictions. In short, that person must 
understand and accept that he runs the risk of liability in those jurisdictions in which the 
publication is not lawful and inflicts damage.857 
Interestingly, two years prior to the Dow Jones ruling, the US District Court in New 
Jersey held in a case involving alleged trademark infringement that it was unreasonable 
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in New Jersey merely because the defendant’s 
851  Dow Jones & Company v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [109] (Kirby J).  
852  Ibid [77].  
853 Ibid [109].  
854 Ibid [151].  
855  Ibid [186] (Callinan J). 
856  Ibid.  
857 Ibid. 
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Web server was located in that state.858 Curiously, the Australian High Court did not 
appear to be aware of the New Jersey decision but it is clear from the New Jersey 
holding that courts on both sides of the Pacific view the location of a server to be a 
rather flimsy basis for asserting jurisdiction.859  
In arguing against vesting jurisdiction in the place where the server is located, Kirby J 
noted that ’the place of uploading of material onto the internet might bear little or no 
relationship to the place where the communication was composed, edited, or had its 
major impact.’860 The court also expressed concern that if the location of a server 
determined the law to be applied in a case publishers would be free to manipulate the 
uploading and location of data so as to insulate themselves from liability in Australia or 
elsewhere, for example, by using a Web server in a ’defamation free jurisdiction’ or one 
in which the defamation laws are tilted decidedly towards defendants.861 The court was 
also cognisant of the fact that a vastly disproportionate share of all of the Web servers in 
the world are in the US. A rule which would focus on the location of the Web server 
would greatly extend the reach of American law. Callinan J even went so far as to decry 
Dow Jones’ attempt to impose an American legal hegemony where the consequence: 
would be to confer upon one country, and one notably more benevolent to the 
commercial and other media than (Australia is), an effective domain over the 
law of defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, 
and the serious disadvantage of those unfortunate enough to be reputationally 
damaged outside the United States.862   
Despite Dow Jones’ contention that US law should apply due to the fact that the 
allegedly defamatory material was made available (uploaded) on servers and therefore 
published in New Jersey, the Australian High Court rejected that argument.863  
858  Amberson Holdings LLC v Westside Story Newsp, 110 F Supp 3d 332 (DNJ 2000).  
859  Richard L Creech, ’Dow Jones and the Defamatory Defendant Down Under: A Comparison 
of Australian and American Approaches to Libellous Language in Cyberspace’ (2004) 22 
JMarshall JComputer & InfoL 553, 560.  
860  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [130] (Kirby J).  
861  Ibid [199] (Callinan J).   
862  Ibid [200] (Callinan J).  
863  On the issue of publication, it is worth noting the views expressed by Hedigan J in the lower 
court, i.e. the Supreme Court of Victoria. He felt that the browser request (from Australia) 
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Instead, it localised the online defamation at the place where damage to reputation 
occurred.864 Ordinarily, the locus of damage will be the place where the alleged 
defamatory material is available in comprehensible form (provided also that the victim 
has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged).865 In opting for place of 
download as locus delicti, the court explained that in the case of online material, it does 
not become available in comprehensible form until downloaded onto the computer of 
someone who has used a web browser to pull the material from the web server.866 In 
other words, the downloading of the suspect material brings about the damage to 
reputation and it is the place of download that constitutes the locus for the commission 
of the tort of defamation.867    
9.3.2 Implications of the ruling  
The Dow Jones ruling is important for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the Australian High Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the novel 
technological context of the internet called for a new and distinct concept of 
publication.868 Instead, the court made no allowances for the intrinsically global nature 
of the internet. It used the analogy of newspaper circulation and ruled that publication 
took place not in the place where the defamatory material was uploaded but rather 
where it was downloaded, i.e. in the place where the material was read and 
comprehended by publishees. 
and the response (from the US) constituted one phenomenon and this was ’not a divisible 
operation’. He stated that the better view would appear to be ‘that the information is 
published in both places at the same time. Not perhaps at the same time for a scientist 
counting in milliseconds but, for the law’s purposes, no distinction can be sensibly drawn.’ 
He went on to say that the message is as much published and delivered in Victoria as it is 
sent for delivery from New Jersey. Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305 [67]. In 
the judge’s view, the information is released and received virtually instantaneously and the 
attempt to separate them for the law’s purpose is a fallacy. Ibid [71]. Hedigan J went on to 
hold that the courts of the place of download (ie the State of Victoria) had jurisdiction to 
entertain the proceedings. Ibid [79].      
864  Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [44].  
865  Ibid. 
866 Ibid. 
867 Ibid. 
868  Ibid [20]. 
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In giving primacy to the place of download, the court focused on the effects of Dow 
Jones’ conduct rather than the conduct itself. The effects of the appellant’s conduct were 
injury to the respondent’s reputation while the act of uploading in New Jersey 
constituted the appellant’s conduct. By emphasising place of download, the court was 
following the approach adopted in cases of pre-internet media such as newspapers and 
TV. In such cases, the established place of the tort for the purposes of defamation is the 
place of ‘publication’, that is, the jurisdiction where the material was received or 
comprehended by a third party.  
In the court’s view, the substance of the action was the harm or the effects of the 
appellant’s conduct. As the respondent’s reputation was damaged in the state of Victoria 
where publishees downloaded and comprehended the defamatory material, the High 
Court had no difficulty finding that the Victorian courts were an appropriate forum.  
Secondly, just like in Berezovsky v Michaels,869 the Australian High Court discounted 
the fact that only a tiny percentage of the subscribers to the relevant website were 
Australians.870 What was key was that a small but perfectly formed defamation had been 
committed in Australia, thereby permitting Victorian courts to assume jurisdiction.   
9.3.3 Jurisprudential inconsistency, post-Dow Jones 
While the Dow Jones ruling has, undoubtedly, a high profile, considerable 
jurisprudential inconsistency has emerged in this area in the common law world. For 
instance, a US Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) ruled in Young v New Haven Advocate871 
that Virginian courts did not have jurisdiction in a case of alleged online defamation 
despite the fact that the allegedly defamatory material872 was accessible online in 
869 Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004. 
870  Even the appellant was unsure as to how many Australians had a subscription to its website 
but on the basis of paid subscription fees linked to credit cards the holders of which gave 
Australian addresses, the appellant estimated that 1,700 of the subscribers to its website were 
Australians. Given that its website had 550,000 subscribers in total, the Australian 
component only constituted 0.30% of the total. Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] 
HCA 56 [169].   
871  Young v New Haven Advocate, 315 F 3d 256 (4th Cir 2002). 
872  The defendant newspapers had published a story about the State of Connecticut’s policy of 
housing prisoners in Virginian institutions and allegedly defamed the warden of a Virginian 
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Virginia and the plaintiff worked in that state. The defendants, two Connecticut 
newspapers - The New Haven Advocate and The Hartford Courant - invoked the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens against the plaintiff. The US Court of Appeals ruled 
that the Virginian courts did not have jurisdiction over the Connecticut-based 
newspapers because the newspapers did not ‘manifest an intent to aim their websites or 
the posted articles at a Virginian audience.’ The Court of Appeals followed its previous 
decisions which had stated that a plaintiff would need to prove that an out-of-state 
defendant’s internet activity was expressly targeted at, or directed to, the forum state in 
order to establish jurisdiction in the courts of that state. In this case, even though the 
plaintiff had allegedly suffered damage to his reputation in Virginia as a result of the 
articles, the evidence showed that the newspapers had intended to direct the publications  
at a (local) Connecticut audience,873 despite the article being accessible online in other 
jurisdictions. 
9.3.4 English rulings which followed the Gutnick Approach 
In contrast with the US, England adopted the Gutnick approach. This is evident from the 
rulings in Harrods Ltd v Dow Jones Co Inc874 and Lewis v King875. Harrods also 
involved allegations (by Harrods against Dow Jones) of online and offline defamation. 
The relevant article was published in the Wall Street Journal printed edition as well as 
on Dow Jones’ website which was accessed by a relatively small number of internet 
users in the UK. The article headed ‘The Enron of Britain’ referred to a possible 
floatation of Harrods. The plaintiff contended that the article imputed corporate 
untrustworthiness on its part and that if publicly listed, it would prove to be Britain’s 
Enron, defrauding and deceiving investors on a huge scale. Harrods commenced 
proceedings in England but Dow Jones invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
a bid to stay the proceedings. The court rejected Dow Jones’ inconvenient forum claim 
and held that an online article is deemed to be published where internet users 
downloaded, read and comprehended it. In addition, the High Court affirmed that the 
‘single publication’ doctrine did not apply in English law.  
prison (a Mr Young) by implying that he was a racist who encouraged the abuse of inmates 
by prison guards.   
873 For the analogous ‘targeting members of the public’ in the context of the web-blocking 
cases, see paragraphs 6.10.2 and 6.10.3  
874  Harrods Ltd v Dow Jones Co Inc [2003] EWHC 1162 (QB).  
875  Lewis v King [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 [28]–[31]. 
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Lewis v King involved litigation in the US between Don King the well-known boxing 
promoter and three defendants the best known of whom was Lennox Lewis (first 
defendant), the then British world heavy weight champion. In short, the proceedings 
represented Don King’s libel claim for alleged internet publications by the third 
defendant, the lawyer representing Lewis in the American litigation. All of the parties 
were USA-based. King brought proceedings in the UK and was granted permission to 
serve out of the jurisdiction. The defendants sought to set that order aside.  
The High Court held against the defendants. It ruled that it was an appropriate case for 
service outside of the jurisdiction as, applying the rule that publication takes place 
where material is heard or read and observing that the claim was limited to publications 
within England and Wales, the tort had been committed and the damage had been 
suffered within that jurisdiction. Secondly, the court deemed England and Wales the 
appropriate forum. The general presumption was that the appropriate forum was where 
the tort was committed. It was significant that the claimant had a substantial reputation 
within the jurisdiction, and that the relevant websites were popular and frequently 
accessed from within the jurisdiction. 
 
On appeal, it was stated in the judgment that the parties accepted that a text on the 
internet is published at the place where it is downloaded.876  
In opting for place of download only, the Dow Jones, Harrods and Lewis rulings are 
obviously more restrictive than the ‘Reinwater’877 line of reasoning. However, Dow 
Jones/Harrods/Lewis deal specifically with an instance of online tort, in contrast with 
Bier which involves an offline tort.   
Clearly, in terms of online libels, the place of download is the preeminent locus for the 
purposes of localisation. Bier is somewhat out on a limb from a precedential value 
perspective. While it gives the claimant optionality in terms of the place to sue, its value 
is arguably diminished somewhat by the fact that it is an offline tort.  
876  Ibid [2]. 
877  Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735 
(analysed at para 4.2.3.2.) .   
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The key issue is how compelling are these various (defamation) rulings when it comes 
to an online copyright situation? The rationale in Gutnick seems to have established a 
firm foothold in the UK.  
9.3.5 The Defamation Act 2013  
In 2013, the UK adopted its Defamation Act. Section 8 of the Act introduces a single 
publication rule which replaces the multiple publication rule. The net effect of the single 
publication rule is that the limitation period in relation to any cause of action brought in 
respect of a subsequent publication is treated as having started to run on the date of the 
first publication. The rule also covers subsequent publications to a limited section of 
society, for example where a blog has a small group of subscribers or followers.878 
Section 8(4) of the 2013 Act provides that the single publication rule does not apply 
where the manner of the subsequent publication (of the statement) is ‘materially 
different’ from the manner of the first publication. In determining this issue, courts may 
have regard to such things as: the level of prominence that a statement is given879 and, 
the extent of the subsequent publication.   
9.3.6.  Two catalysts on the road to adoption of the Defamation Act 2013  
On the long road to adoption of the Defamation Act 2013, two catalysts are apparent. 
Firstly, in December 2002, the Law Commission published its preliminary investigation 
‘Defamation and the Internet – A Preliminary Investigation’880 while, secondly, the 
Ministry of Justice published its consultation paper titled Defamation and the internet: 
the multiple publication rule on 16th September 2009.881  
878  Defamation Act 2013, s 8(2).  
879  For example, a story may first appear relatively obscurely in a section of a website where 
several clicks are needed to access it. But, it is later transferred to the website’s homepage, 
where it receives a much higher number of hits.  
880  Law Commission, Defamation and the Internet – A Preliminary Investigation (Scoping 
Study No 2, December 2002). 
881  Ministry of Justice, Defamation and the internet: the multiple publication rule – 
Consultation Paper (CP20/09, 16 September 2009). 
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9.3.6.1. The Law Commission’s two Scoping Studies on Defamation and the Internet 
from 2002 
Two scoping studies into aspects of defamation law and the internet were published by 
the Law Commission in 2002. The first concerned perceived abuses of the defamation 
procedure and was published in May 2002. 
The second scoping study was published in December 2002 and highlighted four areas 
of concern: the liability of ISPs for other people’s material; the application of the 
limitation period to online archives; the exposure of internet publishers to liability in 
other jurisdictions; and the risk of prosecution for contempt of court.  
The Law Commission acknowledged that there were problems in the way in which the 
limitation period applied to online archives. Referring to the (then) ‘standard English 
rule’ (i.e. the multiple publication rule), the Law Commission stated that a cause of 
action accrues each time a libel is disseminated. As a consequence of this, the limitation 
period runs from each occasion on which a ‘hit’ is made on a website. Therefore, in 
terms of online archived newspapers, libel actions may be brought many years after 
their original publication, at which point it may be difficult for the publishers to mount 
an effective defence because records and witnesses are no longer available.882 Clearly, 
this was an unsatisfactory situation. But so too was the claimant’s situation as he was 
subject to a short one year limitation period. 
Two principal reforms were suggested by the respondents who answered the Law 
Commission’s questionnaire. The first was the adoption of the US single publication 
rule while the second was the provision of a specific archive defence for material that 
had been held for over a year. 
In conclusion, the Law Commission stated that there was a need to review the way in 
which the multiple publication rule interacts with the limitation period applying to 
archived material. It felt that the one year limitation period might cause hardship to 
claimants due to insufficiency of time to prepare a case. Conversely, it felt it was also 
potentially unfair to defendants to allow actions to be brought against newspapers 
decades after their original publication, simply because copies had been placed in an 
882  Law Commission, Defamation and the Internet – A Preliminary Investigation (Scoping 
Study No 2, December 2002) paras 1.6 and 1.14. 
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archive. A lapse of time made it extremely difficult for a newspaper company to mount 
an effective defence as records and witnesses were no longer available. And both these 
disadvantages had to be set in the context of the social utility of online archives, as 
acknowledged by the Court of Appeal. The Law Commission recommended 
considering the issue further either through the adoption of a single publication rule or 
through a more specific defence that would apply to archives (whether online or 
offline).883  
9.3.6.2. The Ministry of Justice’s Consultation Paper  
In its consultation paper ‘Defamation and the Internet: the Multiple Publication Rule’ 
and the response,884 published in March 2010, the Ministry of Justice reviewed the 
application of the multiple publication rule in the context of online content (especially 
archived content). The consultation paper solicited views on whether, in principle, the 
multiple publication rule should be retained and, if not, whether a single publication rule 
should be introduced. An alternative to a single publication rule is also mooted, i.e. 
amending the Defamation Act 1996 to extend the defence of qualified privilege to 
publications on online archives outside the one-year limitation period. Of the 34 
responses received by the Ministry of Justice, 55 percent of the respondents favoured 
the introduction of a single publication rule.885 
9.4. Conclusions  
This chapter has revolved around the issue of pinpointing the locus delicti in the context 
of online defamation. Due to the relative lack of copyright-related jurisprudence, I relied 
on the analogue of online defamation as it involves an act of publication and therefore 
has parallels with the communication to the public right under UK copyright law. 
In Dow Jones v Gutnick, the Australian High Court ruled that the tort of defamation was 
committed at the place of download. The rationale behind that approach was that place 
of download constitutes the place where the defamatory publication occurs as it was at 
that location that the defamatory material was read and comprehended by the publishee. 
883  Ibid para 3.24. 
884  Ministry of Justice, Defamation and the internet: the multiple publication rule – 
Consultation Paper (Response to consultation, CP(R) 20/09, 23 March 2010). 
885 Patrick M Vollmer, Defamation (House of Lords Library Note, LLN 2010/016, 5 July 2010) 
7.  
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The natural follow on is that the defamed person’s reputation is damaged at that time/in 
that place too.  
In the same ruling, the court rejected the argument (by Dow Jones) that the location of 
the server was determinative. Instead, the Australian High Court focused on the place 
where the last event necessary to make the tortfeasor liable took place (i.e. place of 
download).  
 
The English rulings of Harrods v Dow Jones and Lewis v King followed the general 
principle enunciated in Gutnick, thereby copper fastening the place of download as the 
pre-eminent locus for the purpose of localising online libels.  
By including a single publication rule in its 2013 Defamation Act,886 the UK has 
followed the approach taken in the US. The rule will allow UK courts to deem an 
aggregate communication (publication, broadcast or transmission) a single publication. 
The Defamation Act also contains an interesting provision (section 9) on jurisdiction. It 
touches on the principle of forum non conveniens and refers to instances where the 
defendant is not domiciled in the UK or another EU Member State. In such 
circumstances, an English court may only assume jurisdiction in relation to multi-state 
torts if it is satisfied that of all the places in which the defamatory statement was 
published, England and Wales is ‘clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring 
an action in respect of the statement’. 
*** 
886 Defamation Act 2013, s 8. 
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10.1 Introduction: problems and solutions  
This thesis has exposed the very real and practical problems associated with applying 
the tort PIL rules to the internet. Superficially, some of the PIL rules appear to be 
susceptible to easy application but, when, transposed to an online environment, become 
considerably more difficult to apply. The fact that sovereign borders are not as clearly 
marked online as they are in the offline world does not assist the situation. Dicey, 
Collins and Morris puts it well when it states that: 
 
it has not been easy for the conflict of laws to adapt itself to the changes in 
social and commercial life which the 20th century has witnessed. Many of its 
rules were laid down in the 19th century and seem better suited to 19th century 
conditions than to those of the 20th century.887  
 
By logical extension, it would be even more difficult for the field of the conflict of laws 
to adapt itself to the 21st century, given that so many torts take place on the amorphous, 
border-disregarding internet nowadays. Pinpointing the locus delicti is always a 
challenge but this challenge is magnified many times in an online environment. The 
challenges involved in localising copyright’s reproduction right, communication to the 
public right and the making available right in an online environment along with the 
analogue, online defamation, are critically evaluated in chapter 6 while an in-depth 
analysis of the landmark Australian cybertorts ruling - Dow Jones v Gutnick.888 occurs 
in chapter 9.   
 
10.2 PIL’s slow adaptation to the online world  
In some ways, PIL is struggling to adapt to the online world. For a medium of 
communications that transcends sovereign borders it is perhaps unsurprising that it has a 
rather fraught relationship with a field of law so aligned with sovereign demarcations 
and discrete legal systems. But, the relationship between PIL and the internet seems an 
uneasy one, demonstrated by the two examples below, one with a global dimension, the 
other with an EU dimension.  
887 Lord Collins of Mapesbury et al (eds), Dicey, Collins and Morris: The Conflict of Laws, Vol 
1 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 10.  
888 Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
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The first case relates to the proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters which failed due to the proposers and 
draftsmen of that particular convention underestimating complexities created by the 
internet. This is ironic as the global and widespread use of the internet amplifies the 
need for an international instrument like the aforementioned.889 The second example 
points to the fact that the internet does not seem to feature prominently in the collective 
consciousness of EU legislators as evidenced by the fact that, of the three important PIL 
Regulations adopted in the EU since 2000 (Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II), only Rome 
I (through its Recital (24)) makes any reference to the internet and then, in only an 
oblique way.890 
 
10.3 Dow Jones v Gutnick: place of upload or place of download?  
Determining the locus delicti for an international online defamation was the key issue in 
the landmark Australian ruling in Dow Jones v Gutnick. There, the High Court of 
Australia was presented with two opposing points of view relating to alleged online 
defamation. Should an online publication be deemed to occur in the jurisdiction where 
the allegedly defamatory article was downloaded or, in the jurisdiction where it was 
uploaded? The publication, once comprehended by the publishee, caused damage to the 
victim’s reputation (‘the harmful event’ in Brussels I parlance). In opting for place of 
download as locus delicti, the Australian High Court ensured that the State of Victoria 
would both assume jurisdiction of the case and have its laws applied in the proceedings. 
In terms of the push/pull dichotomy (examined in chapter 6), the publication and the 
attendant defamation only occurred after a ‘pull’ by the publishee. Viewed from a 
different perspective, the (defamatory) digital content hosted on the web server was 
only deemed published at the point of access, not at the point of storage.891 It seems too, 
that in Dow Jones, the locus delicti was coterminous with the origin of the ‘pull’ 
(effected by the publishee). 
889  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 288.   
890 See para 1.6.  
891 At para 6.2.  
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10.4 Proxy war for the struggle between the single publication rule and the 
multiple publication rule?  
 
In a slightly odd way, Dow Jones became the ‘arena’ for the struggle between two 
distinct rules of defamation. Invoking the single publication rule, Dow Jones argued that 
New Jersey should be deemed the place of publication as it was in that state that the 
defamatory article was placed on a server. Further, the appellant contended that Victoria 
was forum non conveniens as the laws of New Jersey should apply following its 
determinative act of placing the defamatory article on a server in that state.  
Significantly, however, the single publication rule is not a legal doctrine followed in 
Australia. Instead, that country applies the multiple publication rule. In the High Court, 
the appellant argued that that court should reformulate Australian defamation law so as 
to incorporate the single publication rule and to designate the location of the server as 
the place of single publication. 
Dow Jones further contended that the advent of the internet was a sufficiently 
revolutionary technological advancement so as to warrant a reconsideration of the law 
governing the elements of the tort of defamation.892 As regards the place of wrong for 
choice of law purposes, Dow Jones argued that this should be ascertained by reference 
to where in substance the cause of action arose. In its view, the cause of action arose in 
either New Jersey or New York, both states being the location of its servers.  
The High Court rejected the appellant’s view that jurisdiction be vested in the courts of 
the place of upload. This was done for a number of reasons. Firstly, the place of upload 
might bear little or no relationship to the place where the communication had its major 
impact. Secondly, publishers might manipulate the uploading of data so as to insulate 
themselves from liability in Australia or elsewhere. In other words, defamers could use 
a server in a jurisdiction in which the defamation laws are tilted decidedly towards 
defendants. Thirdly, the risk of an American legal hegemony was cited by Callinan J to 
reject the place of upload. Mr Justice Callinan’s viewpoint was coloured by the fact that 
back in 2002, a vastly disproportionate share of all internet servers in the world were 
located in the US. If place of upload were chosen as the determinative locus for 
determining jurisdiction, then that would, in Callinan J’s view, ‘confer upon one 
892 Dow Jones & Company v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 [77] (Kirby J).  
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country … an effective domain over the law of defamation’.893 Such a rule would, in the 
court’s view, be to the financial advantage of publishers in the US and the serious 
disadvantage of those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the 
US.894  
By giving primacy to the place of download, the Australian High Court focused on the 
effects of Dow Jones’ conduct rather than the conduct itself. The effects were injury to 
the respondent’s reputation while the conduct was the act of uploading to servers in 
New Jersey. Somewhat ironically, and despite the case being one of the most significant 
cybertorts rulings ever, Australia’s highest court followed the approach in cases 
concerning pre-internet media such as newspapers and TV, by attaching greatest 
importance to place of publication. This in effect, was the jurisdiction where the 
defamatory material was received or comprehended by the publishee (the place of 
download). While this approach is defensible in cases of defamation (where a 
publication is necessary), it cannot be carried across uncritically to copyright.  
 
Not all online torts are subject to the place of download rule. Pertinently, two online IP 
infringement rulings examined earlier in this thesis support the place of upload 
approach. They are the Cristal case (Castellblanch SA v Champagne Louis Roederer SA 
[2004] IL Pr 41)895 concerning online trademark infringement, and the Scottish ruling 
Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial Photography v Nicola Askew, Largsholidaylets.co.uk.896 In 
chapter 6, considerably  more complex localisation rules are in evidence in relation to  
the communication to the public right and the making available right.  
893 Ibid [200] (Callinan J).  
894 See Chp 9, para 9.3.1. It is arguable that Callinan J’s comments are equally applicable to 
copyright as the statistics for 2013 show that the US is preeminent in terms of the number of 
servers on its territory. However, the analysis as to locus of infringement (for copyright) 
takes its own course (see chapter 6 and Appendix 2 generally). As regards statistics on 
location of servers/hosting of websites, see: Superb Internet, ‘Study: Where the Web is 
located and Ghost Servers Hauting the Internet’ (24 May 2013) 
<http://www.superb.net/blog/2013/05/24/study-where-the-web-is-located-ghost-servers-
haunting-the-internet/> accessed 10 June 2014. 
895 See para 9.3.1., footnote 838 . 
896 Alan MacKie t/a 197 Aerial Photography v Nicola Askew, Largsholidaylets.co.uk [2009] 
SLT (Sh Ct) 146.  
    
 
307
                                                 
 10.5 Facilitative and non-facilitative elements (viewed from the perspective of 
Article 2, Brussels I)  
In the intermeshing analysis carried out in chapters 7 and 8, this thesis examined 
elements that are deemed facilitative or non-facilitative of the operation of Article 2, 
Brussels I and the related crucial task of identifying the tortfeasor. 
 
In short, three facilitative elements were identified while two non-facilitative elements 
were identified. However, as regards the non-facilitative elements, only dynamic 
allocation of IP addresses was discussed in detail (though anonymising 
software/techniques are recognised as a non-facilitative element).  
 
The facilitative elements are: Norwich Pharmacal relief, geolocation technology and 
data retention legislation (dealt with in chapter 7). The non-facilitative elements are 
dealt with in chapter 8.  
Of the three facilitative elements critically evaluated, all offer support in terms of 
tortfeasor identification but two of the elements have become slightly weakened by 
jurisprudential developments in recent times. They are: the data retention component, 
affected by the recent CJEU ruling in Digital Rights Ireland897 and Norwich Pharmacal 
relief which may well be restricted following the rulings in Media C.A.T.898 and Smith v 
ADVFN.899 It is arguable that the strongest facilitative element is the geolocation 
technology element,900 the only technological element of the three. This technology 
enables the linking of IP addresses to physical locations, thereby offering the possibility 
of defendant identification. However, even geolocation technology has some chinks in 
its armour. I shall now draw some conclusions on the three facilitative elements and the 
non-facilitative element.  
897 The ruling is analysed from para 7.4.4. onwards.  
898 See para 7.3.2.7. 
899 See para 7.3.2.6.  
900 See para 7.5.  
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10.5.1 Norwich Pharmacal relief (facilitative)  
From the perspective of actually identifying a tortfeasor, Norwich Pharmacal relief is 
still, without doubt, facilitative. Particularly so, when one considers that the DEA 2010 
is, for all intents and purposes, in abeyance.901 While the web-blocking rulings under 
section 97A of the CDPA 1988902 prevent infringing activities by blocking illegal 
websites, they do not produce the names and addresses of individual copyright 
infringers, as occurs under a NPO.903  
Two recent rulings – Smith v ADVFN and, Media C.A.T.904 possibly portend a more 
critical and cautious approach by UK courts to this form of equitable relief. Following 
Smith v ADVFN, it seems that the courts will carefully consider whether the material 
complained of is, in fact, defamatory. In addition, Norwich Pharmacal relief will only 
be available if the claimant cannot obtain the relevant document(s) from another source 
or by other means.  
Media C.A.T. too represents a more critical interpretation Judge Birss, perceiving 
certain weaknesses in the Norwich Pharmacal system, drew inspiration from the system 
of Anton Piller orders, to suggest the appointment of a neutral supervising solicitor to 
ensure that the NPO and any information disclosed under it were not abused. Media 
C.A.T. may yet act as a catalyst for a complete reappraisal of the Norwich Pharmacal 
jurisdiction. Possible reforms that might flow from such reappraisal include greater 
restrictions being placed on information disclosed under NPOs along with court 
directions on the use of the information disclosed.  
10.5.2 Geolocation technology (facilitative)  
Svantesson’s comment on geolocation technology, discussed in chapter 7, is probably 
one of the most compelling in relation to this particular technology. He stated that  
901 The key provision of the DEA 2010 that could assist rightholders in identifying copyright 
infringers – Section 4 (obligation on ISPs to provide infringement lists to copyright owners) 
– is currently not in operation.  
902 See para 7.3.5.  
903 There are parallels between Norwich Pharmacal relief and the Enforcement Directive 
(2004/48/EC). Art 8(1) of the latter refers specifically to proceedings concerning an 
infringement of an IPR and empowers the competent judicial authorities to order that 
information relevant to the infringement be made available to a claimant upon his request.  
904 Analysed at paras 7.3.2.6 and 7.3.2.7. respectively.  
    
 
309
                                                 
geolocation technologies should not be seen as an alternative to using PIL to 
erect protective borders on the internet. Rather the application of PIL must 
recognise the value of geolocation technologies and non-technical geo-
identification for the identification of geographical location.905  
 
This form of pragmatic thinking will, likely, chart a way forward for PIL in the online 
world. A symbiotic relationship between the field of law (PIL) and the facilitative 
technology (geolocation technology) is an important first step in smoothing the 
application of PIL to copyright infringements on the internet.  
 
With its capability of identifying geographical location on the internet, geolocation 
technology undoubtedly offers tangible help to both the courts and lawyers. It was 
deployed as an evidential tool in the Yahoo! and Gutnick cases while it was 
acknowledged and endorsed in two US rulings - National Federation of the Blind v 
Target Corporation, and Hageseth v Superior Court, and one German ruling - VGH 
Bayern, 10 CS 08.2399.906  
 
No doubt, geolocation service providers will continue to improve the accuracy of their 
geolocation technology and improving accuracy will persuade courts to attach even 
greater importance to these technologies, thereby creating a virtuous circle. While there 
is not absolute consensus on the effect IPv6 will have on the accuracy of geolocation, 
both Olsen and Jacobus contend that the expanding IP address system will have a 
significantly positive impact on the accuracy of geolocation technology.907 Olsen even 
argues that IPv6 would make the identification of the physical location of an internet 
user a rather trivial task.  
 
As geolocation technology is gradually transforming the internet into a medium that 
takes account of geographical and legal borders, it would be short-sighted of lawyers 
and the courts to ignore the potential benefits offered by this technology.  
Despite the many benefits that flow from geolocation technology, its use is not 
problem-free. Doubts remain about the accuracy levels of the technology and there have 
905 At para. 7.3.16. 
906 At para 7.3.14 
907 At para 7.3.14.  
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been statements from such quarters as the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (Good Practice Note titled ‘Collecting Personal 
Information Using Websites) and Germany’s former data protection commissioner, 
Peter Schaar that IP addresses should be viewed as personal data. This could place quite 
serious legal and commercial strictures on geolocation service providers. 
On balance, however, geolocation technology constitutes a fillip for both the courts and 
copyright owners, a fillip that is likely to grow rather than diminish with the passage of 
time. 
10.5.3 Data retention legislation (facilitative)  
Despite the recent CJEU holding in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention 
Directive is invalid,908 it has to be borne in mind that in the UK, the transposing 
legislation – the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/859) – is still 
in force and may not be automatically invalid.909 Like all legislation, the 2009 
Regulations could be affected by function or scope creep, whereby data retained for one 
purpose – law enforcement – could also be used for other purposes. Lobbying by the 
CMBA has already occurred,910 whereby that association (representing the digital 
content industry) had demanded that access to retained data should also be granted for 
the purpose of investigating other crimes such as IP infringement. This could lead to a 
situation where an instrument brought in as an anti-terrorism measure may, in the 
future, be used to prosecute file-sharers.  
 
It is almost inevitable that a period of legal uncertainty will follow the CJEU ruling. 
There is now a strong likelihood that national transposing measures will be challenged 
in all of the Member States, meaning that the 2009 Regulations may meet the same fate 
as the legal instrument that inspired their adoption. As the declaration of invalidity by 
the CJEU takes effect from the date on which the directive entered into force, this 
element of retrospection could still seriously impact the outcome of court rulings long 
since concluded, where the evidence relied on was data retained under the directive. 
At EU level, it is hard to see a replacement directive being adopted in early course. In 
the meantime, the Luxembourg ruling may further galvanise those in Europe who have 
908 For an analysis of this ruling, see para 7.4.4. 
909 At para 7.4.  
910 At para 7.4.3. 
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been campaigning for a Digital Bill of Rights which would enshrine the right of privacy 
for netizens.  
 
At bottom, the Digital Rights Ireland ruling represents a privacy victory that makes 
subsequent drafting of data retention rules challenging as the European Commission 
will have to acknowledge the strength of the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and ensure that they are 
adequately provided for in any new law.  
 
10.5.4 The Dynamic Allocation of IP addresses (non-facilitative)  
This non-facilitative element is treated in chapter 8 of the thesis. When it comes to the 
dynamic allocation of IP addresses, BMG Canada v John Doe and EMI Records 
(Ireland) Limited v Data Protection Commissioner demonstrate how IP addresses are 
not assigned to the MAC addresses sequentially. Accordingly, IP addresses are not 
associated with any one account holder nor are they allocated in any predetermined 
pattern. As a consequence, it is not possible to directly identify an account holder 
merely from an IP address.  
 
Evidence adduced in BMG Canada v John Doe by BMG Canada’s employees revealed 
that the task of linking a name and address of an account holder to a specific IP address 
is far from straightforward and would involve cross-referencing the IP address to a 
database of MAC addresses and then cross-referencing the MAC address with the 
account database. To compound problems, the more historic the search, the less reliable 
the information. Clearly, the process of linking an IP address with a real person 
(possibly defendant) is neither straightforward nor fast. And, from an evidential 
perspective, much would hinge on how carefully the cross-referencing between the 
various sets of data is carried out.  
10.5.5 Facilitative elements versus non-facilitative elements  
On the basis of the four elements examined in this thesis (across chapters 7 and 8), it is 
clear that the application of the PIL tort rules to the internet will not be entirely 
straightforward. It goes without saying that black letter law cannot provide solutions for 
something like the dynamic allocation of IP addresses but it does seem that through a 
‘coalition’ of the three facilitative elements (Norwich Pharmacal relief, geolocation 
technology and data retention laws), the application of key jurisdictional provision such 
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as Article 2, Brussels I, will be made easier. Put differently, the black letter law alone 
may be inadequate and, for it to work efficaciously, it will be dependent on a ‘coalition’ 
of equitable relief, technology and data retention provisions/principles to provide the 
necessary evidence for locus to be determined. 
10.6  Models and analogues for online copyright infringement  
Chapter 6 was given over to critically evaluating and comparing the two online torts 
which form the backbone of this doctoral research, namely, online copyright 
infringement (the case study) and, the analogue - online defamation. The aim was to 
determine how compelling (or not) the defamation analogue actually is. I also 
highlighted what I felt were points of connection (crossover points) and points of 
disconnection between the various torts. In terms of the making available right, I 
critically evaluated localisation criteria formulated by Sterling and, separately, by the 
European Commission.911    
 
From this point on, I shall specify by heading which 2 torts are being compared in terms 
of conclusions.  
 
10.6.1 Reproduction right versus Defamation  
 
My findings are that there are more points of disconnection than points of connection 
between these two torts and that online defamation does not read so easily onto online 
infringement of the reproduction right. Rather, the approach taken by Svantesson can be 
developed and applied to the analysis of copyright infringement. The principal point of 
connection between the two torts exists at the level of the ISP where, by virtue of the E-
Commerce Directive, the ISP could avail of exemptions under Articles 12 (mere 
conduit) and 14 (hosting) for both defamatory material and content which infringes the 
reproduction right in copyright. 
911 Severine Dusollier et al, ‘Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society’ (European Commission, 
2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_study_en.pdf> 
accessed 5 May 2014. 
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 One significant disconnect between these 2 torts is the delayed harmful event in the case 
of defamation. As defamation requires the publishee to comprehend the defamatory 
material before the injury arises, there is therefore a (necessary) third party involvement 
which can slow down the commission of the tort and have a negative knock on effect 
for the cause of action.  
 
This potentially delayed cause of action contrasts with an online copyright infringement 
where the cause of action arises the instant the protected material is infringed. In sum, 
the infringement of the reproduction right potentially becomes actionable at a much 
earlier stage than defamation. Analysed differently, online copyright infringement cases 
do not require the ‘intervention’ of a third party for the cause of action to accrue.      
 
The possibility of immediate actionability in respect of an online copyright infringement 
is a very real benefit as torrent tracking sites (which have increased in number recently) 
assist rightholders to discover quite quickly if their copyright material has been 
infringed.   
10.6.2 Online Communication to the public versus online defamation  
 
One significant point of disconnection between the localisation of online 
communication to the public and online defamation is the requirement that there be a 
targeting of the public in the former. In the cases based on Section 97A CDPA 1988 
(analysed from para 7.3.5. onwards), it was this targeting of a UK public that localised 
the tort in the UK, thereby justifying assumption of jurisdiction by the UK courts.  
 
Another point of disconnection between the torts is the verifiability of the factors that 
go to make up the tort. When applying the ‘targeting the public’ test, the English High 
Court uses predominantly commercial and social/cultural factors, such as: language; 
advertising and origin of the internet traffic. As these factors are readily verifiable, a 
decision on localisation can be taken speedily. In contrast, when it comes to online 
defamation, the commission of the tort often occurs in a private setting. The tort takes 
place when the publishee downloads (and comprehends) the defamatory material. But, 
this will often involve a discrete and private act by the publishee, something 
considerably less verifiable than the factors outlined for targeting the public. Put 
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differently, localising an act of online defamation is more difficult to achieve than 
localising an online communication to the public, primarily because the factors to be 
verified in the latter are more public and therefore more ascertainable.  
 
10.6.3 Localisation of the making available right 
 
There is commonality between Sterling and the European Commission912 in terms of 
possibly localising the making available right at the place where the server (upon which 
the works are hosted) is located. However, the European Commission also expresses 
some scepticism about this criterion as it acknowledges possible difficulties in 
determining the actual location of the servers.  
 
These difficulties could be exacerbated if the infringing material is spread over different 
servers in different countries. While Sterling considers the two classic broadcasting 
theories – the communications theory and the emission theory – in the context of 
localising the making available right, he ultimately rejects the emission theory as he 
does not believe it to be practicable in an online setting.913 Factors that make the 
emission theory unworkable according to Sterling are: the absence of an identifiable 
transmission point914 and the risk of the infringing material being stored on multiple 
servers. In endorsing the communications theory, Sterling implicitly accepts that the 
making available takes place at the point of reception. In contrast with Sterling, the 
European Commission makes no reference to either of the broadcasting theories in its 
study.  
 
Applying the communications theory may not be entirely problem-free. There may be 
many points of reception for the digital material, making the localisation quite 
challenging. It is also interesting to note the CJEU’s ruling in Football Dataco v 
912 The views of the European Commission are set out in its previously mentioned ‘Study on the 
Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society’. 
913 There is an interesting parallel between Sterling’s viewpoint and the view of the CJEU in 
rejecting the Emission Theory in Case C-173/11 Football Dataco v Sportradar [2013] 
CMLR 29, analysed at para. 3.6.4.5. 
914  In justifying its rejection of the Emission Theory in Football Dataco v Sportradar, the CJEU 
also adverted to the risk of localising the originating server, see para 3.6.4.5.   
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Sportradar where that court seemed to keep all its options open by remaining open to 
both the emission and communications theory.915    
10.7 Research Questions and Answers  
Having set out my general conclusions, I shall now recapitulate my original research 
questions and provide answers to same.  
 
10.7.1 Question 1  
What are the main practical difficulties that arise in terms of applying the EU tort 
PIL rules to the internet? 
The two principal difficulties are linked to Articles 2 and 5(3), Brussels I. The former 
relates to identification of the defendant (IP infringer) while the latter relates to 
localisation of the IP infringement (‘the harmful event’ in the parlance of Brussels I)  
As regards the difficulty linked to Article 2, where the claimant fails to identify an 
online infringer (defendant), the possible action comes to nought. A potentially worse 
scenario might unfold were the IP owner to misidentify the infringer. In such a 
situation, the IP owner could leave himself exposed to an action in defamation. A 
misidentification of infringer is not as far-fetched as it may sound. After all, the 
accuracy of geolocation technology is still impugned in some quarters and, an ISP may 
commit an error when attempting to comply with a NPO. 
In cases of IP infringement, it is very difficult to say where the act of infringement 
occurred when there is a whole sequence of events between the original uploading 
(input) of information and its eventual display on a screen. This situation is 
compounded if the infringement traverses a number of countries. However, even in this 
complicated sequence of events, there will always be two really significant events (or, 
constants) – the uploading of the information and its eventual downloading.  
In cases of online IP infringement, if there is a failure to pinpoint the locus delicti, there 
will be negative consequences for the claimant IP holder though, as the option to sue in 
the country where the harm (tort) occurred would then disappear, thereby forcing him to 
sue the defendant in the latter’s place of domicile (under Article 2, Brussels I). 
915  Para 3.6.4.6.  
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However, this might not necessarily be the claimant’s preferred forum in which to 
litigate. 
 
10.7.2 Question 2  
What role does technology play in conflicts scenarios in the twenty-first century? 
And, on balance, who derives greater benefit from technology - the claimant (IP 
owner) or the defendant (IP infringer)?  
Technology plays an important and growing role in PIL situations. In chapter 7, I 
referred to the growing prominence of geolocation technology in court proceedings and 
even in legislation.916  
Currently, client-side geolocation technologies offer the highest degree of accuracy, 
deploying as they do, a user-centric model. Such technologies operate using GPS and 
wireless tower triangulation and frequently, iPhones and GPS-equipped wireless 
devices can be located within a radius of a few dozen feet which is as close as you will 
get to precise geographic location. Naturally, from a PIL perspective, this is a 
significantly better situation than server-side geolocation tools which can only locate 
most users within a twenty to thirty mile radius.917  
On balance, the IP owner benefits more as geolocation technology continues to improve 
in terms of accuracy and it has been endorsed by the courts in the US and continental 
Europe.918 There is a good prospect that this technology will become well-established as 
an evidential tool in the court system. As anonymity on the internet/anonymising 
software do not come within the scope of this thesis, they have not been considered in 
depth. That said, however, the author recognises the real risk posed by anonymising 
software when it comes to digital copyright/rightholders’ interests on the internet.  
 
916 See para 7.3.13. 
917 As to accuracy levels of geolocation technology in general, see para 7.3.12  
918 At para 7.3.14 
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10.7.3 Question 3  
In terms of applying Articles 2 and 5(3), Brussels I, to an internet environment, 
which elements are either facilitative or non-facilitative when it comes to the 
effective application of those provisions?  
The facilitative elements comprise Norwich Pharmacal relief, geolocation technology 
and data retention legislation. A non-facilitative element is the leasing or dynamic 
allocation of IP addresses (but there is acknowledgement that anonymising 
software/techniques also constitute a non-facilitative element, but they were not covered 
in this thesis)   
 
10.7.4 Question 4  
In terms of applying Article 5 (3), Brussels I, to online IP infringements, how 
useful is the analogue of online defamation? 
At para 6.9.2. of this thesis, I set out the points of disconnection between online 
infringement of the reproduction right and online defamation. The principal 
disconnection is the ‘delayed’ harmful event in online defamation, often caused by the 
publishee only comprehending the defamatory material quite some time after it was 
originally sent. But, this also results in a delay in terms of the cause of action accruing 
to the victim.  
This potentially delayed cause of action contrasts with an online copyright infringement 
where the cause of action arises the instant the protected material is infringed. In other 
words, the online copyright infringement becomes actionable at an earlier stage 
(potentially, much earlier stage) than the online defamation, for infringement of 
reproduction and communication rights 
In addition, in copyright infringement cases, there is no requirement that there be third 
party involvement (i.e. the publishee). Infringement of copyright material occurs once 
the act of primary infringement occurs – there is no requirement that a recipient takes 
possession of the infringing material. The commission of the tort in an online IPR 
scenario is more immediate than in an online defamation scenario.  
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One could argue that the immediate actionability of the online copyright infringement is 
more theoretical than real, but, with the growing number of torrent tracking sites, this 
increases the likelihood of infringing copies being discovered soon after their creation. 
Interestingly, a 2012 study conducted by Birmingham University indicates that an 
illegal file-sharer downloading popular content would be logged by a monitoring firm 
within three hours. 919 
 
10.7.5 How well established is the lex loci protectionis within Europe?  
Clearly, Article 8(1), Rome II, makes provision for the lex loci protectionis in situations 
where copyright is infringed. The rule is further bolstered by Recital (26) of the same 
Regulation. However, the suggestion in that provision that the lex loci protectionis is ‘a 
universally acknowledged principle’ is perhaps going a bit too far as, even before the 
adoption of Rome II, there was no consistent practice among the Member States.  
The lex loci protectionis is found in a number of national laws to include the Belgian 
Code of Private International Law, the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987, the 
Italian Private International Law Act 1995 and the German partial codification of tort 
and property choice of law rules.  
 
 Curiously, while the Austrian Private International Law Act 1978 provides for the lex 
loci delicti, that country’s Supreme Court and a number of authors have effectively 
interpreted it to mean the lex loci protectionis.  
While there is not a universal preference for the lex loci protectionis, there seems to be a 
clear tendency towards various slightly different lex loci protectionis approaches. A 
country which does not apply the lex loci protectionis is the Netherlands. Instead, it 
applies the lex loci delicti by virtue of its 2001 Private International Law Act on Torts 
which has no specific rule on Intellectual Property.  
10.8 Some final conclusions   
One key benefit derived from using and adapting Svantesson’s defamation model was 
that it enabled me to extend my analysis in terms of online tort localisation to two other 
of copyright’s restricted rights, namely the communication to the public right and the 
making available right. In terms of my research on the communication to the public 
919 See para 6.9.2. 
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right, that led me to the webblocking cases and the ‘targeting the public test’, applied by 
the English High to determine if an infringing communication to the public could be 
localised in the UK. In critically evaluating the localisation of the making available 
right, I could draw on the findings of both Sterling and the European Commission. 
 
The localisation ‘template’ that I used in chapter 6 allowed me to position the findings 
conveniently so that I could also draw on pertinent EU legislation (e.g. the E-Commerce 
Directive) that might influence an issue like liability when it comes to an ISP’s 
‘involvement’ in an online tort.  
 
In systematically separating actions and harms in the defamation/reproduction part of 
the ‘template’, it is entirely feasible for this part of the model to be applied to other 
online torts in the future so as to determine locus delicti.  
 
As regards the making  available right, Dusollier’s criterion No 3 (Where the material 
act of upload is initiated)920 represents an attempt to return to the unitary-right model 
first used by the Cable and Satellite Directive, whereby the location of a broadcast for 
copyright/licensing purposes was identified as the single State of uplink. Some 
commentators predicted that the Cable and Satellite Directive would be overtaken by 
digitisation, 921 meaning that rights would would follow the InfoSoc Directive, which, 
arguably reflects a traditional territorial approach. However, my research (at paras 6.10 
to 6.10.3) shows that by adopting a ‘targeted push’ model of online communication to 
the public, the web-blocking cases have avoided the most fragmented version of the 
purely territorial approach that would flow from following Dow Jones v Gutnick. 
Instead, these cases have put online communication to the public on a jurisdictional 
footing similar to cable and satellite, in a way which is compatible with the ‘new public’ 
approach of FAPL v QC Leisure (analysed at 3.6.1.).   
 
 
*** 
920 At para 6.18 
921 For instance, Bernt Hugenholtz, see: , 'Copyright without Frontiers: is there a future for the 
Satellite and Cable Directive' (IViR, 2005) 
<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/copyrightwithoutfrontiers.pdf> accessed 13 June 
2014 
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Appendix 1 (Literature Review) 
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1. Kono – Intellectual Property and Private International Law – Comparative 
Perspectives (2012)  
 
2. Svantesson – Private International Law and the Internet (2012)  
 
3. Fawcett and Torremans – Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2011) 
 
4. Leible and Ohly – Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2009)  
 
5. Dickinson – The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (2008)  
 
6. Gottschalk et al – Conflict of Laws in a Globalised World (2007)  
 
7. Drexl and Kur - Intellectual Property and Private International Law (IIC Studies - 
Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law) (2005)  
 
8. Basedow et al (eds) - Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws (2005)  
 
9. Mireille van Eechoud – Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives 
to the Lex Protectionis (2003) 
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Objective of this Appendix   
This Appendix is a literature review of the principal works published over the last ten 
years or so which are relevant to my doctoral thesis, to include textbooks, monographs 
and edited volumes. Interestingly, quite a number of the works reviewed are based on 
conferences/symposia, proving that the delicate interface between IP and PIL is being 
discussed and debated at public fora more and more. Examples of the last-mentioned 
category include the works by Leible and Ohly, Basedow, Drexl, Kur and Metzger and, 
lastly, that by Drexl and Kur. 
One thing that this appendix highlights is the growing importance and profile of the 
complex interface between IP and PIL. This is evidenced by a growing number of 
exemplary specialist textbooks on this interface with Continental European authors very 
prominent in this regard.  
Literature Review   
The subject-matter of the vast majority of the works referred to in this appendix is 
directly relevant to my thesis. Admittedly, Svantesson’s work is somewhat of an odd 
man out, given its strong consumer contracts and defamation focus. However, the 
tortious character of the last-mentioned element of course ensures the relevance of 
Svantesson’s book to this PhD, as does the incorporation of the treatment of trade marks 
in the second edition (2012) of the work. The fact that the work looks at the thorny 
interface between PIL and the internet is already ample justification for its treatment in 
this doctoral dissertation. The analogue of online defamation, treatment of online trade 
marks infringement and the all-important analysis of geo-identification and geolocation 
technologies (in chapter 10) ensure, together, that Svantesson’s work comes within the 
scope of analysis of my PhD.   
I now propose treating the principal relevant textbooks to this thesis in reverse 
chronological order, commencing with the very recently published Intellectual Property 
and Private International Law, Comparative Perspectives, by Kono (ed). 
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Kono – Intellectual Property and Private International Law – Comparative 
Perspectives (2012)922 
This work grew out of the 18th International Congress of Comparative Law and 
comprises the General and National Reports arising from said congress. It offers a 
comparative law perspective on a range of core issues covering more than twenty 
countries across North America, Europe (EU Member States and third countries) and 
Asia. The topics covered are diverse and include: issues of personal and subject-matter 
jurisdiction, provisional and protective measures, the law applicable to the creation and 
transfer of IPRs and their infringement, problems raised by parallel and concurrent 
proceedings and the recognition/enforcement of foreign judgments. In addition, the 
following are all considered: the CLIP proposals, the ALI proposals, the reform of the 
Brussels I Regulation and the potential impact of the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention. Kono’s book does not omit developments in Asia. The Transparency of 
Japanese Law Project (analogous to the ALI and CLIP Principles) and the Korean 
Waseda project are covered. The Waseda group, established by scholars in Waseda 
University has, as its objective, the drafting of a proposal on jurisdiction and applicable 
law for the whole East Asian region. Running parallel with the aforementioned proposal 
is a separate proposal for the revision of domestic Korean PIL in order to make the 
cross-border adjudication of IP disputes more effective. Ultimately, the intention is to 
unify both sets of Principles. 
Svantesson – Private International Law and the Internet (2012)  
A textbook which marries two of this thesis’ core elements - PIL and the internet, is that 
written by Dan Jerker B Svantesson and published in 2012 (2nd edn) entitled simply but 
appositely, Private International Law and the Internet.923 The book’s relevance derives 
from the following facts: 1. One of its primary foci is online defamation (which, like IP 
infringement, is tortious in nature); 2. A treatment of trade marks is included in the 
current edition; and 3. An entire chapter (Chapter 10) is devoted to geolocation (or geo-
identification) technologies. Besides these two elements, the book very helpfully 
examines the internet’s core characteristics.924 Early in this chapter, Svantesson states 
922  Toshiyuki Kono (ed), Intellectual Property and Private International Law – 
Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2012).  
923  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012). 
924  In chapter 2, titled ‘Approaching the Internet’.   
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that ‘internet communications challenge traditional models of regulation and 
governance’.925 In effect, it is a unique combination of features that makes internet 
communication significantly different. This combination comprises the following 
characteristics: the borderlessness of the internet (the internet is sometimes described as 
border-disregarding); the internet’s geographical independence (it is very easy to make 
internet communication available to people across geographical borders);926 the lack of 
geographical indicators (particularly as regards domain names and e-mail addresses)927 
and the lack of central control of the internet/internet communications.928 
Tellingly, Svantesson observes that the internet’s unique set of characteristics have 
profound implications for jurisdictional issues. Refusing to pull any punches, he states 
that ‘certain rules of PIL have lost their logical bases’.929 Concluding that particular 
chapter of his book, Svantesson states presciently: 
Finally, the observation that internet communications are associated with a 
unique set of characteristics allows us  to draw one last, fundamental and for the 
rest of this book decisive conclusion – the application of existing conflict of 
laws rules to internet-fact scenarios cannot be described as the mere application 
of old rules or principles. Instead, it must be acknowledged that, due to the 
social, economical and technical peculiarities of internet technology, any such 
application, in fact, constitutes an expansion of the scope of the pre-existing rule 
or principle.930  
925  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (2nd edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2012) 29. 
926  This characteristic is manifested in two ways: For the one imparting information, it is easy 
to make internet communication available to people across geographical borders. For the 
ones seeking information, the geographical location of that information is virtually 
irrelevant in most forms of internet communication. Another aspect of internet 
communication being geographically independent is that it is virtually instantaneous. For 
instance, the time difference between visiting a local website (i.e. stored on a local server) 
and visiting a geographically distant website is minimal. Ibid 35 et seq.   
927  However, when it comes to IP addresses, Svantesson qualifies his assessment somewhat. 
This is due to the emergence of ‘increasingly accurate so-called geo-location technologies’. 
These technologies represent the technical means for connecting an IP address with a 
physical location. Svantesson alludes to the increasing use of mobile devices, such as PDAs, 
smart phones and tablets and the related need to consider additional mechanisms for 
geographical identification such as Global Positioning System (GPS). Ibid 44 et seq.     
928  In its very structure and architecture, the internet is decentralised. Svantesson makes the 
interesting observation that PIL rules too have never operated in a climate where a single 
international authority sets the regulatory standard. Ibid 49 et seq.  
929  Ibid 61 (emphasis added). 
930  Ibid 62. 
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Fawcett and Torremans – Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2011)931   
One of the very real advantages of the latest edition of Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law is that it treats the online aspects of the IP/PIL interface in much 
greater detail than did the first edition (published in 1998). In fact, two chapters of the 
second edition are given over to internet-related issues, namely, chapters 10 and 17. The 
former, titled ‘Infringement, the Internet and Broadcasting: Jurisdiction’ encompasses 
such elements as: characteristics of the internet, infringement over the internet, sale of 
infringing goods over the internet, complementary torts committed over the internet 
(one of which is defamation) and lastly, broadcasting. The latter, titled ‘Choice of Law 
and the Internet’ commences by specifying the real clash taking place between the 
global or ubiquitous nature of the internet and the territorial approach, which is the 
founding principle of the IP universe. It then analyses the difficulties in determining 
place of reproduction in alleged online copyright infringement cases. (Does it occur 
when content is pulled up onto the user’s screen or must the content be saved by the 
user onto his PC hard drive before reproduction occurs?) It then distinguishes between 
these localisation issues and PIL issues in the strict sense. In reality, the choice of law 
process and the choice of law rules are unaffected. Rome II Regulation, Article 8 
applies and it is up to the claimant to determine for which countries he seeks protection.  
Importantly, Chapter 17 examines the instance of ubiquitous infringement (facilitated 
by ubiquitous media, such as the internet). As the term suggests, these cases are truly 
global ones where infringement potentially happens in every single country. In effect, 
we are probably really only talking about internet- and satellite-related IP breaches here 
as they are the only media with truly global reach. Tellingly, the authors imply that the 
preponderant example of ubiquitous IP infringement is online copyright infringement: 
What is necessarily ubiquitous are the means of communication used to commit 
the infringement. The potentially global case can only happen if, say, the 
internet is used. Then means of communication must be ubiquitous. In practice, 
we are concerned with copyright infringement on the internet.932  
931  James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2011). 
932  Ibid 918. 
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In instances of ubiquitous infringement, it would be unfair if the infringer who posted 
the infringing document could, on the basis of insignificant use, see a large number of 
different laws potentially applied against him, each time in respect of minuscule 
damage. Instead, what is justifiable is the application of a single law to the case, most 
probably the law with the closest connection to the infringement. Both, the European 
Max Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) and American 
Law Institute (ALI) proposals, have ubiquitous infringement provisions.933 However, 
the two proposals differ somewhat in the criteria (factors) they use to determine which 
State has the closest connection with the infringement.934  
Leible and Ohly – Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2009)935   
An edited work – Intellectual Property and Private International Law by Stefan Leible 
and Ansgar Ohly, was published in 2009. The book is based on a Bayreuth conference 
(4/5 April 2008) of the same name and comprises papers presented at that conference. 
From the perspective of this thesis, the most relevant papers are the following:  
1. Annette Kur’s ‘Are there any common European principles of Private 
International Law with regard to Intellectual Property?’ 
2. Axel Metzger’s ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property 
Infringements on the Internet – Brussels I Regulation, ALI principles and Max 
Planck Proposals’ in Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property 
and Private International Law (1st edn, Mohr Siebeck 2009) 251 – 267 
3. Frank Beckstein’s summary of the presentation given by Rochelle Dreyfuss 
titled ‘The American Law Institute Project on Intellectual Property: Principles 
Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Judgments in Transnational 
Disputes’  
933  The CLIP provision is Article 3:603: Ubiquitous Infringement, while the relevant ALI 
principle is Section 321: Law or Laws to be applied in cases of ubiquitous infringement.  
934  The relevant factors in the CLIP rule are: (a) the infringer’s habitual residence; (b) the 
infringer’s principal place of business; (c) the place where substantial activities in furthering 
of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out; and, (d) the place where the harm 
caused by the infringement is substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety. As 
regards the ALI Principles, the relevant factors are as follows: (a) where the parties reside; 
(b) where the parties’ relationship, if any, is centred; (c) the extent of the activities and the 
investment of the parties; and, (d), the principal markets towards which the parties directed 
their activities.   
935  Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(1st edn, Mohr Siebeck 2009). 
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The first paper, by Annette Kur, titled ‘Are there any common European principles of 
Private International Law with regard to Intellectual Property?’ is quite self-
explanatory. Kur’s paper also explores whether the so-called common European 
principles are distinguishable from those which apply outside Europe, particularly, the 
US. The scope of Kur’s paper covers the CLIP project (Max Planck Institutes in Munich 
and Hamburg) and some of the characteristic features of the counterpart US project - the 
ALI Principles.  
As regards the applicable law in relation to non-contractual obligations, Kur makes 
some interesting observations. She states that even before the Rome II Regulation was 
adopted, the PIL principles applying in Europe with regard to IP infringements were 
common in that the lex loci protectionis prevailed in respect of approximately 95% of 
pre-Rome II law and practice in EU Member States. Kur also contends that by virtue of 
Rome II, Article 8(1), a somewhat modified version of Berne Convention, Article 5(2) 
will become part of European black letter law. In the words of Kur, this incorporation of 
Article 5(2) into the European applicable law legal framework ‘lends a different accent 
to long-standing debates about the character of the lex protectionis as a choice of law 
rule derived from international norms such as national treatment or Berne Convention, 
Article 5(2) itself’.936 
Kur makes an interesting observation about infringements perpetrated through 
ubiquitous media such as the internet. In such cases, the infringement arguably occurs in 
every country that is reached by the communication. In such cases, the courts may 
derogate from the lex protectionis by applying the law which is most closely connected 
with the infringement in its entirety. She acknowledges that such a principle could, 
under certain circumstances, unduly favour the interests of the plaintiff (typically the 
right holder). In cases of ubiquitous infringement, the plaintiff may have an opportunity 
to bring world-wide proceedings in her home country. Further, he may then additionally 
profit from the natural tendency of courts to assume that the law having the closest 
connection to a case is the law of the forum. 
To maintain a balance however, the aforementioned principle has a counterweight (rule) 
whereby any party may prove that the law applying in a country/countries covered by 
936  Annette Kur, ‘Are there any common European principles of Private International Law with 
regard to Intellectual Property?’ in Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual 
Property and Private International Law (1st edn, Mohr Siebeck 2009). 
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the dispute differs, in aspects which are essential for the decision, from the law 
identified by the court as the law having the closest connection. In such a case, the court 
shall apply the different laws unless this leads to inconsistent judgments, in which case 
the differences are taken into account in fashioning the remedy.     
Metzger starts his article ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property 
Infringements on the Internet – Brussels I Regulation, ALI principles and Max Planck 
Proposals’ by referring to the trend of consolidation in terms of jurisdictional issues and 
offers as the clearest landmark of this consolidation process, the final approval of the 
American Law Institute of the ‘Intellectual Property Principles Governing Jurisdiction, 
Choice of Law and Judgments in Transnational Disputes’ in May 2007. Reference is 
then made to an important European academic project initiated by the Max Planck 
Institute (Munich) which published draft principles on jurisdiction in intellectual 
property cases in 2004. Lastly, Metzger describes a follow-up project commenced in 
2004 by the Max Planck Institutes in Munich and Hamburg as an international project 
with members from six Member States of the EU and the US. Titled the ‘European Max 
Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP)’, the objective of the 
project was to formulate a comprehensive set of principles on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement.  
In this short analysis of Metzger’s paper, I shall focus on special jurisdiction (forum 
delicti), in essence, the framework of Brussels I, Article 5(3).  
Metzger makes an important observation about the locus delicti under Article 5(3) when 
he states that ‘the ECJ has not yet decided on the interpretation of the provision in 
internet cases’.937 
Looking at the duality of jurisdictional options under Bier,938 Metzger posits two 
possible places upon which jurisdiction could be based - firstly, place of download and 
secondly, place where the defendant mainly acted or at the place of the server of the 
website. Either, Metzger argues, could constitute the place where the event giving rise 
to the damage took place. As regards basing jurisdiction on place of download, Metzger 
937  Axel Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringements on the 
Internet – Brussels I Regulation, ALI principles and Max Planck Proposals’ in Stefan Leible 
and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law (1st edn, Mohr 
Siebeck 2009) 255. 
938  Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735 (the 
‘Reinwater’ case). 
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cites a number of Continental European judgments which support this position, e.g. 
Roederer (French Cour de Cassation)939 and ‘Red Bull’ (Austrian Oberster 
Gerichtshof).940 However, this approach has lost much of its influence of late as it is 
overly wide and creates many problems for defendants. For instance, IP infringers who 
use peer-to-peer or YouTube to disseminate/display infringing material could end up 
being sued anywhere in the world where the infringing material is downloaded. A 
possible solution comes by limiting jurisdiction to those countries where the alleged 
infringement has commercial effect941 or substantial impact compared to the 
infringement as a whole. The second option - granting jurisdiction to the courts of the 
place where the acts of the alleged infringer occur – ties in with Article 2:202 of the 
Final Text of CLIP’s Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (2011) 
which provides that the infringer must have acted in the relevant State (to initiate or 
further the infringement) or must have directed activity to that State before the courts of 
such State can assume jurisdiction.  
Metzger contends that localising the place of activity may cause practical problems in 
internet cases. Given the ease of manipulation of the server, the location of the server is 
not an adequate determination. Metzger finally localises the place of activity at the place 
where the upload of internet services were initiated or controlled.942      
In disputes concerned with infringement of an intellectual property right, a person may 
be sued in the courts of the State where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur, 
unless the alleged infringer has not acted in that State to initiate or further the 
infringement and his/her activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been directed to 
that State. 
939  Castellblanch SA v Champagne Louis Roederer SA [2004] IL Pr 41, [2004] Rev Crit DIP 
632. 
940  OGH 24.4.2001, GRUR Int 2002, 265 (‘Red Bull’ case). 
941  The commercial effect concept has already found international consensus on a substantive 
law level in the WIPO, ‘Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Marks, and other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet’ 
(845(E), 24 September - 3 October 2001) 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/marks/845/pub845.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2014. 
942  Axel Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringements on the 
Internet – Brussels I Regulation, ALI principles and Max Planck Proposals’ in Stefan Leible 
and Ansgar Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law (1st edn, Mohr 
Siebeck 2009) citing James J Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property in Private 
International Law (1st edn, OUP 1998) 143. 
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Another elucidating piece in the Leible/Ohly work is that by Frank Beckstein. Beckstein 
analyses the presentation given by Rochelle Dreyfuss on the American Law Institute’s 
project on Intellectual Property and Conflicts, to include jurisdiction, choice of law and 
recognition/enforcement elements. The final draft of these Principles received approval 
by the membership of the ALI on 14 May 2007 and, at the time of Beckstein’s writing, 
the final text of the Principles was going to be published imminently.  
Professor Dreyfuss explained that the point of origin of the ALI project was the 
suspension of the work on the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters of the Hague Conference of PIL. The objective of the 
Principles is to serve the courts as guidelines. Courts can rely on these Principles, 
wherever applicable, as long as their use is not against the law of the forum. 
The scope of the Principles, settled in Section 102, is deemed to be very broad, applying 
as they do to both registered and unregistered IPRs. An important limitation of the 
scope of the Principles is the requirement of transnational civil dispute. 
The ALI Principles distinguish between personal and subject matter jurisdiction. As 
regards personal jurisdiction, the Principles at Section 204 offer three different options. 
First, an alleged infringer of IP may be sued in any State in which that person has 
substantially acted (Section 204(1)). A court at the place of the substantial act can deal 
with all injuries that arise from that activity. A second basis for jurisdiction is the place 
where the activities are directed. In such case, however, the competence of the court in 
the relevant State will be limited to injuries that arise in that specific location (Section 
204(2)). The third basis relates to infringement havens. As WTO membership is viewed 
as a kind of ‘proxy’ of good law, non-WTO countries are viewed as potential 
infringement havens. Other important requirements are that the defendant solicits or 
maintains contact, business or an audience in the non-WTO country on a regular basis 
(Section 204(3)). In short, under this jurisdictional basis, if infringers distribute 
infringing (US) copyright-protected material from non-WTO States, then US courts are 
competent with respect to the full geographic scope of the harm, if the infringer directs 
its activities to the US and has enough contacts or business there. 
The Principles differentiate between personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a court 
can only entertain a suit if it has power both over the litigants and the subject matter. 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter depends on the powers given by the respective State 
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and the court cannot exceed its legislatively defined competence over the issues by 
reference to the Principles (Section 211(1)). 
The Principles also suggest rules for the execution of the rules on subject matter 
jurisdiction (Sections 211(2) – 214). As special focus is placed on local law, the parties 
are obliged to present their case, wherever possible, under local law, and, consistent 
with the scope of personal jurisdiction under these Principles, with all transactionally 
related claims in a single court. The courts shall extend their subject matter to all claims 
and counter claims arising from the initial activity (Section 212). However, the parties 
are not obliged to bring all claims in the same court and can present their cases in 
different courts. Under the ALI Principles, therefore, the violation of various patents in 
the same invention can be adjudicated in one forum, unlike the situation that prevailed 
under the Federal Circuit’s decision in Voda v Cordis.943  
On the issue of the applicable law, Prof Dreyfuss stated how the ALI had adopted the 
lex loci protectionis as a general principle for the major issues, i.e. the existence, 
validity, duration, attributes, infringement and remedies (Section 301). In terms of 
defining the lex loci protectionis, it is the law of the State of registration for registered 
rights and, for unregistered rights, it is the law of the place where protection is sought, 
ie where the infringing act has or will have an impact. 
A special rule for ubiquitous infringements is also contained in the ALI Principles 
(Section 321). It is similar to the ideas in the CLIP project as both groups cooperated in 
that matter. Thus, in cases where infringement is ubiquitous, the Principles allow for the 
issues of existence, validity, duration, attributes, infringement and remedies to be 
governed by the law with the closest connection to the entire case (rather than a 
multiplicity of laws). It is also possible to simplify the dispute by applying not one 
single law, but instead a small number of laws that are closely connected to the case. 
In conclusion, Professor Dreyfuss considered the value and the practical relevance of 
the ALI Principles. She believes that the project will promote further discussion and 
greater effort to resolve the problems arising from transnational disputes in IP. It may 
also shift the focus from efforts to over-harmonise IP laws to investigating ways to 
make global litigation less costly and time-consuming. On a distinct issue, as IP 
disputes become increasingly global, Prof Dreyfuss and her fellow reporters believe that 
943  Voda v Cordis, 476 F 3d 887 (Fed Cir 2007). 
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atomised approaches by single countries cannot be the answer in the long run. 
Alternatives to the atomised approach, such as the extraterritorial application of IP law 
and the creation of a system of unitary rights worldwide are unlikely to be acceptable or, 
come into force. Because of the shortcomings of alternative approaches, Prof Dreyfuss 
advocates a system of efficient litigation of the national IPRs as set out in the ALI 
Principles.  
Dickinson – The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (2008)  
In 2008, a specialist text on the Rome II Regulation was published by Andrew 
Dickinson.944 As Rome II features prominently in this thesis, the relevance of the work 
goes without saying. It is also fitting that a book came out so promptly after the 
regulation’s adoption as the instrument clearly constitutes a landmark in PIL. The 
regulation’s importance derives from the fact that it is both the first EU instrument of 
general application harmonising rules of applicable law and the most comprehensive 
instrument of its kind anywhere in the world.945 Chapter 8 of Dickinson’s work proved 
particularly relevant as it treats Intellectual Property. The analysis of Rome II, Article 
8(1) (which governs the applicable law in the context of non-contractual obligations 
arising from an infringement of an IPR) is dealt with in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Gottschalk et al – Conflict of Laws in a Globalised World (2007)  
A 2007 work which commemorates the pioneering work of Professor Arthur Taylor von 
Mehren (Harvard Law School), Conflict of Laws in a Globalised World,946 has two 
principal foci. Firstly, transatlantic litigation and judicial cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters, and secondly, choice of law in transatlantic relationships. In terms 
of the former, Christian Thiele’s chapter ‘The Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court 
Agreements: Was it Worth the Effort?’ carries relevance for this PhD. In terms of the 
latter, Eckart Gottschalk’s chapter titled ‘The Law Applicable to Intellectual Property 
Rights: Is the Lex Loci Protectionis a Pertinent Choice-of-Law Approach?’ also 
944  Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations, Oxford Private International Law Series (OUP 2008). 
945  Ibid Preface. 
946  Eckart Gottschalk et al (eds), Conflict of Laws in a Globalised World (1st edn, CUP 
2007).This work is, in fact, a commemoration of the works of Professor Arthur von Mehren 
(Harvard Law School) who had developed new thinking in the fields of private international 
law and comparative law and who passed away in 2006, having spent 50 years teaching law.   
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contains many components which fall within the scope of this thesis. Some of the core 
elements in Gottschalk’s chapter are the following: the tensions that exist between the 
lex loci protectionis947 and the lex originis;948 how the lex loci protectionis has been 
explicitly codified in many of the recent codifications of PIL;949 whether the national 
treatment clause in Berne Convention, Article 5(2), points towards the law of the 
protecting country or is simply a non-discrimination rule?; What is the scope of the lex 
loci protectionis? Does it only cover the extent of protection, or does it also include the 
creation of copyright including questions of initial ownership?; Recent codification 
projects to encompass the then Discussion Draft produced by the American Law 
Institute titled ‘Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes’ (finalised and published in 2008)950 and the 
then draft Rome II Regulation (with focus on Article 8(1)); and, finally, the challenges 
posed when the lex loci protectionis is applied in the context of multi-State conflicts.951 
Drexl and Kur - Intellectual Property and Private International Law (IIC Studies - 
Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law) (2005)  
This work is a collection of symposium papers put together in the guise of Intellectual 
Property and Private International Law – Heading for the Future (IIC Studies).952 The 
relevant symposium, held in July 2003, was ‘Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
947  Under this choice-of-law rule, IPRs are governed by the law of the State for whose territory 
protection is claimed.   
948  Under this choice-of-law rule, IPRs are governed by the law of the country from which they 
originate.    
949  For example, Swiss Private International Law Act (1987), art 110(1), which served as a 
model for later codifications throughout Europe - for Belgium: Code of Private International 
Law (2004), art 93(1); for Italy: Law No 218/1995, art 54(1); for the Republic of Korea: 
Private International Law Act, revised by Law No 6465/2001, Section 24; for Austria: the 
doctrine and the Supreme Court have interpreted the Private International Law Act 1978, as 
amended, art 34(1) as referring to the law of the State for which protection is claimed. 
950  Analysis revolves around Section 301 (‘Territoriality’) which deals with the applicable law 
in cases of IP infringement (i.e. for registered rights, the law of each State of registration 
and, ‘for other intellectual property rights’, the law of each State for which protection is 
claimed) and Section 321 (‘Ubiquitous Infringements’). Sub-section (1) of Section 321 
permits the parties and the court to agree to apply the law(s) of the State(s) with the closest 
connection to the dispute ‘in exceptional cases’.  
951  Two principal challenges manifest themselves. Firstly, the courts have to deal with a 
multitude of legal systems and, as a corollary, a mosaic of applicable laws. Secondly, the 
forum courts may be inclined to apply the lex loci protectionis extraterritorially, which tends 
to result in overregulation.  
952  Josef Drexl and Annette Kur (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law – 
Heading for the Future (IIC Studies) (Hart Publishing 2005). 
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Intellectual Property Matters - Perspectives for the Future (Europe and Worldwide)’.953 
It marked the culmination of a project concerned with the elaboration of draft provisions 
on jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments in IP matters that had been 
conducted at the Max Planck Institute since spring 2001.   
From the perspective of this thesis, the most relevant papers in this collection of 
symposium papers are: Andrea Schulz’s piece, ‘The Hague Conference Project for a 
Global Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement in Civil and 
Commercial Matters: An Update’, Richard Fentiman’s ‘Choice of Law and Intellectual 
Property’, ‘The Proposed Rome II Regulation: European Choice of Law in the Field of 
Intellectual Property’ by Josef Drexl and, lastly, Ansgar Ohly’s ‘Choice of Law in the 
Digital Environment’.     
While Ohly’s chapter acknowledges that the lex loci protectionis prevails in IP 
disputes,954 he also observes that conflicts and infringements of IPRs on the internet 
make a fresh analysis of the traditional approach to the choice of law in IP disputes 
inevitable. 
Ohly singles out three initiatives that exemplify this fresh analysis. The first initiative 
commenced in 1998 when the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, 
Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications elaborated principles concerning the 
use of marks and other distinctive signs on the internet. After several rounds of 
discussions, the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet was adopted at a 
joint session of the Paris Union and the WIPO General Assembly in 2001. 
The second initiative took the form of a draft international agreement on jurisdictional 
matters in the area of IP Law. This draft agreement, which was put together by Rochelle 
Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg, was later adopted as a project by the American Law 
Institute. The ALI broadened the parameters of the project to include choice of law and 
judgment components in transnational disputes. Those additional elements survived and 
featured in the final set of Principles which were published by the ALI in 2008.955 
953  This symposium was organised by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law. 
954  Referring to the Swiss Act on Private International Law, art 110(1) in the process. 
955  American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of 
Law and Judgments in Transnational Disputes’ (WIPO, 2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7687> accessed 13 July 2012. 
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The Working Group on Questions of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Intellectual 
Property Matters,956 initiated by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law (Munich), constitutes the third initiative. This Working 
Group actually draws on the expertise found in the last-mentioned Institute and the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and Private International Law (Hamburg). Together, 
these institutes organised a joint conference ‘Intellectual Property in the Conflict of 
Laws’ in March 2004 at which representatives of the European Commission, the ALI, 
and the Hague Conference reported on the current status of legislative efforts and legal 
projects.957 
Basedow et al (eds) - Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws (2005)  
The book, Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws958 comprises papers given at the 
Hamburg Symposium held on the 2 and 3 March 2004. The symposium was organised 
by two of the leading centres of study in the fields of law concerned, namely, the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and Private International Law (Hamburg) and the Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (Munich).959 In 
terms of relevance to this thesis, one paper from the Hamburg symposium stands out, 
namely, Graeme Dinwoodie’s ’Conflicts and International Copyright Litigation: The 
Role of International Norms’. In short, the most compelling points from Dinwoodie’s 
paper are as follows: The tendency of US and EU courts to increasingly permit the 
adjudication of claims under foreign copyright law960; the fact that he is open to the 
suggestion that Article 5(2), Berne Convention may not constitute a choice of law rule; 
that author’s acknowledgement of the growing harmonisation of copyright laws into 
what could ultimately be a ‘supranational copyright code’(as suggested by Ginsburg);961 
956 Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law Hamburg, ‘Working 
Group on Questions of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Intellectual Property Matters’ (8 
June 2010) 
<http://www.mpipriv.de/ww/en/pub/research/research_work/international_private_law_proc
/commercial_and_competition_law/workgroup_intellectual_propert.cfm> accessed 13 July 
2012. 
957  A volume containing the conference papers was published at the start of 2005: Jürgen 
Basedow et al (eds), Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws (Mohr Siebeck 2005).  
958  Ibid. 
959   Stig Stromholm, ‘Preface’ in Jürgen Basedow et al (eds), Intellectual Property in the 
Conflict of Laws (Mohr Siebeck 2005).  
960  For example, Boosey & Hawkes Music Pubs v The Walt Disney Co, 145 F 3d 481 (2nd Cir 
1998). 
961  Jane C Ginsburg, ’International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to 
a Supranational Code’ (2000) 47 J Copyright Soc’y USA 265 (as referred to in Graeme B 
Dinwoodie, ’Conflicts and International Copyright Litigation: The Role of International 
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his analysis of how in the US, courts and scholars have sought different ways to apply a 
single law to a multinational dispute and, finally, the various devices used by the US to 
extrude US law globally e.g. the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign acts where there 
exists a ‘predicate act’ in the US that facilitates copyright infringement abroad.962  
Mireille van Eechoud – Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives 
to the Lex Protectionis (2003)963  
The central objective of this work is to determine which conflict rules are suitable for 
contemporary copyright and related rights. Van Eechoud attempts to answer that central 
question from the viewpoint of the aims of choice-of-law and of the policies that 
underlie substantive copyright and related rights law. 
In van Eechoud’s work, there is an acknowledgement that the advent of the Information 
Society has laid bare the shortcomings of the traditional territorial approach to copyright 
and related rights.964 This acknowledgement provokes a natural follow-on question: 
whether conflict rules based on a territorial view of IP are (or possibly ever were) 
adequate? And, if not, what changes should be recommended? 
Van Eechoud also makes the point that while a number of authors interpret Article 5(2), 
Berne Convention as espousing the lex protectionis,965 this is not a unanimous 
Norms’ in Jürgen Basedow et al (eds), Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws (Mohr 
Siebeck 2005).  
962  Dinwoodie lists the following rulings as examples of this jurisdictional policy: Los Angeles 
News Serv v Reuters TV Int’l Ltd, 149 F 3d 987 (9th Cir 1998) (unauthorised transmission 
and copy of work made in the US and then further transmitted to Europe and Africa); 
Update Art, Inc v Modiin Publishing, Ltd, 843 F 2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir 1988) (unauthorised 
copy of plaintiff’s poster made in the US and then further copied and distributed in Israel); 
and Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 106 F 2d 45 (2d Cir 1939) (awarding plaintiff 
profits from both US and Canadian exhibition of infringing motion picture where a copy of 
the motion picture had been made in the US and then shipped to Canada for exhibition).  
963  Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis (Information Law Series) (Kluwer Law International 2003). Mireille van 
Eechoud, ‘Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives to the Lex 
Protectionis’ (DPhil thesis, University of Amsterdam 2003). 
964   Mireille van Eechoud, Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights – Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis (Kluwer Law International 2003) 5. 
965   Mireille van Eechoud, ‘Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis’ (DPhil thesis, University of Amsterdam 2003) 107, fn 302. Van Eechoud 
lists the following authors: Cruquenaire, Hoeren and Quaedvlieg, to name but a few. 
Alexandre Cruquenaire, ‘La Loi applicable au droit d’auteur: état de la question et 
perspectives’ (2000) 3 Auteurs & Media 210, 211; Thomas Hoeren, ‘IPR und EDV–recht. 
Kollisionrechtliche Anknüpfungen bei internantionalen EDV-Verträgen’ (1993) 3 CR 129, 
131; AA Quadvlieg, ‘Een multiple personality syndrome in het IPR: de identificatie van de 
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viewpoint. Viewing the history of Article 5(2) and the difficulties that arise when it is 
regarded as a conflicts rule, van Eechoud’s argues that it should not be considered as 
reflecting the lex protectionis or any other conflict rule, for that matter.966  
*** 
auteursrechthebbende’ in SCJJ Kortmann et al, Op recht: bundel opstellen, aangeboden aan 
prof. mr. A.V.M. Struycken ter gelegenheid van zijn zilveren ambtsjubileum aan de 
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (WEJ Tjeenk Willink 1996) 255, 260.   
966   Mireille van Eechoud, ‘Choice of Law in Copyright and Related Rights. Alternatives to the 
Lex Protectionis’ (DPhil thesis, University of Amsterdam 2003) 109.  
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Appendix 2   - Referring to Chapter 6  - Analytical Steps (Dusollier 2 does not fit into 
table) 
 
Tort/infringement 
[‘NO’, ‘YES’ 
indicate whether 
committed at this 
point in space 
&time] 
Defamation, online Copyright –
Reproduction 
online  
Copyright - 
Communication by 
making available, online, 
on demand 
Step 1 
compose/copy & 
save 
Compose 
defamatory material 
& save on own 
computer 
NO 
Copy protected 
material and save 
on own computer 
YES, unless 
permitted act  
Keep protected material 
on own computer 
NO 
Step 2 
Dispatch 
Send/ upload 
NO 
Upload 
NO (not by sender, 
at least) 
Sterling 1 
Dusollier 3 YES  
Upload to P2P website in 
EMI YES, if targeted 
EMI, FAPL vBSkyB. 
 
And if new public?  
Dramatico 
Step 3 
Transmission and 
intermediary 
storage 
Storage on server 
 
NO 
3a repro in course 
of transmission to 
server 
YES subject ‘mere 
conduit’ 
3b storage on 
server YES 
3c repro in 
transmission to 
recipient, as 3a 
Sterling 2 (server) YES 
 
Dusollier 1 (server) NO 
 
 
Step 4 recipient 
takes possession 
Receives email, 
accesses web site 
but does not read/ 
comprehend NO 
Storage, ie Repro in 
recipient’s 
computer, device 
YES (primary 
liability on 
Download YES  
Sterling 3 
No  Dramatico 
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recipient) subject to 
local authorisation 
/permitted acts 
Step 5 recipient 
reads/ listens/ 
watches  
and comprehends 
content tending to 
H,R,C: YES 
Dow Jones v 
Gutnick 
Repro on 
recipient’s 
computer YES 
subject to 
temporary repro 
defence 
As for broadcasting? 
Step 5 
Immediate harm 
Immediate damage 
to reputation 
(hatred, ridicule, 
contempt) YES  
No further 
infringement; goes 
to damages 
No further infringement; 
goes to damages 
Step 6  
Consequential 
harm 
Goes to damages if 
not too remote 
 
Goes to damages if 
not too remote 
 
Goes to damages if not 
too remote 
 Defamation Copyright repro Copyright comm by 
making available 
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